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Abstract	
	
This	thesis	explores	the	impact	that	legislative	changes	have	had	on	
African	Caribbeans	competing	in	Birmingham’s	market	situations.		It	also	
assesses	the	extent	to	which	educational	and	labour	market	success	or	
failure	might	have	influenced	their	contemporary	spatial	locations.		A	
mixed	methods	approach	is	utilised	to	examine	how	the	social	class	
position,	and	spatial	patterns,	of	the	city’s	African	Caribbean	population	
have	changed	since	the	early	1980s.		The	research	provides	a	
contemporary	update	of	aspects	of	Rex	and	Tomlinson’s	(1979)	survey,	
and	also	Ratcliffe’s	(1981)	work,	which	was	conducted	in	1970s	
Handsworth.		
	
	
Despite	successive	anti-discrimination	legislation,	passed	between	1965	
and	2010,	racist	practices	in	the	education,	employment	and	housing	
markets	have	persisted.		African	Caribbean	social	and	spatial	mobility	
are	examined	in	the	context	of	social,	political	and	ideological	changes	
influencing	the	equality	agenda,	particularly	where	racial	inequality	is	
concerned.		Shifts	in	the	educational	and	labour	market	status	of	Black	
Caribbeans	are	articulated	using	Marxian,	Weberian	and	Bourdieusian	
notions	of	social	classes:	as	position,	as	situation	and	as	disposition,	
respectively.		Social	mobility	is	measured	according	to	the	progress	
African	Caribbeans	have	made	in	their	efforts	to	obtain	higher	
educational	capital,	and	the	extent	to	which	they	have	exchanged	them	
for	occupations	in	the	upper	tiers	of	the	labour	market.			
	
	
African	Caribbean	spatial	mobility	is	mapped	between	1991	and	2011	
and	the	movement	of	Birmingham’s	Black	population,	from	high	to	low	
deprivation	urban	spaces,	is	examined.		Changes	from	renting	to	
homeownership,	are	also	analysed	as	indicators	of	improvement	in	
Black	Caribbean	housing	tenure.		The	critical	race	perspective,	of	
interest	convergence,	is	used	to	argue	that	the	free	market	can	be	
appropriated	to	ameliorate	racism.		However,	it	is	also	acknowledged	
that	African	Caribbean	community	organisations,	and	those	sharing	the	
same	focal	concerns,	must	pool	their	resources	to	achieve	the	aim	of	
racial	equity.	
	
	 1	
1. African	Caribbean	social	and	spatial	mobility:	A	“race”1	analysis	
	
This	research	analyses	the	extent	to	which	legislation,	policies	and	practices	
may	have	enabled	or	constrained	the	social	class	status	and	spatial	mobility	of	
Birmingham’s	African	Caribbean2	population.		The	period	of	investigation	is	
between	1981	and	2014.		The	social	mobility	of	Black	Caribbeans	is	analysed	by	
comparing	their	progression	in	the	educational	and	labour	markets	against	
those	of	their	White	British,	and	Mixed	White	and	Black	Caribbean	(MWBC)	
peers.		Spatial	mobility	is	mapped	by	comparing	disparities	in	residential	
patterns	between	the	same	ethnic	groups	in	Birmingham’s	housing	market.		
The	aim	of	this	inquiry	is	to	assess	the	extent	to	which	legislative	and	social	
changes	might	have	improved	or	inhibited	the	life	chances	of	African	
Caribbeans,	and	to	examine	how	they	use	their	agency	to	negotiate	the	risk	of	
immediate	and	future	poverty.	
	
	
Although	previous	commentators	(Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981,	
Taylor,	1993,	Gillborn,	2005,	Andrews,	2013)	have	examined	the	community	
																																								 																				
1	Although	“race”	is	a	social	construct	and	not	a	biological	reality	(Pilkington,	2003),	racism	has	
a	tangible	impact	on	the	lives	of	Blacks	actors	who	are	pathologically	labelled	and	Othered	by	
virtue	of	their	skin	colour.		Although	the	author	may	at	times	refrain	from	using	ellipses	to	
highlight	the	problematic	meaning	of	“race”,	its	substantive	reality	is	nevertheless	
acknowledged.			
2	It	is	generally	recognised	that	in	21st	century	social	and	political	discourses,	the	nomenclature	
category	Black	is	used	in	reference	to	a	range	of	different	ethnic	groups	(Hayton	and	Paczuska,	
2000:	19).		However,	Black,	Black	Caribbean,	African	Caribbean,	Black	British	and	Black	Britons	
are	used	interchangeably	to	refer	to	peoples	of	African	heritage	–	and	in	particular	to	Britons	
of	Caribbean	descent	or	origin.		The	term	West	Indian	is	used	to	make	a	distinction	between	
Blacks	born	in	the	Caribbean	–	especially	those	who	migrated	to	Britain	in	the	post-war	years	–	
and	their	British	descendants.			
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agency,	educational	attainment,	occupational	status	and	spatial	locations	of	
African	Caribbeans	as	separate	but	related	issues,	their	collective	impact	on	
contemporary	Black	social	mobility	has	to	some	extent	been	overlooked.		
Taylor’s	(1993)	ethnographic	work	examined	the	economic	positions	of	
Birmingham’s	West	Indian	and	Jewish	communities.		However,	most	of	the	
research	data	was	gathered	during	the	1950s,	by	the	Race	Relations	Group	at	
Fircroft	College	of	Adult	Education	(Stephens,	1956).		Although	the	survey	was	
specific	to	the	situation	of	post-war	West	Indians,	it	was	undertaken	too	early	
to	include	an	examination	of	the	social	status	of	their	British	born	children.	
	
	
In	the	mid	1970s	Rex	and	Tomlinson	(1979),	and	Ratcliffe	(1981)	investigated	
the	economic	status,	educational	barriers,	and	residential	positions	of	
Birmingham’s	Caribbean	population.		Rex	and	Tomlinson	(1979:	294)	suggested	
that	discrimination	would	increase	racial	segregation	and	to	‘arrest	the	spiral	of	
racism	[…],	policies	for	a	multi-racial,	multi-cultural	society	must	be	developed’.		
They	further	argued	that	the	persistence	of	racism	would	leave	Black	
Caribbeans	with	little	choice	other	than	to	rely	on	their	community	
organisations	to	provide	education	and	other	life-changing	resources	(ibid,	
1979).		Ratcliffe’s	(1981)	interpretation	of	Rex	and	Tomlinson’s	data	examined	
the	relationship	between	ethnicity	and	gender	in	market	situations.		In	regard	
to	the	future	status	of	the	descendants	of	West	Indians,	Ratcliffe	(1981:	306)	
noted	that	‘much	will	depend	on	the	degree	of	access	which	Blacks	achieve	in	
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relation	to	crucial	commodities’3.		Ratcliffe’s	observation	is	significant	to	this	
inquiry,	particularly	where	the	commodities	of	education,	employment	and	
housing	are	concerned.		This	is	because	the	extent	to	which	legislation	may	
have	enabled	Birmingham’s	Black	Caribbeans	to	improve	their	access	to	these	
essential	resources	has	not	been	examined	in	any	detail	since	the	mid-late	
1970s.			
	
	
The	extent	to	which	equality	polices	might	constrain	or	enable	social	mobility	is	
a	key	concern	of	this	investigation.		Social	policies	have	no	universal	definition	
(Alcock,	2012).		Nevertheless,	they	can	be	perceived	as	rules	or	regulations	in	
which	‘the	role	of	the	State	in	relation	to	the	welfare	of	its	citizens	[...]	is	
concerned	with	the	correction	of	malfunctions	in	the	operation	of	society’	(Hill,	
1996:	3).		Legislation,	specifically	government	Acts,	are	perceived	in	this	thesis	
as	the	legal	instruments	that	guide	the	development	of	policies	in	the	public	
domain.		Practice	is	regarded	as	their	implementation,	by	social	institutions,	
voluntary	organisations	and	private	companies,	for	the	purpose	of	regulating	
actions.			
	
	
																																								 																				
3	Commodities	(Ratcliffe,	1981:	306)	are	perceived	in	the	Marxian	(1995,	[1867]),	sense	as	
items	of	exchange	and	use-value.		They	are	also	viewed	as	symbolic	capital,	which	is	‘simply	
the	symbols	of	power’	(Bourdieu,	1979:	84)	and	social	status.		Both	interpretations	
acknowledge	that	commodities	are	social	capital.		This	research	is	concerned	with	educational,	
labour	and	housing	market	commodities.		
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The	equalities	agenda	are	supposed	to	protect	the	rights	and	welfare	of	citizens	
by	alleviating	the	conditions	that	create	inequality	in	market	situations.		
However,	despite	appearing	to	promote	equity,	equality	policies	often	fail	to	
address	existing	social	inequalities.		This	research	assesses	the	extent	to	which	
legislation,	policies	and	practices,	implemented	to	regulate	discrimination	in	
the	public	and	private	sectors,	have	created	a	level	playing	field	for	African	
Caribbeans	competing	in	the	education,	employment	and	housing	markets.				
	
	
It	is	widely	acknowledged	that	West	Indian	immigrants	were	afflicted	by	
discriminatory	practices	and	policies	in	the	labour	and	housing	markets	of	the	
mid-twentieth	century	(Rex	and	Moore,	1967;	Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979;	
Ratcliffe,	1981;	Sivanandan,	1981;	Fryer,	1984).		Nevertheless,	it	remains	to	be	
seen	if	the	same	barriers	to	social	mobility	still	resonate	for	their	contemporary	
descendants	in	Birmingham.		Unlike	their	West	Indian	antecedents,	African	
Caribbeans	have	had	the	opportunity	to	improve	their	labour	market	status	by	
acquiring	qualifications	in	the	UK	educational	sector.		Therefore,	this	
investigation	will	examine	the	following	in	relation	to	the	social	status	of	
Birmingham’s	Caribbean	population:	
• the	barriers	that	constrain	the	agency	of	Black	community	organisations	
and	the	factors	that	enable	their	mobilisation;	
• changes	in	African	Caribbean	educational	attainment	and	occupational	
status,	and	the	extent	to	which	their	economic	positions	influence	their	
contemporary	spatial	positions;	
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• the	material	conditions	of	the	environments	in	which	Black	Caribbeans	
reside	and	the	changes	that	have	taken	place	in	their	housing	tenure;	
• the	factors	that	influence	the	pattern	of	African	Caribbean	spatial	
movement	and	urban	settlement;	
• changes	in	Black	Caribbean	class	positions	and	how	they	have	been	
influenced	by	the	implementation	of	policies	in	various	market	
situations.	
	
	
Class,	space	and	housing	as	symbolic	capital	
	
The	concept	of	class	is	crucial	to	this	investigation.		However,	it	is	somewhat	
nuanced	and	what	constitutes	a	class	is	often	debated.		Some	commentators	
suggest	that	the	concept	of	class	is	no	longer	capable	of	measuring	the	complex	
social	divisions	in	contemporary	capitalist	societies	(Giddens	in	Atkinson,	2007;	
Beck,	2007;	2013).		Others	contend	that	the	notion	is	multi-dimensional	and	
class	positions	should	also	indicate	inter-heterogeneity	and	cultural	dispositions	
(Waters,	1994;	Bottero,	2004;	Crow	and	Pope,	2008;	Crompton,	2008;	
Bourdieu,	2010	[1984]).		A	social	class	is	defined	in	this	research	as	‘occupants	
of	the	same	position	in	a	space	[…]	corresponding	to	their	[…]	material	
conditions	of	existence	[…]	and	[…]	relationally	to	other	positions,	as	being	
above	or	below	them’	(Bourdieu,	1987:	6).	This	position	also	acknowledges	
that:	i)	the	concept	of	a	social	class	is	indeed	hierarchical	and	multi-dimensional	
and;	ii)	analysing	disparities	between	occupational	classes	is	still	a	relevant	
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means	of	mapping	labour	market	inequalities	(Goldthorpe	and	Marshall,	1992;	
Smith,	2007;	Crompton,	2008;	Savage	et	al,	2013).			
	
	
This	research	also	conflates	Weberian	and	Marxian	class	perspectives	with	
Bourdieu’s	concept,	noted	above.		Weber’s	view	of	a	class	situation	(Weber	in	
Morrison,	1995)	may	seem	in	opposition	to	Marx’s	perspective	of	class	as	a	
position,	as	the	former	‘is	indicated	by	property	and	market	relations’	whilst	
the	latter	is	indicated	by	‘mobility	processes’	(Crompton,	2008:	72).		However,	
both	concepts	add	value	to	Bourdieu’s	idea	of	class	as	a	disposition	influenced	
by	cultural	and	symbolic	capital4	(Bourdieu,	2010	[1984]).		This	is	because	
market	interactions	determine	class	positions,	and	symbolic	capital	is	often	
acquired	as	a	result	of	competition	in	market	situations.			
	
	
Marx	(1995,	[1867]:	48)	contends	that	class	struggles	make	up	the	totality	of	all	
human	relations	in	society.		However,	Weber	takes	the	view	that	economic	
relations	are	not	the	basis	of	all	social	interactions.		To	Weber,	status	group	
interactions	are	distinct	from	economic	class	relations,	as	the	former	suggests	
that	individuals	act	‘as	members	of	groups	who	share	lifestyle,	habits	of	taste	
and	the	pursuit	of	social	esteem.		This	restricts	status	to	activities	related	to	
																																								 																				
4	Bourdieu	(2010,	[1984]:	225)	defines	cultural	capital	as	the	taste,	items	and	pursuits	which	
distinguishes	the	middle-classes	from	their	working-class	counterparts.		The	objects	of	
symbolic	power	relevant	to	this	research	are:	higher	education	qualifications;	occupations	in	
the	professional	and	managerial	classes;	and	home	ownership	–	particularly	owner	occupier	
status	in	environments	recording	low	levels	of	material	deprivation.		
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patterns	of	consumption’	(Morrison,	1995:	239).	The	nexus	between	taste	and	
lifestyle,	articulated	by	Weber	above,	is	also	a	feature	of	the	Bourdieusian	
concept	of	a	social	class5	(Bourdieu,	2010	[1984]).		This	is	because	success	or	
failure	in	market	situations	can	inform	disparities	in	lifestyles,	whereas	taste	
and	differences	in	patterns	of	consumption	are	inextricably	linked	to	status,	
and	also	to	the	Marxian	notion	of	economic	behaviour	and	class	conflict.		Thus,	
class	positions,	social	status,	patterns	of	consumption	and	taste,	are	to	a	great	
extent	acquired	by	competing	for	lifestyle	resources	in	market	situations.		
	
	
The	Weberian	class	perspective	also	suggests	that	market	situations	are	the	
‘great	means	by	which	life-chances	are	dispensed	in	a	modern	urban-industrial	
society’	(Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979:	24).		This	is	demonstrated	in	the	educational	
sector	where	qualifications	tend	to	inform	occupational	positions	and	
disparities	in	income.		Moreover,	home	ownership	can	also	influence	class	
positions,	as	‘differential	control	of	property	produces	different	market	
situations,	and	these	market	situations	are	[…]	class	situations’	(ibid,	1979:	3).		
Rex	and	Moore	(1967)	viewed	ethnic	competition	for	accommodation	in	
Birmingham	in	the	context	of	a	Weberian	struggle	between	housing	classes.		
																																								 																				
5	The	notions	of	field	and	habitus	are	central	components	of	Bourdieu’s	understanding	of	class	
dispositions.		Crossley	(2001:	83)	defines	Bourdieu’s	concept	of	habitus	as	‘an	active	residue	or	
segment	of	[an	agent’s]	past	that	functions	within	his	[sic]	present,	shaping	[…]	perception,	
thought	[…]	action	and	[…]	molding	social	practice	in	a	regular	way’.		The	Field	constitutes	the	
various	social	spaces	in	which	the	habitus	operates	and	is	reproduced.		They	are	‘constituted	
through	competitive	exchanges	of	the	various	resources,	or	goods	that	are	deemed	valuable	
within	them,	and	their	shape	is	that	of	the	distribution	of	those	goods’	(ibid,	2001:	86).		As	
such,	this	inquiry	takes	the	stance	that	the	habitus	of	the	middle-classes	are	reinforced	in	the	
fields	of	education,	employment	and	certain	sections	of	the	housing	market.		These	markets	
produce	items	of	consumption	via	competition,	which	contribute	to	disparities	in	lifestyles	and	
taste.		
	 8	
They	revealed	that	the	housing	tenure	of	West	Indian	migrants	was	mainly	
constrained	within	the	rental	market.		However,	Ratcliffe	(2004:	65)	noted	that	
their	British	born	descendants	were	still	‘more	likely	than	the	general	
population	to	rent	their	property’.		As	Black	Caribbean	spatial	positions	have	
also	been	concentrated	in	some	of	the	most	deprived	urban	areas	in	
Birmingham	(Rex	and	Moore,	1967;	Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981;	
Taylor,	1993),	the	factors	constraining	and	enabling	their	spatial	movements	
are	important	to	this	investigation.		Increasing	levels	of	home	ownership,	over	
rental	tenure,	might	indicate	improvements	in	their	social	status.		This	is	
especially	where	African	Caribbean	settlement	in	low	deprivation	urban	spaces	
is	concerned.	
	
	
The	urban	settlement	patterns	of	post-war	West	Indian	migrants	were	to	some	
extent	constrained	by	racism	and	low	social	capital,	whilst	enabled	by	labour	
shortages	in	specific	industrial	sectors	(Rex	and	Moore,	1967:	100;	Rex	and	
Tomlinson,	1979:	88;	Phizacklea	and	Miles,	1980:	46;	Ratcliffe,	1981:	182;	
Pilkington,	2003:	110).		Moreover,	their	settlement	‘appears	to	have	filled	a	
vacuum	rather	than	created	a	space’	(Peach,	1968:	71).		West	Indians	were	a	
replacement	population,	occupying	deprived	inner-city	areas	vacated	by	the	
outward	movement	of	White	labour	(ibid,	1968:	70-71).		Moreover,	not	only	
did	they	‘move	to	areas	[…]	which	the	White	population	has	been	abandoning,	
but	[…]	their	arrival	may	accelerate	White	withdrawal’	(ibid,	1968:	90).			
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The	inner-city	regions	of	major	British	cities,	such	as	Birmingham	and	London,	
absorbed	the	bulk	of	West	Indian	settlement	(Peach,	1968:	xv;	Phizacklea	and	
Miles,	1980:	55).		Rex	and	Moore	(1967:	20)	refers	to	the	urban	spaces	in	which	
Black	communities	developed	as	‘“twilight	zones”,	that	is	areas	where	large,	old	
houses,	too	good	to	be	classified	as	slums,	had	become	multi-occupied	lodging	
houses’.		To	Burgess	twilight	zones	are	‘Bad	Lands’	6	(2008,	[1925]:	75	[emphasis	
added]).		They	are	effectively	urban	areas	of	high	deprivation	and	poverty.		The	
post-war	Bad	Lands	of	Birmingham	were	ostensibly	populated	by	a	diverse	
array	of	minority	ethnic	groups,	which	included	West	Indian	migrants.		In	
contrast	to	the	Bad	Lands	of	the	city,	Burgess	(2008,	[1925])	classifies	desirable	
suburbs	as	Promised	Lands,	because	they	are	the	aspirational	destinations	of	
immigrants.		This	thesis	uses	the	terms	Promised	Lands	and	Good	Lands	
interchangeably	in	reference	to	the	more	affluent	areas	of	Birmingham.		
However,	the	author	of	this	investigation	also	acknowledges	that	what	
constitutes	Goods	and	Bads,	particularly	in	relation	to	housing	and	location,	is	
not	a	polarised	dichotomy	and	is	often	subjective.		There	are	various	gradients	
between	what	is	generally	considered	Good	or	Bad.		
	
	
Caribbean	migration	declined	following	the	1971	Immigration	Act	(Rex	and	
Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981;	2004;	Solomos,	2003).		However,	for	almost	
																																								 																				
6	The	term	Bad	Lands	is	not	used	as	a	reference	to	areas	defined	by	their	levels	of	deviance.		
The	expression	is	utilised	to	distinguish	between	urban	spaces	according	to	differences	in	
material	deprivation.		The	notion	of	Bad	Lands	as	cultural	Heart	Lands	is	also	discussed	much	
later	in	this	thesis.			
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seventy	years7	the	housing	situation	of	West	Indians,	and	their	British	born	
descendants,	has	been	a	continual	source	of	social	tension	–	and	a	focal	point	
of	political	concern	(Rex	and	Moore,	1967;	Peach,	1968;	Rex	and	Tomlinson,	
1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981;	Fryer,	1984;	Carter,	Harris	and	Joshi,	1987;	Taylor,	1993;	
Solomos,	2003).		If	racism	has	ameliorated	over	time,	then	African	Caribbean	
spatial	movements,	from	the	high	deprivation	Bad	Lands	to	the	low	deprivation	
‘Promised	Lands’	(Burgess,	2008	[1925]:	75	[emphasis	added])	might	be	more	
pronounced.		However,	it	might	be	the	case	that	the	persistence	of	
discriminatory	policies	and	practices,	continue	to	disadvantage	them	and	
constrain	their	spatial	mobility.		It	is	also	possible	that	African	Caribbeans	may,	
for	various	reasons,	choose	to	reside	in	particular	urban	locations	regardless	of	
improvements	in	their	class	status.		Thus,	it	remains	to	be	seen	if	the	majority	
of	African	Caribbeans	in	Birmingham	continue	to	reside	in	high	deprivation	Bad	
Lands	and	if	so	why?		This	inquiry	will	map	the	contemporary	settlement	
patterns	of	African	Caribbeans	in	Birmingham.		It	will	also	examine	the	factors	
that	influence	their	spatial	transitions	and	competition	in	the	housing	market	
	
	
Ethnic	class	[ifications]	
	
The	term	African	Caribbean	(or	Black	Caribbean)	was	first	used	in	the	1991	
Census	to	describe	Black	British	subjects	of	Caribbean	origin	or	parentage	
(Ratcliffe,	2004);	it	is	an	ethnic	group	identity.		The	concept	of	an	ethnic	group	
																																								 																				
7	Fryer	(1984)	maintains	that	African	settlement	in	the	UK	can	be	traced	back	to	the	Roman	
conquest	of	Britain.	
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is	in	some	ways	similar	to	that	of	a	social	class.		A	reason	being	is	that	there	is	
no	universal	definition	that	adequately	describes	what	constitutes	an	ethnic	
group	(Ratcliffe,	2013:	304).		Ethnic	identities	are	transitory,	situational	and	
contingent	upon	shifting	spatial	and	temporal	contexts	(Fenton,	2010:	7).		They	
are	constructed	by	‘the	interaction	between	individuals	as	socialised	members	
of	various	collectivities	and	the	circumstances	of	time	and	geographical	space’	
(Banton,	2011:	199).		As	such,	ethnicity	can	also	be	thought	of	as	transitional	
ideas	about	perception	of	Self	and	significant	Others	that	are	at	times	
primordial,	situational,	diasporic	and	culturally	hybrid	(Ratcliffe,	2004:	28-29).			
	
	
Implicit	within	the	concept	of	an	ethnic	group	are	ideas	of	culture,	which	is	
often	thought	of	as	being	synonymous	with	‘difference	[…]	constituted	from	
the	“inside”	[…],	but	also	from	the	outside’	(Modood,	2013:	38).		As	such,	
notions	of	culture,	ethnicity	and	skin	colour	are	intrinsically	linked	and	signify	
Otherness.		In	the	context	of	twenty-first	century	social	and	political	discourses,	
the	application	of	ethnicity	as	a	social	label	can	also	be	an	‘ideological	
minefield’	(Ratcliffe,	1981:	58),	as	categories,	such	as	African	Caribbean	and	
White	British,	reify	notions	of	both	cultural	and	racial	differences.		The	
intersectionality	(Crenshaw,	1991)	between	ethnicity	and	culture	are	socially	
constructed	in	relation	to	‘the	ways	in	which	we	perceive	and	know	our	social	
world	and	the	theories	concerning	what	“exists”’	(May,	2001:	22).		Therefore,	
ethnic	group	identities	have	to	be	understood	in	terms	of	their	nuanced	power	
relations,	ideological	construction	and	ascription.			
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In	this	inquiry	Weber’s	class	concept	of	a	status	group,	and	Bourdieu’s	
understanding	of	a	class	as	a	collectivity	sharing	cultural	and	common	interests	
in	an	arena	of	shared	social	interactions8	(see	also	Fenton,	2010:	91),	underpins	
the	idea	of	an	ethnic	group.		Moreover,	social	classes	and	ethnic	groups	both	
have	memberships,	which	are	‘identified	by	others	as	constituting	a	category	
distinguishable	from	other	categories	of	the	same	order’	(ibid,	2010:	91).		
However,	a	significant	departure	of	the	concept	of	ethnicity	from	a	social	class	
is	that	the	former	is	often	signified	by	skin	colour	(Miles,	1990:	56;	Ballard,	
1996:	3;	Ratcliffe,	2013:	305).			
	
	
Postmodern	theorists	(Rattansi	and	Westwood;	Malik	in	Ratcliffe,	2013:	307)	
suggest	that	ethnicity	is	an	essentialist	concept	and	more	regard	should	be	paid	
to	ideas	of	diversity	over	those	of	difference.		Nevertheless,	post-structuralism	
overlooks	the	macro	and	micro	duality	of	ethnic	categories	as	both	political	
ascriptions	and	social	identities,	which	are	accepted	and	valorised	by	actors	in	
the	public	sphere.		In	addition,	social	class	and	ethnic	group	identities	also	
relate	‘to	belonging	and	the	perception	of	common	interests’,	(ibid,	2013:	307	
[emphasis	in	original])	which	inform	social	actions.		Thus,	it	is	both	the	political	
and	social	meanings	of	ethnicity	that	are	significant	to	this	investigation.		
																																								 																				
8	Both	Weber	and	Bourdieu’s	social	class	concepts	have	been	outlined	above.	
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Although	ethnic	categories	are	social	constructions,	they	have	the	power	to	
reify	hierarchical	notions	of	“race”.			
	
	
This	thesis	also	recognises	the	subjective	meaning	of	ethnicity,	in	terms	of	how	
ethnic	identities	can	empower	social	actors.		Although	ethnicity	is	a	political	
and	heuristic	tool	claiming	to	represent	a	particular	‘slicing	of	the	social	world’	
(ibid,	2013:	307),	it	can	also	be	self-imposed	and	analytically	conceived	‘as	part	
of	a	process	of	ethnic	mobilisation’	and	agency	(ibid,	2013:	305).		The	use	of	
ethnic	categories	in	this	research	reflects	‘the	complex	dialectical	relationship	
between	various	forms	and	levels	of	agency’	(Ratcliffe,	2004:	34)	whilst	seeking	
to	avoid	the	type	of	zeitgeist	reductionism,	which	overlooks	how	the	past	
continues	to	shape	the	present	and	the	future.		Moreover,	the	main	reason	
that	socially	constructed	categories	are	necessary	to	the	aims	of	this	research	is	
because,	‘those	wishing	to	make	sense	of	contemporary	social	relationships	
and	structures	of	inequality	have	to	resort	to	some	form	of	descriptive	
categories’	(ibid,	2004:	34),	in	order	to	map	disparities	between	and	within	
social	groups.	
	
	
Racial	stratification	in	the	here	and	now	
	
‘Class	is	vitally	important,	[but]	it	is	not	the	whole	story’	(interview	
with	David	Gillborn,	19th	June	2013).		
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Gillborn’s	observation	above	is	of	particular	importance	to	this	research,	as	
class	disparities	cannot	be	examined	outside	of	ethnic	inequalities.		Despite	
most	areas	of	British	society	being	stratified	by	racial	divisions,	the	idea	that	we	
now	live	in	a	post-race9	society	has	gained	increasing	significance	in	
contemporary	sociological	thought	(see	Dwyer	and	Bressey,	2008;	Lazarus,	
2011;	D’Souza	in	Ikuenobe,	2013).		Post-race	theories	promote	the	view	that	‘in	
contrast	to	the	“colour	line”	that	defined	the	20th	century,	the	embodiment	of	
“race”	through	skin	colour	is	no	longer	an	impediment	to	educational	and	
economic	opportunities’	(Mirza,	2015:	1)10.		As	a	consequence,	“race”	research	
is	generally	deemed	to	be	of	little	social	or	political	significance.			
	
	
The	current	political	agenda	promotes	the	idea	of	colour-blindness11.		This	
position	reduces	the	significance	of	racial	inequality,	whilst	focusing	on	
integration,	community	cohesion	and	the	single	equality	regime	(Richardson	
and	Munro,	2012),	in	which	the	nine	protected	characteristics	of	the	Equality	
Act	2010	(HM	Government,	2010)	are	central.		The	equality	agenda,	which	was	
																																								 																				
9	The	stance	taken	in	this	investigation	is	that	post-race	theories	tend	to	reduce	the	debilitating	
impact	of	racism	and	racial	inequality.		Post,	as	a	prefix	to	“race”,	suggests	that	racial	
discrimination	no	longer	exists.		Therefore,	race	inequity	is	generally	viewed	as	having	no	more	
significance	than	other	inequalities	outlined	in	the	Equality	Act	2010	(EA2010).		However,	post-
race	positions	overlook	the	ways	in	which	institutional	racism	(Macpherson,	1999)	and	racist	
practices	are	normalised	in	contemporary	society,	and	continue	to	block	the	life-chances	and	
opportunities	of	individuals.			
10	Mirza	(2015)	acknowledges	the	zeitgeist	obfuscating	claims	of	post-race	perspectives.	
11	This	was	a	policy	position	adopted	by	John	Major,	who	contended	that	policies	which	
favoured	a	particular	ethnic	group	created,	rather	than	reduced,	conflict	(Gillborn,	2008a).		The	
stance	taken	in	this	research	is	that	the	present	Conservative	government,	like	the	previous	
Thatcher	and	Major	regimes,	continue	to	ignore	the	perpetuity	of	racial	disadvantage	and	its	
debilitating	impact	on	life-chances	and	opportunities.	
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previously	the	responsibility	of	the	Commission	for	Racial	Equality	(CRE),	now	
falls	within	the	remit	of	the	Equality	and	Human	Rights	Commission	(CRE,	
2007a:	59;	Bloch,	Neal	and	Solomos,	2013:	5).		There	is	now	a	much	wider	
equality	agenda	than	that	which	was	first	imposed	under	Paragraphs	2.43-2.51	
of	the	Race	Relations	Act	1976	(CRE,	2007a;	59).		However,	despite	wider	social	
tolerance,	where	difference	and	diversity	are	concerned,	racism	continues	to	
reduce	life	chances	and	opportunities.		Moreover,	racial	disadvantage	and	class	
inequalities	often	intersect	and	the	examination	of	one	position	necessitates	
the	consideration	of	the	other.		This	is	especially	the	case	where	the	social	and	
material	situations	of	African	Caribbeans	are	concerned			
	
	
The	term	post-race	suggests	that	equality	legislation	has	successfully	
neutralised	inequity	in	the	public	domain,	and	individuals	can	compete	for	
resources	in	market	situations	on	equal	terms.		However,	the	position	taken	in	
this	research	is	that	the	idea	of	a	post-race	society	is	aspirational,	but	
nevertheless	a	myth.		A	key	reason	being	is	that	‘the	effects	of	racial	division	
continue	to	have	a	profound	impact	on	society	and	politics’	(Lentin,	2008:	91),	
and	individuals	still	experience	social	inequalities	through	the	lens	of	their	
“race”.		The	racialised	experiences	of	the	generation	who	first	entered	the	
British	educational	system,	en	masse	in	the	1960s,	is	defined	in	this	thesis	as	
past-race.		This	is	because	they	were	educated	during	a	period	when	racism	
was	acknowledged	as	a	persisting	and	debilitating	issue	(Troyna,	1992)	and	
their	experiences	of	racism	were	overt,	direct	and	to	a	great	extent	
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unprotected	by	legislation	such	as	the	1968	and	1976	Race	Relations	Acts.		In	
comparison,	their	contemporaries	supposedly	live	in	a	post-race	society.		
“Race”	is	no	longer	considered	to	be	as	problematic	and	socially	divisive	as	it	
was	in	the	1970s.		This	is	despite	the	persistence	of	exclusionary	practices	in	
Britain’s	major	social	institutions	which	privilege	Whites	whilst	disadvantaging	
Blacks	(Gillborn,	2005;	2014).		Racial	inequality	is	now	viewed	as	one	out	of	
nine	politically	recognised	inequalities	within	the	current	equality	agenda	(HM	
Government,	2010).		Thus,	a	major	aim	of	this	research	is	to	determine	if	
legislation	has	substantively	reduced	racial	discrimination	in	market	situations	
for	African	Caribbeans	in	Birmingham,	to	the	extent	where	we	can	now	speak	
of	a	post-race	society	in	a	meaningful	way.	
	
	
Goods,	Bads	and	negotiating	risk	
	
Analysing	changes	in	class	positions	also	necessitates	an	examination	of	how	
African	Caribbeans	negotiate	risk	to	reduce	the	likelihood	of	poverty.		The	idea	
of	risk	in	the	current	neo-liberal12	political	climate	contends	that	its	
management	is	the	responsibility	of	individual	decision-making	‘and	validates	
the	market	as	the	primary	mechanism	whereby	individuals	secure	personal	
security	and	well-being’	(Brodie	in	Beck,	2007:	685).		In	the	context	of	
																																								 																				
12	Neo-liberalism	is	a	way	of	organising	capitalism.		It	is	based	on	the	principles	of	a	small	State	
and	the	absolute	belief	that	free	markets	enable	individual	freedom	and	liberty	by	increasing	
choice	and	competition	(see	Sivanandan,	2013).		Consequently,	the	reduction	of	the	role	of	the	
State	is	supplemented	by	the	view	that	commodities	have	to	be	acquired	via	competition	in	
various	markets.	
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contemporary	Britain,	‘the	means	of	life	is	mediated	through	the	market’	
(Curran,	2013:	57)	and	the	concept	of	risk	is	associated	with	wealth	differentials	
and	the	acquisition	of	commodities	perceived	as	Goods	and	Bads	(ibid	2013:	
45)13.		Within	the	context	of	this	research,	Goods	and	Bads	are	considered	in	
terms	of	how	acquiring	particular	forms	of	capital	and	life-changing	resources	
reduces	the	risk	of	immediate	and	future	poverty.		The	notion	of	Good	and	Bad	
education	and	occupations	can	be	subjective.		Nevertheless,	this	research	
makes	a	distinction	between	educational	Goods,	i.e.	higher	education	
qualifications	and	labour	market	Goods,	which	are	high-income	professional	
occupations.		Educational	Bads	are	perceived	as	qualifications	with	little	
economic	value,	and	economic	Bads	are	low-income,	short-term	occupations.		
Thus,	intra	and	inter,	ethnic	and	class,	differences	can	be	measured	according	
to	differentials	in	Goods	and	Bads	between	their	members.		Improvements	in	
social	status	are	achieved	by	obtaining	Goods,	whilst	reducing	the	risk	of	
acquiring	Bads.			
	
	
Ascertaining	the	age-stage	at	which	Good	commodities	are	acquired	is	also	an	
important	aspect	of	measuring	and	mapping	social	and	spatial	mobility.		For	
example,	GCSEs	should	be	acquired	at	16;	A-levels	at	18,	university	degrees	by	
21	–	at	the	earliest	–	and	labour	market	participation	should	commence	by	the	
time	an	individual	is	24.		Goods,	in	the	form	of	educational	capital	(Bourdieu,	
2010	[1984])	are	the	highest	achievable	grades	at	different	levels	of	study.		
																																								 																				
13	Good	Lands	and	Bad	Lands	have	been	articulated	earlier.				
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Good	GCSEs	can	be	exchanged	for	places	on	A-level	programmes	leading	to	
university.		Good	higher	educational	qualifications	are	subsequently	exchanged	
for	Good	economic	capital;	i.e.	employment	in	well-paid	occupations.		
However,	if	educational	Goods	are	not	acquired	at	the	appropriate	age-stage	
then	individuals	enter	the	labour	market	much	later	and	often	have	less	
economic	value	to	employers.		Consequently,	time	spent	outside	of	the	labour	
market,	whilst	individuals	are	at	the	appropriate	age-stage,	can	have	a	
detrimental	impact	on	capital	accumulation.		It	can	also	influence	where	
individuals	live	and	the	type	of	housing	tenure	they	acquire	at	different	life-
stages.			
	
	
This	research	views	occupations	in	the	upper-tiers	of	the	National	Statistics	
Socio-Economic	Classification	(NS-SEC)	Table,	as	the	labour	market	Goods	that	
drive	social	mobility.		The	professions	in	the	NS-SEC	Classes	1	and	2	are	
generally	perceived	as	reliable	indicators	of	social	class	status.		They	tend	to	
reduce	the	risk	of	immediate	and	future	poverty	by	providing	individuals	with	
above	average	remuneration,	and	greater	financial	security	than	unskilled	Bad	
jobs	in	the	lower-tier	NS-SEC	occupations.		As	noted	above,	educational	Bads	
are	qualifications	that	do	not	allow	either	direct	or	indirect	access	to	higher	
education	and	cannot	be	exchanged	for	economic	capital	(Bourdieu,	2010	
[1984]).		
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Although	spatial	location	and	housing	tenure	can	be	a	matter	of	Individual	
preference,	where	and	how	people	live	can	be	influenced	by	Good	and	Bad	
qualifications	and	employment.		Weber	argues	that	‘the	market	distributes	life	
chances	according	to	the	resources	that	individuals	bring	to	it	[and]	assets	only	
have	value	in	the	context	of	a	market:	hence,	class	situation	is	identified	with	
market	situation’	(Breen,	2004:	1-2).		This	understanding	of	the	relationship	
between	market	situations,	social	class	status	and	life-chances	is	suggestive	of	a	
hegemonic	struggle.		It	is	within	this	context	that	housing	commodities	gain	
increasing	significance,	as	they	are	often	the	means	by	which	security	is	
obtained	and	the	risk	of	generational	poverty	reduced.		This	inquiry	will	
investigate	the	extent	to	which	Black	Caribbean	settlement	patterns	have	
changed	since	1991.		This	is	both	in	terms	of	their	contemporary	locations,	and	
how	risk	is	reduced	or	increased	by	the	different	types	of	housing	tenure	they	
obtain.			
	
	
Competition	in	the	educational,	labour	and	housing	markets	is	perceived	by	this	
research	as	the	process	by	which	Goods	are	acquired	to	obtain	upward	social	
mobility	and	reduce	the	likelihood	of	poverty.		The	market	is	now	the	mediator	
in	which	opportunities	to	become	socially	mobile	are	contested	and	
consequently	denied	to	those	with	the	least	amount	of	capital	(Sivanandan,	
2013).		Thus,	success	in	the	competition	for	resources	can	ultimately	make	
‘individual	and	generational	mobility	easy	and	typical’	(Weber	in	Smith,	2007:	
87)	by	increasing	one’s	life-chances	and	opportunities.		Nevertheless,	ethnic	
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competition	for	Goods	in	market	situations	is	not	a	straight	forward	process.		As	
such,	the	extent	to	which	social	policies	mediate	fairness	within	contemporary	
markets	is	also	a	concern	of	this	inquiry.			
	
	
Migration	and	discrimination	
	
Unlike	their	White	European	migrant	predecessors,	West	Indians	encountered	
different	problems	regarding	integration	(Rex	and	Moore,	1967:	109-110;	
Phizacklea	and	Miles,	1980:	57;).		Their	skin	colour	meant	they	were	a	highly	
visible	minority	and	were	unable	to	blend	into	British	society	in	the	same	way	
that	European	migrants	were	able	to	(Allen,	1971;	Taylor,	1993).		In	the	late	
19th	and	early	20th	centuries,	discrimination	against	Irish	and	Jewish	migrants	
was	based	on	perceived	religious	and	racial	differences	(Allen,	1971:	57;	Taylor,	
1993:	17;	Mason,	2000:	20;	Douglas,	2002:	43).		Although	they	were	socially	
constructed	as	racial	Others	(Allen,	1971;	Douglas,	2002),	their	skin	colour	was	
a	significant	factor	in	their	subsequent	integration.		However,	post-war	
immigration	introduced	a	new	dimension	that	was	absent	from	previous	labour	
flows:	skin	colour	as	a	signifier	of	both	cultural	and	racial	Otherness	(Phizacklea	
and	Miles,	1980:	44).		
	
	
In	the	immediate	post-war	years,	West	Indian	entry	and	UK	citizenship	were	to	
some	extent	facilitated	by	the	1948	British	Nationality	Act.		The	post-war	
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economy	required	a	surplus	workforce,	and	the	Act	was	instrumental	in	
appropriating	the	labour	of	Britain’s	New	Commonwealth	subjects.		However,	
successive	Immigration	Acts	after	1962	regulated	and	reduced	the	flow	of	
migrant	labour	from	the	Caribbean	(Rex	and	Moore,	1967;	Rex	and	Tomlinson,	
1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981;	Fryer,	1984;	Heath	and	Cheung,	2007).		Immigration	Acts	
were	followed	by	race	equality	legislation,	the	first	of	which	was	the	1965	Race	
Relations	Act	(Ratcliffe,	2004:	148).		Although	the	aim	of	successive	race	
relations	legislation	has	been	to	mediate	racial	equity	in	relationships	between	
Britain’s	White	majority	and	the	nation’s	minority	ethnic	groups,	the	extent	to	
which	this	aim	has	been	achieved	is	debateable	(ibid,	2004).		
	
	
The	post-war	occupational	positions	of	West	Indians	were	to	a	great	extent	
determined	by	their	skin	colour	(Peach,	1968).		Regardless	of	the	employment	
skills	acquired	in	their	native	Caribbean	islands	(Roberts	and	Mills,	1955;	Rex	
and	Moore,	1967:	109),	West	Indian	labour	was	generally	consigned	to	menial	
occupations	in	Britain’s	declining	manufacturing	and	production	industries	
(Fryer,	1984:	374).		The	early	Race	Relations	Acts	did	little	to	reduce	racial	
discrimination	in	the	public	and	private	sectors	(Ratcliffe,	2004).		Private	
landlords	routinely	discriminated	against	West	Indians	(Sivanandan,	1981:	112;	
CRE,	1990:	5;	CRE,	2007b:	1),	as	did	their	employers	and	White	competitors	in	
the	labour	market.		Moreover,	the	colour	bar	(Gunter,	1954;	Stephens,	1956;	
Taylor,	1993)	also	confined	West	Indian	labour	to	low-paid	“bad	occupations”	
(Sivanandan,	1981:	113	[emphasis	in	original]).			
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West	Indians	were	expected	to	take	night	shifts,	denied	overtime	and	
constantly	overlooked	for	promotion	(Fryer,	1984:	374).		Racist	employment	
policies	and	practices	often	meant	that	they	were	used	as	a	reserve	army	of	
labour	(Castles	and	Kosack,	1973).		West	Indians	were	generally	employed	in	
areas	where	White	labour	was	unavailable,	and	were	more	inclined	to	
experience	redundancy	than	their	White	peers	(Gunter,	1954;	Stephens,	1956;	
Fryer,	1984;	Taylor,	1993;	Solomos,	2003).		Against	this	historical	backdrop	of	
discrimination,	this	research	will	establish	the	extent	to	which	the	occupational	
positions	of	African	Caribbeans	have	changed.		It	will	also	assess	if	African	
Caribbeans	are	now	accessing	the	skilled	occupations	that	were	previously	
denied	to	their	West	Indian	antecedents.			
	
	
Community	and	agency	
	
Animosity	against	post-war	Caribbean	migrants	culminated	in	racial	conflict	on	
the	streets	of	Britain.		Following	the	Notting	Hill	and	Nottingham	‘race	riots’	of	
1958	(Fryer,	1984:	376;	Ratcliffe,	2012:	7)	West	Indian	reaction	to	racism	
increasingly	took	the	form	of	political	mobilisation.		Sivanandan	(1981:	118)	
notes	that	at	the	time	‘the	two	most	popular	organisations	were	the	Co-
ordinating	Committee	Against	Racial	Discrimination	(CCARD)	in	Birmingham,	
and	the	Conference	of	Afro-Asian-Caribbean	Organisations	(CAACO)	in	London’.		
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Other	organisations	such	as	The	British	West	Indian	Association	(BWIA),	The	
West	Indian	Standing	Conference	(WISC),	and	the	more	militant	Racial	Action	
Adjustment	Society	(RAAS),	mobilised	to	combat	racial	discrimination	and	
violence	against	Blacks	(ibid,	1981).		The	agency	of	these	groups	was	a	political	
response	to	racist	organisations	such	as	the	Smethwick	based	Racial	
Preservation	Society	(Midland	News,	1965:	1)14,	which	viewed	the	presence	of	
immigrants	as	a	threat	to	the	British	way	of	life.			
	
	
Political	gains	against	discrimination,	in	labour	and	housing	market	situations,	
were	contested	from	the	bottom	up	(Sivanandan,	1981).		The	social	and	
political	struggles	and	campaigns	of	immigrant	community	organisations	were	
instrumental	in	influencing	legislative	changes	(Fryer,	1984:	385).		The	first	anti-
discriminatory	legislation	was	the	1965	Race	Relations	Act	(RRA1965)	(Ratcliffe,	
2004)	and	subsequent	Acts	were	implemented	with	the	supposed	aim	of	
reducing	discrimination	and	promoting	equality	of	opportunity.		However,	
reducing	the	adverse	effects	of	discriminatory	practices	in	the	education,	
employment	and	housing	sectors	has	never	been	of	major	concern	to	
successive	governments	(Ratcliffe,	1981:	286;	Solomos,	2003:	79;	Pilkington,	
2003:	164).		Solomos	(2003:	106)	has	revealed	that	while	some	government	
policies	have	been	successful	in	reducing	direct	forms	of	discrimination,	they	
have	had	little	impact	on	alleviating	discriminatory	practices	in	market	
situations.		Thus,	as	political	activism	in	the	Black	community	has	played	an	
																																								 																				
14	Birmingham	City	Council	Library	Services.	
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important	role	in	combatting	discrimination	and	disadvantage,	this	research	
will	analyse	the	contemporary	agency	of	a	few	Black	community	organisations.		
It	will	also	examine	the	barriers	those	community	organisations	experience	in	
their	efforts	to	obtain	life-changing	Goods	for	African	Caribbeans.	
	
	
Education	and	exclusion	
	
Education	is	a	vehicle	of	upward	social	mobility	and	is	generally	accepted	as	the	
building	block	of	economic	success	and	financial	security.		Entry	to	the	
professions	of	the	middle-classes	also	requires	evidence	of	attainment	in	higher	
education.		However,	historically,	the	educational	market	has	been	a	site	of	
exclusionary	practices,	in	which	Black	pupils	have	encountered	significant	
discrimination.		During	the	1960s,	the	education	sector	was	used	as	a	vehicle	to	
embed	policies	aimed	at	assimilating	the	children	of	West	immigrants	into	the	
perceived	norms	of	British	culture	(Coard,	1971;	Carby,	1982;	Mirza,	2007).		
	
	
Political	ideologies	influencing	educational	policies	shifted	from	assimilation	to	
integration	and	multi-culturalism	in	the	1970s	(Troyna,	1992;	Mirza,	2007).		This	
was	followed	by	the	Conservative	Government’s	1988	Education	Reform	Act,	
under	which	free	market	educational	policies	reduced	State	intervention	and	
undermined	the	political	focus	on	racial	inequalities	(Troyna	and	Carrington,	
1990).		After	1997,	education	policies	focussed	on	ideas	of	social	inclusion	
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under	New	Labour	(Gillborn,	2008a).		However,	since	2010	the	focus	on	
educational	inequity	has	been	steadily	eroded	by	the	neo-liberal	austerity	
policies	of	the	Coalition	and	Conservative	Governments.		Nevertheless,	despite	
successive	ideological	shifts	in	education	policies,	a	constant	theme	has	been	
the	failure	of	the	education	system	where	the	learning	of	Black	Caribbean	
children	is	concerned	(Plowden,	1967:	193:	32;	Carby	1982:	198;	Modood,	
1997:	144;	Mamon,	2004:	79;	Gillborn,	2005:	494;	Strand,	2008:	19;	Amin	et	al.,	
2011:	34).	
	
	
Although	the	Equality	Act	2010	classifies	disability	as	a	contemporary	
inequality,	it	is	not	a	major	concern	of	this	investigation.		However,	some	of	
those	who	participated	in	this	research	and	are	identified	by	pseudonyms	have	
more	recently	been	diagnosed	with	dyslexia15.		In	the	context	of	this	research,	
disability	is	only	examined	in	terms	of	how	it	mediated	the	subjects’	
educational	experiences.		It	may	well	have	been	the	case	that	under	the	
assimilation	policies	of	the	1960s,	a	few	Black	children	–	perceived	as	being	
educationally	subnormal	–	may	have	had	hidden	cognitive	disabilities,	but	there	
is	no	way	of	knowing	with	any	certainty.		However,	in	the	1960s	and	1970,	the	
comparatively	poor	literacy	acquisition	of	some	African	Caribbeans	reinforced	
the	notion	that	‘Black	children	on	average	have	lower	IQs	than	White	children’	
																																								 																				
15	See	Appendix	i.:	Table	1.1.		Dyslexia	is	a	reading	disability	(Nosek,	1997:	4).		It	is	a	lifelong	
hidden	condition	that	sufferers	are	born	with.		Although	dyslexics	tend	to	have	average,	or	
above	average,	intelligence	they	are	often	taught	to	read	using	specific	techniques	and	
learning	strategies.		Famous	dyslexics	include	Winston	Churchill,	Richard	Branson,	Leonardo	Da	
Vinci,	Michelangelo,	Hans	Christian	Anderson,	Lewis	Carroll,	William	Butler	Yeats	and	Thomas	
Edison	(ibid,	1997:	3).	
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(Coard,	1971:	19).		Where	cultural	deficiency	was	viewed	as	the	explanatory	
factor	of	Black	children’s	relatively	low	educational	attainment,	White	children	
who	may	have	had	similar	cognitive	impairments	were	seen	by	teachers	as	slow	
–	rather	than	deficient	–	learners	(ibid,	1971).		
	
	
The	issue	of	learning	disabilities	has	gained	increasing	significance	since	the	
implementation	of	the	Disability	Discrimination	Act	1995	(Ratcliffe,	2015)	and	
the	Special	Education	Needs	and	Disability	Act	(SENDA)	2001	(HM	Government,	
2001).		All	educational	institutions	now	have	a	statutory	duty	to	implement	
reasonable	adjustments,	so	as	not	to	disadvantage	students	with	cognitive	or	
physical	impairments	(ibid,	2001).		Nevertheless,	despite	being	acknowledged	
as	a	protected	characteristic	(HM	Government,	2010;	Acas,	2011),	the	existence	
of	dyslexia	as	a	biological	and	neurological	condition	is	still	contested	(Nosek,	
1997:	7).		Although	the	educational	experiences	of	some	of	those	who	
participated	in	this	research	are	not	representative	of	all	African	Caribbeans,	
they	nevertheless	provide	an	insight	into	how	disability	compounded	racism	in	
the	1970’s	education	sector.		Their	narratives	of	racial	disadvantage	are	used	as	
a	backdrop	against	which	to	assess	the	contemporary	progress	made	by	Black	
students,	and	to	ascertain	the	extent	to	which	racism	might	still	be	a	major	
factor	in	their	general	educational	experiences.			
	
	
	 27	
As	educational	qualifications	influence	the	occupational	status	of	individuals	
(Ratcliffe,	1981;	2004),	this	research	will	also	examine	higher	education	
participation	as	a	factor	of	social	mobility.	It	has	already	been	established	that	
despite	successive	race	and	equality	legislation,	implemented	from	1965	
onwards,	African	Caribbeans	are	not	fulfilling	their	potential	in	the	English	
education	sector.16		However,	little	is	known	regarding	the	extent	to	which	
Black	Caribbeans	in	Birmingham	have	increased	their	contemporary	higher	
education	participation,	in	comparison	to	their	White	peers.		This	is	particularly	
the	case	with	regard	to	their	access	to	the	elite	universities	(Shiner	and	
Modood,	2002).		As	argued	previously,	age	is	also	a	crucial	factor	of	upward	
social	mobility.		Therefore,	Black	Caribbean	higher	education	participation	is	
compared	to	that	of	their	White	British	counterparts,	within	the	18-24	age-
range	cohort.		Analysing	educational	change	will	to	some	extent	indicate	if	
legislation,	policies	and	practices	have	constrained	or	enabled	Black	Caribbean	
access	to	higher	education	Goods,	and	facilitated	their	entry	into	the	
professional	occupations.			
	
	
Summary	
	
If	African	Caribbeans	are	still	obtaining	Bad	qualifications,	acquiring	Bad	
occupations	and	residing	in	Bad	residences	in	Bad	urban	spaces,	then	their	
predicament	warrants	investigation.		This	is	especially	as	–	if	the	above	is	
																																								 																				
16		For	more	detailed	accounts	see:	Rhamie	and	Hallam	(2002);	Graham	and	Robinson	(2004);	
Mamon	(2004);	Strand	(2008);	Boyle	and	Charles	(2011).			
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indeed	the	case	–	the	immobility	or	stagnation	of	their	social	status	increases	
the	risk	of	trans-generational	poverty.		Moreover,	current	neo-liberal	policies	
undermine	State	intervention	in	the	distribution	of	resources,	whilst	promoting	
the	free	market	as	the	means	by	which	they	can	be	obtained	(Ratcliffe,	2015).		
This	effectively	means	that	there	is	a	real	risk	that	the	State’s	equality	agenda	
will	be	undermined	by	free	market	politics	and	as	a	consequence	persisting	
forms	of	racial	inequality	will	be	overlooked.				
	
	
The	research	questions	
The	following	questions	are	central	to	the	investigation	of	African	Caribbean	
social	and	spatial	mobility:	
	
i. What	impact	have	changes	in	legislation,	policies	and	practices	had	on	
the	operational	capacity	and	agency	of	Black	Caribbean	community	and	
religious	organisations	in	Birmingham?	
ii. How	are	the	education	and	labour	market	experiences	of	African	
Caribbeans	in	Birmingham	mediated	by	their	gender	and	ethnicity?	
iii. To	what	extent	does	legislation,	allied	to	policies	and	practices,	enable	
or	constrain	African	Caribbean	social	mobility	in	market	situations?	
iv. What	shifts	have	taken	place	in	the	spatial	patterns	of	Birmingham’s	
African	Caribbean	population	over	the	past	thirty	years?		
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v. How	have	thirty	years	of	social	change	impacted	on	the	social	mobility	
of	Birmingham’s	African	Caribbean	population?			
	
	
The	following	chapter	examines	the	historical	relationship	between	Jamaica	
and	Britain.		The	aim	is	to	highlight	the	nexus	between	Empire,	industry,	unfree	
and	free	labour,	and	how	they	in	turn	relate	to	the	Black	British	presence	
(Hobsbawm,	1967;	Black,	1991;	Harris,	2008).		Since	the	17th	century	ideas	of	
‘White	Superordination	and	Black	subordination’	(May	and	Cohen,	1974:	112)	
have	been	reinforced	by	economic	relations,	in	which	the	social	status	of	Blacks	
has	been	constructed	and	constrained	by	a	combination	of	legislative	and	social	
processes	(Edwards,	1988;	Walvin,	2001).		The	chapter	also	explains	how	
natural	and	economic	disasters	in	Jamaica	influenced	internal	and	external	
migration	(Black,	1991;	Chamberlain,	1999).		An	account	is	also	provided	of	how	
restrictions	in	immigration	legislation	initially	directed	Caribbean	labour	
towards	South	and	North	America,	and	then	Canada,	before	redirecting	it	
towards	Britain	(Fryer,	1984;	Black,	1991).			
	
	
Chapter	Two	reveals	that	Britain	was	not	necessarily	the	primary	destination	of	
choice	for	the	majority	of	West	Indian	migrants.		It	also	articulates	how	low	
financial	capital,	racism	and	discriminatory	practices	restricted	the	labour	
market	participation	of	newly	arriving	migrants	to	the	lower	tiers	of	the	
economy	(Gunter,	1954;	Stephens,	1956;	Sivanandan,	1981;	Taylor,	1993).		Not	
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only	did	discrimination	constrain	the	post-war	social	mobility	of	Caribbean	
migrants,	to	some	extent	it	also	concentrated	the	bulk	of	their	spatial	
settlement	within	the	inner-city	Bad	Lands	of	Birmingham	and	other	major	
cities	in	Britain	(Peach,	1968).	
	
	
Chapter	Three	justifies	the	‘mixed-methods’	(Venkatesh,	2013:	3)	approach	
used	in	this	research.		Ethnographic	fieldwork	provided	a	first-hand	account	of	
the	impact	that	legislation,	policies	and	practices	have	had	on	the	
contemporary	agency	of	Black	Caribbean	organisations.		By	observing	and	
questioning	the	Black	community’s	political,	educational	and	religious	leaders,	
some	of	the	barriers	and	factors	constraining	and	enabling	their	agency	was	
identified.		Audio-visual	equipment	was	also	used	to	record	the	narratives	of	a	
small	sample	of	African	Caribbean	subjects	and	their	experiences	of	
competition	in	the	educational,	labour	and	housing	markets.		Combining	
observation	with	technological	resources,	produced	rich	meaningful	accounts	
of	some	of	the	barriers	African	Caribbeans	in	Birmingham	encounter	in	their	
day-to-day	struggles	to	improve	their	social	situation.	
	
	
National	and	Birmingham	data,	from	the	1991,	2001	and	2011	Censuses,	were	
analysed	to	compare,	contrast	and	map	ethnic	differences	in	labour	and	
housing	market	positions.		The	datasets	identified	changes	in	the	material	
conditions	of	the	ethnic	groups	surveyed	in	this	research.		The	aim	of	utilising	
	 31	
this	method	was	to	establish	if	African	Caribbeans	had	improved	their	
occupational	and	housing	situations,	or	if	they	still	maintained	similar	labour	
market	and	spatial	positions	as	their	West	Indian	antecedents.		Datasets	from	
the	Higher	Education	Statistics	Agency	(HESA)	are	also	used	in	a	similar	way	to	
the	Census	datasets.		They	provided	an	overview	of	changes	in	African	
Caribbean	access	to	educational	Goods.		Educational,	labour	market	and	
housing	data	are	also	examined	against	political	and	legislative	changes.		the	
aim	is	to	determine	what,	if	any,	impact	they	may	have	had	on	the	social	status	
of	African	Caribbeans.			
	
	
The	following	chapter	examines	the	agency	of	Black	Caribbean	community	
groups	and	religious	organisations.		This	is	particularly	in	terms	of	their	
contemporary	operational	capacity	and	the	capability	they	have	to	obtain	life-
changing	resources	for	their	supporters.		The	ways	in	which	organisations	in	the	
Black	community	have	mobilised	in	the	past,	to	fight	against	racism	and	
discrimination,	is	widely	documented	(Sivanandan,	1981;	Fryer,	1984;	Rex	and	
Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981;	2004).		Black	grassroots	organisations	have	
successfully	introduced	and	delivered	supplementary	educational	programme	
(Andrews,	2013).		This	included	operating	Saturday	and	Summer	Schools	in	
Black	communities,	to	address	the	failure	of	mainstream	education.		However,	
it	remains	to	be	seen	if	they	have	developed	their	capacity,	in	line	with	social	
and	political	changes,	to	obtain	educational	resources	and	labour	market	
assistance	for	their	supporters	in	the	community.	
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Chapter	Five	highlights	the	importance	of	education	as	an	enabling	resource	of	
African	Caribbean	social	mobility.		The	impact	of	educational	policies	is	
assessed	in	terms	of	the	extent	to	which	they	may	have	reduced	discriminatory	
practices	in	the	education	sector.		Although	racism	undoubtedly	blocked	higher	
education	opportunities	for	the	majority	of	Black	Britons	of	Caribbean	
parentage	(Coard,	1972;	Carby,	1982),	it	remains	to	be	seen	if	that	is	still	the	
case	for	subsequent	generations.		The	past-race	narratives	of	African	
Caribbeans	are	examined	against	data	of	the	progress	made	by	their	
contemporary	peers	in	the	supposedly	post-race	educational	market.		
Differences	between	the	rates	at	which	African	Caribbeans	and	their	White	
British	counterparts	are	accessing	higher	education	institutions,	and	disparities	
in	their	degree	outcomes	from	particular	universities,	are	also	examined.			
	
	
The	Russell	Group	participation	of	African	Caribbeans	from	Birmingham	is	also	
important	to	this	research.		Russell	Group	universities	are	generally	considered	
to	be	the	Premier	League	higher	education	institutions	and	their	degrees	tend	
to	have	more	economic	value	(Which?	University,	2014).		Moreover,	the	age	at	
which	students	participate	in	higher	education	is	also	a	crucial	factor	of	upward	
social	mobility.		As	noted	earlier,	the	likelihood	of	occupational	progress	is	
maximised	if	individuals	enter	the	labour	market	at	the	earliest	opportunity,	
after	leaving	university.		Moreover,	workers	tend	to	have	more	economic	value	
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to	employers,	if	they	obtain	the	right	skills	at	the	appropriate	age-stage	
(Ratcliffe,	1981).	
	
	
Changes	in	the	occupational	status	of	Black	Caribbeans	are	examined	in	
Chapter	Six.		The	aim	is	to	determine	the	extent	to	which	higher	educational	
Goods	is	being	exchanged	for	economic	Goods	in	the	higher-tier	NS-SEC	classes.		
The	industrial	sector	favoured	male	labour,	and	the	demise	of	manufacturing	
and	production	industries	may	well	mean	that	African	Caribbean	have	new	
opportunities	in	the	expanding	service	sector.		Unemployment	is	also	compared	
by	gender	and	between	ethnic	groups,	as	is	routine	occupations.		This	indicates	
if	African	Caribbeans	are	improving	their	social	status	by	climbing	the	
occupational	ladder,	and	also	if	their	contemporary	forms	of	employment	differ	
from	those	in	which	their	West	Indian	antecedents	were	employed.	
	
	
The	proceeding	chapter	examines	changes	in	African	Caribbean	spatial	patterns	
and	housing	tenure.		Housing	positions	are	often	informed	by	the	income	and	
occupational	status	of	their	owners.		Post-war	West	Indians	in	Birmingham	had	
a	tendency	to	rent	rather	than	purchase	their	accommodation,	and	their	
communities	have	developed	within	some	of	the	most	deprived	areas	in	the	
city	(Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981;	2004).		Therefore,	there	is	a	
need	to	examine	the	extent	to	which	the	current	housing	tenure,	and	spatial	
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locations	of	the	descendants	of	West	Indians,	are	informed	by	improvements	in	
their	occupational	status.	
	
	
The	concluding	chapter	draws	the	data	together	and	answers	the	research	
questions.		The	findings	are	analysed	in	relation	to	aims	of	the	thesis	to	
establish	if	African	Caribbeans	in	Birmingham	have	improved	their	social	class	
status	and	spatial	positions.		This	final	part	of	the	research	outlines	the	main	
issues	faced	by	the	Caribbean	population.		Threats	and	opportunities,	to	their	
future	class	and	spatial	positions,	are	also	identified	based	on	an	overall	
examination	of	the	data.			
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2. Empire,	slavery,	migration	and	ethnic	competition	
	
Britain	was	the	major	post-war	destination	of	choice	for	many	West	Indian	
labour	migrants	(Rex	and	Moore,	1967;	Peach,	1968;	Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979;	
Ratcliffe,	1981;	Sivanandan,	1981;	Fryer,	1984;	Taylor,	1993;	Solomos,	2003).		
However,	to	understand	why	they	chose	to	come	to	the	UK,	and	not	the	U.S.,	
Canada	or	some	other	European	nation	State,	it	is	necessary	to	examine	the	
relationship	between	Britain,	its	former	colonial	Caribbean	subjects	and	
Empire.		This	chapter	will	articulate	how	the	following	factors	have	influenced	
the	contemporary	social	status	of	African	Caribbeans:	
• the	exploitation	of	slave	labour	and	free	labour,	and	their	relationship	to	
Britain’s	economic	development;	
• the	role	of	transnational	legislation	and	policy	in	facilitating	and	
restricting	the	global	distribution	of	West	Indian	labour;	
• the	extent	to	which	racial	discrimination	in	the	post-war	labour	and	
housing	markets	constrained	the	social	status	and	spatial	mobility	of	
West	Indian	migrants;	
• the	contribution	that	Black	community	organisations	have	made	to	
social	and	political	changes;	
• ideological	shifts	in	policy,	and	their	impact	on	the	educational	
attainment	and	social	status	of	the	descendants	of	West	Indian	
migrants.	
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Jamaica	is	used	as	a	case	study,	to	illustrate	the	UK’s	former	colonial	power	in	
the	West	Indies.		The	island	is	important	to	any	examination	of	the	social	and	
spatial	mobility	of	Birmingham’s	African	Caribbean	population,	in	more	ways	
than	one.		The	majority	of	West	Indian	migrants	came	from	Jamaica	in	the	early	
post-war	years	(Peach,	1968),	and	in	the	1950s	and	1960s	they	developed	
communities	in	Birmingham	(Gunter,	1954;	Rex	and	Moore	1967;	Rex	and	
Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981;	Taylor,	1993).		However,	it	is	not	generally	
recognised	that	Britain’s	relationship	with	the	West	Indies,	and	Birmingham’s	
ties	with	the	Caribbean,	go	back	much	further	than	Commonwealth	migration	
(Black,	1991;	Harris,	2008).		The	Black	presence	in	post-war	Britain	can	only	be	
understood	by	appreciating	the	relationship	between	Empire,	slavery	in	the	
Americas17,	the	factors	influencing	Caribbean	migration	and	their	impact	on	the	
industrial	development	of	Britain.		Therefore,	to	write	about	the	material	
conditions	of	African	Caribbeans	in	the	context	of	21st	century	Britain,	‘without	
also	saying	something	about	the	West	Indies	[…],	is	unreal’	(Hobsbawm,	1969:	
20).			
	
	
Slave	labour,	free	labour	and	Britain’s	economic	development		
	
The	Spanish	and	Portuguese	amassed	fortunes	from	trafficking	Africans	in	the	
fifteenth	and	sixteenth	centuries	(Black,	1991).		However,	it	was	Britain	that	
																																								 																				
17	Prior	to	the	United	Sates	Declaration	of	Independence	in	1776,	the	West	Indies	was	
incorporated	into	the	territory	referred	to	as	the	Americas.		What	is	now	known	as	the	United	
States,	and	what	was	formerly	defined	as	the	West	Indies,	constituted	a	substantial	part	of	
Britain’s	colonial	Empire.	
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transformed	the	slave	trade18	into	a	highly	lucrative	business19	(Williams,	2005	
[1944]).		In	the	1660s,	Britain	gained	overall	control	of	the	Americas	from	
Portugal	and	Spain20	and	by	1670	Jamaica	‘was	officially	ceded	to	England	by	
the	Treaty	of	Madrid’	(Black,	1991:	39).		Richardson	(1992:	70)	notes	that	by	the	
end	of	the	seventeenth	century	‘the	English	had	become	the	largest	traffickers	
in	slaves	in	the	Western	world’.		Despite	acquiring	the	label	of	troublesome	
during	the	seventeenth	century,	due	to	its	numerous	slave	revolts,	Jamaica	was	
revered	as	‘the	biggest	[and]	the	richest’	(Walvin,	2001:	221)	of	Britain’s	
colonies	in	the	West	Indies.		
	
	
The	capital	generated	from	slavery,	in	Jamaica	and	Britain’s	other	Caribbean	
colonies,	contributed	to	financing	England’s	industrial	revolution21.		Williams	
(2005,	[1944]:	54-55)	contends	that	between	1714	and	1773	Jamaica	‘was	as	
																																								 																				
18	Exchanging	human	beings	for	inferior	items	of	consumption	can	hardly	be	defined	as	a	trade	
in	any	real	sense	of	equal	commercial	exchange,	see	Isichei	(1977).		However,	the	forced	
migration	and	enslavement	of	Africans	is	often	referred	to	as	the	slave	trade.	
19	The	main	feature	that	distinguished	Trans-Atlantic	chattel	slavery,	from	contemporary	forms	
of	human	trafficking	is	that	under	laws	created	in	Britain	and	passed	in	the	Americas,	‘African	
slaves	had	been	reclassified	between	the	years	1600	and	1700,	from	human	beings	[…]	to	
items	of	trade	under	the	Navigation	Act’	(Edwards,	1988:	xviii	[emphasis	in	original]).		Hence,	
African	slaves	were	classed	as	non-human	commodities.		The	legal	reduction	of	human	beings	
to	items	of	property	denied	them	any	lawful	rights	and	facilitated	the	exploitation	of	their	
labour	for	hundreds	of	years.	
20	The	first	West	Indian	islands	claimed	by	the	British	were	‘St	Kitts	and	Barbados	in	1624,	
followed	by	Nevis	in	1628,	and	Antigua	then	Montserrat	in	1632’	(Black,	1991:	33).		Although	
British	ships	first	landed	in	Jamaica	in	1643,	it	was	not	until	1655	that	the	Spanish	relinquished	
all	claims	to	the	island.			
21	There	is	not	enough	room	in	this	thesis	to	articulate	the	nexus	between	Britain’s	domination	
of	chattel	slavery,	the	spread	of	its	Empire	and	the	nation’s	subsequent	industrial	development	
and	global	economic	supremacy.		For	more	detailed	debates	see	Eltis	and	Engerman	(2000)	
Williams	(2005,	[1944]),	especially	Chapter	3;	Hobsbawm	(1969),	especially	Chapters	1-3;	Derry	
and	Blakeway	(1969);	Isichei	(1977);	Harris	(2008).		See	also	Graeber	(2006),	regarding	the	role	
of	slavery	in	transforming	the	capitalist	modes	of	production	from	an	agricultural	to	an	
industrial	base.	
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valuable	as	New	England’22.		Hobsbawm	(1969:	58)	also	acknowledges	that	until	
the	1790s	all	of	Britain’s	raw	materials	were	provided	by	its	colonies	in	the	
West	Indies.		The	exploitation	of	slave	labour	was	maintained	by	laws	passed	in	
Britain	that	classified	Africans	as	commodities	(Edwards,	1988).		Marx	(1995,	
[1867]:	51)	contends	that	‘commodities	are	things,	and	therefore	without	
power	of	resistance	against	man’.		However,	humans	classified	as	commodities	
and	producing	the	raw	material	needed	to	manufacture	the	commodity	of	
sugar,	resisted	their	inhumane	situation.		Rogozinski	(1999:	160)	notes	that	
prior	to	the	Haitian	revolution,	Jamaica	had	the	most	slave	uprisings	and	‘more	
rebellions	than	all	the	other	British	colonies	put	together’.		Despite	numerous	
slave	insurrections,	the	British	economy	grew	as	a	result	of	subsidiary	trades	
that	were	to	some	extent	supplemented	by	the	production	of	sugar	(Black,	
1991;	Williams,	2005	[1944]).		
	
	
During	the	eighteenth	and	nineteenth	centuries,	the	growth	of	Birmingham	in	
the	UK	can	be	attributed	to	the	city	‘supplying	the	various	Goods	that	
merchants	required	for	the	“African	Trade”:	guns,	fetters,	shackles,	chains,	
brassware	and	so	on’	(Harris,	2008:	74-75)23.		A	number	of	England’s	port,	
shipbuilding	and	textile	manufacturing	cities	such	as	London24,	Liverpool,	
																																								 																				
22	See	the	tables	of	imports	and	exports	between	Britain	and	its	colonies	in	Williams	(2005,	
[1944]:	226).	
23	See	also	Hobsbawm	(1969)	and	Williams	(2005,	[1944]).	
24	See	UCL	(2015),	for	an	analysis	of	how	London’s	stock	exchange,	and	the	city’s	development	
as	an	international	centre	of	commerce	and	finance,	was	made	possible	by	reinvesting	and	
redirecting	the	profits	made	from	chattel	slavery.		UCL	(2015)	provides	evidence	of	how	
financial	institutions,	including	Barclays	and	Lloyds,	developed	as	a	result	of	their	involvement	
in	chattel	slavery.		
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Lancaster,	Bristol,	Newcastle	and	Sheffield,	also	developed	their	economies	as	a	
result	of	their	relationship	with	the	slave	trade	(Harris,	2008;	Hobsbawm,	
1969).		Nevertheless,	the	expansion	of	the	UK’s	industrial	base	had	tragic	
consequences	for	enslaved	Africans	in	Jamaica.		Williams	(2005,	[1944]:	121)	
reveals	that	between	1780	and	1787,	in	the	initial	stages	of	Britain’s	economic	
modernisation,	some	‘fifteen	thousand	slaves	died	of	famine’	in	Jamaica.		
However,	British	industrial	production,	driven	by	exports	and	imports	from	its	
overseas	colonies,	continued	to	expand	at	an	average	rate	of	over	30	per	cent	
throughout	the	1800s	and	1900s	(Hobsbawm,	1969:	68).					
	
	
In	1807	the	abolition	of	slavery	increased	the	cost	of	sugar,	a	reason	being	was	
that	plantations	could	no	longer	appropriate	slave	labour	to	facilitate	
production	(Black,	1991).		Emancipation	also	created	agricultural	labour	
shortages,	as	freed	slaves	looked	for	paid	work	and	better	living	conditions	
(ibid,	1991:	116-117).		After	1846	the	British	Parliament	equalised	the	tariff	on	
sugar,	which	resulted	in	the	decline	of	Jamaican	rum,	coffee	and	sugar	exports	
to	Britain.		The	West	Indian	banks,	which	were	responsible	for	financing	the	
export	of	raw	materials	to	Britain,	collapsed	as	the	price	of	sugar	fell	(ibid,	
1991:	118).		Many	Jamaican	plantations	subsequently	fell	into	ruin,	which	
created	a	domino	effect	of	massive	unemployment	in	both	the	rural	and	urban	
economies.		In	1850	a	combination	of	disease	and	natural	disasters	decimated	
Jamaica’s	population.		Black	(1991:	118)	notes	that	the	resulting	poor	sanitary	
conditions	and	cholera	outbreaks	caused	by	earthquakes,	claimed	the	lives	of	
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some	‘32,000	people	[…]	or	about	one	in	every	thirteen	of	the	population’.		By	
the	early	twentieth	century,	Emancipation	combined	with	natural	and	
economic	disasters25,	influenced	the	movement	of	free	labour	out	of	Jamaica	
and	towards	South	America.		Panama	was	a	major	destination,	where	migrant	
Jamaican	labour	was	appropriated	on	the	railway	and	Canal	Zone26.		
	
	
Migration	and	immigration	legislation	
	
Migration	is	often	perceived	as	‘a	combination	of	“push	factors”,	impelling	
people	to	leave	their	areas	of	origin,	and	“pull	factors”,	attracting	them	to	
certain	receiving	countries’	(Castles	and	Miller,	2003:	22).		Push	and	pull	factors	
are	macro	explanations	for	migration.		They	include	‘low	living	standards,	lack	
of	economic	opportunities,	political	repression	[…],	demand	for	labour	[and]	
good	economic	opportunities’	(ibid,	2003:	22).		The	push	and	pull	factors	of	
Caribbean	migration	during	the	1930s,	were	high	population	growth,	lack	of	
economic	opportunities	and	periods	of	demand	for	surplus	labour	outside	of	
the	islands	(Black,	1991).		Peach	(1968:	92)	argues	that	the	above	factors	are	
‘permissive,	rather	than	dynamic’.		Although	‘they	allow	migration	to	take	
place;	they	do	not	cause	it’	(ibid,	1968:	92),	and	post-war	Caribbean	migration	
																																								 																				
25	See	Black	(1991),	esp.	Chapter	18.	
26	Black	(1991:	145)	also	notes,	‘the	first	wave	of	migration	to	Panama	was	in	the	1860s	to	help	
build	the	railway	there’.		The	American	sponsored	building	of	the	Panama	Canal	also	attracted	
Jamaican	labour	during	the	1900s.		Up	until	the	1930s,	the	developing	banana	industry	in	Costa	
Rica	and	Honduras	influenced	significant	Jamaican	migration	and	settlement.		There	was	also	
available	work	on	the	sugar	and	coffee	plantations	of	Cuba	from	1930	up	until	the	start	of	the	
War	(ibid,	1991:	146).		This	demonstrates	that	the	main	destination	of	pre-war	Caribbean	
migration	was	South	America	and	the	Spanish	speaking	Caribbean.	
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was	also	‘reacting	[…]	to	a	single	external	stimulus’	(ibid,	1968:	93):	the	
overseas	demand	for	labour.		As	between	1860	and	1930	the	majority	of	
foreign	labour	in	Panama	came	from	Jamaica	(Black,	1991:	145),	the	
construction	of	the	Panama	Canal27	could	be	perceived	as	an	external	stimulus	
that	influenced	the	island’s	pre-war	labour	flow.		
	
	
North	America	was	also	a	labour	destination	for	Jamaican	migrants	in	the	early	
twentieth	century.		This	was	due	to	its	geographical	proximity,	and	the	1924	
Johnson-Reed	Immigration	Act,	which	facilitated	the	flow	of	surplus	West	
Indian	labour	(ibid,	1991).		Under	the	Act,	Jamaicans	who	migrated	to	America	
did	not	require	a	passport	(ibid,	1991:	146).		However,	following	the	1952	
McCarran-Walter	Immigration	Act,	‘85	per	cent	of	the	154,277	visas	available	
annually,	were	allotted	to	individuals	of	Northern	and	Western	European	
lineage’	(US	Department	of	State	Office	of	the	Historian,	2012).		This	created	a	
process	of	exclusion,	which	restricted	the	flow	of	West	Indian	labour	to	US	
territories	in	favour	of	European	migrants	(Fryer,	1984:	373).		The	McCarran-
Walter	Act	also	protected	the	American	workforce	from	unwanted	foreign	
competition,	by	creating	a	labour	certification	scheme	for	overseas	
employment	applicants.		For	a	period,	Canada	then	became	the	major	
destination	of	Caribbean	migration	until	changes	to	its	immigration	policies	
stemmed	the	influx	of	West	Indian	labour	(Black,	1991:	147).		
	
																																								 																				
27	See	Footnote	26.	
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Although	the	1952	McCarran-Walter	Act	restricted	the	flow	of	Caribbean	labour	
to	the	US,	UK	legislation	facilitated	its	redirection.	The	1948	British	Nationality	
Act	enabled	New	Commonwealth	immigration	by	granting	British	passports	to	
West	Indians	(Fryer,	1984;	Heath	and	Cheung,	2007).		Fryer	(1984:	373)	notes	
that	‘their	British	passports	gave	them	the	right	to	come	to	Britain	and	stay	[…]	
for	the	rest	of	their	lives’.		Although	Britain	was	experiencing	labour	shortages	
in	specific	industrial	sectors	following	the	War	(Fryer,	1984;	Heath	and	Cheung,	
2007),	it	was	not	until	1954	that	the	scale	of	migration	from	the	West	Indies	to	
Britain	markedly	increased	(Peach,	1968;	Castles	and	Kosack,	1973).		In	1956	
London	Transport	organised	a	recruitment	campaign	in	the	Caribbean,	urging	
West	Indians	to	apply	for	jobs	in	the	transport	industry	(Mason,	2000;	Ratcliffe,	
2004).		There	was	also	a	demand	for	West	Indian	nurses	in	the	newly	created	
National	Health	Service	(Peach,	1968:	94;	Bryan,	Dadzie	and	Scafe,	1985;	
Mason,	2000;	Ratcliffe,	2004:	50;	Heath	and	Cheng,	2007:	510).		However,	West	
Indians	were	‘destined	to	fill	vacancies	for	which	there	was	either	insufficient	
White	labour	available	or	which	White	workers	were	insufficiently	willing	to	fill’	
(Peach,	1968:	94).		West	Indians	were	effectively	a	reserve	army	of	labour	
(Castles	and	Kosack,	1973),	a	replacement	workforce	for	indigenous	British	
workers,	some	of	whom	were	suspended	or	sacked	because	of	their	
involvement	in	industrial	action	(McKenley,	2001).		
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Heath	and	Cheung	(2007:	511)	suggest	that	the	majority	of	Jamaican	migrants	
had	‘low	levels	of	skill	and	human	capital’.		Castles	and	Kosack	(1973:	95)	also	
argue	that	Jamaican	skills	were	not	on	par	with	those	of	British	workers.		The	
report	by	Roberts	and	Mills	(1955),	which	Castles	and	Kosack	refer	to	in	an	
effort	to	substantiate	their	claim,	reveals	quite	the	opposite28.		Roberts	and	
Mills’	(1955)	report	reveals	that	the	Jamaican	Government	was	worried	by	the	
skills	drain	caused	by	UK	emigration,	and	the	British	Colonial	Office	wanted	to	
identify	the	economic	skills	of	the	migrants	so	they	could	distribute	their	labour	
accordingly29.		If	the	majority	of	Jamaican	immigrants	entering	Britain	were	as	
unskilled	as	the	above	commentators	suggest,	their	emigration	would	not	have	
been	a	major	concern	to	the	Jamaican	Government30.	
	
	
Roberts	and	Mills	(1955)	reveal	that	some	Jamaican	emigrants,	albeit	relatively	
few,	were	doctors,	lawyers,	teachers,	engineers	and	members	of	other	highly	
skilled	professions.		However,	it	should	also	be	acknowledged	that	the	majority	
were	not	professional	workers.		Most	male	migrants	were	aged	between	25	
and	29	and	either	skilled	or	semi-skilled.		Some	of	the	migrants’	skills	
documented	by	Roberts	and	Mills	(1955)	included	telephone	operators,	
telegraph	clerks,	bakers,	cabinet-makers,	painters,	printers,	potters,	coopers,	
jewellers,	shoemakers	and	various	types	of	building	contractors.		Fryer	(1984:	
374)	notes	that	‘of	the	men	who	came	here,	a	mere	13	per	cent	had	no	skills;	of	
																																								 																				
28	See	Roberts	and	Mills	(1955).	
29	Public	Record	Office	(2008):	CO1034/20.	
30	Roberts	and	Mills	(1955)	note	that	by	1953	a	fifth	of	Jamaica’s	male	working-age	population	
had	emigrated	to	the	UK.	
	 44	
the	women,	only	5	per	cent’.		The	majority	of	female	Jamaican	migrants	were	
aged	20	to	24	and	were	also	skilled,	mainly	as	dressmakers,	tailors,	nurses	
(Ratcliffe,	2004)	and	cloth	[sic]	designers	(Roberts	and	Mills,	1955).		Marx	
(1995,	[1867])	would	have	described	the	Caribbean	migrants	as	artisans.		Their	
skills-set	would	have	complemented	the	guilds	and	crafts	of	Britain’s	industrial	
manufacturing	and	production	base.		However,	only	a	relative	few	would	have	
acquired	employment	where	they	could	use	their	skills.		Most	West	Indian	
migrants	had	to	accept	low-skilled,	low-paid	and	unattractive	but	available	
work	(Fryer,	1984).				
	
	
Heath	and	Cheung	(2007),	and	Castles	and	Kosack	(1973),	also	overlook	two	
things:	i)	migration	is	a	relatively	expensive	affair	and	the	Jamaican	Dollar	has	
always	been	of	significantly	less	value	than	British	Sterling.		This	suggests	it	
would	have	been	extremely	difficult	for	unskilled	workers	to	earn	enough	to	
pay	for	their	journey	to	the	UK.		ii)	The	family	networks	of	West	Indians	were	a	
rich	source	of	human	capital	and	a	major	agent	of	migration	(Chamberlain,	
1999).	There	is	a	tendency	for	proponents	of	macro	theories	of	migration	to	
reduce	the	importance	of	micro	factors.		Consequently,	the	Caribbean	family,	
and	its	importance	as	a	key	agent	in	the	migration	process,	is	generally	
overlooked.		Craig-James	(in	Chamberlain,	1999:	253)	uses	the	term	
‘indigenisation’	to	define	the	ways	in	which	Caribbean	social	and	cultural	
networks	are	sustained	abroad	and	linked	by	human	capital.		Kinship	ties	in	
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Britain	reinforced	indigenisation	by	providing	valuable	support	for	newly	
arriving	migrants.		
	
	
Chamberlain	(1999:	259)	argues	that	migrants	‘went	as	collaterals	to	join	
siblings,	cousins,	uncles	and	aunts’	who	had	arrived	much	earlier	in	Britain.		The	
extended	family,	which	is	a	popular	family	structure	in	the	Caribbean,	also	
enabled	young	females	to	migrate	and	return	remittances.		Relatives	cared	for	
the	children	of	migrants	until	they	either	returned	or	paid	their	children’s	fare	
to	join	them	in	their	new	countries	(ibid,	1999:	258).		It	should	also	be	
recognised	that	decisions	to	migrate	are	not	always	rational	and	calculated	
acts,	‘making	money	(by	no	means	synonymous	with	labour	migration),	
adventure,	travel,	education,	escape	and	love’	were	some	of	the	reasons	West	
Indians	migrated	(ibid,	1999:	255).		Although	Jamaicans	have	historically	
migrated	to	North	and	South	America31,	there	has	also	been	a	tendency	to	
migrate	between	rural	and	urban	economies.	Migration	has	been	a	way	of	life	
in	Jamaica	since	Emancipation,	and	not	just	a	response	to	external	economic	
stimuli	as	some	commentators	suggest	(Peach,	1968).		The	importance	of	family	
ties	demonstrates	that,	contrary	to	Heath	and	Cheung’s	(2007)	suggestion,	
Jamaicans	had	significant	levels	of	human	capital	which	they	appropriated	to	
good	effect32.	
	
																																								 																				
31	See	Footnote	26	and	earlier	in	the	chapter	above.	
32	For	further	examples	of	how	West	Indians	appropriated	their	human	capital	see	Chapter	
Seven.	
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European	and	West	Indian	surplus	labour			
	
Castles	and	Kosack	(1973:	444)	contend	that	the	post-war	‘discrimination	
against	coloured	immigrants	[…]	is	very	similar	to	the	hostility	against	White	
immigrants	–	notably	the	Irish	and	Jews	–	in	the	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	
centuries’33.		However,	skin	colour	rather	than	cultural	differences	was	the	
distinguishing	feature	between	European	and	West	Indian	migration	
(Phizacklea	and	Miles,	1980).		Although	New	Commonwealth	immigration	was	a	
response	to	Britain’s	need	for	surplus	labour	(Fryer,	1984),	the	demand	for	
Black	workers	only	materialised	because	Europeans	could	not	fill	the	necessary	
shortages	(Castles	and	Kosack,	1973;	Castles	and	Miller,	2003).			
	
	
Following	the	War,	the	Ministry	of	Labour	campaigned	in	Ireland	for	
replacement	labour	(Castles	and	Kosack,	1973:	29).		Although	an	estimated	
350,000	Irish	workers	were	recruited	between	1946	and	1959,	the	bulk	of	
labour	from	overseas	consisted	of	foreign	citizens	and	former	European	soldiers	
who	had	served	under	British	command.		There	were	approximately	‘460,000	
foreigners	[…],	the	largest	group	were	the	115,000	Poles	who	came	in	under	
the	Polish	Resettlement	Scheme’	(ibid,	1973:	29).		In	addition	to	recruiting	
former	Ukrainian,	German	and	Italian	prisoners	of	war,	the	Ministry	of	Labour	
also	obtained	the	services	of	90,000	European	Volunteer	Workers	(EVWs)	
(Castles	and	Miller,	2003:	69).		However,	EVWs	faced	considerable	hostility	
																																								 																				
33	For	more	detailed	accounts	of	the	politicalised	and,	to	some	extent,	racialised	experiences	of	
Jewish	and	Irish	UK	migrants	see	Allen	(1971);	Taylor	(1993)	and	Douglas	(2002).	
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from	British	workers	and	‘the	restrictions	imposed	on	EVWs	were	so	severe	[…]	
some	observers	[…]	refer	to	the	system	as	one	of	“institutionalised	
discrimination”’	(Castles	and	Kosack,	1973:	30).		Britain’s	economy	relied	on	
EVWs	until	the	late	1940s	and	early	1950s,	when	the	supply	of	White	surplus	
labour	began	to	dry	up.			
	
	
Despite	Britain’s	need	for	surplus	labour,	only	‘a	trickle	of	West	Indian	workers’	
entered	the	UK	between	1948	and	195334	(Fryer,	1984:	373).		However,	from	
1954	onwards	West	Indian	immigration	became	a	source	of	social	and	political	
concern	(Carter,	Harris	and	Joshi,	1987).		Correspondence	between	the	Colonial	
Office’s	Research	Department	and	the	British	Government,	States	that	between	
‘1948-53	net	emigration	from	Jamaica	to	the	United	Kingdom	averaged	less	
than	600	year’35.		However,	a	1954	Savingram36	from	the	Secretary	of	State	for	
the	Colonies	to	the	British	Treasury,	expressed	concern	that	the	majority	of	
migrants	entering	Britain	were	Jamaicans.		It	was	thought	that	West	Indians	
were	‘arriving	at	the	rate	of	about	1000	a	month’37.		Stephens	(1956:	7)	notes	
that	‘at	the	end	of	1955	there	may	have	been	about	[…]	50,000	to	60,000’	West	
Indian	migrants	in	Britain.		In	terms	of	gender	ratio,	Peach	(1968:41)	contends	
that	of	the	26,441	West	Indians	arriving	in	1956,	58.1	per	cent	were	male.			
	
																																								 																				
34	This	is	also	noted	earlier.		Despite	the	implementation	of	the	1948	British	Nationality	Act,	
West	Indian	immigration	did	not	substantially	increase	until	1954.		
35	See	Roberts	and	Mills	(1955).	
36	A	Savingram	is	a	‘British	Diplomatic	Service	term	for	a	relatively	low	priority	message	sent	
telegraphically,	rather	than	by	the	less	economical	diplomatic	bag’	(Macrofox,	2015).	
37	See	Roberts	and	Mills	(1955).	
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According	to	Peach	(1968)	West	Indian	labour	was	unevenly	distributed	across	
the	UK.		The	areas	of	high	demand	for	surplus	labour	were	‘London	and	the	
south-east,	the	combined	eastern	and	southern	region	and	the	south-west’	
(ibid,	1968:	64).		Although	a	high	proportion	of	West	Indians	settled	in	London,	
they	were	over-represented	in	the	Midlands	and	North	Midlands	where	labour	
shortages	were	only	moderate	(ibid,	1968:	66).		The	1961	Census	reveals	that	in	
England	and	Wales	the	total	number	of	West	Indians	was	171,796	and,	‘London	
and	Birmingham	were	the	main	centres	of	coloured	immigration’	(ibid,	1968:	
XV).		Birmingham,	a	city	that	developed	its	industrial	economy	by	indirectly	
supporting	the	slave	trade	(Hobsbawm,	1969;	Williams,	2005	[1944];	Harris,	
2008)38,	attracted	significant	West	Indian	labour.		It	is	ironic	that	a	hundred	and	
fifty	years	after	Emancipation	Birmingham	would	appropriate	the	free	labour	of	
the	descendants	of	slaves,	whose	unfree	labour	had	contributed	to	the	city’s	
prosperity.	
	
	
Occupational	discrimination	and	spatial	segregation	
	
Birmingham	is	the	second	city	of	the	UK,	‘the	heart	of	the	West	Midlands	
conurbation	[and]	the	largest	single	focus	of	coloured	immigration	outside	
greater	London’	(Jones,	1976:	89).		The	city	was	an	industrial	powerhouse	in	the	
eighteenth	and	nineteenth	centuries	(Harris,	2008),	when	the	factories	of	
																																								 																				
38	See	earlier	in	the	chapter	above.	
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Matthew	Boulton,	William	Murdoch	and	James	Watt	were	major	sources	of	
employment	in	Handsworth’s	Soho	area	(Harris,	2008).		It	was	during	Britain’s	
industrial	decline,	in	the	mid-twentieth	century,	that	West	Indians	were	
employed	in	Birmingham’s	manufacturing	and	production	sector	(Rex	and	
Moore,	1967;	Peach,	1968;	Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981;	Taylor,	
1993).		In	voting	terms,	Birmingham	is	divided	into	districts	known	as	wards,	
with	the	outer-ring	suburbs	generally	offering	better	material	conditions	and	
quality	of	life	than	the	inner-city	areas	(Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1967;	Jones,	1976;	
Flett,	Henderson	and	Brown,	1979;	Henderson	and	Karn,	1984).		In	the	1950s	
and	1960s	West	Indian	settlement	was	mainly	concentrated	in	the	inner	and	
middle-ring	regions	of	the	north-east	and	north-west	parts	of	Birmingham	
(Flett,	Henderson	and	Brown,	1979;	Jones,	1976).		Some	of	the	wards	occupied	
by	the	Caribbean	population	were	designated	as	Clearance	Areas	(City	of	
Birmingham,	1961:	69).		
	
	
Handsworth,	like	Ladywood,	was	also	an	urban	Bad	Land.		It	was	regarded	as	‘a	
symbol	of	[…]	West	Indian	settlement	[...]	and	[…]	one	of	Britain’s	race	relations	
capitals’	(Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979:	70).		The	ward	lies	outside	of	the	City	
Centre	in	the	north-west	corridor	of	Birmingham.		Although	a	large	West	Indian	
community	developed	in	the	area	during	the	1960s	(Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979;	
Ratcliffe,	1981),	Handsworth	was	a	deteriorating	inner-city	area	with	high	levels	
of	material	deprivation.		It	is	a	short	distance	away	from	Aston,	Stockland	Green	
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and	Oscott39.		The	Soho	part	of	the	ward	has	a	border	with	Sandwell	and	
Smethwick,	which	was	a	site	of	ethnic	conflict	in	the	1960s	(Solomos,	2003;	
Ratcliffe,	2004)	40.		Handsworth	has	more	material	deprivation	than	the	
‘Promised	Land’	of	the	outer-ring	suburbs	(Burgess,	2008	[1925]:	75	[emphasis	
added]).		During	the	1960s,	West	Indians	comprised	8.4	per	cent	and	10.5	per	
cent	of	the	respective	total	populations	of	Handsworth	and	Soho	(Rex	and	
Tomlinson,	1979:	74).		When	West	Indians	settled	in	Handsworth	the	ward	was	
already	deteriorating	(Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981).		Their	arrival	
also	coincided	with	a	decrease	in	the	city’s	indigenous	population	(Peach,	1968:	
96);	a	number	of	White	residents	moved	outward	to	less	deprived	areas	
located	on	the	periphery	of	the	city	(Flett,	Henderson	and	Brown,	1979).		As	
migrants	generally	arrive	at	their	destination	with	little	financial	capital,	it	is	not	
surprising	that	West	Indians	settled	in	Twilight	Zones	(Rex	and	Moore,	1967),	
such	as	Handsworth,	and	started	‘at	the	foot	of	the	occupational	[…]	and	[…]	
residential	ladder’	(Peach,	1968:	97).	
	
	
It	is	usually	the	case	with	migrants	that	as	they	improve	their	occupational	
status	and	accumulate	more	capital,	they	might	move	out	of	the	inner-city	Bad	
Lands	and	acquire	accommodation	in	the	suburban	Good	Lands.		However,	
West	Indians	had	few	opportunities	to	improve	their	social	status	and	acquire	
spatial	mobility	by	accumulating	capital	via	high-income	occupations.		Their	age	
and	circumstances	made	education	an	unlikely	option,	and	despite	their	artisan	
																																								 																				
39	Chapter	Seven	highlights	the	significance	of	these	wards	in	regard	to	housing.	
40	See	Birmingham	Archives	(N.D.):	MS	2141/7/12.	
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skills41	discriminatory	employment	practices	constrained	West	Indians	within	
the	lower-tiers	of	the	labour	market	(Sivanandan,	1981;	Fryer,	1984).		Stephens	
(1956:	6)	reveals	that	in	1956	Birmingham,	there	were	approximately	15,000	
migrant	workers,	the	majority	of	whom	were	West	Indians.		He	concedes	that	
although	the	managers	of	employment	exchanges	tried	to	match	the	
qualifications	of	Black	workers	with	appropriate	employment,	some	employers	
were	reluctant	to	take	on	migrant	labour.		Racial	discrimination	in	the	labour	
market	erected	a	glass	ceiling	under	which	West	Indian	workers	could	only	go	
‘thus	far	and	no	further’	(Peach,	1968:	95).			
	
	
Constraining	Black	labour	to	low-status	occupations	also	enabled	the	
government	to	maintain	low	levels	of	remuneration,	which	created	a	false	
consciousness42	amongst	the	White	working-class.		Although	Black	labour	was	
mainly	appropriated	‘in	the	dirty	ill-paid	jobs	that	White	workers	did	not	want’	
(Sivanandan,	1981:	3),	they	blamed	their	meagre	wages	and	poor	working	
conditions	on	the	presence	of	their	Black	working-class	counterparts.		White	
workers	overlooked	the	role	of	the	State	in	the	perpetuity	of	their	class	
situation.		To	some	extent	government	policy	facilitated	the	employment	of	
West	Indians,	as	they	‘like	British	workers	in	most	trades,	were	covered	by	the	
Notification	of	Vacancies	Order	under	which	they	could	only	be	taken	on	with	
																																								 																				
41	See	Roberts	and	Mills	(1955).	
42	Marx	(1995,	[1867])	uses	the	term	false	consciousness	in	reference	to	how	the	working-class	
overlook	their	class	interests	by	succumbing	to	divisions	created	by	the	capitalist	class.		In	the	
context	of	Black	and	White	workers	above,	the	White	working-class	prioritise	the	commonalty	
of	shared	skin	colour	with	the	ruling	class,	over	and	above	the	labour	market	oppression	and	
exploitation	they	share	with	their	Black	working-class	counterparts.	
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the	permission	of	the	Ministry	of	Labour’	(Stephens,	1956:	11)43.		Thus,	
employment	legislation	enabled	West	Indians	to	enter	the	labour	market	and	
facilitated	the	exploitation	of	their	labour.		However,	it	did	not	protect	them	
from	the	racist	practices	of	White	employers	and	workers.		
	
	
Gunter	(1954)	reveals	that	during	the	1950s,	the	wages	of	West	Indian	
transport	workers	in	Birmingham	were	so	low	they	had	little	choice	other	than	
to	work	overtime.		However,	in	a	major	Birmingham	factory	they	had	‘money	
extorted	from	them	by	a	foreman	for	the	privilege	of	working	overtime’	(ibid,	
1954:	7	[emphasis	added]).		Stephens	(1956)	also	acknowledges	the	
ambivalence	of	unions	and	that	Black	workers	had	little	protection	from	
discriminatory	employment	practices.		Although	most	unions	recognised	that	
‘the	coloured	people	coming	to	England	are	British	subjects	only	seeking	a	
means	of	existence	which	is	denied	them	in	their	place	of	birth’	(ibid,	1956:	17),	
they	also	took	the	stance	that	foreign	labour	constitutes	‘a	danger	to	the	
workers	of	this	country’	(ibid,	1956:	17).			
	
	
A	major	obstacle	to	the	employment	of	West	Indians	in	Birmingham	was	the	
prevalence	of	a	colour	bar	in	the	1950s44.		The	colour	bar	was	also	implemented	
																																								 																				
43	See	Chapter	Seven	
44	For	a	detailed	account	of	the	impact	of	Birmingham’s	colour	bar	on	West	Indian	workers	see,	
Stephens	(1956).	
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in	pubs	and	clubs45.		Gunter	(1954:	6)	notes	‘one	of	the	most	disheartening	
colour	bars	to	arouse	public	concern	was	the	refusal	of	the	City	Transport	
Department	to	employ	coloured	[sic]	drivers	or	conductors’.		Birmingham’s	
Transport	Department	justified	its	support	of	the	colour	bar	by	suggesting:	
Black	workers	were	not	capable	of	issuing	bus	tickets	correctly;	spouses	would	
not	allow	female	conductresses	to	work	late	night	shifts	with	Black	workers;	
and	White	employees	would	simply	refuse	to	work	with	Blacks	(ibid,	1954:	6).		
Many	employers	also	shared	the	view	of	the	Transport	Department	and	were	
reluctant	to	employ	West	Indians	alongside	White	women.		Stephens	notes	
(1956:	12)	there	were	concerns	regarding	‘the	employment	of	coloured	men	
among	White	girls	or	[…]	fears	[…]	that	[…]	the	recruitment	of	British	workers	
will	be	affected’	(ibid,	1956:	12)46.			Black	workers	were	also	the	victims	of	
discriminatory	redundancy	policies,	as	‘some	firms	adhered	to	the	practice	of	
“last	in,	first	out”’,	which	automatically	favoured	the	job	security	of	White	
workers	over	immigrants	(ibid,	1956:	15).		As	racism	constrained	the	labour	
market	status	of	West	Indians	in	Birmingham,	it	could	also	be	argued	that	their	
low-waged	occupations	confined	their	spatial	positions	to	the	deprived	inner-
city	Bad	Lands.	
	
	
	
	
																																								 																				
45	Birmingham	City	Council	Library	Services.	
46	This	was	not	a	new	phenomenon.		May	and	Cohen	(1974:	115)	note	that	‘sexual	competition	
[…]	and	[…]	competition	for	employment’	were	two	of	the	four	causes	of	racial	“riots”	in	
Cardiff	and	Liverpool	during	1919.	
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Black	community	organisations	as	agents	of	political	change	
	
The	1954	report	of	the	government’s	Welfare	Liaison	Officer	expressed	concern	
regarding	rising	immigration,	and	the	lack	of	national	resources	to	
accommodate	new	migrants47.		However,	it	also	acknowledged	the	way	in	
which	the	established	Jamaican	community	in	Birmingham	provided	support	for	
their	peers48.		The	British	West	Indian	Association,	the	Afro-West	Indian	Club,	
the	West	Indian	Social	Club	and	the	Consultative	Committee	for	Coloured	
People49	all	provided	information,	advice	and	guidance	to	new	Caribbean	
migrants	arriving	in	Birmingham.		However,	despite	appropriating	their	human	
capital	to	develop	a	support	network	for	their	fellow	migrants,	West	Indians	
were	constantly	fighting	against	a	backlash	of	racism	amplified	by	their	
increasing	presence.	
	
	
In	1958	there	were	“race”	riots	in	London’s	Notting	Hill,	Nottingham	and	also	as	
far	north	as	Middlesbrough	(Fryer,	1984:	376-385;	Ratcliffe,	2004:	50).		Public	
concern	over	immigration	in	Birmingham	also	led	local	Tory	MPs	to	lobby	
Parliament.		The	combination	of	political	and	social	anxieties	influenced	the	
introduction	of	the	1962	Commonwealth	Immigration	Act	(Fryer,	1984:	381;	
Solomos;	2003:	57;	Ratcliffe,	2004:	51).		The	Act	was	the	first	post-war	
legislation	aimed	at	restricting	immigration	from	non-White	Commonwealth	
																																								 																				
47	Public	Record	Office	(2008).	
48	Ibid.	
49	ibid.	
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countries	(Rex	and	Moore,	1967;	Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981;	
Fryer,	1984).		Although	the	legislation	did	not	impose	a	formal	ban	on	
Caribbean	immigration,	it	introduced	a	voucher	system	‘structured	in	such	a	
way	that	it	could	easily	be	used	to	tailor	migrant	cohorts	in	future	years’	
(Ratcliffe,	2004:	51).		Solomos	(2003:	57)	notes	that	between	1962	and	2002	
there	were	ten	successive	pieces	of	legislation	implemented	to	control	
immigration,	whereas	in	the	same	period	there	had	only	been	three	Race	
Relations	Acts.	
	
	
In	addition	to	providing	support,	Black	community	organisations	also	mobilised	
to	defend	West	Indians	against	racism.		Gillborn	(2005:	486)	argues	that	‘in	
England	[…]	virtually	every	major	public	policy	meant	to	improve	race	equity	
has	arisen	directly	from	resistance	and	protest	by	Black	and	[…]	minoritised	
communities’	[emphasis	in	original].		Workplace	protests,	street	campaigns	and	
demonstrations	organised	by	Black	community	organisations	(Sivanandan,	
1981;	Fryer,	1984),	influenced	the	passing	of	the	1965	Race	Relations	Act	
(RRA1965).		The	Act	was	supposed	to	outlaw	‘direct	discrimination	in	places	of	
“public	resort”’	(Ratcliffe,	2004:	148).		However,	its	remit	did	not	extend	to	
prohibiting	discrimination	in	the	education,	labour	and	housing	markets50.		The	
Race	Relations	Board	(RRB)	was	also	established	to	investigate	cases	of	racial	
discrimination.		Two	days	after	it	was	formed	the	RRB	was	overwhelmed	by	the	
																																								 																				
50	See	Solomos	(2003).	
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‘barrage	of	complaints	alleging	racial	discrimination’	in	Birmingham51.		The	Co-
ordinating	Committee	Against	Racial	Discrimination	(CCARD),	a	Birmingham	
based	Black	community	organisation,	identified	four	cases	of	discrimination	
made	against	public	houses	in	Birmingham.52	In	addition,	the	Birmingham	
branch	of	the	West	Indian	Standing	Conference	questioned	the	effectiveness	of	
the	RRB,	stating	that	it	was	unable	to	deal	with	indirect	forms	of	
discrimination53.			This	was	evident	in	the	way	that	Birmingham’s	colour	bar	
continued,	despite	the	RRA1965	and	the	RRB.			
	
	
In	September	1965,	the	Evening	Mail	and	Despatch,	reported	complaints	
lodged	with	the	RRB	against	three	pubs	and	a	factory	in	the	Smethwick	area.54		
Following	political	pressure	in	which	the	Campaign	Against	Racial	
Discrimination	(CARD)	was	instrumental,	a	second	Race	Relations	Act	was	
introduced	in	1968	(Sivanandan,	1981;	Ratcliffe,	2004).		In	contrast	to	its	1965	
predecessor	the	remit	of	the	1968	Race	Relations	Act	(RRA1968)	was	more	
extensive.		The	Act	outlawed	discrimination	in	all	areas,	which	included	the	
housing,	education	and	labour	markets	(Ratcliffe,	2004).		However,	the	
RRA1968	did	not	eliminate	racial	discrimination,	as	legislation	only	sets	out	an	
agenda	that	government	has	to	take	the	lead	in	enforcing.		The	persistence	of	
racist	practices	in	the	educational	market	was	a	source	of	concern	for	Black	
																																								 																				
51	Birmingham	City	Council	Library	Services.	
52	Ibid.	
53	ibid.	
54	ibid.	
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organisations	and	a	focal	point	of	their	mobilisation55.		The	Race	Relations	Act	
1976	(RRA1976)	was	the	last	full	piece	of	legislation	implemented	to	address	
racial	discrimination.		The	RRB	and	the	Community	Relations	Commission	were	
amalgamated	to	form	the	new	Commission	for	Racial	Equality	(CRE).		The	Act	
introduced	the	definitions	of	direct	and	indirect	forms	of	discrimination,	to	
outlaw	policies	and	practices	that	‘had	a	disproportionately	negative	impact	on	
minorities’	(ibid,	2004:	150).		Solomos	(2003;	83)	argues	that	the	RRA1976	was	
‘the	government’s	recognition	that	the	majority	of	Black	immigrants	were	“here	
to	stay”	and	that	policies	had	to	be	based	on	recognition	of	this	fact’.		This	was	
especially	as	a	new-generation	of	British-born	Blacks	was	emerging,	who	could	
not	be	defined	as	either	West	Indians	or	immigrants	in	the	same	way	as	their	
parents	(Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981;	see	also	Fryer,	1984:	esp.	
Chap.	12).			
	
	
Racism	and	dispersal	policies	in	the	housing	market	
	
Rex	and	Moore’s	(1967)	Sparkbrook	survey	highlighted	the	need	for	effective	
legislation	to	reduce	housing	discrimination.		They	revealed	how	Birmingham	
City	Council’s	housing	policy	arbitrarily	discriminated	against	West	Indians,	by	
extending	the	five-year	period	that	immigrants	had	to	wait	before	they	could	
go	on	the	social	housing	register	(ibid,	1967:	101).		Consequently,	many	West	
																																								 																				
55	Black	community	organisations	have	been	particularly	active	in	the	education	of	Black	
children	and	highlighting	the	failings	of	the	mainstream	education	sector.		For	a	detailed	
account	of	the	relationship	between	the	agency	and	mobilisation	of	Black	organisations,	and	
the	history	of	the	supplementary	educational	programme	in	the	UK,	see	Andrews	(2013).	
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Indian	families	had	little	choice	other	than	to	live	in	over-cramped	rooms	
rented	from	private	sector	landlords	(ibid,	1967:	102).	The	treatment	meted	
out	to	West	Indians	by	Birmingham	City	Council	contrasted	to	that	given	to	
White	applicants,	who	could	‘go	on	the	register	at	any	time’	(ibid,	1967:	26).		
Rex	and	Moore	(1967:	27)	were	not	‘able	to	prove	that	Birmingham	City	Council	
operates	a	discriminatory	policy	which	keeps	coloured	[sic]	people	off	its	
estates’.		However,	they	suggested	that	the	City’s	Housing	Officers	were	
concentrating	West	Indians	in	‘slum-clearance	areas’	(ibid,	1967:	26),	such	as	
those	in	Ladywood.		
	
	
In	May	1968,	Birmingham	City	Council	attempted	to	reduce	the	burden	on	
education,	welfare	and	housing	resources	by	dispersing	Black	tenants	
throughout	the	city	(Flett,	Henderson	and	Brown,	1979).		The	dearth	of	
resources	in	the	city	was	viewed	as	a	consequence	of	the	‘presence	of	82,000	
West	Indians	and	Asians	in	Birmingham’	(ibid,	1979:	290).		Thus,	dispersal	
policies	had	the	dual	aim	of	reducing	the	burden	on	public	services	in	areas	
with	a	high	West	Indian	concentration,	whilst	supposedly	facilitating	
‘integration	by	spreading	Black	people	thinly	amongst	the	White	population’	
(ibid,	1979:	291).		This	was	effectively	a	racialised	practice	whereby	‘in	any	
block	of	flats	or	maisonettes	and	in	any	street	[…]	a	maximum	of	one	in	six	
properties	could	be	allocated	to	Blacks’	(ibid,	1979:	293;	see	also	Rex	and	
Tomlinson,	1979:	142).		However,	the	Council	operated	its	dispersal	policy	
covertly.		It	did	not	become	public	knowledge	until	after	being	terminated	in	
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1975	(Flett,	Henderson	and	Brown,	1979).	Dispersal	housing	practices	were	also	
influenced	by	the	actions	of	White	Ladywood	residents,	who	sought	to	
undermine	the	Council’s	decision	to	house	two	Black	families	in	one	of	12	
maisonettes	situated	on	their	estate	(ibid,	1979;	see	also	Henderson	and	Karn,	
1984).		In	addition	to	the	support	received	from	Ladywood’s	White	residents,	
the	dispersal	policy	was	also	backed	by	the	Government.			
	
	
The	Institute	of	Race	Relations	Report,	the	Cullingworth	Report	and	the	Report	
of	the	Select	Committee	on	Immigration	and	Race	Relations,	all	supported	the	
policy	of	dispersing	West	Indians	(Flett,	Henderson	and	Brown,	1979:	292).		The	
Reports	suggested	that	dispersal	was	not	just	a	means	of	reducing	the	burden	
on	education	and	welfare	provisions,	it	was	also	a	way	of	avoiding	racial	conflict	
by	integrating	the	Black	community	and	improving	housing	standards	(ibid,	
1979).		However,	the	Council	provided	little	evidence	to	support	such	claims.		
By	the	time	the	RRB’s	ruling	had	outlawed	Birmingham’s	dispersal	policy	in	
1975,	it	had	contributed	to	West	Indian	disadvantage	and	ethnic	inequality	by	
forcing	‘Black	tenants	into	the	worst	estates’	(ibid,	1979:	306)	within	the	inner-
city	wards.		This	policy	constrained	the	spatial	positions	of	West	Indians,	who	
were	unable	to	purchase	their	own	properties,	within	Birmingham’s	Bad	Lands.	
	
	
Despite	the	passing	of	the	RRA1976,	discrimination	in	the	housing	market	
continued.		Evidence	of	racial	discrimination	in	Birmingham’s	private	housing	
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sector	can	be	found	in	the	Commission	for	Racial	Equality’s	(CRE)	(1990)	Report.		
It	revealed	that	26	per	cent	of	private	landlords	in	Birmingham	discriminated	
against	potential	Black	tenants.		The	figure	for	Birmingham	was	more	than	five	
times	greater	than	the	national	average	(ibid,	1990:	18).		This	demonstrates	the	
laissez-faire	stance	of	government	where	racial	equality	is	concerned.		Although	
equality	legislation	is	implemented	with	the	supposed	aim	of	reducing	racial	
discrimination	in	the	public	sector,	there	is	no	real	political	will	to	enforce	it.		
	
	
Assimilation	and	the	education	of	African	Caribbeans	
	
Understanding	the	impact	that	education	policies	have	had	on	improving	the	
life-chances	of	Black	Britons	is	important	to	this	research56.		This	is	because	
educational	Goods57	are	generally	a	key	determinant	of	occupational	positions,	
which	provide	the	means	by	which	individuals	can	improve	their	social	status	
(Bourdieu,	2010	[1984]).		Whereas	West	Indians	experienced	direct	
																																								 																				
56Previous	research,	in	which	the	social	status	of	minority	ethnic	groups	has	been	analysed	(i.e.	
Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981;	Heath	and	Cheung,	2007),	have	used	the	terms	first	
and	second	(or	next)	generation	in	reference	to	the	descendants	of	West	Indian	immigrants.		
Despite	acknowledging	that	the	majority	of	children	of	West	Indian	parentage	were	born	in	
Britain,	the	Swann	Report	(1985:	xvii)	also	classified	them	as	West	Indians.		This	inquiry	takes	
the	view	that	although	those	labels	are	generally	applied	with	the	best	of	intentions	they	reify	
Otherness,	as	they	overlook	the	national	identity	of	British	born	Blacks	in	favour	of	their	
primordial	descent.		The	implication	of	first	and	second-generation	labels	is	that	the	primary	
identity	of	Black	Britons	is	constructed	by	referencing	their	skin	colour	to	a	geographical	space	
outside	of	the	UK.		The	consequence	of	this	ascription	is	that	regardless	of	successive	
generations	having	been	born	in	Britain,	the	descendants	of	West	Indian	subjects	will	never	be	
perceived	as	belonging	to	the	nation.		The	British	born	descendants	of	Irish,	Australian	or	
Eastern	European	immigrants	are	not	classified	in	the	same	way	as	the	descendants	of	West	
Indians.		For	example,	Ed	Miliband	–	the	former	leader	of	the	Parliamentary	Labour	Party	–	is	
the	British	born	son	of	Polish	immigrant	parents.		However,	he	is	not	Othered	by	the	labels	of	
first,	second	or	next	generation	Polish	immigrant.	
57	The	educational	qualifications	required	by	the	professions	and	high-income	occupations,	as	
opposed	to	those	that	have	little	economic	value.	
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discrimination	in	the	labour	and	housing	markets	(Rex	and	Moore,	1967;	Rex	
and	Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981;	Sivanandan,	1981,	Fryer,	1984),	their	
children	encountered	racism	in	the	educational	sector.		Therefore,	it	is	
important	to	assess	i)	the	extent	to	which	equality	policies	in	the	educational	
system	may	have	facilitated	African	Caribbean	access	to	educational	Goods,	
and	ii)	if	African	Caribbeans	have	been	able	to	climb	the	occupational	ladder	by	
exchanging	their	educational	Goods	for	economic	capital.			
	
	
Since	the	British	born	children	of	West	Indian	immigrants	first	entered	UK	
schools	in	the	1960s,	there	have	been	several	ideological	shifts	in	educational	
policies.		In	the	late	1960s,	policy	initiatives	focused	on	utilising	the	education	
sector	as	a	vehicle	to	assimilate	Black	children	into	the	perceived	social	norms	
of	British	culture	(Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979:	28-29).		Assimilation	is	essentially	a	
‘flattening	process’	(Troyna,	1992:	68),	in	which	Black	children	were	taught	to	
be	culturally	similar	to	their	White	counterparts.		It	was	presented	as	the	
political	solution	to	concerns	about	the	learning	needs	of	Black	children,	which	
were	perceived	as	being	distinctly	different	to	those	of	their	White	
counterparts.		
	
	
The	general	consensus	in	the	1960s	was	that	Britain’s	inner-city	schools	would	
be	unable	to	accommodate	Black	children	(Coard,	1971;	Carby,	1982),	and	that	
‘teachers	were	as	ill	equipped	and	unprepared	for	the	cultural	impact	of	Black	
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immigration,	as	other	parts	of	British	society’	(McKenley,	2001:	317).		In	1963	
the	Ministry	of	Education	(MoE)	published	English	for	Immigrants,	which	
emphasised	the	need	for	schools	to	assimilate	West	Indians	into	British	culture.		
However,	its	premise	was	that	‘black	pupils	should	be	treated	as	“trainee	
Whites”’	(Troyna	and	Carrington,	1990:	9).		General	guidelines	were	provided	in	
the	MoE	Pamphlet	N.43	for	an	‘“administrative	procedure”	to	deal	with	[the]	
sudden	influx	into	schools’	(Carby,	1982:	186).		In	a	similar	way	to	the	housing	
dispersal	policy	outlined	above,	the	Department	for	Education	and	Science	
(DES)	Circular	recommended	bussing58	Black	children	to	facilitate	their	
assimilation	(Carby,	1982:	186).		The	educational	policy	of	dispersal	reinforced	
the	notion	that	too	many	immigrant	children	in	any	single	school	would	
contaminate	the	education	of	their	White	counterparts59.		
	
	
During	1966,	the	Birmingham	Planet	conveyed	local	anxieties	regarding	the	
number	of	West	Indian	and	Asian	children	in	local	schools.		In	reference	to	
Wattville	Road	and	Westminster	Road	schools	in	Handsworth,	the	newspaper	
Stated	that	if	the	advice	of	the	Ministry	of	Education	was	implemented,	both	
schools	would	be	‘ripe	for	dispersal’60.		However,	only	Sandwell	LEA	adopted	
the	dispersal	policy	in	the	West	Midlands	(Troyna,	1992:	68).		The	Birmingham	
																																								 																				
58	This	was	an	educational	policy	that	legitimated	dispersing	Black	children,	by	bussing	them	
out	to	other	schools,	see	also	Mirza	(2007).	
59	The	Conclusion	of	the	Plowden	Report	(1967,	32:	193)	also	reiterates	that	LEAs	have	the	
option	of	dispersing	immigrant	children,	if	their	presence	in	a	school	exceeded	a	certain	level,	
so	as	not	to	‘interfere	with	the	ability	of	other	children	to	learn’	(ibid,	1967,	32:	193),	see	also	
Rex	and	Tomlinson	(1979:	177).			
60	Birmingham	City	Council	Library	Services.	
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Planet	also	suggested	‘Birmingham	dare	not	risk	dispersing	[…]	coloured	pupils	
in	Handsworth	across	the	outer	circle	road	to	Perry	Barr	and	[to]	other	schools	
that	have	[…]	an	upward	trend	in	their	immigrant	ratio’61.		Thus,	the	media	
amplified	the	fear	of	what	this	research	defines	as	cultural	contagion,	which	
could	only	be	avoided	by	enforcing	social	and	spatial	distance	between	the	
indigenous	and	immigrant	populations.		
	
	
Carby	(1982:	184-185)	notes	that	although	West	Indians	and	their	British	born	
children	spoke	only	English,	the	perceived	Black	problem	was	expressed	in	
terms	of	numbers62,	and	language	deficiency	(Mirza,	2007).	The	Caribbean	
dialect63	was	defined	as	a	foreign	language	in	the	1971	survey	conducted	by	the	
National	Foundation	for	Educational	Research	(NFER).		Moreover,	the	perceived	
inferiority	of	West	Indian	culture	and	the	idea	of	a	Caribbean	language	were	
considered	causal	factors	in	the	‘culturally	induced	backwardness	of	immigrant	
children	[affecting]	assessment	of	ability	and	actual	school	performance’	
(Carby,	1982:	188).		Consequently,	the	conflation	of	both	factors	led	to	a	
significant	number	of	Black	children	being	labelled	backward	and	placed	in	
schools	for	the	educationally	sub-normal	(ESN)	(Coard,	1971;	Troyna,	1984;	
																																								 																				
61	Ibid.	
62	Carby	refers	to	the	perception	that	there	were	too	many	immigrant	children	in	schools	and	
not	enough	educational	resources.		Political	and	social	anxieties	regarding	immigration	and	the	
perceived	problem	of	numbers,	prior	to	the	1962	Commonwealth	Immigration	Act,	is	
articulated	by	Peach	(1968).		See	also	Carter,	Harris	and	Joshi	(1987).	
63	West	Indian	patois	is	English.		Patois	can	be	described	as	Creole	English,	a	legacy	of	slavery	
and	colonialism.		Some	words	are	the	remnants	of	the	various	tribal	languages	of	African	
slaves.		However,	it	can	in	no	way	be	considered	as	a	foreign	language.		The	words	are	
pronounced	with	a	strong	Caribbean	dialect,	which	differs	between	urban	and	rural	areas.		
Caribbean	patois	also	has	regional	variations.		The	tone	and	pronunciation	alters	slightly	
between	different	English	speaking	Caribbean	islands.			
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Troyna	and	Carrington,	1990).		McKenley	(2001:	318)	reveals,	‘by	1970	a	culture	
of	“blaming	the	victim”	was	in	place	with	regard	to	the	education	of	immigrant	
pupils’.		The	children	of	West	Indian	immigrants	were	denied	an	education	
because	of	the	pathological	assumptions	constructed	around	their	culture,	and	
reinforced	by	teachers	(Coard,	1971;	Troyna	and	Carrington,	1990).			
	
	
During	the	mid	1970s,	‘there	was	a	gradual	shift	of	emphasis	in	educational	
policy’	(Mason,	2000:	69),	along	with	the	acceptance	that	assimilation	
legislation	had	failed	(McKenley,	2001:	320).		Lord	Bullock’s	1975	DES	report	
signalled	the	demise	of	monocultural	policies	in	favour	of	multicultural	
education	(MCE)	(Carby,	1982:	199;	Troyna,	1992:	69).		The	educational	
paradigm	shifted	to	incorporate	ideas	of	diversity	and	cultural	difference.		
However,	these	changes	were	only	superficial.	
	
	
Multicultural	and	antiracist	education	
	
During	the	mid-1970s	and	early	1980s,	the	State	implemented	MCE	policies	
with	the	supposed	aim	of	ameliorating	the	persisting	problem	of	racism	in	
education.		However,	MCE	merely	‘tinkered	with	educational	techniques	and	
methods	[…]	leaving	unaltered	the	racist	fabric	of	the	educational	system’	
(Institute	of	Race	Relations	in	Troyna,	1992:	75).		MCE	policies	focused	on	‘the	
ethnic	and	cultural	lifestyles	of	Black	pupils,	rather	than	the	wider	political	
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culture	in	which	their	life	chances	were	to	be	determined’	(Troyna,	1992:	74).		
Ethnic	differences	were	celebrated	in	terms	of	sport,	Caribbean	food,	music	and	
art,	rather	than	focusing	on	the	racism	experienced	by	Black	children	in	wider	
society.		MCE	policies	utilised	‘discoursive	deracialisation’	(Reeves	in	Troyna,	
1992:	72)	in	which	“race”	is	the	elephant	in	the	room.		The	methods	appeared	
to	‘speak	purposely	to	their	audiences	about	racial	matters,	while	avoiding	the	
overt	deployment	of	racial	descriptions,	evaluations	and	prescriptions’	(ibid,	
1992:	73).			
	
	
The	MCE	idea	of	promoting	cultural	diversity	within	schools	was	to	display	
materials	from	the	immigrant	countries	of	Black	children	in	the	classroom,	
whilst	teaching	pupils	West	Indian	songs	and	stories	(Select	Committee	on	Race	
Relations	in	Carby,	1982:	194).		However,	assimilation	policies	had	entrenched	
the	idea	that	West	Indians	and	their	British	born	children	were	culturally	and	
intellectually	deficient.		Thus,	despite	its	benign	appearance	MCE	policies	subtly	
reinforced	the	idea	of	a	pathological	Black	culture,	because	the	notion	of	West	
Indian	backwardness	was	never	challenged.			
	
	
MCE’s	focus	on	culture,	rather	than	common	shared	academic	aspirations	
between	different	ethnic	groups,	suggested	that	the	talents	of	Black	children	
lay	outside	of	the	educational	paradigm.		Consequently,	teachers	generally	
accepted	that	Black	children	were	unlikely	to	do	well	in	subjects	such	as	English	
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or	Maths,	which	required	higher	order	cognitive	skills.		Instead,	MCE	gave	
credence	to	the	idea	that	the	abilities	of	Black	children	were	naturally	suited	to	
non-academic	activities	that	had	no	direct	economic	value	(Mason,	2000:	71).		
This	reified	the	notion	that	White	children	were	naturally	intelligent,	whereas	
the	attributes	of	their	Black	peers	lay	in	their	physical	prowess.		It	consequently	
became	the	practice	of	teachers	to	steer	Black	children	towards	low	skilled	
occupations,	whilst	their	White	peers	were	groomed	for	the	professions	and	
higher	managerial	occupations	(Troyna	and	Carrington,	1990).	
	
	
The	agency	of	Black	parents,	and	protests	by	their	community	organisations,	
were	responsible	for	the	1979	‘committee	of	inquiry	into	the	education	of	
minority	ethnic	children’	(Gillborn,	2005:	486).		However,	the	government	
continued	to	adopt	a	laissez-faire	approach,	where	policies	promoting	cultural	
diversity	were	concerned.		Local	Education	Authorities	(LEAs)	were	instructed	
to	develop	their	own	interpretation	of	MCE	policies,	which	was	problematic	for	
those	that	had	a	comparatively	small	minority	ethnic	population	(Troyna,	1992:	
74).		Not	all	LEAs	thought	it	necessary	to	implement	MCE	policies.		However,	
because	of	the	failure	of	MCE	approaches,	some	LEAs	in	areas	with	a	
disproportionally	high	Caribbean	population	–	such	as	Birmingham	and	Brent	–	
adopted	antiracist	education	(ARE)	policies	(ibid,	1992:	81;	see	also	Ratcliffe,	
2004:	78).		In	short,	ARE	encapsulated	the	realisation	that	colour-blind	
educational	policies	were	not	as	effective	as	those	that	challenged	racist	ideas.		
In	contrast	to	MCE,	ARE	policies	were	about	‘taking	racism	seriously’	(Mason,	
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2000:	74).		Rather	than	circumventing	the	R	Word,	ARE	highlighted	‘the	reality	
of	racism	as	a	corrosive	feature	in	the	lives	of	Black	communities	in	the	UK’	
(Troyna,	1992:	74).			
	
	
Regardless	of	differences	in	educational	policy	approaches,	Black	children	
continued	to	be	marginalised,	problematised	and	excluded,	all	of	which	
impacted	on	their	educational	attainment	(Mamon,	2004).		Concerns	that	the	
education	system	was	failing	Black	children	influenced	the	mobilisation	of	Black	
parents,	supported	by	their	community	organisations.		Although	there	was	no	
effort	by	government	to	provide	a	truly	inclusive	curriculum,	funding	was	
obtained	through	ARE	policies	to	develop	Black	educational	programmes.		The	
Black	Studies	programme	was	an	example	of	ARE	initiative	aimed	at	raising	the	
educational	attainment	of	Black	children	(Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979:	186).		The	
programme,	however,	was	not	embedded	in	the	curriculum	taught	at	William	
Murdoch	Secondary	School	in	Handsworth.		Ratcliffe	(2004:	78)	notes,	‘the	new	
teaching	material	was	essentially	tacked	onto	the	existing	curriculum.		It	[…]	
tended	to	be	seen	as	supplementary,	rather	than	integral	to	the	existing	
syllabus’	(emphasis	in	original).	However,	Birmingham’s	Chief	Education	Officer	
personally	intervened	and	ended	the	course,	after	receiving	a	series	of	
complaints,	including	some	from	teachers	at	the	school	(ibid,	1979).		It	could	be	
argued	that	the	main	reason	for	the	failure	of	MCE	policies	was	their	lack	of	
political	support	from	central	Government.		
	
	 68	
	
Birmingham’s	Black	Churches	supported	the	educational	needs	of	African	
Caribbean	children	in	their	Sunday	School	programmes	(Rex	and	Moore,	1967;	
Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981).		Black	community	organisations	also	
provided	supplementary	education	in	Saturday	Schools.		However,	despite	the	
combined	efforts	of	parents	and	supporters,	Black	children	in	secondary	
schools	continued	to	be	excluded	at	disproportionately	high	rates	(Mirza,	
2007).		In	1979	the	Commission	for	Racial	Equality	(CRE)	investigated	‘national	
concerns	about	the	number	of	Black	pupils	who	were	being	suspended	from	
school’	(Troyna	and	Carrington,	1990:	33).		Birmingham	was	the	focus	of	the	
CRE’s	inquiry	because	of	the	city’s	large	African	Caribbean	population	and	the	
high	rate	of	Black	pupils	being	excluded	from	school.		The	CRE	revealed	that	
between	1974	and	1980	‘black	pupils	were	four	times	as	likely	as	their	White	
peers	to	be	suspended	from	secondary	school’	(ibid,	1990:	33-34).		Being	
disproportionately	excluded	placed	Black	children	at	a	distinct	disadvantage	to	
their	White	peers	(McKenley,	2001:	320).		Leaving	school	without	acquiring	any	
educational	Goods	did	more	than	just	restrict	their	labour	market	participation,	
it	also	constrained	their	subsequent	housing	situation	and	social	mobility.		
Meaningful	and	secure	employment	is	often	unattainable	without	educational	
Goods,	and	low	income	occupations	can	also	increase	dependency	on	social	
housing.					
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Lord	Rampton’s64	1981	Interim	Report,	acknowledged	both	institutional	and	
individual	racism	(Taylor,	1986;	Mason,	2000;	Ratcliffe,	2004)	as	causal	factors	
in	the	underachievement65	of	West	Indian	children.		It	emphasised	the	need	to	
change	social	attitudes	and	perceptions,	in	order	to	provide	equality	of	
opportunity	and	a	‘harmonious	multi-cultural	society’	(Taylor,	1986:	68).		Lord	
Swann’s	Report	also	acknowledged	the	problem	of	institutional	racism	and	
would	be	the	last	to	focus	specifically	on	ethnic	inequity	in	the	education	
sector.		The	1988	Education	Reform	Act	(ERA1988)	reduced	the	focus	on	racial	
disadvantage,	whilst	introducing	the	principles	of	the	free	market	to	the	
education	sector	(Troyna	and	Carrington,	1990).		Competition	within	an	
educational	market	supported	the	idea	that	disparities	in	ethnic	attainment	
were	perceived	as	consequences	of	individual	failings	based	on	differences	in	
ability	and	aspirations	(Troyna,	1992).		The	transformation	of	the	educational	
landscape	into	a	market	reinvented	pupils	and	parents	as	consumers.		Allowing	
educational	institutions	to	compete	for	funding	was	seen	as	a	means	of	raising	
standards,	whilst	also	reducing	State	intervention.	
	
	
																																								 																				
64	Anthony	Rampton	was	commissioned	to	produce	the	1981	Interim	Report:	West	Indian	
Children	in	Our	Schools,	see	Mamon,	2004.		However,	he	resigned	due	to	disagreements	with	
the	Thatcher	regime,	who	appointed	him.		His	report	implicated	structural	and	individual	
racism	as	causal	factors	in	the	educational	underachievement	[sic,	see	below]	of	West	Indian	
children.		Lord	Swann	was	appointed	in	Rampton’s	wake.		See	Taylor	(1986:	69);	and	Ratcliffe	
(2004:	80).		Swann’s	1985	report	was	entitled	Education	For	All.	
65	The	concept	of	underachievement	is	misleading	when	used	in	the	context	of	the	education	of	
West	Indian	children.		Mason	(2000:	66)	argues	that	it	‘appears	to	refer	to	the	difference	
between	results	that	might	have	been	expected	and	those	that	were	actually	achieved’.		
However,	the	term	overlooks	that	exam	expectations	were	in	some	cases	measured	by	
teachers	according	to	the	ethnicity	of	pupils,	rather	than	their	assessed	or	actual	abilities.		See	
also	Troyna	(1984)	and	Troyna	and	Carrington	(1990).	
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From	marketisation	to	social	inclusion	and	a	single	equality	regime	
	
Hardy	and	Veiler-Porter	(1992:	102)	argue	that	the	ERA1988	cannot	be	
examined	‘in	isolation	but	as	part	of	a	systematic	programme	of	change’,	which	
encompassed	the	privatisation	of	all	State	assets,	including	social	housing	and	
deregulation	of	the	labour	market.		Promoting	competition	within	an	
educational	market,	where	institutions	had	‘relative	independence	from	local	
authorities	[…]	for	curricula	matters’	(Mason,	2000:	75),	enabled	the	
Conservative	Government	to	adopt	a	laissez	faire	approach	to	the	provision	of	
education.		The	major	school	reforms	included	‘a	compulsory	national	
curriculum	[…]	and	the	proportion	of	time	devoted	to	each	subject’	(ibid,	2000:	
75).		There	was	also	a	shift	from	O-level	examinations	to	GCSE	entries	and	more	
assessed	work.		The	ERA1988	created	an	A*-C	economy66,	which	was	supported	
by	School	League	Tables.		Schools	were	ranked	according	to	the	number	of	
pupils	who	obtained	good	A*-C	GCSE	grades	(Ratcliffe,	2004:	83).		Higher	
achieving	schools	attracted	more	consumers	and	more	funds	from	the	funding	
formula	policy,	which	rewarded	schools	for	each	pupil	enrolled.		However,	the	
dominant	theme	of	marketisation	is	the	notion	of	raising	educational	
standards,	‘placing	a	premium	on	[…]	subjects	[…]	in	the	school	tests	and	
leading	to	increased	selection	and	separation	of	students’	(Gillborn,	2005:	494),	
based	on	perceived	differences	in	their	academic	ability.		
	
	
																																								 																				
66	The	A*-C	economy	and	educational	triage	are	concepts	originally	used	by	Gillborn	and	
Youdell	(2000).	
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The	ERA1988	first	promoted	the	idea	of	British	values,	whereby	the	teaching	of	
English,	British	History	and	Christianity	in	Religious	Studies,	were	viewed	as	
core	components	of	the	new	curriculum.		In	addition,	educational	autonomy	
under	the	Act	was	supposed	to	make	schools	more	responsive	to	the	needs	of	
pupils,	parents	and	the	local	community.		However,	time	constraints	meant	
that	the	teaching	of	additional	curriculum	content,	such	as	studies	related	to	
multiculturalism,	were	significantly	reduced	or	removed.		Moreover,	as	schools	
gained	autonomy	and	responsibility	for	their	finances,	many	were	able	to	cite	
financial	constraints	to	opt	out	of	multicultural	or	anti-racist	studies	(Ratcliffe,	
2004).		Consequently,	the	educational	needs	of	African	Caribbean	children	
became	secondary	to	those	of	the	school	in	the	educational	market.			
	
	
Gillborn	(2005:	494)	notes	that	‘of	the	five	principal	ethnic	categories	
monitored	continuously	since	the	late	1980s,	only	one	group	–	Whites	–	have	
enjoyed	consistent	year-on-year	improvement’.		The	educational	reforms,	
which	began	with	the	ERA1988,	has	seen	Black	students	fall	further	behind	
their	White	peers	in	terms	of	the	acquisition	of	A*-C	Grades.		The	disparity	
between	White	and	Black	pupils	in	1989	was	12	percentage	points,	but	by	2004	
it	had	increased	to	20	percentage	points	(ibid,	2005:	494).		Consequently,	Black	
children	are	perceived	as	a	risk	to	the	school’s	success	and	its	capacity	to	
acquire	funding	to	the	extent	where,	‘some	schools	have	sought	to	limit	[…]	and	
to	expel	disproportionate	numbers	of	Black	students’	(ibid,	2005:	495).		What	is	
also	worth	noting	here	is	that	both	male	and	female	Black	students	have	high	
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rates	of	school	exclusions,	in	comparison	to	their	ethnic	peers	of	the	same	
gender67.		The	perception	that	Black	pupils	will	fail	leads	to	a	self-fulfilling	
prophecy	of	low	educational	expectations.		Black	children	in	lower	streams	are	
sometimes	entered	for	exams	where	the	highest	obtainable	Grade	is	D	(ibid,	
2005:	496).		As	a	consequence	of	being	unable	to	obtain	educational	Goods	
within	the	A*-C	economy,	they	are	often	unable	to	progress	onto	A-Level	
courses	that	allow	students	to	access	universities.		
	
	
John	Major’s	Conservative	Government	promoted	a	Colour-blind	policy	
approach.		This	is	a	one-size	fits	all	educational	model	in	which	policies	are	
supposed	to	address	the	needs	of	citizens	equally,	regardless	of	differences	in	
their	social	status.		However,	the	notion	of	Colour-blindness	was	effectively	‘an	
obstinate	refusal	to	consider	ethnic	diversity	despite	a	wealth	of	evidence	that	
minorities	are	not	sharing	equally’	(Gillborn,	2008a:	715	[emphasis	in	original]).		
The	Further	and	Higher	Education	Act	1992	(FHEA1992)	(UKPGA,	1992)	–	which	
enabled	polytechnics	with	over	55	per	cent	of	their	students	enrolled	on	higher	
education	courses	to	acquire	university	status	–	was	passed	during	Major’s	
term	as	Prime	Minister.		Allowing	colleges	to	acquire	university	status	might	
have	facilitated	African	Caribbean	higher	education	participation,	as	there	is	
evidence	to	suggest	they	have	more	difficulties	than	their	White	counterparts	
accessing	red	brick	universities	(Shiner	and	Modood,	2002).		However,	The	
FHEA1992	did	nothing	to	end	elitism	between	former	polytechnics	and	their	
																																								 																				
67	See	Chapter	Four.	
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pre-1992	counterparts,	as	the	distinction	between	new	and	old	university	
degrees	was	reinforced	by	selection	in	the	labour	market.		Although	the	
FHEA1992	improved	access	to	universities,	it	did	not	necessarily	guarantee	
improved	employment	opportunities.		Students	from	the	more	prestigious	red	
brick	institutions	‘tend	to	go	on	to	the	best-paying	jobs’	(Dorling,	2016).		This	
suggests	that	degrees	from	old	universities	are	perceived	by	employers	as	
having	a	higher	status	than	those	from	their	new	counterparts.		
	
	
Stephen	Lawrence,	a	19-year-old	African	Caribbean	A-level	student,	was	
murdered	in	South-East	London	by	White	racists	in	1993.		Although	John	Major	
was	Prime	Minister	when	he	was	killed,	it	was	Tony	Blair’s	government	that	
commissioned	the	Macpherson	inquiry	into	his	murder.		The	resulting	report	
heralded	a	significant	shift	in	race	policy	and	how	racial	inequality	is	monitored,	
particularly	within	public	sector	organisations.	The	Macpherson	Report	(1999)	
accused	the	police	of	institutional	racism	and	led	to	the	passing	of	the	2000	
Race	Relations	Amendment	Act	(RRAA2000).		The	Macpherson	Report	
recommendations	also	imposed	a	duty	on	all	public-sector	bodies	to	monitor	
ethnic	inequalities,	in	order	to	reduce	the	likelihood	of	racial	discrimination.		
Educational	institutions	are	now	required	to	collate	data	relating	to	the	
‘participation,	retention	and	achievement’	of	socially	disadvantaged	groups	
(Learning	Skills	Council,	2001:	3)	and	to	promote	race	equality.		New	Labour	
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promoted	education68	as	the	vehicle	for	social	inclusion	(Gillborn,	2008a).	
Although	New	Labour	did	not	displace	the	marketisation	policies	of	the	
previous	Conservative	government,	its	policies	focused	on	widening	
participation	into	higher	education	as	a	means	of	tackling	social	exclusion	and	
poverty.			
	
	
Between	1991	and	2001	ethnic	disparities	in	educational	attainment	had	
increased	significantly,	with	both	‘black	boys	and	girls	[…]	lagging	far	behind	
their	peers’	(Mamon,	2004:	88).		This	was	especially	the	case	in	Birmingham,	
where	the	gap	in	attainment	between	Black	children	and	their	White	peers	
widened	greatly	between	1998	and	2001	(ibid,	2004:	87).	The	RRAA2000	led	to	
the	introduction	of	Equality	and	Diversity	Impact	Measurements	(EDIMs)	in	
education,	to	monitor	ethnic	inequalities	and	various	forms	of	social	
disadvantage	(Learning	and	Skills	Council,	2001).		However,	as	discussed	above	
in	relation	to	the	role	of	government	where	MCE	and	ARE	policies	were	
concerned,	New	Labour	did	not	impose	a	national	directive	that	standardised	
EDIMs.			
	
	
Although	New	Labour	spoke	of	social	exclusion,	their	actions	supported	the	
colour-blind	policies	of	the	previous	government	(Gillborn,	2008a).		Educational	
institutions	were	only	required	to	have	a	system	in	place	to	monitor	racial	
																																								 																				
68	Education,	education,	education	was	the	slogan	adopted	by	New	Labour	during	their	1997	
election	campaign.	
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discrimination	and	other	forms	of	inequalities.		Consequently,	learning	
institutions	have	adopted	a	tendency	to	collate	inequality	data	in	an	arbitrary	
manner	without	taking	actions	to	address	identified	problems.		Moreover,	
under	the	Data	Protection	Act	1998	student	information	is	protected,	which	
makes	it	difficult	to	identify	how	educational	establishments	respond	to	issues	
where	inequity	is	identified.		This	creates	a	paradox	in	which	public	sector	
organisations	are	obligated	to	record	ethnic	discrimination,	but	are	not	duty-
bound	to	release	the	data	for	public	scrutiny.		As	the	data	are	not	in	the	public	
domain	it	is	difficult	to	assess	the	effectiveness	of	equality	policies.		
Consequently,	disparities	in	ethnic	attainment	can	appear	to	be	a	consequence	
of	variations	in	ability	–	highlighted	by	competition	in	the	educational	market	–	
rather	than	factors	such	as	institutional	discrimination	that	are	often	reinforced	
by	the	individual	prejudices	of	teachers	(Troyna	and	Carrington,	1992;	Ratcliffe,	
2004;	Gillborn,	2008a).	
	
	
Since	2010,	when	the	Conservative	and	Liberal	Democrat	Coalition	Government	
replaced	New	Labour,	“race”	has	been	reconstructed	as	a	protected	
characteristic	under	the	2010	Equality	Act	(EA2010).		The	idea	of	race	as	one	of	
nine	protected	characteristics,	is	the	latest	ideological	shift	in	educational	
policy.	The	specific	public	sector	duties	of	the	RRAA2000	now	fall	within	the	
remit	of	the	EA2010	(UKPGA,	2014),	which	promotes	a	single	equality	regime	
(Richardson	and	Monro,	2012)	and	reinforces	the	notion	that	racial	inequalities	
are	no	different	to	other	forms	of	inequalities.		The	nine	protected	
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characteristics	in	the	EA2010	are:	age,	disability,	gender	reassignment,	
marriage	and	civil	partnership,	pregnancy	and	maternity,	race,	religion	or	belief,	
sex	and	sexual	orientation	(UKPGA,	2014:	Part	2,	Chap.	1:	Section	4).		The	Act	
also	conflates	ethnicity,	or	national	origin,	within	the	idea	of	a	racial	group	(ibid,	
Part	2,	Chap.	1:	Section	9.1).		Although	it	reinforces	the	duty	to	monitor	racial	
inequality,	it	appears	that	‘the	more	things	change	the	more	they	stay	the	
same’	(Mirza,	2007:	1).		This	is	because	the	relative	de-emphasis	of	“race”	in	
policy	approaches	is	problematic	to	those	afflicted	by	racism,	particularly	in	the	
key	sites	of	education,	employment	and	housing.		Pears	(2013)	contends	that	
despite	the	passing	of	the	EA2010	‘Black	communities	are	proportionally	worse	
off	in	almost	every	single	area	of	society:	redundancies,	unemployment	[and]	
education’.		
	
	
Conclusion		
Jamaica’s	relationship	with	Empire	articulates	how	historical	and	contemporary	
legislation	have	enabled	the	exploitation	of	Black	labour,	and	to	some	extent	
constrained	the	social	status	of	Black	British	subjects.		Laws	passed	by	the	
British	in	the	seventeenth	century,	and	implemented	in	the	Americas,	classified	
Africans	as	items	of	property:	chattel.		Denying	slaves	their	rights	as	humans	
inhibited	their	social	status	and	legitimated	the	idea	of	Black	servitude.		After	
Emancipation,	and	up	until	the	twentieth	century,	US	immigration	legislation	
enabled	the	movement	of	free	Black	labour	between	South	and	North	America.		
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However,	the	1952	McCarran-Walter	Act	(US	Department	of	State	Office	of	the	
Historian,	2012)	favoured	European	workers	over	their	Black	counterparts.		The	
Act	was	also	instrumental	in	redirecting	the	flow	of	labour	from	the	Caribbean.		
Immigration	restrictions	to	the	US	made	Canada	a	viable	option	for	migration,	
until	Canadian	legislation	also	constrained	immigration	from	the	Caribbean.		
From	chattel	slavery	in	the	seventeenth	and	eighteenth	centuries,	to	
Emancipation	in	the	nineteenth	century	and	free	labour	in	the	twentieth	
century,	the	labour	of	Caribbean	subjects	has	been	exploited	for	European	
benefit.		The	combination	of	natural	disasters,	an	education	system	that	only	
few	could	afford	(Black,	1991)	and	a	dearth	of	economic	opportunities,	
influenced	Jamaican	migration	and	contributed	to	the	material	deprivation	of	
the	majority	of	Caribbean	subjects.		
	
	
Migration	was	not	a	new	phenomenon	where	Jamaica	was	concerned.		
However,	what	was	new	about	the	outward	flow	of	post-war	Jamaican	labour	
was	the	direction	of	travel	towards	Britain.		Moreover,	Caribbean	migration	was	
not	solely	influenced	by	economic	factors	as	personal	circumstances	and	
individual	reasons	have	also	played	their	part.		The	1948	British	Nationality	Act	
facilitated	the	entry	and	settlement	of	West	Indian	surplus	labour	by	providing	
Commonwealth	citizens	with	British	passports	(Fryer,	1984).		Many	of	the	major	
UK	cities	that	attracted	Caribbean	migrants	had	developed	their	economic	
infrastructure	with	capital	accumulated	indirectly	from	slave	labour	
(Hobsbawm,	1969;	Williams,	2005	[1944]).		Birmingham	profited	from	slave	
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labour,	prior	to	and	during	the	industrial	revolution	(Harris,	2008),	and	in	the	
1950s	and	1960s	the	city	benefitted	from	the	exploitation	of	the	West	Indian	
workforce	(Rex	and	Moore,	1967;	Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981).	
Caribbean	migrants	obtained	work	in	Birmingham’s	foundries	and	factories,	
and	acquired	housing	in	deteriorating	urban	spaces	vacated	by	the	White	
population	(Taylor,	1993).		However,	discriminatory	employment	and	housing	
policies	and	practices	constrained	their	social	and	spatial	mobility	to	particular	
forms	of	work	and	in	specific	urban	spaces	of	high	material	deprivation	
(Sivanandan,	1981;	Phizacklea	and	Miles,	1982;	Fryer,	1984).			
	
	
The	need	to	obtain	economic	and	housing	Goods,	as	a	means	of	improving	
one’s	social	status,	has	been	noted	by	previous	commentators	(Rex	and	Moore,	
1967;	Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981).		Therefore,	the	education,	
employment	and	housing	markets	are	key	sites	of	conflict	in	the	competition	
for	life-changing	resources.		West	Indians	continued	to	be	over-represented	in	
semi-skilled	and	unskilled	occupations	during	the	mid-1970s	(Rex	and	
Tomlinson,	1979:	146).		Ratcliffe	(1981:	298)	also	noted	that	in	line	with	the	
occupations	of	their	parents	‘relatively	few	West	Indians	[…]	have	obtained	
White	collar	occupations’.		However,	it	may	be	the	case	that	African	Caribbeans	
are	accessing	the	higher	income	occupational	positions	that	were	previously	
denied	to	their	parents.		On	the	other	hand,	the	persistence	of	racism	might	
still	be	constraining	their	opportunities	in	the	contemporary	labour	market.	
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Ratcliffe	(1981:	308)	argued	that	robust	anti-discriminatory	policies	would	be	
necessary	to	reduce	future	labour	market	inequalities.		Moreover,	‘much	will	
depend	on	the	success	of	policy	makers	in	tackling	overt	racism’	(ibid,	1981:	
308)	to	ensure	the	‘easy	and	typical’	(Weber	in	Smith,	2007:	87)	occurrence	of	
Black	Caribbean	social	mobility.		Black	organisations	have	contributed	to	the	
passing	of	race	equality	legislation	designed	to	reduce	discrimination,	in	the	
market	situations	where	ethnic	groups	compete	for	vital	commodities	
(Ratcliffe,	2004).		However,	it	remains	to	be	seen	if	the	decreasing	focus	on	
“race”	in	contemporary	equality	legislation	has	reduced	the	agency	of	African	
Caribbean	religious	and	political	groups,	and	the	power	they	have	to	obtain	
resources	for	their	supporters.		Conflating	“race”	with	other	protected	
characteristics69	might	also	suggest	that	racist	practices	and	racial	
disadvantage,	are	harder	to	ameliorate	than	they	were	in	the	past.		
	
	
The	problem	of	discrimination	in	the	public	housing	market	has	shifted	since	
the	mid-1960s	and	1970s	(Rex	and	Moore,	1967;	Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979).		In	
comparison	to	the	West	Indian	residents	of	1960s	Sparkbrook	(Rex	and	Moore,	
1967),	more	of	the	Council’s	housing	stock	has	been	allocated	to	West	Indians	
and	their	children	(Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979;	Flett,	Henderson	and	Brown,	
1979).		However,	‘there	has	arisen	a	de	facto	type	of	segregation	and	even	a	
tendency	towards	making	ghettos	of	certain	areas’	(Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979:	
																																								 																				
69	See	the	2010	Equality	Act.	
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143	[emphasis	in	original]).		Thus,	there	is	a	need	to	ascertain	if	African	
Caribbeans	have	increased	their	presence	in	Birmingham’s	Good	lands,	or	if	
they	continue	to	reside	in	Bad	Lands	such	as	Handsworth.		As	space	and	
particular	types	of	tenure	are	salient	factors	of	spatial	mobility,	it	is	also	
important	to	establish	if	African	Caribbeans	are	reducing	their	future	risk	of	
poverty	by	becoming	owner-occupiers.		The	importance	of	choice	and	
constraint	in	the	housing	market	also	has	to	be	assessed.		This	is	in	terms	of	
whether	the	urban	concentration	of	the	Caribbean	population	is	constrained	by	
discriminatory	practices,	or	if	their	contemporary	settlement	patterns	are	a	
consequence	of	other	factors.		
	
	
The	ideological	shift	in	educational	policies	–	from	assimilation,	to	
multiculturalism,	to	anti-racism,	marketisation	and	social	inclusion	–	
represented	one	policy	failure	after	another	where	the	education	of	Black	
children	is	concerned.		The	ERA1988	transformed	the	educational	landscape	
into	a	market	(Troyna	and	Carrington,	1992),	in	which	African	Caribbean	pupils	
are	perceived	as	ethnic	liabilities	in	the	competition	for	Goods.	This	is	
particularly	the	case	given	that,	after	1988,	educational	institutions	had	to	
compete	for	funding,	whilst	achieving	attainment	and	retention	targets.		
Sivanandan	(in	Christian,	2005:	340)	maintains	that	the	exclusion	of	Black	
children	became	an	automatic	consequence	of	marketisation:	
	
	 81	
‘When	you	have	an	educational	system	which	puts	a	premium	not	on	
the	educability	of	the	child	but	on	the	price	of	its	education,	the	
challenge	to	the	teacher	is	the	financial	cost	of	keeping	it	[the	child]	
in,	not	the	human	cost	of	keeping	it	out’.			
	
	
In	comparison	to	other	ethnic	groups,	African	Caribbeans	have	a	higher	rate	of	
school	exclusion,	which	has	been	the	case	since	the	1960s	(Christian,	2005:	328;	
Gillborn,	1997:	66).		Bourdieu	(2010,	[1984])	also	notes	the	importance	of	
acquiring	educational	Goods	at	the	expected	age.		This	is	particularly	important	
in	regard	to	the	acquisition	of	higher	education	capital,	which	allows	individuals	
to	enter	the	labour	market	at	the	earliest	opportunity	and	obtain	occupations	
with	more	income	and	security	than	less	skilled	work	in	the	lower	tiers	of	the	
economy.		Moreover,	young	highly	qualified	workers	have	more	economic	
value	to	employers	than	their	equally	qualified	but	older	counterparts.		This	
demonstrates	how	school	exclusions	can	block	the	life-chances	of	African	
Caribbeans.		Early	exit	from	the	educational	system	condemns	African	
Caribbeans	to	early	entry	into	the	labour	market,	but	without	the	requisite	
skills	needed	to	take	advantage	of	opportunities	for	occupational	progression.	
	
	
As	can	be	seen	above,	much	has	been	documented	regarding	the	social	and	
political	struggles	of	Caribbean	peoples	in	the	1950s,	1960s	and	1970s	(Rex	and	
Moore,	1967;	Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981;	Sivanandan,	1982;	
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Phizacklea	and	Miles,	1982;	Fryer,	1984;	Carter,	Harris	and	Joshi,	1987;	Taylor,	
1993;	Solomos,	2003).		However,	there	is	a	dearth	of	analysis	regarding	the	
impact	that	equality	policies,	earned	through	years	of	struggle	against	racial	
discrimination,	may	have	had	on	improving	the	life-chances	of	Black	
Caribbeans.		This	is	particularly	as	the	RRA1976	and	the	RRAA2000	have	been	
superseded	by	the	EA2010,	which	views	all	forms	of	inequity	equally.		The	aim	
now	is	to	address	that	oversight	by	mapping	and	analysing	changes	in	the	social	
status	and	spatial	mobility	of	Black	Caribbeans.		However,	before	this	inquiry	
can	proceed,	it	is	necessary	to	justify	the	methods	employed	in	this	research.	
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3. The	researcher	as	gatekeeper	and	insider	
	
This	research	analyses	the	social	class	and	spatial	mobility	of	African	Caribbeans	
by	mapping	changes	in	their	educational,	labour	and	housing	market	positions,	
and	comparing	them	to	those	of	their	White	British	and	Mixed	White	and	Black	
Caribbean	(hereafter	referred	to	as	MWBC)	peers.	Despite	the	passing	of	
successive	race	and	equality	legislation	(Ratcliffe,	2004)	West	Indians,	and	their	
British	born	descendants,	have	experienced	considerable	discrimination	in	
market	situations70.		Thus,	variations	in	the	social	status	of	African	Caribbeans	
are	also	analysed	vis-à-vis	the	impact	of	legislative	change.		The	differential	
access	that	African	Caribbeans	have	to	life-changing	goods	is	also	compared	to	
those	who	identify	as	MWBC.		This	is	because	prior	to	the	introduction	of	the	
Mixed	ethnic	category	in	the	2001	Census,	both	groups	may	well	have	shared	
the	same	ontological	status.	
	
	
A	‘mixed-methods’	(Venkatesh,	2013:	3)	approach	was	employed	to	examine	
the	factors	influencing	Black	Caribbean	spatial	and	social	mobility.		They	
consisted	of	the	following:	
• ethnographic	fieldwork;	
• semi-structured	interviews	recorded	with	audio-visual	devices;	
• Census	Area	Statistics	Tables	and	aggregated	data;	
• Small	Area	Statistics	Micro-data	(SAM);	
																																								 																				
70	See	Chapter	Two.	
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• Higher	Education	Statistics	Agency	(HESA)	datasets	and	tables;	
• Higher	Education	Information	Databases	for	Institutions	(HEIDI)	tables;	
• an	Index	of	Multiple	Deprivation.			
	
	
The	ethnographic	fieldwork	took	place	in	Birmingham’s	African	Caribbean	
community	between	2010	and	2014.		The	observational	elements	required	
participation	in	weekly	community	meetings	over	the	duration	of	the	research,	
participation	in	four	African	Liberation	Day	(ALD)	events	and	approximately	15	
seminars	organised	by	African	Caribbean	organisations.		Thirteen	interviews	
were	conducted,	seven	of	which	were	with	African	Caribbean	adults,	of	both	
genders	(see	Appendix	ii.:	Table	1.1).		The	seven	subjects	were	participants	in	a	
three-year	community	educational	project	based	in	Hockley	and	hosted	by	a	
company	called	ACFAS	(African	Caribbean	Further	Advancement	Society).		
Hockley	is	near	to	Handsworth	and	Smethwick,	where	some	of	the	participants	
lived.		The	wards	are	also	major	enclaves	of	post-war	Caribbean	settlement	in	
Britain	and	have	been	sites	of	racial	conflict	on	different	occasions71.		In	
addition,	Handsworth	has	also	been	the	focus	of	previous	research,	in	which	
ethnic	competition	in	market	situations	was	examined	(Rex	and	Tomlinson,	
1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981;	Taylor,	1993).				
																																								 																				
71	The	Black	community	clashed	with	members	of	the	National	Front	(NF)	when	the	latter	
marched	through	Handsworth	during	the	1977	Ladywood	bye-election	(Ratcliffe,	1981).		There	
were	also	violent	confrontations	between	the	Black	community	and	the	police	in	Handsworth	
during	1981	and	1985,	see	Ratcliffe	(2004)	and	also	Solomos	(2003)	for	a	wider	debate	on	the	
causes	of	urban	disturbances	during	the	1980s.		West	Bromwich	was	a	site	of	racial	conflict	
between	Black	migrants	and	their	European	Voluntary	Worker	(EVW)	counterparts	in	the	
1940s,	see	Chapter	Seven.		During	the	1960s	there	were	also	violent	confrontations	between	
the	West	Indian	and	White	communities	of	Smethwick,	also	see	Chapter	Seven.		In	2011	the	
Lozells	area	was	the	scene	of	ethnic	tensions,	which	also	erupted	in	violence,	see	Chapter	Four.	
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It	was	difficult	to	find	potential	participants	who	met	the	criteria	and	were	
located	in	a	single	place.		The	criteria	for	inclusion	in	the	research	was	that	the	
subjects	must	have	been	born	during	the	1960s	and	educated	in	the	UK.		The	
age	of	the	subjects	is	important	because	it	identified	them	as	belonging	to	the	
first	generation	of	Black	children	educated	in	British	schools	(Coard,	1971;	
Carby,	1982).		Moreover,	the	period	between	the	mid	1960s	and	early	1980s	is	
also	significant	in	regard	to	various	ideological	and	political	changes	in	equality	
policies,	particularly	in	the	education	sector.		The	author	heard	about	ACFAS	by	
word-of-mouth.		It	was	the	only	Black-led	community	educational	organisation	
with	a	cohort	of	Black	adults.		Thus,	the	seven	African	Caribbean	respondents,	
mentioned	above	were	selected	as	part	of	a	convenience	sample	(Smith,	1991).		
The	sample	size	is	extremely	small,	and	as	such	the	research	is	not	attempting	
to	make	a	generalisable	statement.		
	
	
According	to	Bryman	(2001:	99),	the	snowball	method	of	obtaining	a	sample	
focuses	‘upon	or	reflect	relationships	between	people’.		Immersion	in	the	
African	Caribbean	community	allowed	the	author	to	build	relationships	with	
individuals	who	were	able	to	signpost	him	to	others	whose	work	was	relevant	
to	the	aims	of	the	research.		It	was	by	this	means	that	the	author	heard	of	
ACFAS	and	subsequently	developed	a	rapport	with	the	organisation’s	female	
Project	Manager	(PM),	who	wished	to	remain	anonymous.		She	became	a	
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gatekeeper	and	provided	access	to	the	organisation’s	Black	Caribbean	learners	
who	matched	the	research	criteria.		By	chance,	a	few	of	the	research	
participants	just	happened	to	be	dyslexic.		The	community	project	ACFAS	was	
delivering	at	the	time	involved	providing	dyslexia	assessments	for	adults	with	
non-specific	learning	difficulties.		The	PM	maintained	ACFAS’s	statutory	duty	
towards	safeguarding	when	considering	the	suitability	of	participants	to	be	
interviewed.		In	the	context	of	educational	settings,	learners	with	cognitive	
disabilities	are	protected	under	the	Safeguarding	and	Vulnerable	Groups	Act	
2006	(Independent	Safeguarding	Authority	[ISA],	2014)	and	the	2010	Equality	
Act	(EA2010).		Before	the	author	was	allowed	to	interview	the	subjects,	they	
were	in	the	first	instance	evaluated	by	the	PM.		She	discussed	the	aims	of	the	
research	with	the	subjects	and	obtained	their	consent	to	pass	their	contact	
details	to	the	author.		
	
	
Those	selected	to	be	interviewed	initially	received	a	text	from	the	author,	
asking	when	it	would	be	suitable	to	call	them.		Those	who	responded	were	
contacted	by	phone	and	the	research	was	explained	to	them.		Seven	ACFAS	
learners	agreed	to	participate	as	long	as	they	could	remain	anonymous.		It	was	
therefore	agreed	that	they	would	all	use	pseudonyms.		Consent	to	use	audio-
visual	recording	equipment	was	also	obtained	during	the	telephone	dialogue.		
After	the	author	made	initial	contact,	the	PM	then	arranged	mutually	
convenient	dates	and	times	when	the	interviews	could	take	place	at	ACFAS.		
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Four	out	of	the	seven	interviews	were	conducted	at	ACFAS,	whilst	the	
remaining	three	took	place	in	the	participants’	homes.			
	
	
The	narratives	of	five	dyslexic	subjects	attending	ACFAS	were	used	in	this	
research,	alongside	two	who	had	no	hidden	disabilities.		Although	Disability	is	
not	the	focus	of	this	research,	it	is	nevertheless	concerned	with	social	
disadvantage	and	the	factors	that	influence	it.		None	of	the	dyslexic	participants	
had	their	disability	identified	in	mainstream	education.		Their	biographies	are	
examined	to	explore	how	disability	and	racism	intersected	their	experiences	of	
schooling	in	the	1970s	and	early	1980s.		Their	narratives	also	provided	valuable	
insights	into	the	meanings	they	attach	to	their	perceptions	of	self,	and	their	
lived	experiences	of	competition	in	the	educational,	housing	and	labour	
markets.		The	narratives	of	the	subjects	are	also	analysed	against	quantitative	
data	of	their	contemporaries	in	the	education,	labour	and	housing	markets.		
The	aim	of	this	approach	is	to	examine	if	the	current	equality	agenda	may	have	
contributed	to	reducing	the	impact	of	racism	in	the	above	market	situations,	or	
if	the	contemporary	experiences	of	African	Caribbeans	still	resonate	with	those	
of	the	previous	generation.				
	
	
The	remaining	six	interviews	were	conducted	with	Black	Caribbean	community	
leaders	and	a	White	British	Professor	of	Sociology,	whose	research	focuses	on	
ethnic	inequalities	in	education.		The	community	organisations	were	selected	
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by	a	mixture	of	haphazard	sampling,	‘because	they	[…]	fortuitously	presented	
themselves’	(Smith,	1991:	147)	and	snowball	sampling.		This	is	because	as	
noted	above,	contacts	in	the	Black	community	often	directed	me	to	relevant	
others.		The	community	leaders	were	of	different	social	classes	and	members	of	
religious	and	community	based	Black	organisations.		Their	qualitative	data	
provided	a	first-hand	account	of	the	factors	constraining	and	enabling	their	
agency,	and	how	legislative	change	has	impacted	on	the	capacity	of	their	
organisations	to	support	the	needs	of	the	African	Caribbean	community.		
	
	
The	demographic	data	used	in	this	research	was	obtained	from	revised	datasets	
used	in	the	1991,	2001	and	2011	national	Censuses.		The	data	captured	
national	and	local	employment,	and	housing	characteristics,	of	the	three	ethnic	
groups	featured	in	this	research.		Datasets	from	HESA	and	HEIDI	were	also	used	
to	capture	ethnic	differences	in	educational	attainment.		An	Index	of	Multiple	
Deprivation	(IMD)	established	material	disparities	between	the	various	Lower	
Super	Output	Areas	(LSOAs)	in	Birmingham’s	40	wards72.		A	critical	analysis	of	
the	methods,	and	the	problems	that	arose	in	relation	to	their	usage,	now	
follows.	
	
	
	
																																								 																				
72	Super	Output	Areas	(SOAs)	are	geographical	spaces	‘small	enough	to	identify	problems	
within	wards	but	large	enough	to	avoid	the	dangers	of	breaching	confidentiality’	(Birmingham	
City	Council,	2013:	1).	
	 89	
African	Caribbean	demography	and	geography		
	
Ratcliffe	(1981:	56)	argues	that	although	‘Census	data	tells	us	little	about	the	
precise	quality	of	life	enjoyed	by	Britain’s	citizens	[…],	they	do	undoubtedly	
provide	an	impressionistic	overview’	of	disparities	in	their	material	conditions.		
Census	data	is	used	in	this	inquiry	to	distinguish	changes	in	ethnic	occupational	
and	spatial	positions	during	different	decades.		By	analysing	trends	in	the	data	
between	1991	and	2011,	it	is	possible	to	identify	improvements,	stagnation	and	
regression	in	the	employment	and	housing	positions	of	African	Caribbean,	
White	British	and	MWBC	ethnic	groups.		Therefore,	we	can	‘learn	a	great	deal	
about	the	present	position	of	minority	groups	and	also	about	the	problems	
which	may	be	faced	by	future	generations’	(ibid,	1981:	60).			
	
	
Birmingham	has	a	total	of	forty	areas	that	for	political	purposes	are	classified	as	
wards.		However,	the	city	had	thirty-nine	wards	in	1971;	forty-two	in	1981	and	
in	the	national	Censuses	of	1991	and	2001	Birmingham	had	thirty-nine	wards73.		
Boundary	changes	are	responsible	for	the	variations	in	ward	sizes,	the	last	of	
which	was	in	2004.		Boundary	changes	can	create	ontological	problems	in	
relation	to	understanding	what	exists	(May,	2001).		For	example,	in	the	1971	
National	Census	Birmingham	came	under	the	County	of	Warwickshire.		
However,	in	1974	the	city’s	boundaries	changed	when	Birmingham	became	
																																								 																				
73	Census	Area	Statistics	on	the	Web	(CASWEB)	(2014)	and	ONS	(2014).	
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part	of	the	Metropolitan	County	of	the	West	Midlands74.		Birmingham’s	Local	
Authority	also	redrew	the	boundary	of	the	Soho	ward	in	1982.		The	
restructuring	of	the	Soho	ward	was	significant	in	terms	of	the	statistical	
representation	of	the	Caribbean	population	in	Birmingham.		This	is	because	‘the	
new	ward	of	Soho	(just	like	the	old	Soho)	had	the	largest	minority	population’	
in	Birmingham75.		Therefore,	boundary	changes	give	the	appearance	that	the	
ethnic	populations	residing	in	the	affected	areas	have	increased	or	reduced	in	
size.		
	
	
Ethnicity	as	identity	and	social	category	
	
There	are	hermeneutic	(May,	2001:	15)	problems	in	the	use	of	ethnic	Census	
classifications,	which	are	caused	by	changes	in	the	political	meanings	of	what	
are	effectively	socially	constructed	categories.		For	example,	African	Caribbean	
is	an	adaptation	of	the	Black-Caribbean	ethnic	classification,	which	refers	to	the	
same	group.		The	category	was	first	used	in	the	1991	Census	when	Question	11	
asked	respondents	to	select	their	‘ethnic	group’	(Ratcliffe,	1996:	5).		A	political	
argument	for	the	inclusion	of	a	question	regarding	the	ethnicity	of	individuals	
was	the	concern	that	‘accurate	statistics	were	a	necessary	prerequisite	in	any	
																																								 																				
74	When	Birmingham’s	boundary	was	extended	in	1981	the	Sutton	wards	were	incorporated	
into	the	city.		The	1981	National	Census	records	the	new	Sutton	wards	as	Sutton	Coldfield	No.	
1,	No.	2	and	No.	3	respectively.		Although	All	Saints,	Deritend,	Gravelly	Hill,	Newtown,	Rotton	
Park,	Saltley	and	Stechford,	were	all	recorded	as	Birmingham	wards	in	1981,	they	were	
renamed	or	reconstituted	by	the	boundary	changes	in	1982.		As	a	result	of	these	changes	the	
new	wards	of	Bartley	Green,	Bournville,	Hodge	Hill,	Kingsbury	and	Nechells	were	created.			
75	Birmingham	City	Council	(1981):	Paragraph	5	of	the	Appendix.	
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attempt	to	measure	the	extent	of	racial	discrimination’	(Ballard,	1996:	10).		
Ratcliffe	(1996:	7)	notes	there	were	two	key	arguments	behind	the	introduction	
of	the	question:	the	need	to	assess	the	effectiveness	of	the	1976	Race	Relations	
Act;	and	to	overcome	the	problem	of	using	a	question	to	do	something	it	was	
not	designed	for.		Prior	to	1991	British	born	Black	children	were	classified	
according	to	the	Caribbean	origin	of	their	West	Indian	parents	(Owen,	1995:	2),	
which	made	their	epistemological	and	ontological	status	somewhat	
problematic.		This	problem	was	demonstrated	in	the	Handsworth	survey	of	Rex	
and	Tomlinson	(1979),	and	Ratcliffe’s	(1981)	interpretation	of	their	data.		The	
researchers	were	unable	to	use	Census	data	to	gather	information	on	the	
children	of	West	Indians	and	resorted	to	using	data	from	the	Birmingham	
Statistics	Office,	in	order	to	identify	them	in	a	meaningful	way	(Rex	and	
Tomlinson,	1979:	322).		
	
	
Despite	the	political	arguments,	which	suggested	the	question	on	ethnic	origin	
in	the	1991	Census	was	justified	as	a	means	of	monitoring	racial	inequalities	
(Skellington,	1996:	32),	Ballard	(1996)	notes	that	the	purpose	for	which	it	was	
intended	has	been	generally	overlooked.		This	has	generated	underlying	fears	
that	the	use	of	ethnicity	data	is	more	‘concerned	with	identifying	members	of	
Britain’s	visible	minorities’	(ibid,	1996:	8)	than	material	inequalities.		Moreover,	
the	use	of	ethnic	categories	has	to	some	extent	reinforced	notions	of	Otherness	
based	on	physical	differences.		As	a	consequence,	ethnicity	is	often	used	as	a	
reference	to	“race”	(Ballard,	1996:	3;	Ratcliffe,	1996:	3),	and	although	the	
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Census	attempts	to	portray	ethnicity	as	a	non-racial	classification,	it	reifies	skin	
colour	as	the	primary	and	distinguishing	feature	of	an	ethnic	group	(Ballard,	
1996:	12).			
	
	
Ballard	(1996:	13)	contends	that	in	the	1991	and	2001	Censuses,	the	White	
‘majority	were	implicitly	being	invited	to	identify	themselves	as	members	of	a	
physically	distinctive	racial	category’.		This	suggests	that	Whiteness	equates	to	
Britishness,	whereas	the	Black	category	is	Othered	by	the	way	that	it	can	be	
further	deconstructed	into	sub-categories	of	Black	African	or	Black	Other	
(Ratcliffe,	2004:	37-38).		For	those	who	subscribe	to	the	Black-Caribbean	
category,	this	reduces	any	sense	of	belonging	to	the	nation	(Ballard,	1996:	12).		
Moreover,	the	ethnic	question,	along	with	its	parental	birthplace	predecessor,	
constructs	the	national	identities	of	Black	Britons	according	to	their	putative	
ancestral	origins.		This	overlooks	that	fact	that	those	labelled	as	African	
Caribbean	are,	in	most	cases,	British	by	birth.		
	
	
Shifting	notions	of	individual	concepts	of	self	can	also	blur	the	ontological	
meanings	behind	ethnic	categories.		This	is	because	social	actors	may	switch	
allegiance	from	one	classification	to	another,	or	indeed	may	not	subscribe	to	
any	of	them.		This	is	demonstrated	with	the	introduction	of	the	Mixed	ethnic	
category	in	the	2001	Census	(Ratcliffe,	2004).		Although	the	ethnic	classification	
did	not	exist	in	the	1991	Census,	there	have	always	been	people	of	mixed	
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ethnicities.		As	highlighted	earlier,	some	who	may	have	subscribed	to	the	Black	
Caribbean	category	in	1991	might	have	switched	allegiance	to	the	MWBC	group	
in	2001.		Moreover,	in	2011	they	could	see	themselves	as	Mixed,	White	or	even	
Black	Caribbean.		There	are	individuals	of	Black	and	White	parentage,	whose	
skin	colour	and	physical	appearance	identifies	them	in	the	first	instance	as	
White.		Such	individuals	may	not	see	themselves	as	either	Black	or	Mixed,	and	
might	subscribe	to	the	White	category.		Nevertheless,	individuals	can	also	
socially	accept	their	inclusion	to	a	particular	ethnic	category,	and	valorise	
particular	characteristics	as	substantive	and	tangible	signifiers	of	their	group	
membership.		Therefore,	even	though	the	distinction	between	ethnic	
categories	can	be	ideologically	problematic	‘the	labels	they	deploy	are	almost	
universally	accepted,	or	at	least	recognised,	by	those	to	whom	they	are	
intended	to	refer’	(ibid,	2004:	39).			
	
	
Higher	education	attainment	and	participation	
	
University	degrees	provide	evidence	that	individuals	possess	the	knowledge	
and	skills	required	by	the	professions.		This	research	views	higher	educational	
capital	as	Goods	that	can	be	exchanged	in	the	labour	market	for	economic	
capital	(Bourdieu,	2010	[1984]),	which	in	turn	reduces	the	risk	of	long-term	
financial	insecurity.		As	educational	qualifications	are	often	a	prerequisite	of	
social	mobility,	African	Caribbean	access	to	higher	education	(H.E.)	is	significant	
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to	this	inquiry.		Data	from	HESA	and	HEIDI	were	used	to	create	the	following	
tables:	
• the	annual	national	distribution	of	first-year	full-time	student	
participation	by	gender,	2003-2013;	
• White	British	and	Black	Caribbean	18-2476	aged	student	populations	as	a	
percentage	of	their	national	18-2477	population,	2003-2013;	
• the	national	distribution	of	First	Class	Honours	and	Second	Class	First	
Division	Degrees	between	White	British	and	Black	Caribbean	students,	
2003-2012;	
• White	British,	Black	Caribbean	and	MWBC	Birmingham	students	
accessing	national	universities,	2007-2013;	
• White	British,	Black	Caribbean	and	MWBC	Birmingham	students	aged	
18-24	accessing	Russell	Group	universities	by	gender,	2007-2013;	
• White	British,	Black	Caribbean	and	MWBC	Birmingham	students	
accessing	Russell	Group	and	other	universities	and	their	age-range	
distributions,	2007-2013.	
	
	
Comparisons	between	the	18-24-age	ethnic	cohorts	are	important	because	it	is	
the	age-stage78	in	which	there	is	a	normative	expectation	that	H.E.	
																																								 																				
76	The	18-24	data	are	based	on	revised	estimates	from	the	16-24	HESA	data.		HESA	
acknowledges	that	there	are	relatively	few	students	who	might	access	universities	at	the	age	
of	sixteen.		Bearing	this	in	mind	the	data	was	revised	to	provide	a	more	valid	picture	of	the	
majority	of	White	British	and	Black	Caribbean	students	accessing	universities	nationally.	
77	The	national	18-24	aged	populations	were	calculated	from	their	respective	ethnic	group	
Census	populations,	see	Appendix	ii.:	Tables	3.1,	3.2,	3.3	and	3.4.	
78	See	Chapter	One.	
	 95	
participation	will	take	place.		Eighteen	is	the	most	common	age-stage	of	those	
entering	university	nationally.		For	students	studying	in	full-time	State	
education	this	would	suggest	two	years	of	post-16	studies,	in	a	college	or	sixth-
form	centre,	to	acquire	three	A-levels.		Bourdieu	(2010,	[1984]:	75)	
acknowledges	that,	‘one	of	the	mediations	through	which	cultural	capital	is	
transformed	into	educational	capital	is	speed	of	progress	through	the	system’.	
As	individuals	are	generally	expected	to	acquire	H.E.	Goods	by	the	time	they	are	
24,	it	can	be	considered	as	the	normative	age	when	post-higher	education	
labour	market	participation	is	expected	to	commence.		Therefore,	those	
acquiring	university	degrees	by	the	age	of	24	will	be	within	the	optimum	age-
range,	in	which	there	is	a	higher	probability	that	intergenerational	social	
mobility	will	occur	in	a	way	that	seems	‘easy	and	typical’	(Weber,	1920	in	
Smith,	2007:	87).		This	is	because	the	earlier	that	economic	activity	takes	place,	
after	acquiring	H.E.	Goods,	the	sooner	it	is	that	individuals	may	gain	upward	
social	mobility.			
	
	
The	higher	education	participation	of	Black	Caribbean	children,	born	in	
Birmingham	during	the	1960s	and	1970s,	preceded	the	statutory	duty	to	collate	
national	ethnicity	data	to	monitor	social	inequalities79	(Learning	Skills	Council,	
2002;	Paragraph	6:	2;	Berkeley,	2014:	6).		Nevertheless,	as	noted	earlier,	the	
educational	experiences	of	the	research	subjects	are	captured	in	narratives	and	
compared	to	the	data	of	their	contemporaries.		It	is	also	difficult	to	obtain	
																																								 																				
79	See	Chapter	Two.	
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educational	data	regarding	MWBC	participation	even	after	the	Mixed	ethnic	
category	was	formally	introduced	in	the	2001	Census	(Ratcliffe,	2004).		The	
Higher	Education	Statistics	Agency	(HESA)	tends	to	conflate	all	Mixed	ethnic	
groups	into	a	single	category.		However,	national	HESA	datasets	was	used	to	
map	the	H.E.	participation	of	African	Caribbeans	and	White	British	students	
from	2003.		The	data	available	for	MWBCs	is	only	applicable	to	Birmingham	
from	2007-2013	in	this	thesis.			
	
	
Due	to	administrative	changes	in	the	way	that	ethnicity	data	are	collated	it	is	
not	possible	to	make	meaningful	comparisons	prior	to	200780.		Therefore,	
ethnic	differences	in	the	H.E.	participation	of	Birmingham	students	is	analysed	
between	2007	and	2013	using	HESA	datasets.		HESA	lists	162	UK	higher	
education	institutions,	24	of	which	belong	to	the	Russell	Group.		As	these	
institutions	are	considered	to	be	in	the	Premier	League	of	universities	(Which?	
University,	2014;	Guardian,	2014),	it	is	important	to	ascertain	the	rate	at	which	
Birmingham’s	African	Caribbean	students	are	accessing	old	and	new	
universities81	(Shiner	and	Modood,	2002)	over	the	years.		HEIDI	datasets	also	
provide	national	ethnic	differences	of	students	obtaining	First	Class	and	Upper	
Second	Class	Degrees	in	Russell	Group	universities.			
	
	
																																								 																				
80	See	Appendix	iii.	
81	Shiner	and	Modood	(2002:	209)	argue	that	‘ethnic	minority	candidates	are	filtered	into	the	
new	university	sector’.		These	are	universities	created	after	the	1992	Higher	Education	Act	and	
are	not	considered	as	prestigious	as	their	old	or	Red-Brick	counterparts,	see	Chapter	Two.	
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The	18-24	White	British	and	Black	Caribbean	student	populations	were	
calculated	as	a	percentage	of	their	national	18-24	populations	using	the	
Censuses	of	2001	and	201182.		There	is	no	way	of	knowing	the	exact	population	
variation	between	the	Censuses.		They	were	therefore	estimated	on	the	basis	
of	interpolations	from	2001	and	2011	Census	data.		HEIDI	data,	for	first	class	
honours	and	second	class	first	division	degrees	awarded,	were	also	estimated83.		
The	number	of	degrees	awarded	were	divided	by	the	respective	student	
populations	in	the	same	3-year	cohorts84.		Although	the	totals	are	approximate	
rather	than	accurate,	they	nevertheless	provide	a	heuristic	picture	of	the	
distribution	of	degrees	between	African	Caribbean	and	White	British	students.	
	
	
Examination	of	the	participation	of	full-time	students	is	significant	to	this	
inquiry.		Their	mode	of	study	would	suggest	they	are	younger	than	their	part-
time	peers,	and	their	age-stage	is	significant	to	improving	their	social	status	for	
the	reasons	outlined	above.		Comparing	changes	in	the	percentages	of	Black	
Caribbean	and	White	British	16-24	populations	accessing	university	in	recent	
years,	will	reveal	the	extent	to	which	African	Caribbeans	are	widening	their	
participation	in	higher	education.		This	analysis	will	also	indicate	if	Caribbeans	
are	acquiring	the	academic	Goods	that	are	necessary	to	obtaining	employment	
in	the	high-income	occupations.			
	
																																								 																				
82	See	Table	5.2.	
83	See	Figures	1.5	and	2.5.	
84	See	also	Table	5.2.	
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Changes	in	educational	legislation	are	also	analysed	alongside	variations	in	
university	participation	by	ethnicity	and	gender.		There	is	no	way	of	establishing	
for	certain	the	extent	to	which	legislative	change	may	have	facilitated	or	
constrained	Black	Caribbean	H.E.	access.		However,	its	potential	influence	on	
gender	differences,	and	participation	and	attainment	by	ethnicity,	is	assessed.		
Thus,	analysing	the	relationship	between	legislation,	policy	and	practice,	and	
the	ways	in	which	they	might	have	influenced	university	access	and	attainment,	
will	address	the	question:	
• To	what	extent	does	legislation	enable	or	constrain	African	Caribbean	
social	mobility	in	the	context	of	competitive	market	situations?	
Comparing	educational	progress	to	labour	market	participation,	and	assessing	
whether	African	Caribbeans	are	exchanging	H.E.	Goods	for	economic	Goods,	
will	also	address:	
• How	are	the	education	and	labour	market	experiences	of	African	
Caribbeans	in	Birmingham	mediated	by	their	gender	and	ethnicity?	
	
	
The	hierarchical	occupational	structure	and	labour	market	participation	
	
As	noted	earlier	in	this	thesis,	occupational	change	can	reflect	variations	in	
income	and	lifestyle,	which	defines	class	as	a	combination	of	position,	situation	
(Marx	and	Weber	in	Morrison,	1995)	and	disposition	(Bourdieu,	2010	[1984]).		
Variations	in	the	labour	market	positions	of	African	Caribbeans	are	examined	
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between	1991	and	2011,	and	compared	to	those	of	their	White	British	
counterparts,	to	determine	if	their	class	status	has	changed.		Data	for	MWBCs	
are	also	included	from	2001.		This	method	will	establish	if	African	Caribbeans	
are	still	employed	in	similar	occupations	as	their	West	Indian	antecedents85;	it	
will	also	facilitate	the	examination	of	the	role	that	legislation,	policies	and	
practices	might	have	played	in	constraining	or	enabling	their	employment	
situations.		Although	Census	datasets	are	designed	for	their	reliability,	they	do	
not	provide	a	true	picture	of	the	barriers	African	Caribbeans	encounter	in	
labour	market	situations.		Therefore,	semi-structured	interviews	were	also	used	
to	capture	the	lived-experience	of	the	research	subjects.	
	
	
The	occupational	schema	used	to	reveal	differences	in	class	positions	changed	
in	the	2001	Census,	from	those	based	on	the	Registrar	General	Social	Classes86,	
to	the	National	Statistics	Socio-economic	Classifications	(NS-SEC).		According	to	
																																								 																				
85	The	manufacturing	and	production	industries	that	employed	a	significant	number	of	West	
Indians,	in	the	1950s,	60s	and	early	70s	have	declined	(Phizacklea	and	Miles,	1980).		However,	
similar	types	of	occupations	in	the	contemporary	labour	market	are	viewed	as	precarious	work	
(Standing,	2011),	which	are	low-paid,	short-term	and	unskilled	routine	occupations.	
86	The	Registrar	General’s	Social	Classes	(RGSC)	were	the	means	by	which	differences	in	class	
positions,	according	to	occupation	and	industry,	were	first	measured	in	the	1911	Census	(Rose,	
1995).		The	variables	were	also	used	to	quantify	disparities	in	the	mortality,	fertility	and	
marriage	rates	of	the	upper,	middle	and	working-classes	(ibid,	1995).		In	1990	the	RGSC	was	
renamed	Social	Class	based	on	Occupation	(SC)	(ibid,	1995).		It	was	then	superseded	in	1994	by	
the	National	Statistics	Socio-economic	Classification	(NS-SEC)	(Rose,	1995;	Rose	and	Pevalin,	
2001:	4).		Between	2000	and	2010	the	NS-SEC	were	mapped	to	the	Standard	Social	
Occupations	Classifications	2000	(SOC2000)	and	then	the	Standard	Occupational	Classification	
2010	(SOC2010),	which	are	basically	catalogues	of	occupations	listed	within	their	hierarchical	
employment	classes	(Rose	and	Pevalin,	2010).		SOC2010	is	now	the	most	commonly	used	
occupational	catalogue,	in	which	occupations	are	ranked	according	to	the	level	of	skill	they	
require.		A	major	criticism	of	the	RGSC,	and	its	SC	successor,	is	that	it	overlooked	how	female	
participation	in	the	labour	market	has	changed	since	the	1970s.		Consequently,	it	‘failed	to	
describe	adequately	the	individual	class	situation	of	women’	(Crompton,	2008:	67).		In	
addition,	the	RGSC	and	SC	did	not	take	into	account	the	economic	contribution	of	the	retired,	
or	acknowledge	the	long-term	unemployed.		These	omissions	influenced	a	review	of	the	
schema	in	the	1990s,	which	subsequently	led	to	the	creation	of	the	NS-SEC	(ibid,	2008:	64).			
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the	Office	for	National	Statistics	(ONS)	(2010:3)	the	NS-SEC	differentiates	
‘positions	within	[…]	different	labour	market	situations	and	work	situations’.		In	
this	respect	a	labour	market	situation	is	concerned	with	‘income	[…],	economic	
security	[…]	and	advancement’	(ibid,	2010:	3).		However,	an	individual’s	work	
situation	is	defined	by	their	location	within	the	hierarchical	employment	
structure	and	their	relative	autonomy	as	a	worker.			
	
	
There	are	eight	analytic	classes	in	the	NS-SEC,	seven	of	which	consist	of	a	
variety	of	occupations	that	are	hierarchically	classified	in	SOC2010,	according	to	
their	technical	complexities.		Class	1	represents	the	highest	level	of	skilled	
employment,	whereas	Class	8	is	allocated	to	the	unemployed.		The	Higher	
Managerial,	Administrative	and	Professional	Occupations	of	Class	1,	also	
contain	two	sub-groups87.		The	NS-SEC	is	examined	over	Census	periods,	
nationally	and	in	the	context	of	Birmingham	by	ethnicity	and	gender.		It	
facilitates	the	examination	of	labour	market	hierarchies,	between	the	high-
income	professions	and	the	low-income	unemployed	and	allow	changes	in	
social	status	to	be	mapped	over	time.		Census	datasets	were	used	to	construct	
the	following	Tables:	
• social	class	based	on	occupation	by	ethnicity,	Birmingham	and	national,	
1991;	
																																								 																				
87	The	two	Class	1	sub-groups	have	been	aggregated	in	the	Tables	used	in	Chapter	Six	of	this	
research.	
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• socio-economic	classifications	by	ethnicity,	for	ages	16-74,	Birmingham	
and	national,	2001-2011;	
• socio-economic	classifications	by	ethnicity	and	gender,	for	ages	16-74,	
Birmingham	and	national,	2001-2011;	
• Birmingham	socio-economic	classifications	by	ethnicity	and	gender,	for	
ages	16-74,	2001-2011;	
• national	socio-economic	classifications	by	ethnicity,	for	ages	25-49,	
2001-2011;		
• socio-economic	classifications	by	ethnicity	and	gender,	for	ages	25-49,	
Birmingham	and	national,	2001-2011.				
	
	
The	National	Census	occupational	data,	for	ages	25-49	in	2001,	was	not	
available	via	ONS.		Although	the	dataset	was	obtained	from	the	UK	Data	Service	
Small	Area	Micro-data	(SAM),	the	population	sample	was	one	fifth.		It	therefore	
would	have	to	be	multiplied	by	twenty	to	provide	a	more	accurate	correlation	
to	the	ONS	data	for	those	aged	25-49	in	2011.		In	addition	to	the	datasets,	
occupational	and	legislative	changes	are	also	examined	alongside	the	narratives	
of	African	Caribbean	subjects	in	employment	situations,	to	answer	the	
following	question:	
• To	what	extent	does	legislation	enable	or	constrain	African	Caribbean	
social	mobility	in	the	context	of	competitive	market	situations?	
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This	research	is	also	concerned	with	the	ways	in	which	the	educational	and	
economic	situations	of	African	Caribbeans	are	also	differentiated	by	gender,	
and	the	extent	to	which	opportunities	are	influenced	expectations	of	progress	
at	particular	age-stages.		Analysis	of	the	combination	of	the	educational	and	
labour	market	data	will	answer	the	question:		
• How	are	the	education	and	labour	market	experiences	of	African	
Caribbeans	in	Birmingham	mediated	by	their	gender	and	ethnicity?	
• How	have	thirty	years	of	social	change	impacted	on	the	social	class	
mobility	of	Birmingham’s	African	Caribbean	population?	
	
	
Spatial	distribution	in	Good	Lands	and	Bad	Lands	
	
As	argued	earlier88,	mapping	demographic	movement	from	the	inner-city	Bad	
Lands	to	the	suburban	‘Promised	Land’	(Burgess,	2008	[1925]:	75	[emphasis	
added])	can	sometimes	reveal	improvements	in	social	status.		This	is	because	
spatial	movements	and	settlement	are	often	enabled	or	constrained	by	
exchanging	educational	capital	for	labour	market	capital	(Bourdieu,	2010	
[1984]).		However,	that	is	not	always	the	case,	as	there	are	a	number	of	choices	
and	constraints	that	can	influence	where	individuals	live.		Nevertheless,	quality	
of	life	is	often	linked	with	class	status.		Therefore,	this	research	utilises	the	2010	
Index	of	Multiple	Deprivation	(IMD2010)	to	establish	the	existing	levels	of	
poverty	and	disadvantage	in	Birmingham’s	wards.		
																																								 																				
88	See	Chapter	One.	
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Until	2010,	Peter	Townsend’s	Index	of	Deprivation	(TID)	was	one	of	the	main	
means	by	which	social	scientists	compared	material	disparities	in	urban	spaces	
(Hick,	2015:	164).		However,	Townsend’s	Index	has	been	criticised	because	of	
its	‘“mismatch”	between	low	income	and	material	deprivation’	(ibid,	2015:	
164).		It	is	now	acknowledged	that	there	are	several	indicators	of	poverty	
overlooked	by	the	TID.		Spicker	(1999)	argues	that	poverty	has	twelve	clusters	
of	meaning,	most	of	which	overlap.		More	recently,	the	Economic	and	Social	
Research	Council	(ESRC,	2015)	has	identified	twenty	indicators	of	poverty	that,	
like	Spicker’s	(1999)	definitions	of	poverty,	also	intersect.		Nevertheless,	the	TID	
was	used	to	map	material	deprivation,	prior	to	the	introduction	of	the	
IMD2010.		
	
	
The	TID	measures	deprivation	at	ward	level	in	the	1991	and	2001	Censuses	
using	a	‘composite	score	based	on	four	variables:	unemployment,	
overcrowding,	non-car	ownership	and	non-home	ownership’	(UK	Data	Service,	
2015).		However,	the	IMD2010	is	able	to	distinguish	deprivation	at	lower	super	
output	area	level	(LSOA),	which	is	the	smallest	geographical	measurement.		In	
comparison	to	the	four	variables	used	in	the	TID,	the	IMD2010	measures	
deprivation	in	seven	domains.		Disparities	in	income;	employment;	health	and	
disability;	education,	skills	and	training;	barriers	to	housing	and	services;	crime	
and	also	living	environment	are	incorporated	into	the	measure.		This	method	
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was	employed	because,	as	argued	above,	revealing	material	disparities	
between	LSOAs	can	indicate	the	quality	of	life	of	those	who	reside	there.		
	
	
England	has	32,	482	Super	Output	Areas	(SOAs),	the	sizes	of	which	vary	
according	to	the	density	of	the	population	in	each	area	(Birmingham	City	
Council,	2013).		The	populations	of	SOAs	can	range	from	1,000	to	3,200	
individuals.		Birmingham	has	‘641	SOAs	[…]	over	half	(61%)	are	ranked	in	the	
most	deprived	25%	in	England’	(ibid,	2013:	5).		The	city’s	641	SOAs	are	further	
divided	into	3,127	LSOAs,	each	of	which	consist	of	about	three	hundred	people.		
There	are	33,307	postcodes89	in	Birmingham	of	which	526	are	non-residential.		
The	remaining	32,781	residential	postcodes	are	divided	unequally	between	
Birmingham’s	forty	wards.		Each	ward	has	a	number	of	SOAs	containing	several	
different	postcodes.		The	various	deprivation	scores	for	each	of	the	seven	
domains,	and	in	each	of	Birmingham’s	641	SOAs,	were	obtained	from	ONS	
datasets.		They	were	then	applied	to	Birmingham’s	residential	postcodes	and	
their	corresponding	LSOAs.			
	
	
Birmingham’s	3,127	LSOAs	either	nestle	within	or	straddle	the	boundaries	of	
wards;	they	also	generally	have	different	levels	of	material	deprivation.		This	is	
an	example	of	an	ecological	fallacy,	which	basically	asserts	that	
disproportionate	levels	of	poverty	and	disadvantage	can	exist	within	the	same	
																																								 																				
89	See	Appendix	iv.	
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ward.		These	pockets	of	deprivation	are	demonstrated	in	the	Edgbaston	area	of	
Birmingham.		Some	LSOAs	in	the	ward	have	high	levels	of	poverty	and	the	
majority	of	housing	is	council	owned.		However,	within	the	same	ward	also	
exists	some	of	the	most	expensive	privately	owned	property	in	the	city,	which	
are	situated	in	areas	of	low	deprivation.		
	
	
Census	datasets	along	with	the	IMD2010	were	used	to	construct	the	following	
Tables:	
• the	distribution	of	White	British	and	Black	Caribbeans	aged	16-74	in	low	
and	high	deprivation	Birmingham	wards,	1991;	
• the	distribution	of	different	types	of	housing	tenure	in	low	and	high	
deprivation	Birmingham	wards,	1991;	
• the	distribution	of	White	British,	Black	Caribbean	and	MWBC	
populations	aged	25-49	in	low	and	high	deprivation	Birmingham	wards,	
2001	and	2011;	
• the	household	reference	person	of	White	British,	Black	Caribbean	and	
MWBCs,	aged	16	and	over	and	also	aged	25-49,	and	their	housing	
tenure	in	low	and	high	deprivation	wards	in	Birmingham,	2001	and	
2011;	
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• the	household	reference	person	of	White	British,	Black	Caribbean	and	
MWBCs,	aged	25-49,	and	their	housing	tenure	in	their	respective	
Birmingham	Hinter	Lands90	in	2011;	
• the	IMD	scores	of	the	respective	ethnic	Hinter	Lands,	Good	Lands	and	
Bad	Lands	and	the	educational	qualifications	of	those	aged	16-74	
residing	in	them.	
	
	
The	ethnicity	categories	of	the	groups	that	are	the	focus	of	this	research	have	
remained	the	same	in	the	Censuses	of	2001	and	2011.		They	are	therefore	used	
to	map	ethnic	changes	in	the	acquisition	of	housing	tenure	and	spatial	
settlement	between	2001	and	2011.		Consequently,	the	1991	Census	can	only	
be	used	as	a	starting	point	to	make	heuristic	comparisons	between	White	
British	and	Black	Caribbean	ethnic	groups.		This	is	especially	as	MWBC	data	
were	not	included	until	2001.		Combining	the	use	of	the	IMD2010	with	the	
Census	ethnic	population	datasets	made	it	possible	to	map	the	spatial	
settlement	patterns	of	African	Caribbeans,	and	also	identify	the	levels	of	
deprivation	in	the	areas	in	which	they	are	now	concentrated.		Comparing	
differences	in	the	urban	concentration	of	the	three	ethnic	groups	will	to	some	
extent	indicate	how	the	material	situation	and	social	status	of	African	
Caribbeans	have	changed	over	time.		This	will	in	turn	indicate	if	they	have	
achieved	upward	social	mobility	and	enable	the	following	questions	to	be	
answered:		
																																								 																				
90	The	notion	of	ethnic	Hinter	Lands	is	articulated	in	Chapter	Seven.	
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• What	shifts	have	taken	place	in	the	spatial	patterns	of	Birmingham’s	
African	Caribbean	over	the	past	thirty	years?	
• How	have	thirty	years	of	social	change	impacted	on	the	social	mobility	
of	Birmingham’s	African	Caribbean	population?			
	
	
Ethics		
	
This	research	is	guided	by	the	ethical	principles	of	the	Social	Research	
Association	(SRA).		Where	obligation	to	subjects	is	concerned,	undue	intrusion	
must	be	avoided,	informed	consent	must	be	obtained,	misleading	must	not	
occur,	confidentiality	must	be	maintained	and	interests	protected	(SRA,	2003).		
According	to	Bryman	(2001:	479)	ethical	considerations	in	sociological	research	
are	also	concerned	with:	‘whether	there	is	harm	to	participants;	whether	there	
is	a	lack	of	informed	consent;	whether	there	is	an	invasion	of	privacy;	whether	
deception	is	involved’	(emphases	in	original).		The	major	ethical	tension	in	this	
investigation	was	the	problem	of	negotiating	the	space	between	‘deontology	
and	consequentialism’	(May,	2001:	60).		This	can	be	interpreted	as	decisions	
made	to	use	sociological	methods	that	do	not	violate	ethical	boundaries,	
against	the	dilemma	of	using	those	that	lead	to	their	infraction.	
	
	
The	quantitative	methods	in	this	investigation	are	essentially	deontological.		
Bryman	(2001)	contends	that	the	methods	employed	in	deontological	research	
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do	not	compromise	the	four	ethical	concerns	identified	above.		However,	
working	within	an	ethical	framework,	in	which	scientific	rules	guide	the	
construction	of	knowledge,	can	sometimes	constrain	research	to	an	essentialist	
understanding	of	the	social	world	(Restivo,	1983:	5).		In	this	sense,	ethical	
principles	can	be	perceived	as	paradigms	that	restrict	knowledge	to	the	level	of	
‘discursive	accomplishments’	(Knorr,	1981;	Woolgar,	1981	in	Restivo,	1983:	7).		
Nevertheless,	research	has	to	be	guided	by	standards	within	a	framework.		The	
Census,	HESA	and	HEIDI	datasets	used	in	this	research	are	anonymous	and	do	
not	breach	confidentiality	or	invade	the	privacy	of	individuals.		They	reveal	
national	and	local	variations	between	African	Caribbean,	White	British	and	
MWBC	ethnic	groups	by	gender,	age,	occupation,	spatial	location,	economic	
activity	and	educational	qualifications.		This	deontological	approach	
operationalises	the	ethnic	subjects	of	this	research	as	objects,	whereby	
differences	in	their	access	to	Goods	and	Bads	are	examined	empirically.			
	
	
Analysing	differences	between	the	material	conditions	of	ethnic	groups	as	
statistical	data,	enables	the	researcher	to	maintain	a	degree	of	detachment	
(May,	2001:	10).		The	anonymity	involved	in	data	analysis	does	not	allow	
attachments	to	be	formed,	which	assists	the	process	of	maintaining	objectivity.		
Moreover,	as	no	interaction	takes	place	between	the	researcher	and	subjects,	
the	issue	of	harm	to	participants	does	not	arise.		In	addition,	as	secondary	data	
are	freely	available	in	the	public	domain,	lack	of	informed	consent,	deception	
and	invasion	of	privacy	are	not	methodologically	problematic.		The	data	used	to	
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construct	the	IMD	were	first	made	available	in	2010	by	the	Office	for	National	
Statistics	(ONS),	and	supports	the	above	ethical	principles.		Although	the	IMD	
data	consists	of	postcodes,	the	ONS	have	developed	Samples	of	Annonymised	
Records	(SARs)	that	do	not	reveal	the	identities	of	individual	residents.		The	
same	process	is	used	in	the	construction	of	Census	datasets.		Therefore,	the	use	
of	these	methods	was	consistent	with	a	deontological	approach,	as	they	did	not	
breach	any	ethical	principles.			
	
	
Working	within	ethical	guidelines	can	sometimes	be	problematic.		This	is	
especially	the	case	where	ethnographic	methods	are	concerned.		In	contrast	to	
the	deontological	approach,	consequentialism	posits	that	sociologists	have	to	
consider	the	context	of	their	research	and	the	circumstances	in	which	they	find	
themselves.		Ethical	boundaries	can	be	violated,	but	only	if	the	ends	of	the	
research	justify	the	means.		Therefore,	it	is	important	that	the	researcher	
reflects	on	‘the	situation	[…]	and	[…]	the	consequences	of	their	act’	(ibid,	2001:	
61).		Schensul	et	al.	(1999)	suggest	that	the	methods	used	by	ethnographers	
should	not	be	viewed	as	being	external	to	the	sociologist.		This	is	because	the	
researcher	is	the	primary	tool	of	his/her	investigation	(ibid,	1999:	viii).			For	this	
reason,	the	use	of	secondary	data	posed	fewer	problems	than	the	qualitative	
methods;	this	was	because	the	latter	demanded	interaction	and	engagement.			
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Audio	visual	equipment	was	utilised	to	record	the	interviews	of	subjects	
participating	in	the	research.		The	fieldwork	consisted	of	participant	
observation,	deployed	during	meetings,	activities	and	educational	seminars.		
However,	during	the	course	of	the	research	there	were	times	when	the	
fieldwork	was	more	inclined	towards	consequentialism,	because	of	the	element	
of	deception.		This	tension	arose	from	the	author’s	need	to	control	information	
regarding	the	research	and	from	his	position	as	a	researcher	(Goffman,	1963).		
It	was	thought	that	the	actors,	who	presented	themselves	at	the	various	events	
he	attended,	might	not	accept	him	if	they	knew	his	presence	was	guided	by	
academic	research91.		Thus,	the	author	had	to	consider	‘the	routine	cycle	of	
restrictions	he	[sic]	faces	regarding	social	acceptance	[…]	by	[…]	managing	
information	about	himself’	(ibid,	1963:	91).				
	
	
There	was	a	certain	apprehension	that	in	revealing	the	part	of	his	social	
identity,	which	was	most	relevant	to	the	situation,	the	author	would	be	
‘discredited’	(ibid,	1963:	83)	in	the	eyes	of	his	research	subjects.		Consequently,	
they	might	not	perform	in	the	way	they	normally	would.		Thus,	for	the	purpose	
																																								 																				
91	White	researchers,	who	descend	on	the	Black	community,	are	generally	viewed	with	
suspicion.		It	is	believed	their	research	only	serves	to	further	White	interests	rather	than	those	
who	they	seek	to	observe.		Bini	Brown,	the	leader	of	the	African	Caribbean	Self-Help	
Organisation	(ACSHO)	(see	further	on	in	this	chapter),	refused	Rex	and	Tomlinson’s	(1979)	
request	for	an	interview	during	their	Handsworth	research.		However,	that	did	not	stop	them	
writing	about	him,	his	organisation	and	its	members	from	a	position	that	suggested	they	had	
inside	knowledge	(ibid,	esp.	Chapter	8).		Their	subterfuge	still	rankles	with	ACSHO	and	others	in	
the	Black	community.		The	general	consensus	is	that	the	researchers	misrepresented	and	
undermined	ACSHO’s	cause	for	their	academic	agenda,	which	was	of	no	benefit	to	the	African	
Caribbean	community.		For	a	critique	of	Rex	and	Tomlinson’s	(1979)	speaking	position	in	
relation	to	their	Handsworth	study	see	Back	and	Solomos	(1993).		Although	Rex	and	Tomlinson	
(1979)	accused	some	of	their	subjects	of	creating	myths	(Back	and	Solomos,	1993),	it	appears	
that	it	was	they	who	were	guilty	of	myth-making	where	information	regarding	ACSHO	was	
concerned.	
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of	maintaining	validity,	the	author	decided	to	manage	information	about	
himself,	as	‘a	[…]	strategy	of	the	discreditable	person	is	to	handle	his	[sic]	risks	
by	dividing	the	world	into	a	large	group	to	whom	he	[sic]	tells	nothing	and	a	
small	group	to	whom	he	[sic]	tells	all’	(ibid,	1963:	95).		Hence,	there	were	
relevant	others	who	were	aware	of	the	author’s	reasons	for	participating	in	the	
various	activities,	organised	by	African	Caribbean	organisations.		However,	
there	were	also	individuals	present	who	presumed	that	he	was	there	solely	to	
support	their	interests.		Although	the	author	was	aware	of	this	misconception,	
he	did	nothing	to	correct	it.			
	
	
Reflexivity	
	
Young	(2013:	51)	argues	that	‘ethnographers	cannot	hide	behind	their	work.		
Their	visibility	surfaces	in	the	course	of	reading	an	ethnography,	as	the	reader	
asks	“Who	is	the	author	of	this	work?”’		Moreover,	Khan	and	Jerolmack	(2013:	
10)	also	maintain	that	‘there	is	something	jarring	about	authors	referring	to	
themselves	in	the	third	person’,	which	is	something	I	have	been	guilty	of	until	
this	point.		I	have	referred	to	myself	as	the	author	in	an	effort	to	maintain	
objectivity.		However,	I	now	find	that	in	justifying	the	qualitative	methods	of	
this	research,	I	am	unable	to	sustain	the	same	form	of	detachment	as	I	have	
previously	demonstrated.		In	discussing	the	relevance	of	qualitative	data,	I	am	
no	longer	dealing	with	objects	of	social	classification;	I	am	now	concerned	with	
subjects	and	interpreting	the	meanings	they	attach	to	their	actions,	which	is	not	
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a	neutral	process.		Problems	arose	during	interviews	and	observational	
fieldwork,	because	my	subjects	and	I	share	the	same	ethnic	identity.		Therefore,	
in	discussing	why	the	qualitative	approaches	I	adopted	were	appropriate	for	
the	aims	of	this	inquiry,	it	was	also	important	for	me	to	analyse	my	connections	
and	relationships	with	them.		This	also	meant	examining	methods	of	
neutralisation,	so	that	I	might	not	have	an	adverse	influence	on	the	actions	and	
responses	of	those	whom	I	observed	and	interviewed.		
	
	
Although	I	grew	up	in	the	community	where	my	fieldwork	was	based,	it	has	
been	a	number	of	years	since	I	lived	in	Handsworth.		Nevertheless,	my	skin	
colour,	culture,	ethnic	identity,	and	also	my	social	and	intimate	relationships	
identified	me	as	a	member	of	the	African	Caribbean	community.		The	idea	of	
informal	sponsorship’	(Hammersley	and	Atkinson,	1995:	60)	posits	that	
gatekeepers	are	necessary	for	researchers	to	enter	the	world	of	those	whom	
they	investigate.		However,	that	is	not	always	the	case.		Researchers	can	also	be	
insiders	who	already	have	access	to	their	subjects.		This	was	the	case	with	this	
research,	as	‘the	community	viewed	me	as	an	insider’	(Islam,	2000:	35):	
someone	who	is	also	one	of	their	own,	because	I	share	the	same	ethnic	identity	
and	similar	lived	experiences	of	growing	up	in	the	same	urban	space.		I	
employed	what	I	define	as	an	eversion	technique	to	my	ethnographic	fieldwork,	
which	is	in	essence	researching	from	the	inside	outwards.		Outsiders,	in	
ethnographic	research,	generally	encounter	problems	of	access.		After	gaining	
access	they	then	immerse	themselves	in	the	world	of	their	subjects.		Eversion	is	
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the	obverse,	because	as	an	insider	I	am	to	a	great	extent	already	immersed	in	
the	world	of	my	subjects.		
	
	
When	researchers	also	have	insider	status,	there	are	tensions	that	must	be	
negotiated	in	the	process	of	maintaining	objectivity.		Nevertheless,	there	are	
also	privileges	that	come	with	insider	status,	as	‘minority	scholars	[…]	face	less	
distrust,	hostility	and	exclusion	from	minority	communities’	(ibid,	2000:	42).		
However,	despite	sharing	the	same	African	Caribbean	identity	as	my	subjects,	I	
was	also	conscious	of	my	differences.		My	education,	occupation	and	current	
spatial	location	reflected	my	middle-class	habitus,	and	also	signified	my	
outsider	status	in	the	eyes	of	my	working-class	subjects.		Although	my	skin	
colour	provided	me	with	acceptance	and	invisibility	in	the	settings	of	my	
subjects,	it	was	sometimes	difficult	to	negotiate	the	space	between	my	class	
and	ethnicity.		This	was	because	my	middle-class	habitus	was	so	far	removed	
from	the	environment	of	my	mainly	working-class	subjects.			
	
	
A	major	tension	of	insider	status	is	not	so	much	the	problem	of	getting	in,	but	
of	getting	out	when	the	research	is	over.		Were	it	not	for	my	research	I	would	
have	very	little	reason	to	regularly	enter	the	social	worlds	of	my	subjects.		
Therefore,	it	was	important	that	I	was	honest	with	them	so	as	not	to	leave	a	
vacuum	of	bad	feelings	behind	me.		They	had	confided	in	me,	and	welcomed	
me	into	their	homes	and	organisations.		I	did	not	want	to	nurture	any	feelings	
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of	resentment	or	give	them	cause	to	feel	that	I	had	betrayed	their	trust	or	
exploited	them	for	my	own	interests.		My	objective	was	to	empower	my	
subjects	by	capturing	their	lived	experiences	and	organisational	struggles,	
which	would	otherwise	have	been	invisible.		As	I	also	shared	their	focal	
concerns,	it	was	crucial	to	nurture	a	relationship	based	on	mutual	respect,	truth	
and	trust.		
	
	
African	Caribbeans,	particularly	those	who	are	politically	engaged	in	the	Black	
community,	might	view	the	academic	world	as	a	space	that	underpins	
dominant	discourses	of	Whiteness92.		Mistrust	can	therefore	be	aroused	by	
acknowledging	the	power	that	researchers	have	to	falsify	knowledge,	as	a	
means	of	furthering	their	own	interests	93.		As	a	consequence,	Black	researchers	
are	sometimes	perceived	as	sell-outs,	who	betray	their	community	for	the	
rewards	of	Whiteness94.		Therefore,	‘just	as	my	insider	status	gave	me	access	to	
particular	discourses,	it	also	made	others	difficult	to	explore’	(ibid,	2000:	50).		
The	tension	in	this	duality	surfaced	during	a	meeting	I	attended	at	the	African	
Caribbean	Self-Help	Organisation	(ACSHO)	in	Handsworth.		One	of	the	former	
Directors	of	Harambee	(Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981;	2004)	was	
suspicious	of	my	presence	and	consistently	advised	ACSHO’s	members	to	be	
careful	about	what	they	said	in	front	of	me.		On	one	occasion,	he	accused	me	of	
																																								 																				
92	This	understanding	of	Whiteness	locates	ideas	of	White	superiority	‘in	the	economic	and	
political	dominance	of	White	people	over	Black	people	in	Britain’s	colonial	past’	(Carrington	
and	Short,	1987:	1).		See	also	Gillborn	(2005).	
93	See	Footnote	91.	
94		In	my	case	the	rewards	of	Whiteness	could	be	perceived	as	a	PhD.	
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being	a	police	informer.		Thus,	even	though	the	African	Caribbean	community	
accepted	me	as	an	insider	–	because	of	my	shared	ethnic	identity	and	ties	
within	the	community	–	I	also	incurred	suspicion	because	of	my	middle-class,	
outsider	academic	status.		The	inherent	duality	of	this	position	meant	‘I	would	
be	the	[…]	ambassador	and	possibly	the	traitor	to	the	community’	(Islam,	2000:	
35).			
	
	
Hammersley	and	Atkinson	(1995:	16)	note	that	‘the	orientations	of	researchers	
will	be	shaped	by	their	socio-historical	location,	including	the	values	and	
interests	that	these	locations	confer	upon	them’.		Throughout	my	fieldwork	I	
had	to	consistently	examine	the	relationships	of	power	that	existed	between	
my	subjects	and	I.		Moreover,	I	also	had	to	consider	my	position	as	one	who	
shares	the	same	social	and	historical	connections	(Back	and	Solomos,	1993).		
Therefore,	it	was	important	to	acknowledge,	deconstruct	and	scrutinise	the	
empathy	and	racial	markers	that	I	have	in	common	with	my	subjects.			
For	example,	I	share	the	same	African	Caribbean	heritage.		My	Jamaican	
parents	came	to	the	UK	to	improve	their	life-chances	and	opportunities.		Like	
my	subjects,	I	am	also	a	native	of	the	city	of	Birmingham.		I	was	born	in	Marston	
Green	in	the	1960s,	which	at	that	time	was	part	of	Solihull.		I	also	belong	to	the	
first	generation	of	British-born	Black	children	to	enter	the	English	education	
sector.		I	grew	up	in	Handsworth	and	attended	local	schools.		However,	unlike	
many	of	my	peers,	and	the	majority	of	research	participants,	I	have	obtained	
educational	Goods	from	two	of	the	elite	Russell	Group	Universities.	
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Despite	being	a	Brummie,	I	know	what	it	means	and	feels	like	to	be	classified,	
declassified,	constructed,	reconstructed	and	labelled	as	a	member	of	a	visible	
minority.		At	different	stages	in	my	life	I	have	been	a	West	Indian;	a	Jamaican;	a	
second-generation	immigrant;	a	Negro;	an	IC3;	a	coloured;	a	Black;	an	Afro-
Caribbean,	and	an	African	Caribbean.		Each	form	of	ascription,	be	it	political,	
social,	polite	or	abusive,	is	connected	–	overtly,	covertly,	explicitly,	implicitly,	
indirectly	or	directly	–	to	the	colour	of	my	skin.		Therefore,	I	have	experienced	
the	same	sense	of	societal	disengagement,	exclusion	and	discrimination	
incurred	by	many	of	my	subjects.		I	am	in	the	first	instance	perceived	in	relation	
to	my	skin	colour,	and	socially	constructed	according	to	the	pathological	
connotations	surrounding	my	Blackness	and	African	heritage.		As	a	
consequence,	who	I	am	seems	to	matter	less	than	what	my	skin	colour	signifies	
I	am	supposed	to	be.		As	such,	any	sense	of	belonging	to	the	city	or	nation	of	my	
birth	is	only	of	secondary	concern.		It	is	in	this	way	that	racialised	identities	
have	the	effect	of	transforming	those	who	are	ascribed	by	them	into	
‘“simulacra”	[…],	multiple	identical	images	with	no	original’	(Baudrillard	in	
Garner,	2007:	22).		In	researching	the	disadvantages	faced	by	members	of	my	
community	and	ethnic	group,	I	am	acutely	aware	that	my	values	are	always	
simmering	below	the	surface.		Sociological	research	should	be	an	objective	
process.		Therefore,	acknowledging	that	I	share	the	same	racial	markers	and	
Otherness	as	my	subjects	reinforces	the	importance	of	appropriating	a	reflexive	
strategy.			
	 117	
	
	
Whilst	conceding	that	research	cannot	be	completely	value	free	(May,	2001:	
47),	I	nevertheless	also	realise	the	necessity	to	utilise	a	radical	type	of	
reflexivity	(Gunaratnam,	2003).		This	means	reflecting	on	the	similarities	and	
disparities	between	how	my	subjects	and	I	are	socially	situated	and	to	
acknowledge	how	my	‘research	is	entangled	with	wider	social	and	historical	
relations,	[that]	involves	the	ideological	construction	of	the	subjects’	(ibid,	
2003:	7).		This	form	of	self-analysis	is	crucial	when	researching	from	the	inside.		
It	is	important	to	recognise	that	my	subjects	and	I	share	historical	similarities,	
which	tend	to	influence	the	way	in	which	wider	society	perceives	us	
collectively.		However,	individually,	there	are	also	major	points	of	departure,	
particularly	in	relation	to	our	opposing	class	dispositions.		Understanding	and	
negotiating	this	dual	tension	is	crucial	to	maintaining	an	objective	focus.			
	
	
The	presentation	of	subjects	in	eversion	ethnography	
	
Although	it	is	difficult	to	make	any	‘hard-and-fast-distinction	between	
ethnography	and	other	sorts	of	qualitative	enquiry’	(Hammersley	and	Atkinson,	
1995:	2),	the	main	idea	behind	ethnographic	research	is	that	the	researcher	
tries	to	understand	‘the	routine	ways	in	which	people	make	sense	of	the	world’	
(ibid,	1995:	2).		The	ethnographic	fieldwork	of	this	research	took	place	between	
2010	and	2014.		The	fieldwork	required	me	to	participate	‘overtly	or	covertly,	in	
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people’s	daily	lives	for	an	extended	period	of	time,	watching	[…],	listening	[…],	
asking	questions	–	in	fact,	collecting	whatever	data	are	available’	(ibid,	1995:	1).		
Although	I	did	not	immerse	myself	in	the	day-to-day	lives	of	my	subjects,	I	
visited	them	in	their	homes	and	interacted	with	them	in	social	settings	that	
were	focal	points	of	political	activism	in	the	Black	Caribbean	community.		These	
settings	were	spaces	of	agency	and	mobilisation,	where	issues	of	
discrimination,	empowerment	and	cultural	affirmation	were	contested	and	
represented.	
	
	
My	eversion	approach	used	mixed	qualitative	methods,	consisting	of	semi-
structured	interviews	and	participant	observation	in	various	private	and	public	
settings.		The	data	was	captured	in	hand-written	notes	and	through	the	use	of	
audio-visual	recording	equipment.		Islam	(2000:	40)	argues,	‘it	is	critical	that	
researchers	explore	descriptive	life	histories.		Such	a	method	uncovers	the	
conceptual	framework	of	respondents’.		Interviews	and	observation	were	the	
preferred	qualitative	methods,	as	they	enable	researchers	to	interpret	how	
subjects	make	sense	of	their	social	worlds.		Although	the	data	collection	took	
various	forms	I	also	acknowledge	that	in	ethnographic	fieldwork,	‘the	
researcher	is	the	primary	tool	for	collecting	primary	data’	(Schensul	et	al.,	1999:	
viii)	and	therefore	has	to	utilise	whatever	method	comes	to	hand.		
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I	used	a	semi-structured	interview	schedule,	which	was	recorded	
simultaneously	on	a	Flip	Video	Recorder	and	also	a	Sony	Voice	Recorder	to	
capture	the	‘disruptions	and	continuities’	(Islam,	2000:	39)	in	the	biographies	of	
my	respondents.		I	had	to	ensure,	that	as	far	as	it	was	possible,	my	presence	
was	not	influencing	the	participants	to	respond	in	a	way	they	thought	
conformed	to	my	expectations	of	what	they	‘ought	to	be’	(May,	2001:	47)	
saying.		Moreover,	analysing	‘the	disconnect	between	[…]	narratives	and	
actions’	(Khan	and	Jerolmack,	2013:	12)	is	crucial	to	the	production	of	
knowledge,	as	‘the	meanings	and	significance	of	the	accounts	gathered	through	
interviews	vary	depending	on	the	characteristics	of	the	participants’	(ibid,	
2013:9).		Thus,	understanding	how	ambiguities	can	occur	during	interviews	
made	it	important	to	maximise	validity.		This	was	done	by	firstly	encouraging	
the	respondents	to	relax	by	engaging	in	an	informal	dialogue	prior	to	asking	
questions.		This	tactic	was	used	to	overcome	the	Hawthorne	Effect.		They	soon	
forgot	about	the	presence	of	the	camera,	and	the	interview	was	generally	over	
before	they	were	aware	it	had	started.	
	
	
Establishing	an	initial	rapport,	prior	to	asking	questions,	also	facilitated	the	
observation	of	thick	descriptions	(Geertz,	1994)	of	the	subjects	and	their	
surroundings.		I	could	observe	actions	and	behaviour	in	the	subjects’	natural	
social	settings,	and	make	comparisons	of	‘interview	accounts	with	observed	
activity’	(Khan	and	Jerolmack,	2013:	18).		Whilst	playing	back	the	recordings	I	
could	also	uncover	hidden	meanings	and	inaccuracies	by	watching	the	reactions	
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and	body	language	of	my	subjects	whilst	listening	to	their	responses.		Thus,	I	
was	able	to	assess	whether	the	research	subjects	might	be	performing	to	my	
perceived	expectations	(Goffman,	1963),	rather	than	recalling	the	true	order	of	
events	in	their	narratives		
	
	
The	interviews	took	place	in	the	homes	of	subjects,	the	buildings	used	by	
community	organisations,	their	places	of	work	and	educational	centres.		They	
were	conducted	wherever	the	respondents	felt	most	comfortable	to	talk	and	it	
was	convenient.		The	narratives	captured	rich,	meaningful	data	regarding	their	
educational	experiences	and	also	their	housing	and	employment	situations.		I	
did	not	mention	racism	directly	when	questioning	the	participants	about	their	
experiences	of	competition	in	market	situations.		As	noted	above,	this	was	
because	I	wanted	them	to	recall	and	define	their	experiences	of	discrimination	
without	feeling	they	were	being	led	to	say	what	they	thought	I	might	want	to	
hear.		However,	in	describing	their	experiences	it	was	obvious	that	some	of	the	
interviewees	had	encountered	racism,	but	they	did	not	always	‘name	their	
experiences	as	racism’	(Islam,	2000:	40	[emphasis	in	original]).		On	the	other	
hand,	some	of	the	subjects	were	only	too	aware	of	how	their	experiences	were	
intersected	by	racism.			
	
	
During	the	course	of	my	fieldwork,	there	were	times	when	people	‘felt	
comfortable	making	[...]	racist	statements	[…]	because	it	was	assumed	that	I	
	 121	
would	share	these	views’	(ibid,	2000:	47),	or	at	least	understand	them	because	
we	shared	the	same	ethnic	identity.		However,	I	had	to	make	it	clear	that	I	did	
not	agree	with	such	statements.		Although	my	actions	might	have	had	the	
effect	of	making	my	subjects	modify	their	behaviour,	I	did	not	think	it	would	be	
wise	to	compromise	my	ideological	position.		I	had	to	consider	that	if	I	did	not	
make	a	stance	by	challenging	racist	expressions,	then	my	inertia	was	actually	
condoning	racism.	
	
	
Although	the	power	of	researchers	in	the	production	of	knowledge	cannot	be	
overlooked,	it	must	also	be	recognised	that	the	research	process	also	provides	
opportunities	for	respondents	to	use	it	to	promote	their	own	agenda.		
Interviewees	may	use	the	situation	as	a	forum	to	project	an	image	of	how	they	
see	themselves,	which	is	not	necessarily	how	others	might	see	them.		
Therefore,	the	combination	of	observation	and	audio-visual	recordings	
reinforced	the	research’s	validity.		This	is	because	‘standard	ethnographic	
practice	presumes	that	observations	will	[…]	permit	ready	validation	of	speech’	
(Khan	and	Jerolmack,	2013:	17).		However,	subjects	may	distort	validity	by	
presenting	an	image	that	is	inaccurate	and	driven	by	unrelated	interests.		This	
might	happen	when	the	interviewee	is	aware	of	the	impact	that	communicating	
their	image	in	a	certain	way,	and	for	a	particular	audience,	can	have.	
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Interviews	can	be	a	form	of	‘social	signalling’	(ibid,	2013:	17)	for	respondents,	in	
which	the	researcher	has	to	consider	how	knowledge	is	constructed	and	
contested	as	they	toggle	‘between	speech	and	everyday	behaviour’	(ibid,	2013:	
17).		Goffman	(1959:	3)	refers	to	this	process	of	social	interaction	as	inference.		
This	is	when	actors	perform	a	conscious	form	of	sign	activity	in	which	they	give	
off	signals	that	feign	expectations.		In	the	context	of	an	interview	this	can	occur	
when	the	subjects	see	themselves	as	having	a	social	status	that	warrants	
particularistic	behaviour.		This	process	of	inference	can	highlight	discontinuities	
with	previous	actions,	observations	and	knowledge	gained	from	relevant	
Others.		Thus,	it	is	important	to	recognise	that	‘disengagement	in	the	
interviewing	process	is	not	[…]	a	realistic	possibility,	but	a	process	that	is	
constructed	after	the	event’	(May,	2001:	134).		Open	questioning	–	to	unpack	
meaning	and	dispel	inaccuracies	–	assisted	by	audio-visual	recording	equipment	
are	valuable	tools	in	this	process.		As	noted	above,	their	combined	use	can	be	
deployed	to	carefully	analyse	inconsistencies	after	the	interaction	has	taken	
place.		The	use	of	technological	tools	in	my	eversion	ethnography,	alongside	the	
examination	of	HESA	and	Census	data,	enabled	me	to	address	the	question:	
• How	are	the	education	and	labour	market	experiences	of	African	
Caribbeans	in	Birmingham	mediated	by	their	gender	and	ethnicity?	
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Eversion	and	agency	in	the	Black	community	
	
African	Caribbean	community	organisations	have	contributed	to	legislative	
changes	in	the	public	domain,	where	life-changing	goods	are	obtained	via	
competition	in	various	markets	(Sivanandan,	1981;	Fryer,	1984;	Ratcliffe,	2004;	
Gillborn,	2005;	Andrews,	2013).		Therefore,	I	wanted	to	understand	the	barriers	
they	have	encountered	in	recent	years,	in	their	efforts	to	provide	support	for	
those	whose	interests	they	represent.		It	was	necessary	to	see	the	world	
through	the	eyes	of	various	Black	community	leaders	to	assess	the	impact	that	
contemporary	changes	in	legislation	have	had	on	their	agency.	
	
	
Without	first-hand	knowledge,	it	is	difficult	to	understand	the	external	and	
internal	factors	that	might	constrain	or	enable	the	operational	capacities	of	
organisations.		This	form	of	knowledge	can	only	be	brought	to	the	surface	by	
observation,	asking	questions	and	engaging	in	dialogues.		However,	it	must	also	
be	acknowledged	that	legislation,	policy	and	practices	do	not	always	constrain	
social	agency	as	human	action	–	or	more	precisely,	inaction	–	can	also	be	
contributory	factors.		This	is	why	observing	the	relationship	between	efficacy	
and	operational	capacity,	is	an	appropriate	method	of	ascertaining	the	barriers	
and	drivers	of	community	action.		
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The	African	Caribbean	Self-Help	Organisation	(ACSHO)	is	a	politically	focused	
African	Caribbean	community	group.		Its	agency	has	featured	in	the	analyses	of	
previous	researchers	(Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981;	2004)	who	
have	never	met	any	members	of	the	organisation95.		My	shared	ethnic	identity	
and	community	affiliations	facilitated	access	to	ACSHO.		I	was	able	to	
participate	in	their	meetings	and	take	part	in	the	events	they	organised	on	
behalf	of	the	African	Caribbean	community96.		I	was	granted	permission	to	
interview	and	record	ACSHO’s	leader,	Bini	Brown,	on	the	condition	that	I:		
	
‘Tell	it	like	it	is’	(Bini	Brown,	20th	August	2013,	Birmingham).			
	
This	meant	not	using	pseudonyms	when	referring	to	the	organisation	and	
providing	a	valid	account	of	their	struggles	against	racism	and	discrimination.		
My	eversion	technique	allowed	me	to	provide	a	first-hand,	inside-out	account	
of	the	impact	that	legislative	change	has	had	on	the	agency	of	a	prominent	
African	Caribbean	organisation.			
	
																																								 																				
95	See	Footnote	91.	
96	The	weekly	meetings	of	ACSHO	were	held	each	Tuesday	evening	and	chaired	by	their	leader	
Bini	Brown.		They	started	at	7	p.m.	and	ended	at	10	p.m.		ACSHO	organised	various	national	
and	community	events.		Some	of	them,	such	as	African	Liberation	Day,	were	held	annually.		I	
helped	out	in	a	small	way	at	the	African	Liberation	Day	events	by	handing	out	tickets,	leaflets	
and	covering	the	duties	of	ACSHO	members,	when	they	took	breaks.		I	also	attended	other	
meetings	of	various	community	groups.		Some	of	them	were	organised	by	the	community’s	
Black	Churches	and	affiliated	organisations.		For	example,	Excell	3	(see	below)	held	seminars	in	
the	community	to	generate	support	for	their	application	for	a	Free	School.		In	addition,	I	often	
attended	the	bi-monthly	meetings	of	UBL	[United	in	Building	Legacy]	a	multi-function	
community	action	group.		The	organisation	has	several	constituent	bodies	that	specialises	in	
providing	Black	Caribbeans	with	support	in	specific	areas	i.e.	educational,	legal,	youth	and	
religious	work.		Religion	was	used	as	a	force	for	social	change.		Bishop	Joe	Aldridge	of	UBL	
organised	meetings	of	the	various	religious	groups	in	the	community	to	discuss	ways	of	
working	together	to	benefit	African	Caribbeans	generally.	
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Over	the	years	that	I	attended	ACSHO’s	weekly	meetings	I	witnessed	the	
barriers	they	faced	trying	to	provide	social	assistance	for	the	African	Caribbean	
community.		Bini	involved	me	in	some	of	the	African	Liberation	Day	(ALD)	
events	the	group	organises	on	an	annual	basis,	and	after	a	while	some	of	the	
organisation’s	members	forgot	the	primary	purpose	of	my	presence,	which	
created	a	personal	moral	dilemma.		By	failing	to	remind	them	of	my	academic	
outsider	status	my	actions	could	be	interpreted	as	deceit.		However,	knowing	
that	I	was	highlighting	barriers	and	inequalities	in	the	Black	community,	which	
would	have	otherwise	been	invisible,	soothed	my	conscience.		Although	I	often	
felt	as	if	I	was	betraying	those	who	trusted	me,	I	was	also	aware	that	as	an	
academic	I	was	able	to	empower	them	and	give	their	agency	a	voice.			
	
	
It	should	not	be	overlooked	that	‘research	is	a	two-way	process’	in	which	the	
researcher	must	not	see	‘people	in	the	[…]	process	as	simply	sources	of	data’	
(May,	2001:	21).		Thus,	I	offered	ACSHO	something	in	turn	for	my	acceptance.		I	
helped	out	at	their	community	functions,	and	wrote	letters	on	their	behalf	
when	requested97.		Thus,	I	was	able	to	witness	first-hand	how	ACSHO	differed	
from	other	African	Caribbean	community	organisations.		I	was	also	able	to	
understand	how	they	perceived	other	Black	organisations,	how	they	perceived	
themselves	and	how	others	perceived	them.	
	
																																								 																				
97	See	Appendix	v.	
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There	are	a	variety	of	different	groups	that	utilise	an	array	of	networks	to	
support	the	needs	of	Birmingham’s	African	Caribbean	community.		United	in	
Building	Legacy	(UBL)98	is	one	of	them.		The	Chair	of	the	organisation	is	GK,	who	
was	a	former	member	of	ACSHO.		Birmingham	City	Council	employs	him	in	a	
prominent	administrative	position;	he	is	also	a	senior	member	of	the	Caribbean	
community’s	Council	of	Black	Led	Churches.		Like	ACSHO,	UBL	also	has	a	
political	focus.		However,	unlike	ACSHO	their	focal	concerns	revolve	around	the	
social	progression	of	Black	Britons,	rather	than	Pan-African	ideology.		That	is	
not	to	say	they	are	not	concerned	with	Pan-Africanism,	only	that	it	is	not	their	
primary	concern.		UBL	is	segmented	into	sub-divisions	to	facilitate	their	agency.		
The	sub-groups	focus	on	supporting	specific	needs	of	the	Black	community,	in	
legal,	educational	and	other	relevant	contexts.			
	
	
Rosemary	Campbell-Stephens	is	an	educationalist	and	leader	of	the	education	
sub-division	of	UBL.		She,	like	the	Chair	of	the	organisation,	is	also	a	former	
member	of	ACSHO.		I	met	Rosemary	during	one	of	the	educational	seminars	
that	she	organised	on	behalf	of	her	organisation.		When	we	met,	she	was	
gathering	community	support	for	an	application	to	open	the	first	African	
Caribbean	Free	School	in	Birmingham.		Free	Schools	come	under	the	remit	of	
the	2010	Academies	Act	(AA2010)	and	are	effectively	schools	that	are	free	from	
local	education	authority	(LEA)	control.			
																																								 																				
98	See	Footnote	96.	
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I	was	impressed	by	the	hard	work	and	sheer	determination	Rosemary	invested	
in	her	effort	to	set	up	a	Free	School,	and	she	subsequently	became	my	
gatekeeper.		As	a	result,	I	was	able	to	attend	UBL’s	meetings	and	assess	how	
their	efforts	were	progressing	in	relation	to	setting	up	a	Free	School.		Although	
Rosemary	was	aware	of	my	research,	and	that	I	was	analysing	the	agency	of	
UBL	in	relation	to	their	aims,	she	did	not	share	her	knowledge	with	the	other	
members.		Rosemary	was	not	attempting	to	deceive	her	colleagues;	she	
genuinely	trusted	my	intentions	and	believed	that	my	research	was	useful	to	
the	Caribbean	community	and	necessary	in	terms	of	documenting	the	struggles	
they	encountered.		If	my	presence	at	a	UBL	meeting	were	ever	challenged,	I	
was	prepared	to	divulge	my	research	and	its	aims.		However,	the	situation	
never	arose.		Rosemary	gave	me	permission	to	interview	her,	and	to	use	her	
name	in	my	research.		She	considered	her	work	for	the	community	to	be	of	vital	
importance	and	encouraged	its	documentation.				
	
	
I	also	utilised	my	inside	status	and	contacts	in	the	community	to	attend	the	
meetings	of	another	African	Caribbean	group	called	Excell	399.		One	of	their	
former	members,	Dr	Tony	Talburt,	is	a	friend	of	mine,	and	it	was	he	who	told	
me	about	Excell	3’s	bid	for	a	Free	School.		Excell	3	is	a	faith	based	African	
Caribbean	community	group	that	focuses	on	the	education	and	spiritual	needs	
																																								 																				
99	See	Footnote	96.	
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of	the	community.		The	organisation	is	led	by	an	African	Caribbean	female,	Dr	
Cheron	Byfield,	who	I	was	introduced	to	by	Tony.		Excell	3	and	UBL	pooled	their	
organisational	resources	in	an	effort	to	obtain	State	funding	to	set	up	a	Free	
School.		I	was	subsequently	invited	to	Excell3’s	Free	School	meetings,	regarding	
the	progress	of	their	application,	by	both	Cheron	and	Rosemary.		Cheron	
granted	me	permission	to	video	record	their	community	meeting,	which	was	
held	at	the	New	Testament	Church	of	God	(NTCG)	and	to	use	her	name	and	
details	of	her	organisation	in	my	research.			
	
	
Derek	Webley	is	Bishop	of	the	NTCG	in	Lozells.		Bishop	Webley	is	the	former	
Chair	of	the	Independent	Police	Complaint	Commission	and	a	prominent	
member	of	the	African	Caribbean	community.		The	Council	of	Black	Led	
Churches	is	a	very	powerful	organisation	in	the	African	Caribbean	community	
and	its	leaders	are	highly	respected.		Bishop	Webley	has	featured	in	local	and	
national	News	and	current	affairs	programmes.		He	has	been	courted	by	the	
media,	in	his	role	as	a	community	leader	and	also	in	his	former	position	working	
alongside	West	Midlands	Police.		I	have	known	Bishop	Webley	since	we	were	
teenagers	in	the	African	Caribbean	community	and	I	know	Bishop	Jackson	
through	my	mother-in-law,	who	is	a	member	of	the	NTCG.		It	is	my	insider	
knowledge	of	the	NTCG	that	allowed	me	to	obtain	interviews	with	them.		Both	
bishops	allowed	me	to	refer	to	them	by	name	in	my	research,	and	Bishop	
Webley	gave	his	permission	to	film	our	dialogue.		I	asked	him	about	the	political	
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and	social	barriers	obstructing	the	agency	of	the	Church	and	what	are	the	main	
issues	confronting	the	African	Caribbean	community	today.			
	
	
As	higher	education	qualifications	are	Goods,	and	factors	of	social	mobility	
(Bourdieu,	2010	[1984]),	I	also	needed	an	informed	perspective	from	outside	of	
the	African	Caribbean	community,	to	assess	the	impact	that	contemporary	
educational	policies	have	had	on	reducing	ethnic	inequalities.		I	obtained	the	
views	of	Professor	David	Gillborn,	the	Director	of	the	Centre	for	Research	in	
Race	and	Education	(CRRE),	based	at	the	University	of	Birmingham.		Professor	
Gillborn	is	also	acknowledged	as	one	of	the	UK’s	leading	researchers	of	ethnic	
inequalities	in	education.		I	interviewed	him	in	his	office	at	the	University	and	
recorded	his	views	on	the	impact	that	legislative	changes	have	had	on	African	
Caribbean	educational	attainment.			
	
	
The	aim	of	the	various	qualitative	methods	used	to	gather	data	in	the	African	
Caribbean	community	was	to	answer	the	following	question:	
• What	impact	have	changes	in	legislation,	policies	and	practices	had	on	
the	operational	capacity	and	agency	of	Black	Caribbean	community	and	
religious	organisations	in	Birmingham?	
The	interview	conducted	with	Professor	David	Gillborn,	the	narratives	of	
various	African	Caribbean	subjects	and	the	use	of	quantitative	data,	are	
analysed	against	social	and	political	changes	to	address	the	question:	
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• To	what	extent	does	legislation	enable	or	constrain	African	Caribbean	
social	mobility	in	the	context	of	competitive	market	situations?	
	
	
Summary	
	
The	quantitative	methods	used	in	this	research	enabled	me	to	examine	African	
Caribbean	progress	in	the	educational	and	labour	markets.		They	also	allowed	
me	to	map	changes	in	their	spatial	positions,	and	compare	them	against	those	
of	their	White	British	and	MWBC	counterparts.		Variations	in	the	educational	
attainment,	labour	and	housing	market	positions	of	Black	Caribbeans	in	
Birmingham,	were	examined	alongside	changes	in	equality	legislation,	policies	
and	practices.		The	aim	of	this	approach	was	to	explore	if	changes	in	the	
equality	agenda	have	constrained	or	enabled	African	Caribbean	social	mobility.		
The	qualitative	methods	outlined	above	were	employed	to	generate	primary	
data	of	the	barriers	community	groups	and	educationalists	faced	in	their	day-
to-day	struggles	against	racial	inequality,	and	their	efforts	to	support	the	
Caribbean	community.		The	methods	also	enabled	me	to	understand	how	
legislative	change	impacted	on	the	agency	of	organisations	fighting	for	equity,	
and	the	factors	that	influence	the	contemporary	social	status	of	Birmingham’s	
Caribbean	population.	
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4. From	the	politics	of	collectivism	to	free	market	individualism	
	
The	role	played	by	African	Caribbean	organisations	in	the	development	of	
community	supplementary	educational	programmes	has	been	outlined	
earlier100	and	extensively	documented	elsewhere	(Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979;	
Andrews,	2013).		However,	it	is	important	to	understand	if	Black	organisations	
are	still	capable	of	effectively	securing	education,	and	other	resources	crucial	to	
achieving	upward	social	mobility,	for	their	supporters.		This	is	especially	as	the	
free	market	politics	of	neo-liberalism101now	undermines	the	collective	action	of	
organisations	in	favour	of	the	kind	of	agency	that	is	informed	by	free	market	
individualism.		Where	the	examination	of	Black	agency	in	this	chapter	is	
concerned,	neo-liberal	‘individualism,	presented	as	personal	freedom,	not	only	
undermines	a	sense	of	solidarity	[…]	but	militates	against	any	sort	of	collective	
action	or	social	movement.		In	exchange,	neo-liberalism	offers	[…]	a	make-good	
private	enterprise’	(Sivanandan,	2013:	7).		This	chapter	will:		
• assess	the	contemporary	operational	capabilities	of	Black	Caribbean	
community	organisations;	
																																								 																				
100	See	Chapter	Two.	
101	As	noted	in	Chapter	One,	neo-liberalism	supports	the	reduction	of	the	State,	particularly	the	
rolling	back	of	its	powers	to	mediate	equality	in	the	public	domain	by	implementing	social	
policies.		The	tenets	of	neo-liberalism	encourage	‘the	abolition	of	regulations	that	interfered	
with	the	free	play	of	the	market’	(Sivanandan,	2013:	2).		In	a	neo-liberal	society	individuals	are	
granted	the	autonomy	to	‘sink	or	swim	by	his/her	own	efforts,	irrespective	of	whether	they	
were	stranded	on	the	shores	of	unemployment,	disability,	old	age	or	just	poverty’	(ibid,	2013:	
2).		
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• identify	some	of	the	legislative	barriers	African	Caribbean	organisation	
face	in	their	efforts	to	obtain	educational	resources	and	labour	market	
assistance	for	their	supporters;	
• establish	how	social	and	political	changes	influence	community	action,	
inaction,	opportunities	and	disadvantages;	
• examine	how	effectively	Black	organisations	mobilise	and	the	
relationship	between	their	self-sufficiency	and	agency.	
	
	
Although	African	Caribbean	organisations	lack	formal	power,	they	operate	in	
the	urban	community	space	that	Shukra	et	al	(2004:	33)	refer	to	as	the	
‘transitional	sphere’	of	informal	political	participation,	also	known	as	‘the	
alternative	public	sphere’	(emphases	in	original).		It	is	within	the	urban	
landscape	of	the	transitional	community	sphere	that	Black	organisations	have	
been	able	to	mobilise,	‘inform,	direct	and	respond	to	developments’	(ibid,	
2004:	33),	which	have	in	turn	empowered	their	supporters	and	influenced	
social	change	(Sivanandan,	1982;	Andrews,	2013).		The	contemporary	
operational	capacities	of	the	New	Testament	Church	of	God,	ACSHO,	ACFAS,	
UBL,	Excell	3	and	–	to	a	small	extent	–	ACFAS	and	Kajan	are	examined	in	this	
chapter.		The	aim	is	to	establish	how	effectively	these	organisations	navigate	
the	transitional	sphere,	to	secure	educational	resources	and	labour	market	
assistance	for	African	Caribbeans.	
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The	New	Testament	Church	of	God	(NTCG)	
	
The	NTCG	is	a	member	of	the	body	of	UK	Christian	institutions	known	as	the	
Council	of	Black	Led	Churches,	which	consists	of	a	number	of	Protestant	
Christian	churches,	of	various	denominations.		The	leadership,	and	the	majority	
of	the	congregations,	are	of	Caribbean	and	African	heritage.		Bishop	Derek	
Webley	is	the	leader	of	the	NTCG	in	Lozells.		He	is	a	53-year-old	African	
Caribbean,	who	is	married	with	four	children	and	lives	a	few	miles	away	from	
his	church.		There	are	two	local	branches	of	the	NTCG:	the	larger	branch	is	
situated	in	Lozells	and	there	is	a	smaller	church	a	short	distance	away	in	
Hockley.		The	Hockley	church	is	known	as	The	Rock	and	it	is	led	by	Bishop	
Jonathan	Jackson.		He	is	a	45-year-old	African	Caribbean,	who	lives	in	the	
Sandwell	area	with	his	wife	and	their	two	children.		I	know	both	Bishops	
personally.		Bishop	Webley,	like	myself,	grew	up	in	Handsworth.		My	mother-in-
law	is	also	a	senior	member	of	the	congregation	of	Bishop	Jackson’s	church	in	
Hockley.		
	
	
Although	the	majority	of	the	NTCG’s	congregation	is	Black,	there	are	also	a	few	
White	members	of	both	genders	who	attend	the	weekly	Sunday	services.		
Approximately	75-80	per	cent	of	the	church’s	members	are	females.		Despite	its	
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patriarchal	structure102,	Bishop	Webley	acknowledges	that	female	members	
play	a	very	important	role	in	the	church’s	operations:	
	
‘The	women	are	far	more	energetic,	vibrant	and	drive	the	church’	(Bishop	
Webley,	23rd	April	2013,	Birmingham).	
	
Most	of	the	NTCG’s	congregation	is	aged	between	25-55	and	its	membership	
includes	a	substantial	number	of	elders.		The	majority	of	its	members	are	
married	and	live	within	a	10-mile	radius	of	the	church,	in	the	Handsworth,	
Handsworth	Wood,	Perry	Barr	and	Great	Barr	areas.		
	
	
The	activities	of	the	Black	Churches	are	well	known	in	the	African	Caribbean	
community.		At	different	stages	in	their	lives,	most	of	the	research	participants	
had	some	involvement	with	one	of	the	local	Black	Churches.		However,	only	a	
few	claim	to	be	religious	and	just	one	of	the	seven	research	subjects	from	
ACFAS103	was	dismissive	of	the	work	carried	out	by	the	church.		The	majority	of	
the	participants	were	familiar	with	the	NTCG,	in	either	Lozells	or	Hockley.		The	
Lozells	branch	tends	to	be	better	known,	due	to	its	size	and	its	historical	
relationship	with	the	elderly	members	of	Handsworth’s	West	Indian	
community.	
	
																																								 																				
102	The	NTCG	is	governed	by	the	Canon	Law	of	the	Anglican	General	Synod,	which	at	the	time	
did	not	allow	females	to	become	Bishops.		The	Synod	changed	Canon	Law	on	November	17th	
2014	and	as	a	result	female	Bishops	can	now	be	ordained.		
103	See	Chapter	Three	
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The	NTCG:	Social	policy	and	financial	autonomy	
	
The	Lozells	branch	of	the	NTCG	is	situated	on	the	corner	of	Lozells	Road	and	
George	Street,	near	to	the	boundary	between	Handsworth	and	Lozells.		The	
church	is	an	imposing	building,	which	has	recently	undergone	a	major	
refurbishment.		The	frontage	now	incorporates	a	substantial	modern	extension,	
which	compliments	the	original	Victorian	structure.		There	are	two	entrances:	
the	original	Victorian	access	on	George	Street	and	the	new	entrance	on	Lozells	
Road.		The	weekly	Sunday	services	are	very	popular	and	well	attended	by	both	
young	and	older	members	of	the	African	Caribbean	community.		The	tithes	
(individual	contributions)	collected	from	members,	and	those	attending	
services	each	week,	help	the	church	to	generate	its	own	finances.		The	recent	
renovation	has	also	increased	the	seating	capacity	of	the	Lozells	NTCG,	to	the	
extent	where	it	can	comfortably	accommodate	several	hundred	people	on	two	
seating	levels.			
	
	
In	recent	times	the	church	has	presided	over	more	funerals	than	weddings.		The	
Lozells	NTCG	is	the	main	church	of	choice	for	Black	funerals	in	North-West	
Birmingham.		Funerals	also	generate	finances	for	the	church.		There	is	a	
children’s	nursery	adjacent	to	the	George	Street	side	of	the	church,	which	
belongs	to	the	NTCG.		The	nursery	was	built	during	the	church’s	renovation.		
Although	African	Caribbean	females	are	its	main	consumers,	the	nursery	is	
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operated	as	an	independent	business	and	is	also	used	by	non-members.		The	
nursery	indirectly	assists	African	Caribbean	parents	to	access	the	labour	and	
educational	markets,	by	providing	a	childcare	facility	for	their	children	during	
the	working	week104.		Some	of	the	funds	acquired	by	the	nursery	contribute	
towards	the	activities	and	running	costs	of	the	church.		Therefore,	the	policy	of	
Childcare	Tax	Credits	subsidises	the	NTCG’s	nursery	service	and	indirectly	
assists	the	church	to	maintain	its	financial	autonomy.	
	
	
The	power	and	agency	of	the	NTCG		
	
The	NTCG’s	agency	is	not	compromised	by	fear	of	sanctions	from	external	
sponsors.		Financial	independence	allows	the	NTCG	to	act	autonomously	where	
the	interests	of	the	church	and	the	Black	community	are	concerned.		Thus,	the	
church	can	be	both	proactive	and	reactive	as	the	need	arises;	it	is	able	to	
respond	ad	hoc	to	unforeseen	situations	without	the	need	for	prior	
consultation	with	other	organisations.		In	many	ways,	the	church’s	relationship	
with	death	prepares	it	for	this	worldly	action.		Bereavement	is	often	
unpredictable,	as	death	is	the	most	unforeseen,	unplanned	and	disruptive	of	
																																								 																				
104	At	the	time	of	writing	nursery	places	are	funded	by	the	Government’s	policy	of	Tax	Credits.		
They	enable	single	parents	who	are	working	16	or	more	hours	to	claim	a	maximum	of	£122.50	
a	week,	to	cover	childcare	fees	for	one	child;	parents	with	two	children	can	apply	for	up	to	
£210	(Gov.UK,	2014).		Discretionary	Learner	Support	Grants	for	childcare	are	also	available	to	
parents	over	the	age	of	20	–	and	studying	on	a	full-time	programme	at	a	further	education	
college	(ibid,	2014).		Unemployed	parents	can	also	obtain	some	form	of	childcare	assistance.		
Tax	Credits	fund	570	hours	of	free	childcare	per	year	for	children	between	the	ages	of	3	and	4	
(ibid,	2014).			
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life’s	events.		Therefore,	the	church	always	expects	to	contend	with	unexpected	
circumstances.		
	
	
The	shooting	of	Mark	Duggan,	by	London’s	Metropolitan	Police	in	2011,	was	
the	catalyst	for	a	series	of	disturbances105	in	many	of	Britain’s	cities,	which	the	
national	media	labelled	“race”	riots	(Independent,	2011).		When	the	civil	unrest	
spread	to	Birmingham	the	Lozells	NTCG	became	a	focal	point	for	Black	
Caribbean	mobilisation.		Meetings	were	held	at	the	Lozells	church	as	the	
disturbances	in	the	city	developed.		The	NTCG	organised	street	marches	in	
which	the	Caribbean	community	politicised	their	plea	for	an	end	to	the	
disturbances.		Local	TV	and	radio	stations	covered	the	street	protests,	which	
were	led	by	Bishop	Derek	Webley106	(ibid,	2011).	
	
	
I	attended	a	community	meeting	organised	at	short	notice	that	took	place	at	
The	Rock	in	Hockley,	on	the	Saturday	following	a	night	of	major	unrest	in	the	
city	during	August	2011	(NTCG,	2011a;	b;	c).		The	meeting	was	in	response	to	
concerns	in	the	African	Caribbean	community	they	were	being	blamed	for	the	
																																								 																				
105	I	am	conscious	that	some	sociologists	might	use	the	term	riots,	to	describe	the	actions	I	
refer	to	as	civil	unrest	or	disturbances.		By	labeling	collective	urban	disturbances	as	riots,	there	
is	a	danger	that	sociologists	can	inadvertently	depoliticise	the	actions	of	those	who	are	
involved	in	such	events.		Moreover,	the	underlying	social	causes	of	the	actions	of	individuals	
are	also	overlooked.	
106	Bishop	Webley	is	well	known	to	the	media.		He	was	a	member	of	the	West	Midlands	Police	
Authority	(WMPA)	for	thirteen	years	before	being	elected	as	its	Chairman.		However,	his	
position	was	abolished	in	November	2012	and	subsequently	replaced	by	the	new	office	of	
Police	and	Crime	Commissioner	for	the	West	Midlands.		Although	Bishop	Webley	was	one	of	a	
number	of	candidates	who	contested	for	the	new	office,	his	campaign	was	unsuccessful.		The	
late	Bob	Jones	was	elected	as	the	first	Crime	Commissioner.		However,	he	died	in	July	2014.		
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disturbances107,	by	certain	sections	of	the	national	and	local	media.		The	
community	meeting	was	organised	by	Mandesa	Gordon.		She	is	a	female	
African	Caribbean	journalist	who	at	the	time	was	working	as	a	presenter	for	
BBC	Radio	WM	in	Birmingham.		Although	Mandesa	arranged	the	meeting	quite	
quickly,	a	significant	number	of	African	Caribbeans	attended.		The	600	seats	on	
the	lower	level	of	the	church	were	full,	as	were	the	aisles	and	corridors.		Dr	
Robert	Beckford,	an	African	Caribbean	academic	who	at	the	time	was	attached	
to	the	University	of	Warwick,	chaired	the	meeting.		The	panel	consisted	of	a	
mixture	of	young	and	elderly	local	community	activists,	the	Labour	politician	
Yvonne	Mosquito,	Professor	Gus	John	and	Bishop	Derek	Webley108.		Although	
the	meeting	was	organised	by	a	BBC	journalist,	and	invitations	were	extended	
to	the	mainstream	local	and	national	media,	they	were	conspicuous	by	their	
absence.		The	media’s	disinterest	indicated	that	the	community’s	mobilisation,	
in	response	to	their	concerns	about	media	demonisation,	was	not	considered	
																																								 																				
107	The	media	initially	attempted	to	present	the	disturbances	as	‘race	riots’,	and	blame	Black	
Caribbeans	for	the	criminal	element.		Bias	newspaper	and	TV	coverage	painted	a	picture	of	
pathological	Blacks	stealing	from	hardworking	Asian	businesses.		The	media’s	lies	and	
exaggeration	culminated	in	reports	indicating	that	an	African	Caribbean	male	was	driving	the	
car,	which	tragically	killed	three	young	Asian	men	in	the	Winson	Green	area.		However,	it	was	
later	established	that	the	driver	was	a	local	White	youth.		He	was	charged	with	murder,	but	
later	acquitted.		In	contrast	to	the	media	coverage	of	Black	males	as	perpetrators	and	
aggressors,	little	attention	was	paid	to	their	status	as	victims.		The	night	prior	to	the	Winson	
Green	incident,	an	African	Caribbean	driver	was	beaten	unconscious	by	Sikh	vigilantes	outside	
of	the	Guru	Nanak	Gurdwara	Sikh	Temple	on	Smethwick	High	Street.		The	victim	was	dragged	
out	of	his	vehicle	and	assaulted	with	a	variety	of	weapons.		Although	the	incident	was	covered	
on	television	and	reported	in	the	local	newspapers,	no	one	was	arrested.		Local	TV	crews	also	
recorded	masked	and	armed	Asian	gangs,	roaming	the	city’s	streets	during	the	disturbances.		
Although	their	actions	were	illegal	the	assailants	were	portrayed	as	Asian	businessmen,	
defending	their	properties	from	Caribbean	attacks.		For	a	discussion	on	the	racist	nature	of	the	
media’s	coverage	of	the	unrest,	see	Wadsworth	(2012).	
108	Both	Dr	Robert	Beckford	and	Professor	Gus	John	have	very	high	profiles	in	the	academic	
community.		They	have	published	a	range	of	literature	documenting	issues	specific	to	the	black	
community.		Robert	Beckford	has	also	starred	in	a	succession	of	programmes	for	Channel	4.		
Gus	John’s	(1970)	analysis	of	Handsworth	featured	in	the	later	work	of	Rex	and	Tomlinson	
(1979).		The	meeting	at	The	Rock	was	filmed	and	excerpts	were	uploaded	to	YouTube	(NTCG,	
2011	a;	b;	c).	
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to	be	of	any	significant	news-value	(Wadsworth,	2012).		Apparently,	a	peaceful	
gathering	between	different	sections	of	the	African	Caribbean	community	did	
not	conform	to	the	more	popular	news	stories	being	circulated	at	the	time	of	
Black	criminality	and	gun	violence	(McCarthy,	2014).					
	
	
The	meeting	itself	provided	substantive	evidence	of	how	quickly	the	church	
could	mobilise	the	Black	community	in	response	to	a	perceived	crisis.		The	
gathering	at	The	Rock	also	demonstrated	that	any	member	of	the	Black	
community	could	utilise	the	church	as	a	resource	–	regardless	of	the	way	in	
which	they	perceived	religion.		I	found	out	about	the	meeting	via	a	text	
message,	others	had	received	emails	and	the	majority	of	those	who	attended	
heard	about	it	by	word-of-mouth.		Although	the	lines	of	communication	were	
effective	in	gathering	and	galvanising	support,	the	lack	of	media	attention	
meant	that	the	actions	of	the	community	had	no	wider	political	impact	outside	
of	the	transitional	sphere.		Therefore,	it	was	difficult	to	assess	exactly	how	the	
Caribbean	community	benefitted	from	the	meeting	at	The	Rock.		Mandesa	and	
Robert	gathered	the	email	addresses	of	many	of	those	who	participated	in	the	
meeting,	including	myself.		However,	like	everyone	else,	I	did	not	receive	any	
further	communication.		I	asked	Bishop	Jackson	what	actions	had	resulted	
following	the	meeting	at	The	Rock	and	exactly	what	had	been	achieved.		He	
told	me	that	the	role	of	the	NTCG	in	mobilising	the	Caribbean	community	
during	the	disturbances	had	been	noticed	by	David	Cameron.		Not	long	after	
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the	meeting	he	had	been	contacted	by	the	Government	through	Derek	Bailey109	
and	invited	to	10	Downing	Street	to	form	part	of	a	Government	think	tank110.	
The	rationale	was	to	utilise	the	informal	power	of	the	church	in	the	transitional	
sphere,	to	reduce	the	potential	for	further	national	unrest.			
	
	
An	initial	meeting	at	10	Downing	Street	was	quickly	followed	by	two	more.		
However,	momentum	waned	and	political	support	was	subsequently	retracted	
as	it	became	clear	that	the	nation	had	returned	to	its	normative	State	of	calm.		I	
asked	Bishop	Jackson	if	any	actions	had	surfaced	as	a	consequence	of	the	
meeting	at	The	Rock,	which	enabled	the	African	Caribbean	community	to	
address	the	problem	of	media	scapegoating.		He	told	me:	
	
‘People	just	weren’t	interested	when	they	saw	there	was	no	money	
to	be	made.		It	was	a	case	of	“what’s	the	hustle”?		When	they	saw	
there	wasn’t	one,	they	soon	lost	interest’	(Bishop	Jackson,	10th	
October	2013,	Birmingham).	
	
																																								 																				
109	Dr	Derek	Bailey	is	an	African	Caribbean	who	also	grew	up	in	the	Handsworth	area.		The	local	
media	generally	seek	his	views	on	crime	and	the	Black	community,	whenever	African	
Caribbeans	are	the	focus	of	the	media’s	gaze.		In	2007	the	former	Home	Secretary,	John	Reid,	
gathered	together	members	of	the	UK’s	Black	communities	to	address	the	national	problem	of	
escalating	gun	crime	(Metro,	2007).		Bailey	was	selected	to	represent	the	West	Midlands	area.		
He	was	provided	with	a	formal	position,	which	made	him	appear	to	have	valuable	insider	
knowledge	on	local	gangs	and	gun	crimes.		However,	the	gangs	that	he	is	supposed	to	have	
expert	knowledge	of	do	not	know	him.	
110	The	Cinnamon	Network,	a	Christian	charity,	and	the	Lighthouse	Project	were	also	part	of	
the	think	tank.		The	idea	was	to	form	a	partnership	with	the	Council	of	Black	Led	Churches,	
aimed	at	reducing	the	risk	of	further	unrest	and	conflict	between	communities.	
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Bishop	Jackson’s	comment	would	appear	to	imply	that	an	element	of	
individualism	exists	within	the	Black	community.		However,	this	should	not	be	
interpreted	as	meaning	that	the	level	of	self-interest	in	the	Black	community	
exceeds	that	of	other	ethnic	groups.		Individualism	is	not	specific	to	any	group;	
it	effects	all	communities,	particularly	those	who	are	most	afflicted	by	material	
deprivation.		Bishop	Jackson	views	racism	as	the	root	cause	of	hardship	and	
generational	poverty,	and	a	major	concern	for	African	Caribbeans.		He	told	me	
that	material	deprivation	nurtures	a	sense	of	immediacy	in	the	Black	
community.		In	the	eyes	of	the	poor	time	is	often	viewed	as	an	unaffordable	
commodity.		Consequently,	actions	are	not	perceived	as	beneficial	unless	they	
are	achieved	in	the	short-term	and	can	be	translated	into	material	gain.		Bishop	
Jackson’s	analysis	to	some	extent	explained	why	African	Caribbeans	–	whose	
lived-experiences	are	defined	by	poverty	–	might	prioritise	actions	that	could	
acquire	material	Goods	immediately,	over	agency	that	might	achieve	long-term	
gains.			
	
	
Politics	in	the	mainstream	sphere	and	the	NTCG	
	
The	Black	Churches,	more	than	perhaps	any	other	African	Caribbean	
community	organisations,	have	been	able	to	skilfully	negotiate	the	political	
terrain	between	the	transitional	sphere	and	the	mainstream	political	sphere	
(Shukra	et	al.,	2004).		Perhaps	the	most	famous	international	example	is	that	of	
Martin	Luther	King,	who	engaged	with	the	politics	of	US	society	without	ever	
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holding	a	public	office.		Certain	sections	of	the	African	Caribbean	community	
are	distrustful	of	the	police.		Therefore,	it	came	as	no	surprise	that	some	were	
suspicious	of	Bishop	Webley’s	role	within	the	Police	Authority.		I	spoke	to	a	
supporter	of	the	Michael	Powell	Campaign111,	who	told	me	that	Bishop	Webley	
did	little	to	promote	the	interests	of	the	African	Caribbean	community	when	
their	concerns	conflicted	with	those	of	the	police.		He	explained	that	although	
Bishop	Webley	had	appeared	on	television	several	times	to	support	Asian	
concerns	regarding	the	police	erecting	surveillance	cameras	in	the	South	
Birmingham	area112,	he	did	very	little	to	highlight	the	Black	community’s	
concerns	regarding	Mikey	Powell’s	death	in	police	custody.			
	
	
After	his	unsuccessful	campaign	to	become	the	city’s	first	Crime	Commissioner,	
Bishop	Webley	is	no	longer	involved	in	local	politics	and	told	me	that	he	no	
longer	has	any	political	aspirations.		He	regards	the	Ministry	and	the	fight	for	
social	justice	as	his	major	concerns.		Although	saving	souls	is	the	primary	
business	of	the	church,	Bishop	Webley	suggested	that	some	of	the	younger	
members	of	the	Black	community	might	be	beyond	redemption.	
	
																																								 																				
111	Mikey	Powell	was	a	childhood	friend	from	Handsworth.		He	died	in	the	custody	of	West	
Midlands	Police	in	2003	(see	Palmer,	2009).		At	the	time	of	his	arrest	he	was	suffering	with	
mental	health	problems.		His	mother	called	for	the	police	to	assist	her	in	restraining	him	
because	his	behaviour	was	erratic.		However,	during	his	arrest	the	police	assaulted	him	and	
then	ran	over	him	with	their	car;	Mikey	died	a	few	minutes	later	whilst	in	police	custody.		It	is	
an	issue	of	grave	concern	for	his	family,	and	the	wider	Caribbean	community,	that	no	police	
officer	was	charged	or	even	disciplined	as	a	result	of	Mikey’s	death.			
112	See	Ferguson,	(2010).	
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‘I	think	they	have	lost	their	moral	compass	to	a	large	degree.		I’m	not	
even	certain	if	some	of	them	have	moral	compasses	anymore.		If	they	
do,	then	it’s	set	at	such	a	low	level	that	it	just	doesn’t	kick	in.		I	think	
the	acceptance	by	some	that	they	can	pull	a	gun	and	shoot	another	
person	[…]	is	unacceptable’	(Bishop	Webley,	23rd	April	2013,	
Birmingham).	
	
Despite	acknowledging	that	some	young	gang	members	lack	moral	regulation,	
Bishop	Webley	utilised	their	backing	during	his	campaign	for	the	Office	of	Police	
and	Crime	Commissioner	(Brady,	2011).		Nevertheless,	appropriating	support	
from	all	sections	of	the	community	is	precisely	what	politicians	do	when	the	
need	arises.		Moreover,	politics	is	about	power	and	in	the	context	of	political	
action,	votes	can	be	viewed	as	Goods.		It	should	also	be	acknowledged	that	
Bishop	Webley’s	campaign	facilitated	the	political	participation	of	groups	
lacking	formal	power	and	labelled	as	hard-to-reach.		Therefore,	regardless	of	
those	who	might	be	suspicious	of	his	relationship	with	the	police,	his	
engagement	with	disaffected	and	socially	excluded	sections	of	the	Black	
community	might	be	viewed	in	the	future	as	the	catalyst	that	influenced	a	new	
generation	of	Black	political	agency.	
	
	
At	times	the	tensions	between	Bishop	Webley’s	social	identities	(Goffman,	
1963)	as	Christian,	Police	Authority	Chair	and	Black	community	leader,	were	
evident	during	our	interview.		He	acknowledged	the	view	of	those	who	thought	
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his	Police	Authority	role	was	incompatible	with	being	a	representative	of	the	
African	Caribbean	community.		However,	Bishop	Webley	balanced	public	
opinion	alongside	the	church’s	belief	of	peaceful	integration	and	providing	
spiritual	guidance	without	prejudice.		He	argued	that	Jesus	also	believed	in	
change	through	political	action.		Therefore,	it	is	understandable	that	Bishop	
Webley	would	be	concerned	with	effecting	change	through	the	politics	of	the	
transitional	sphere,	and	promoting	the	interests	of	all	communities.		He	viewed	
his	role	as	Chair	of	the	Police	Authority	as	representing	the	wider	interests	of	all	
ethnic	groups:	
	
‘When	I	was	Chair	of	the	West	Midlands	Police	Authority	I	was	
representing	the	community	of	the	West	Midlands,	the	public,	the	
citizens	of	the	West	Midlands.		I	was	not	representing	the	African	
community,	the	Caribbean	community.		I	was	there	for	the	West	
Midlands	as	a	whole’	(Bishop	Webley,	23rd	April	2013,	Birmingham).			
	
Although	all	humanity	is	equal	in	the	eyes	of	God,	social	disadvantage	is	
distributed	disproportionately	in	this	world.		African	Caribbeans	incur	greater	
levels	of	poverty,	discrimination,	and	exclusionary	practices	in	market	situations	
than	most	ethnic	groups	(Berthoud,	1999;	Clark	and	Drinkwater,	2007;	Dorling,	
2009;	Garner	and	Bhattacharyya,	2011;	Tackey,	Barnes	and	Khambhaita	2011).		
Although	Bishop	Webley	acknowledges	that	the	Black	community	has	concerns	
and	challenges	that	are	specific	to	its	members,	the	inclusive	ideology	of	the	
church	may	be	counterproductive	to	their	predicament.		The	NTCG,	like	other	
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Black	Churches,	has	a	majority	Black	congregation.		However,	its	leaders	do	not	
necessarily	speak	purposefully	of	the	disadvantages	their	supporters	
experience.		This	is	especially	when	the	material	situation	of	African	Caribbeans	
is	compared	to	those	of	other	ethnic	groups.				
	
	
Education	and	the	NTCG	
	
The	NTCG	at	The	Rock	began	free	Saturday	School	sessions	in	the	aftermath	of	
the	Birmingham	disturbances.		Although	the	lessons	take	place	at	both	
churches,	the	Saturday	School	programme	at	the	Lozells	Road	church	was	
established	a	few	years	earlier.		The	Saturday	Schools	are	aimed	at	secondary	
school	pupils	who	are	preparing	for	their	GCSEs.		There	are	teachers	in	the	
NTCG’s	congregation	who	volunteer	to	support	the	church’s	philanthropic	aims.		
Despite	being	open	to	everyone,	the	majority	of	pupils	who	use	the	church	as	
an	educational	resource	are	from	the	African	Caribbean	community.			
	
	
Bishop	Jackson	believes	that	education	has	the	power	to	increase	life-chances	
and	reduce	the	risk	of	future	poverty.		He	and	Bishop	Webley	adopt	a	Weberian	
Protestant	Ethic	approach113	to	social	progress.		They	see	material	success	as	
the	end	reward	of	a	culmination	of	moral	regulation,	self-determination	and	
																																								 																				
113	Rex	and	Moore	(1967:	182)	also	noted	the	emphasis	West	Indians	placed	on	material	
acquisition,	through	spiritual	development,	self-determination	and	hard	work.		Nevertheless,	
they	significantly	underplayed	the	church’s	influence	on	Black	political	agency.			
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protracted	effort.		In	a	similar	way	to	the	US	Civil	Rights	Movement,	Both	
Bishops	believe	that	spiritual	inner	strength	is	necessary	to	obtain	moral	
guidance	and	success	in	the	earthly	world.		They	view	racism	as	a	sin,	but	also	
understand	that	all	sins	can	be	overcome	by	a	combination	of	prayer,	self-
belief,	faith	in	the	power	of	God	and	social	action.		However,	an	earthly	
obstacle	to	the	educational	agency	of	the	church	is	the	Safe	Guarding	
Vulnerable	Adults	and	Children	Act	2006	(ISA,	2014),	which	stipulates	that	the	
Disclosure	and	Barring	Service	(DBS)	should	vet	everyone	undertaking	regulated	
activities	with	children.		According	to	the	legislation,	education	is	a	regulated	
activity.		Thus,	the	church	has	to	complete	the	necessary	registration	process	
and	submit	the	required	fees,	to	ensure	that	everyone	who	have	contact	with	
children	have	DBS	clearance.		This	places	a	financial	constraint	on	the	
educational	agency	of	the	church,	because	of	the	time	and	cost	involved	in	
vetting	potential	teachers	who	wish	to	support	their	Saturday	School	
programme.			
	
	
Bishop	Webley	told	me	of	his	concerns	that	some	members,	who	may	have	
committed	minor	criminal	offences,	when	they	were	much	younger,	would	be	
automatically	barred	from	assisting	the	church	to	perform	regulated	activities.		
Bishop	Jackson	has	managed	to	overcome	this	problem	by	only	using	members	
who	are	also	teachers,	as	their	DBS	clearance	is	renewed	every	three	years	by	
their	State	employers.		Bishop	Webley	acknowledges	that	the	contemporary	
church	is	not	exempt	from	the	legislative	framework	within	which	all	registered	
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companies	have	to	operate.		As	well	as	DBS	regulations,	the	church	also	has	to	
comply	with	financial	legislation	applicable	to	the	management	of	charities,	
health	and	safety	legislation	and	public	compliance	orders	in	relation	to	the	use	
of	its	buildings.	
	
	
One	of	the	major	strengths	of	the	NTCG	is	its	power	to	appropriate	its	human	
capital	in	the	transitional	sphere.		Many	of	the	church’s	members	work	in	the	
professions	and	have	senior	positions	in	NGOs,	mainstream	educational	
establishments,	employment	agencies	and	the	city’s	local	authority.		The	
members	organise	weekly	surgeries	where	African	Caribbeans	are	signposted	
to	agencies	that	are	relevant	to	their	educational,	employment	or	housing	
needs.		Short	courses	in,	health	and	safety,	first	aid,	business	ethics	and	
business	start-up	programmes,	are	delivered	by	the	church’s	professional	
members.		The	NTCG	also	has	several	social	outreach	programmes,	which	
includes	refuge	for	female	victims	of	domestic	abuse.		There	are	also	different	
Ministries	within	the	church.		There	is	a	Youth	Ministry,	which	is	led	by	its	
younger	members,	and	Women,	Children	and	Men’s	Ministries.		However,	the	
church	does	not	directly	provide	educational	qualifications,	housing	or	
employment	Goods.		The	NTCG’s	nursery	is	the	only	direct	contribution	the	
church	makes	towards	facilitating	the	labour	market	participation	of	African	
Caribbean	parents.	
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The	African	Caribbean	Self-Help	Organisation	(ACSHO)	
	
ACSHO	is	probably	the	oldest	active	African	Caribbean	community	group	in	
Birmingham.		It	was	founded	on	August	1st	1964	in	Leonard	Road,	Handsworth.		
The	organisation	has	a	Pan-African	agenda,	which	is	concerned	with	the	liberty	
and	self-determination	of	the	Black	“race”.		ACSHO	acknowledges	the	existence	
of	“races”	as	a	biological	reality.		Its	members	consider	the	idea	of	racial	groups	
to	be	of	more	significance	than	contemporary	notions	of	ethnicity.		Where	the	
NTCG	is	inclusive,	and	seeks	to	embrace	all	within	the	sacred	canopy	of	religion,	
ACSHO	is	exclusive	and	is	only	concerned	with	supporting	the	needs	and	
interests	of	African	heritage114	people.		The	group’s	political	ideology,	where	
ideas	of	“race”	are	concerned,	is	quite	similar	to	elements	of	the	Black	Panther	
movement	and	the	Nation	of	Islam	in	the	1960s	and	1970s.					
	
	
The	organisation’s	headquarters	is	in	Heathfield	Road,	Handsworth,	a	few	
hundred	metres	from	the	Lozells	branch	of	the	NTCG.		The	local	Caribbean	
community	refers	to	ACSHO’s	headquarters	as	104,	after	its	address:	104	
Heathfield	Road.		There	are	three	properties	on	the	104	Heathfield	Road	plot,	
all	of	which	belong	to	the	organisation.		One	of	the	houses	is	a	listed	building	
and	a	former	residence	of	the	local	industrialist	James	Watt.		The	three	
Georgian	and	Victorian	buildings	are	nestled	between	a	primary	school	and	a	
row	of	1950s	semi-detached	houses.		The	building	used	by	ACSHO’s	as	its	
																																								 																				
114	ACSHO	makes	no	distinction	between	Africans	born	in	the	continent	and	Blacks	of	African	
heritage	born	in	the	diaspora.	
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headquarters	is	highly	distinctive	and	was	formerly	a	Victorian	mansion.		It	is	
set	back	from	the	main	road	and	has	a	spacious	drive	in	front	of	it.		The	
perimeter	walls	have	been	built	in	a	style	that	is	reminiscent	of	ancient	
Egyptian	architecture.		High	wrought	iron	gates,	and	iron	railings	mounted	
between	pyramid-like	pillars,	protect	the	driveway	and	entrance	to	the	
building.	
	
	
Although	Christianity	has	been	practiced	in	Africa	since	at	least	the	fourth	
century	A.D.	(Brooks,	1995),	ACSHO	view	it	as	a	European	religion.		A	number	of	
the	members	I	have	met	practice	African	Spiritualism.		Unlike	the	NTCG,	ACSHO	
is	not	concerned	with	integration	or	building	bridges	between	communities.		
Their	mission	is	to	liberate	African	minds	from	negative	European	influences.		
As	a	Pan-African	organisation,	the	agency	of	ACSHO	transcends	the	local	
concerns	of	the	Caribbean	community.		They	locate	the	discriminatory	
experiences	of	African	Caribbeans	in	Birmingham	within	the	wider	context	of	a	
global	struggle	against	racism	and	White	oppression.			
	
	
ACSHO	does	not	provide	information	to	the	public	regarding	its	membership,	
the	gender	of	its	members,	or	any	details	concerning	its	organisational	
structure.		I	was	told	that	this	was	because	the	organisation	has	been	
constantly	scrutinised	by	the	British	Security	Services	since	the	1970s.		I	am	
unable	to	refute	or	confirm	that	claim.		Although	a	current	member	of	the	
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organisation	is	a	lawyer,	ACSHO	does	not	appear	to	have	as	many	professional	
and	NGO	members	as	the	NTCG.		There	is	a	hardcore	membership	of	individuals	
who	are	mainly	over	fifty	and	have	been	in	the	organisation	since	its	heydays	in	
the	1970s	and	1980s.	
	
	
When	I	interviewed	the	research	participants	that	I	met	through	ACFAS115,	only	
one	of	the	female	subjects	actually	knew	anything	about	ACSHO.		Although	she	
had	no	direct	dealings	with	the	organisation,	she	lived	quite	close	to	ACSHO’s	
headquarters	and	walked	past	it	on	a	daily	basis.		Bini	Brown	is	the	leader	of	
ACSHO.		When	I	interviewed	him	he	was	66	years	old.		Bini	was	born	in	St	
Andrews,	Jamaica	and	came	to	Britain	aged	11	in	1959.		He	is	a	father,	
grandfather	and	lives	with	his	partner	near	the	organisation’s	base	in	Heathfield	
Road.			
	
	
Legislation	and	financial	autonomy	
	
One	of	the	ways	in	which	ACSHO	generates	its	income	is	by	renting	different	
parts	of	its	buildings	to	Black	groups	and	businesses,	some	of	which	are	female	
organisations.		There	is	also	a	motor	vehicle	repair	shop	that	is	based	on	the	
premises,	which	uses	a	large	part	of	the	car	park.		A	space	in	the	main	building	
is	also	rented	to	a	group	of	African	Spiritualists.		However,	the	rent	accrued	
																																								 																				
115	See	Chapter	Three.	
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from	external	organisations	is	not	enough	to	cover	the	full	cost	needed	to	
repair	the	ageing	buildings.		Unlike	the	newly	renovated	NTCG	in	nearby	Lozells,	
the	headquarters	of	ACSHO	has	not	undergone	any	major	refurbishment	for	
several	years.		The	main	building	has	attractive	Victorian	features,	including	
Milton	tiled	and	parquet	flooring,	and	high	ceilings	finished	with	period	
cornices.		However,	its	upkeep	has	steadily	declined	over	the	years	and	it	
currently	requires	major	restoration.		Whilst	the	NTCG	has	obtained	a	large	
mortgage	from	a	mainstream	bank,	ACSHO	has	been	unable	to	secure	grants	
from	British	Heritage	or	the	National	Lottery	to	repair	its	listed	building.		Bini	
Brown	believes	it	is	because	ACSHO	is	viewed	as	a	subversive	organisation.		
That	might	indeed	be	the	case.		However,	ACSHO’s	financial	predicament	might	
be	a	consequence	of	its	inability	to	provide	evidence	of	due	diligence116	and	the	
way	that	the	organisation	is	perceived	by	potential	sponsors.			
	
	
Since	2001,	the	political	agenda	of	successive	governments	have	been	
concerned	with	community	cohesion	and	reducing	disparities	between	social	
groups	that	can	lead	to	parallel	lives	(Cantle,	2002:	1).		In	addition,	the	7/7	
London	bombings	have	increased	the	political	emphasis	on	promoting	
community	cohesion,	as	a	means	of	reducing	the	danger	of	religious	extremism.		
Consequently,	organisations	with	an	agenda	that	is	specific	to	a	single	ethnic	
group	can	be	viewed	as	being	in	opposition	to	the	principles	of	community	
																																								 																				
116	According	to	KPMG	(2012:	1)	‘due	diligence	is	the	process	used	to	assess	the	
appropriateness	of	potential	or	intended	recipients	of	a	grant	[…]	to	protect	charities	when	
making	grants	or	other	payments	to	third	parties’.			
	 152	
cohesion117.		As	ACSHO	refuses	to	compromise	its	Pan-African	interests,	
potential	sponsors	might	view	their	political	ideology	as	a	form	of	extremism.		
This	is	especially	as	the	core	principles	of	community	cohesion	are	‘tolerance;	
respect	for	differences	and	inter-group	co-operation’	(ibid,	2002:	13),	which	are	
not	necessarily	the	focus	of	ACSHO’s	concerns.			
	
	
Perhaps	the	main	source	of	ACSHO’s	revenue	is	the	annual	African	Liberation	
Day	(ALD)	celebration,	which	the	group	organises.		Between	2010	and	2014	I	
volunteered	to	help	the	organisation	with	its	ALD	events.		People	come	from	all	
over	the	country	to	support	them.		In	2012	ALD	was	held	at	a	Birmingham	City	
Council	owned	venue	in	Camp	Lane,	Handsworth.		Despite	utilising	the	Camp	
Lane	venue	for	a	number	of	years,	the	Council	informed	the	organisation	that	it	
would	no	longer	be	able	to	use	it	after	2012.		ACSHO	subsequently	obtained	the	
use	of	other	venues	in	Aston	and	Handsworth	to	deliver	ALD.		The	organisation	
rent	spaces	for	Black	entrepreneurs	to	set	up	their	stalls	at	the	ALD	events.		A	
variety	of	culturally	themed	products	are	sold:	from	literature	to	ornaments	
and	clothing.		Most	of	the	stall	holders	appeared	to	be	Rastafarians	or	Pan-
Africanists.		Although	there	were	a	few	younger	people	who	attended	the	
event,	the	average	age	of	most	of	the	participants	would	probably	have	been	
about	forty.		The	majority	of	young	people	attending	ALD	appeared	to	be	the	
children	of	stallholders,	rather	than	independent	supporters.		Nevertheless,	
ACSHO	do	have	certain	speakers	at	their	events	who	are	capable	of	attracting	
																																								 																				
117	For	a	detailed	account	of	the	Government’s	reductionist	view	of	community	cohesion	and	
its	disregard	of	the	underlying	causes	of	social	inequality,	see	Ratcliffe	(2012).	
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and	engaging	with	a	younger	audience118.		In	addition	to	ALD,	ACSHO	host	a	
number	of	Pan-African	events	throughout	the	year,	including	Kwanzaa119,	
which	attract	speakers	from	Africa	and	America.		They	also	have	a	shop	based	
at	the	organisation’s	headquarters,	which	sells	a	range	of	organic	products	and	
African	Caribbean	foods.		
	
	
During	the	1970s	and	early	1980s,	the	organisation	was	able	to	financially	
sustain	itself	from	income	generated	by	using	the	basement	of	their	Heathfield	
Road	premises	as	a	club.		However,	it	is	no	longer	functioning.		Loss	of	income	
from	the	closure	of	the	club,	has	reduced	the	operational	capabilities	of	ACSHO	
and	has	had	a	detrimental	impact	on	its	self-sufficient	status.			
	
‘The	club,	like	other	clubs	and	pubs	in	the	community,	became	
problematic	because	the	youths	used	to	smoke	ganja,	fight	and	stuff	
like	that,	outside	of	the	premises.		The	youths	started	to	rob	people	
out	there	in	the	streets	at	gunpoint.		Police	kept	coming	in	the	place	
and	the	clientele	just	disappeared’	(Bini	Brown,	20th	August	2013,	
Birmingham).			
	
																																								 																				
118	Dr	Amon	Rashidi	was	one	of	the	overseas	speakers	who	attended	ALD	in	2012.		He	is	
an	African	American	rapper,	teacher	and	philosopher,	who	was	formerly	a	gang	member	
and	now	hosts	a	US	radio	station.		Rashidi	gives	lectures	and	organises	seminars	about	
the	dangers	of	involvement	with	guns,	drugs	and	gangs.		He	is	an	example	of	the	range	
of	international	academics	and	activists	who	headline	ALD	events.		Asher	Kwesi,	the	Nile	
Valley	Historian,	is	also	a	popular	speaker,	along	with	former	ZANU,	ANC	and	MPLA	
freedom	fighters.			
119	A	Pan-African	cultural	and	family	holiday,	similar	to	Christmas,	which	is	celebrated	each	
year	between	December	26th	and	January	1st,	see	Karenga	(2008).	
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Heathfield	Road	is	near	to	the	Handsworth/Aston	boundary,	which	has	been	
the	subject	of	territorial	disputes	between	the	Burger	Bar	Gang	of	Handsworth	
and	the	Johnson	Crew	of	Aston.		The	central	location	of	the	club,	in	the	heart	of	
the	transitional	sphere	(Shukra	et	al,	2004),	formerly	attracted	regular	
customers.		However,	the	community	is	not	what	it	once	was.		The	police	and	
Birmingham	City	Council	are	reluctant	to	grant	licenses	to	sell	alcohol	to	
establishments	in	areas	with	high	levels	of	criminality.		ACSHO’s	location	in	a	
part	of	the	community	that	is	at	the	centre	of	local	gang	rivalry	makes	it	highly	
unlikely	that	they	would	ever	be	granted	such	a	license.		Thus,	the	risk	of	crime,	
and	high	levels	of	social	deprivation	in	the	locality,	now	contribute	to	the	
financial	instability	of	the	organisation.		
	
	
Education	and	ACSHO	
	
The	concern	of	African	Caribbean	parents,	that	their	children	were	
unlearning120	because	of	racist	practices	in	Birmingham’s	education	sector,	
influenced	ACSHO	to	set	up	what	was	arguably	the	country’s	first	Saturday	
School	programme	in	1967121.		Their	agency	was	to	some	extent	enabled	by	the	
1968	Report	of	the	Kerner	Commission	(Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979,	Ratcliffe,	
1981;	Ratcliffe,	2004).		Although	the	Report	overlooked	the	failings	of	the	
education	system	where	Black	children	were	concerned,	it	recommended	that	
																																								 																				
120	See	the	narrative	of	Subject	B	in	Chapter	Five.	
121	See	Andrews	(2013)	
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they	should	be	engaged	during	the	school	summer	holiday122	(Rex	and	
Tomlinson,	1979:	187).		During	the	1970s,	Birmingham	City	Council	consented	
to	ACSHO	and	Harambee123	using	Grove	Lane	and	Heathfield	Road	schools	in	
Handsworth	to	host	their	Summer	School	programme.		The	schools	were	
successful	and	over-subscribed	and	the	syllabus	aimed	to	engage	Black	children	
with	aspects	of	their	history,	which	were	omitted	or	reduced	in	the	
ethnocentric	State	curriculum124.	
	
	
Bini	Brown	contends	that	it	was	only	after	James	Hunte’s125	intervention	in	
1982,	that	Birmingham	City	Council	provided	ACSHO	with	a	grant	to	support	the	
delivery	of	the	Saturday	School	programme.		However,	in	real	terms,	the	grant	
was	equivalent	to	two	pence	for	every	child	who	attended.		If	it	were	not	for	
West	Indian	parental	support,	the	work	of	the	Saturday	and	Summer	Schools	
would	not	have	been	possible.		My	parents	paid	for	my	brother	and	I	to	attend	
the	Summer	Schools,	which	were	run	like	their	mainstream	counterparts,	with	
structured	lessons,	a	timetable,	break	times,	dinner	times	and	a	school	trip	at	
the	end	of	the	programme.		However,	the	ways	in	which	we	were	taught	were	
significantly	different	to	State	education.		Blacks,	as	active	rather	than	passive	
																																								 																				
122	The	recommendations	were	not	a	benign	attempt	to	redress	an	identified	imbalance	in	the	
State	education	of	Black	children,	but	rather	a	means	of	reducing	the	potential	risk	of	social	
disorder	during	the	long	hot	summers	of	the	1970s.		Thus,	the	Report’s	recommendations	
reified	the	assimilationist	notion	of	cultural	deficiency	(see	Chapters	Two	and	Five	of	this	
thesis),	as	it	implied	that	Black	children	were	potentially	troublesome.	
123	See	Rex	and	Tomlinson	(1979).	
124	ibid	(1979:	198-202).	
125	James	Hunte	used	to	live	on	Leonard	Road	in	Handsworth	and	died	in	Barbados	in	2012.		He	
was	the	Independent	candidate	for	the	Ladywood	constituency	and	also	the	father	of	my	
sister-in-law.		He	is	pictured	on	the	cover	of	Rex	and	Tomlinson’s	(1979)	work.		For	further	
details	on	his	political	career,	see	the	Birmingham	Post	(2012).	
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agents,	were	made	visible	in	the	Summer	School	curriculum.		Black	history	was	
not	just	reduced	to	ideas	of	slavery	and	the	glorious	Empire126.		The	lessons	
conveyed	the	rich	history	of	the	African	continent	before	the	human	
degradation	of	Trans-Atlantic	Slavery127.		It	enabled	us	to	understand	how	
reductionist	State	education	was	in	regard	to	the	teaching	of	history,	literature,	
the	Arts	and	geography.		The	Summer	School	programme	ended	in	the	1980s.		
it	is	a	testament	to	the	teachers	and	pupils	that	there	were	never	any	serious	
disciplinary	issues128.	
	
	
ACSHO,	like	the	NTCG,	has	also	been	adept	at	appropriating	its	human	capital	
as	a	resource	in	the	transitional	sphere.		For	several	years	ACSHO	utilised	the	
services	of	the	local	community	to	assist	with	the	delivery	of	its	Summer	and	
Saturday	Schools.		Andrews	(2013:	100)	reveals	that	he	was	allowed	to	teach	on	
ACSHO’s	supplementary	education	programme,	after	turning	up	and	asking	if	
he	could	help.		However,	as	highlighted	above	in	the	case	of	the	NTCG,	
contemporary	safeguarding	policies	specify	that	adults	who	come	into	contact	
with	children	for	regulated	activities	must	now	have	DBS	clearance.		Therefore,	
the	organisation	is	no	longer	able	to	legally	utilise	volunteers	in	the	African	
Caribbean	community	as	it	used	to.		Health	and	safety	legislation	also	creates	
additional	legal	problems	regarding	the	operation	of	Saturday	Schools.		
Although	ACSHO	still	has	a	learning	environment,	under	current	legislative	
																																								 																				
126	See	Andrews	(2013).	
127	See	Chapter	Two.	
128	This	is	in	contrast	to	the	systematic	exclusion	of	Black	children	in	State	schools,	see	Chapter	
Five.	
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requirements	it	is	not	fit	for	purpose	because	of	the	repair	and	renovation	work	
needed	to	the	property.		This	highlights	how	safeguarding,	and	also	health	and	
safety	policies,	constrain	the	agency	of	ACSHO.		The	inability	to	deliver	their	
educational	programmes	effectively	denies	the	organisation	a	vital	source	of	
revenue.			
	
	
Like	Bishops	Webley	and	Jackson,	Bini	Brown	is	equally	concerned	with	the	lack	
of	moral	regulation	amongst	some	of	the	younger	members	of	the	African	
Caribbean	community.		He	is	also	frustrated	with	the	contemporary	shift	in	the	
mindset	of	the	Black	community.		This	is	in	terms	of	a	shift	from	collective	
action,	towards	what	he	sees	as	nihilism	and	individualism:	
	
‘The	first	generation	that	was	born	here	didn’t	listen	to	their	parents	
and	now	some	of	the	present	generation	are	doing	the	same.		Some	
of	these	people	in	the	community	who	say,	“the	youths	need	help”,	
don’t	really	understand	that	some	of	them	are	just	plain	criminals.		
They	work	with	the	system	to	oppress	their	own	people.		When	you	
can	gun	down	your	own	people	over	money,	you	have	a	sick	mind.		
You	don’t	have	the	facility	of	capable	thinking.		Education	is	the	only	
hope	we	have	of	turning	around	that	kind	of	sick	mentality’	(Bini	
Brown,	20th	August	2013,	Birmingham).	
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Bini’s	statement	above	suggests	that	although	West	Indian	immigrants	
valorised	education129,	the	educational	discrimination	experienced	by	their	
British	born	children	have	narrowed	opportunities	and	widened	the	social	
exclusion	of	the	present	generation.		It	is	within	the	context	of	marginality	that	
criminality	might	appear	to	be	an	option	for	a	few	individuals.	
	
	
Reaching	the	community	
	
In	the	1960s,	1970s	and	the	early	1980s	ACSHO	was	more	used	to	the	
community	reaching	out	to	them,	rather	than	the	other	way	around.		This	is	
demonstrated	in	the	example	of	supplementary	education	above,	when	the	
group	acted	in	response	to	the	concerns	of	Black	parents	(Andrews,	2013).		
Their	historical	agency	has	always	been	based	on	the	knowledge	that	the	
organisation	occupies	a	prominent	position	within	the	community,	and	its	door	
is	always	open	to	supporters.	However,	religion	has	much	more	of	a	mass	
appeal	than	Pan-African	politics,	which	is	one	of	the	reasons	that	the	church	is	
able	to	attract	a	much	wider	audience.			The	NTCG	uses	social	networks	and	
websites	to	inform,	mobilise	and	attract	new	members,	whereas	ACSHO	are	to	
some	extent	distrustful	of	most	forms	of	modern	social	media.		Even	where	
they	do	use	contemporary	technology,	ACSHO’s	equipment,	and	human	capital,	
are	often	unreliable:	
	
																																								 																				
129	See	Chapters	Two	and	Five.	
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‘We	have	an	Internet	radio	station	called	Bantu	Radio,	but	it	keeps	
crashing	because	the	presenters	come	and	go.		People	say	that	they	
are	fed	up	of	working	with	old	computers,	but	we	have	to	keep	
patching	them	up	because	we	haven’t	got	the	money	to	buy	new	
ones’	(Bini	Brown,	20th	August	2013,	Birmingham)		
	
In	years	gone	by	ACSHO	reached	its	supporters	by	way	of	literature	sold	at	
various	venues.		Its	activities	were	documented	in	the	organisation’s	PA	(Pan-
African),	Jomo	and	Harambee	magazines.		They	also	had	a	newspaper	called	
The	African.		Insufficient	funding	now	constrains	their	capability	to	produce	
new	literature.		Nevertheless,	ACSHO	acknowledges	how	important	it	is	to	
utilise	the	Internet	effectively	to	reach	their	supporters	in	the	community.	
	
	
I	have	witnessed	a	number	of	people	attending	ACSHO’s	weekly	meetings,	who	
require	support	for	a	variety	of	ad	hoc	issues	and	projects.		However,	they	have	
been	mainly	for	individual	concerns	that	are	unconnected	to	education,	
employment	or	housing.		For	example,	West	Indian	pensioners	from	the	Merry	
Hill	Allotment	Association	enlisted	ACSHO’s	support	to	petition	against	
Birmingham	City	Council	hiking	the	rent	of	the	Black	Patch130	allotments.		
Another	example	is	that	of	a	local	political	activist,	who	sought	ACSHO’s	
assistance	to	bolster	his	election	bid	for	the	Office	of	Police	and	Crime	
																																								 																				
130	Black	Patch	is	an	area	that	straddles	the	Winson	Green,	Smethwick	and	Handsworth	wards,	
see	Chapter	Seven.	
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Commissioner,131.		Some	of	ACSHO’s	members	also	have	properties	in	Africa.		
The	organisation’s	meetings	are	sometimes	used	as	a	forum	for	visiting	
Africans,	who	wish	to	raise	awareness	of	opportunities	to	purchase	property,	
land	and	resources	on	the	continent.		From	time	to	time,	different	female	
organisations	also	attend	the	meetings	to	generate	support	for	various	
projects.		One	such	organisation	comprises	of	Rastafarian	females	(some	of	
whom	have	PhDs),	who	have	bought	small	diamond	mines	in	Africa	and	actively	
encourage	members	of	the	African	Caribbean	community	to	invest	in	their	
project.			
	
	
During	2011’s	summer	of	unrest,	various	groups	and	individuals	visited	ACSHO,	
hoping	the	organisation	would	take	a	lead	in	voicing	their	concerns	regarding	
the	negative	portrayal	of	the	African	Caribbean	community	by	the	media132.		I	
listened	to	Bini	as	he	spoke	to	a	group	of	females	and	tried	to	articulate	the	
disturbances,	and	the	actions	of	the	media,	within	the	wider	context	of	global	
																																								 																				
131	This	office	was	unsuccessfully	contested	by	Bishop	Derek	Webley.	
132		I	noticed	that	the	female	groups	who	visited	ACSHO	were	more	militant	and	forthright	than	
their	male	counterparts.		A	number	of	groups	were	concerned	that	the	media	were	martyring	
three	Asian	youths,	who	were	tragically	killed	in	the	Winson	Green	area	during	the	height	of	
the	disturbances,	whilst	the	Caribbean	community	was	being	demonised.		It	seemed	common	
knowledge	in	the	African	Caribbean	community	that	at	least	two	out	of	the	three	Asians	who	
died	were	also	involved	in	drug	dealing.		I	spoke	to	two	African	Caribbean	males	who	visited	
ACSHO	during	this	period.		They	were	social	workers	who	at	some	stage	had	been	appointed	to	
mentor	two	of	the	young	Asian	men	following	their	conviction	for	drug	offences.		The	mentors	
came	to	ACSHO	to	voice	their	concerns	that	the	media	were	overlooking	the	drug	convictions	
of	their	former	mentees.		A	local	female	journalist	also	visited	ACSHO	and	brought	a	visual	
recording	of	the	disturbances	in	Birmingham	City	Centre.		I	watched	the	film	in	which	she	
spoke	to	several	masked	men	with	foreign	accents,	who	were	playing	an	active	role	in	looting	
and	destroying	property.		They	Stated	that	their	actions	were	retribution	for	British	military	
intervention	in	their	respective	Middle	East	nations.		Although	the	recording	was	provided	to	
the	local	media,	they	completely	ignored	it	and	instead	preferred	to	blame	the	Caribbean	
community	for	the	unrest.	
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racism.		Needless	to	say,	the	females	were	not	impressed.		In	contrast	to	
ACSHO’s	inaction	the	NTCG	busied	itself	by	mobilising	support	for	street	
protests,	which	caught	the	attention	of	the	media133.		I	understand	that	
ACSHO’s	agency	is	mainly	concerned	with	liberating	the	minds	of	its	supporters	
from	racism	in	the	here	and	now.		However,	their	brand	of	global	Pan-
Africanism	can	give	the	impression	that	the	organisation	is	out	of	sync	with	its	
supporters’	local	and	immediate	interests,	particularly	in	a	time	of	crisis.			
	
	
Although	the	views	of	ACSHO	are	as	uncompromising	as	ever,	its	present	
operational	capacity	has	to	some	extent	been	curtailed	by	the	absence	of	a	
proactive	and	energetic	younger	generation.		This	is	in	contrast	to	the	NTCG.		I	
attended	meetings	at	The	Rock,	during	the	same	period	when	groups	and	
individuals	were	visiting	ACSHO	expecting	the	organisation	to	take	a	lead	
supporting	the	immediate	interests	of	the	community.		Several	young	members	
of	the	NTCG	were	present	at	The	Rock.		Despite	their	youth	they	confidently	
articulated	how	proud	they	were	to	be	members	of	their	church.		They	also	
expressed	their	discord	at	being	portrayed	as	gangsters	by	the	media,	when	in	
reality	they	were	hardworking	young	pupils,	college	and	university	students.		
Bini	recognises	how	crucial	it	is	for	the	continuity	of	ACSHO	that	the	
organisation	engages	the	younger	generation	in	the	politics	of	the	transitional	
sphere.		However,	unlike	the	NTCG’s	Youth	Ministry,	ACSHO	does	not	have	a	
																																								 																				
133	See	earlier	on	in	this	chapter.	
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specific	programme	concerned	with	nurturing	young	African	Caribbeans	so	that	
the	organisation	is	able	to	effectively	develop.			
	
	
UBL,	Excell	3,	ACFAS	and	Kajan:	Funding	and	autonomy	
	
Community	cohesion	policies	have	gained	increasing	significance,	particularly	
with	the	potential	risks	incurred	by	terrorism	and	rising	religious	
fundamentalism134.		However,	the	focus	has	shifted	from	New	Labour’s	
education	strategies,	aimed	at	integrating	communities	(Cantle,	2002),	to	those	
promoting	British	values	to	prevent	radicalisation	(HM	Government,	2011;	DfE,	
2014).		Nevertheless,	both	political	ideologies	have	specific	implications	where	
the	funding	needs	of	African	Caribbean	organisations	are	concerned.		Those	
whose	aims	are	concerned	with	‘perceptions	of	British	foreign	policy,	racism,	
discrimination,	inequalities’	and	inadequate	opportunities	for	social	mobility,	
are	considered	vulnerable	to	radicalisation	(HM	Government,	2011:	27).		This	is	
especially	if	those	groups	appear	to	reject	the	values	of	mainstream	society135	
(ibid,	2011).		As	the	Pan-African	concerns	of	ACSHO	might	appear	to	fall	within	
the	Prevent136	remit	of	Government	they	will	consequently	be	denied	funding,	
as	financial	assistance	might	be	viewed	as	a	means	of	increasing	their	ability	to	
radicalise	others.			
	
																																								 																				
134	See	the	Coalition	Government’s	Prevent	Strategy	(HM	Government,	2011	[emphasis	in	
original]).	
135	In	this	context,	mainstream	society	could	be	interpreted	as	a	euphemism	for	White	society.	
136	HM	Government	(2011).	
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Where	the	aims	of	integration	are	concerned,	the	Government	supports	local	
strategic	partnerships	(LSPs)	that	do	not	prioritise	the	needs	of	a	single	group,	
but	instead	‘consider	plans	and	funding	applications	specifically	to	address	
community	cohesion	in	their	area’	(Cantle,	2002:	28).		This	is	one	of	the	ways	in	
which	the	neo-liberal	agenda	fragments	collective	interests	in	favour	of	
individualism	(Sivanandan,	2013).		Paradoxically,	Black	organisations	that	
publicly	oppose	Pan-African	ideology	might	be	eligible	to	apply	for	some	of	the	
millions	of	pounds	available,	to	fight	radicalisation	in	the	transitional	sphere	
(HM	Government,	2011).			Therefore,	modifying	mono-ethnic	ambitions,	in	
favour	of	an	integrationist-inclusive	approach,	might	increases	the	chances	of	
success	when	Black	organisations	compete	for	funding.		Adjusting	how	the	
interests	and	aspirations	of	organisations	are	presented	in	particular	contexts,	
is	sometimes	necessary.		However,	it	can	be	viewed	as	a	form	of	
‘“minstrelization”,	whereby	the	stigmatised	[…]	ingratiatingly	acts	out	before	
normals	[…]	the	[…]	bad	qualities	imputed	to	his	[sic]	kind’	(Goffman,	1963:	110	
[emphasis	added])	to	achieve	their	intended	aims.		Minstrelization	is,	in	other	
words,	a	Faustian	compromise	that	stems	from	the	realisation	that	perception	
and	presentation	are	key	elements	when	organisations	compete	for	
sponsorship.		Playing	the	integration	game	to	gain	an	advantage	in	the	market,	
by	appearing	to	demonstrate	that	perceived	bad	qualities	have	been	identified	
and	corrected,	is	to	a	little	extent	examined	below.		
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The	leader	of	United	in	Building	Legacy	(UBL)	is	an	African	Caribbean	Christian,	
who	I	shall	hereafter	refer	to	as	GK137.		UBL	use	offices	within	a	building	that	is	
located	in	Handsworth	and	owned	by	the	City	Council.		From	the	meetings	I	
attended	it	appears	that	the	majority	of	UBL’s	membership	is	male.		However,	
the	most	charismatic	member	of	UBL	is	a	female	named	Rosemary	Campbell-
Stephens138,	who	grew	up	on	a	road	adjacent	to	where	my	family	lived	in	
Handsworth.		Rosemary	is	head	of	UBL’s	educational	division	and	was	
previously	a	headmistress,	OFSTED	Inspector	and	school	governor.		During	the	
period	my	fieldwork	was	conducted	she	was	a	self-employed	Leadership	
Consultant.		Rosemary	describes	UBL	as	a	political/social	advocacy	group.		Their	
role	is	to	bring	together	Black	organisations	for	specific	purposes,	beneficial	to	
the	African	Caribbean	community.			
	
	
None	of	the	research	participants	from	ACFAS	had	ever	heard	of	UBL,	which	is	
perhaps	not	surprising.		Most	of	the	work	that	Rosemary	undertakes	for	UBL	
involves	networking,	rather	than	direct	action	in	the	transitional	sphere.		She	
moves	in	academic	and	political	circles	and	is	a	confidant	of	the	MP	Diane	
Abbott.		However,	she	is	also	very	close	to	her	roots	in	the	Black	community.		
One	of	Rosemary’s	greatest	skills	is	her	ability	to	negotiate	the	space	between	
the	transitional	sphere	and	the	mainstream	political	arena.			
	
	
																																								 																				
137	See	Chapter	Three.	
138	ibid.	
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I	mentioned	earlier	that	I	was	formally	introduced	to	Rosemary	during	the	time	
she	was	mobilising	support	in	the	community	for	a	Free	School	application139,	
which	is	a	process	that	is	ultimately	decided	by	Government.		Free	Schools	are	
effectively	Academies.		They	were	initially	the	idea	of	New	Labour	(Gillard,	
2007),	but	have	increased	in	prominence	since	the	Coalition	Government	
passed	the	Academies	Act	2010	(AA2010)	(UKPGA,	2010).		The	1988	Education	
Reform	Act	(ERA)	introduced	free	market	principles	into	the	education	
sector140,	which	provided	parents	and	pupils	with	more	choice,	and	
subsequently	led	to	the	creation	of	the	AA2010.		Some	suggest	Free	Schools	are	
a	waste	of	taxpayers’	money	and	contribute	to	increasing	class	inequalities	
between	children	(Gilbert,	2012),	whilst	others	argue	that	private	sector	
sponsored	education	encourages	selection	by	stealth	(Gillard,	2007;	Gillborn,	
2013).					
	
	
Unlike	Academies	–	which	are	public/private	partnerships	(Gillard,	2007)	–	Free	
Schools	encourage	private	sector	intervention,	as	non-government	
organisations	(NGOs)	and	various	interest	groups	can	apply	to	open	a	Free	
School.		Although	they	are	funded	by	the	State,	Free	Schools	are	to	a	great	
extent	exempt	from	local	education	authority	control.		They	are	able	to	set	
their	own	curriculum	and	entry	criteria	without	government	interference.		
Rosemary	understood	that	the	AA2010	provided	an	opportunity	for	Caribbean	
parents	to	empower	themselves	to	overcome	educational	inequalities	in	State	
																																								 																				
139	ibid.	
140	See	Chapter	Five.	
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schools.		The	Free	School	policy	could	be	used	to	embed	Black	Studies141,	and	
anti-racism	education	into	the	mainstream	curriculum.		It	was	also	a	means	to	
rectify	the	failings	of	State	education,	where	the	learning	of	Black	children	was	
concerned.		Although	it	might	be	possible	to	appropriate	the	AA2010	to	
empower	African	Caribbeans,	according	to	Professor	David	Gillborn	the	
legislation	can	also	entrench	racism:	
	
‘Black	kids	did	worse	in	academies	than	they	did	in	similar	State	
schools.		That	raises	a	set	of	questions	about	what	happens	in	
academies	that	depresses	the	achievement	of	Black	kids.		The	
Government’s	own	assessment	of	academies,	which	is	one	of	their	
flagship	educational	programmes,	suggests	that	academies	are	
actually	bad	news	for	Black	students.		Yet	the	policy	has	been	rolled	
out	nationally	with	absolutely	no	safeguards	in	place	to	make	sure	
that	the	situation	gets	better.		That	[the	Academies	programme]	is	a	
perfect	example	of	how	racism	operates	in	education	policy	without	
any	clear	conscious	racist	intent’	(Professor	David	Gillborn,	19th	June	
2013,	Birmingham).	
	
Although	Free	Schools	and	Academies	fall	under	the	AA2010,	Gillborn	suggests	
that	academisation	will	provide	no	benefits	for	Black	students.		However,	the	
relative	autonomy	that	Free	Schools	have	regarding	setting	their	curriculum,	is	
the	aspect	of	empowerment	that	Rosemary	was	seeking	to	appropriate.			
	
																																								 																				
141	See	Rex	and	Tomlinson	(1979).	
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Rosemary	initially	intended	to	apply	for	a	Free	School	working	with	just	UBL	as	
the	sole	applicant.		However,	she	subsequently	decided	it	was	more	prudent	to	
support	Excell	3’s142	application.		This	was	because	a	joint	bid,	which	pooled	the	
skills	and	resources	of	the	Black	community,	would	stand	a	greater	chance	of	
being	successful.		In	the	build-up	to	their	second	Free	School	application,	Dr	
Cheron	Byfield,	the	leader	of	Excell	3,	held	a	meeting	at	the	NTCG	where	she	
presented	her	plans	for	her	organisation’s	King	Solomon	International	Business	
School	(KSIBS).		She	introduced	a	White	neuroscientist,	named	Dr	Roy	Paget,	
who	outlined	what	he	referred	to	as	a	scientific	method	that	he	had	pioneered	
to	raise	the	attainment	of	children	studying	Maths.		I	was	told	that	Dr	Paget	
was	not	involved	in	Excell	3’s	initial	application,	but	his	services	had	
subsequently	been	enlisted.		It	appeared	as	if	the	initial	aspiration	of	opening	a	
school,	which	focussed	on	raising	the	educational	attainment	of	Black	children,	
was	being	overlooked	in	favour	of	a	more	inclusive	approach.		I	know	that	some	
																																								 																				
142	Excell	3	is	a	Christian	based	educational	organisation	led	by	Dr	Cheron	Byfield,	a	female	
African	Caribbean	academic.		Their	Christian	sponsors	are,	like	the	NTCG,	members	of	the	
Council	of	Black	Led	Churches.		The	organisation	is	based	in	a	building	they	own,	which	is	
located	at	the	Scot	Arms	Junction	of	Perry	Barr	and	Great	Barr.		The	work	of	the	organisation	
was	first	brought	to	my	attention	by	Dr	Tony	Talburt,	who	is	a	friend	of	mine.		He	was	a	
member	of	Excell	3	when	they	submitted	their	first	bid	for	a	Free	School	and	he	also	worked	
with	Excell	3’s	education	consultancy	company:	Black	Boys	Can.		However,	it	was	Rosemary	
who	introduced	me	to	Cheron.		She	allowed	me	to	attend	Excell	3’s	meetings	where	they	went	
over	the	administrative	details	of	their	bids,	and	those	organised	at	the	NTCG	in	Lozells	to	
generate	parental	support.		The	meetings	at	the	NTCG	was	extremely	well-attended.		They	
demonstrated	how	much	the	community	supported	Excell	3’s	endeavours	and	also	provided	
evidence	of	the	extent	to	which	African	Caribbeans	valorised	education,	but	was	disaffected	
with	their	children’s	chances	of	success	under	the	present	State	system.		Although	Excell	3	
submitted	three	Free	School	applications	–	the	first	of	which	was	in	2010	–	only	the	final	King	
Solomon	Business	School	bid	in	2013	was	successful.		In	each	subsequent	application,	they	
were	forced	to	scale	down	their	plans	and	the	cohort	size.		They	initially	planned	for	a	school	
supporting	children	between	the	ages	of	5-19,	which	would	also	have	a	nursery	provision.		
However,	the	successful	application	is	for	a	school	of	a	very	moderate	size,	which	will	only	
have	200	pupils.		As	noted	above,	Rosemary	agreed	to	support	their	application	in	favour	of	
the	one	UBL	was	intending	to	submit.		At	the	time,	Excell	3	was	modifying	their	rejected	
second	application	to	take	into	account	feedback	received	from	the	Department	for	Education.				
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members	of	Excell	3,	particularly	those	involved	in	Black	Boys	Can143,	are	highly	
proficient	in	Maths.		I	am	also	aware	of	several	Black	teachers	in	the	community	
who	teach	Maths	in	State	schools.		Therefore,	the	introduction	of	Dr	Paget	
appeared	to	support	an	alternative	agenda.	
	
	
In	the	context	of	the	neo-liberal	educational	market,	Whiteness	can	be	seen	as	
cultural	capital	in	terms	of	acceptance	and	respectability.		This	is	because	the	
presence	of	Whiteness	can	signify	‘shared	expectations	of	behaviour	on	the	
part	of	minority	groups,	a	belief	that	one	is	part	of	a	tradition	[…]	that	will	
produce	intended	outcomes	in	particular	situations’	(Garner,	2007:	59).		This	
understanding	of	Whiteness	in	market	situations	tends	to	suggest	that	the	
credibility	of	Black	organisations	is	considerably	enhanced	if	Whites	are	
involved	in	their	operations.		Therefore,	Whiteness	can	denote	power,	eligibility	
and	the	right	to	distribute	Goods	without	question	in	the	context	of	competing	
for	State	funding.			
	
	
Whilst	interviewing	some	of	the	research	participants	at	ACFAS	I	noticed	that	
their	Maths	teacher	and	Admin	Assistant	were	both	White.		I	asked	ACFAS’	
Project	Manager	(PM)	if	their	employment	was	a	conscious	attempt	to	procure	
White	sponsors	and	enhance	the	credibility	of	the	organisation	to	outsiders.		
She	told	me	that	the	organisation’s	Maths	tutor	was	a	former	PhD	student	at	
																																								 																				
143	Black	Boys	Can	(BBC)	is	a	partner	organisation	of	Excell	3,	which	focuses	on	raising	the	
attainment	of	Black	boys	studying	in	State	education.	
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Oxford	University,	who	had	a	nervous	breakdown	in	his	final	year.		In	addition,	
the	Admin	Assistant	was	the	only	candidate	interviewed	who	was	proficient	in	
the	skills	required	for	her	post:	
	
‘Where	am	I	going	to	find	an	ex-Oxford	University	student	and	
someone	with	[name	of	Admin	Assistant]	experience,	who	are	willing	
to	work	for	what	we	are	paying	them?		We	interviewed	Black,	White	
and	Asian	candidates:	whoever	met	the	person	specs.		A	lot	of	Black	
people	apply	for	jobs	where	they	are	the	best	candidates,	but	fail	to	
get	it	simply	because	of	the	colour	of	their	skin.		[names	of	Maths	
tutor	and	Admin	Assistant]	were	the	best	candidates	we	interviewed,	
and	that’s	why	they’re	here’	(ACFAS	PM,	10th	May	2014,	
Birmingham).		
	
The	PM’s	justification	for	employing	ACFAS’	White	staff	is	an	excellent	example	
of	equal	opportunities	in	practice.		However,	as	she	noted	above,	Blacks	who	
are	equally	qualified	as	Whites	often	encounter	racial	discrimination	in	the	
labour	market144.		Employing	a	minimum	number	of	Black	workers	can	be	a	
means	by	which	White	organisations	comply	with	legislative	requirements145.		
However,	employing	Black	workers	does	not	necessarily	provide	Black	
organisations	with	the	level	of	credibility	derived	from	having	White	
employees.		This	is	particularly	the	case	when	Black	organisations	are	
																																								 																				
144	See	Chapter	Six	for	data	regarding	this	statement.	
145	This	is	often	the	case	with	Race	Relations	legislation,	see	Ratcliffe	(2004).		
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competing	in	a	very	competitive	market,	which	is	argued	above	in	the	case	of	
Excell	3.	
	
	
In	March	2014	Excell	3	held	a	meeting	at	Carrs	Lane	Methodist	Church	in	the	
City	Centre,	to	thank	the	Black	community	for	supporting	its	successful	third	
Free	School	application	bid.		Information	was	also	provided	to	the	community	
regarding	the	timeline	for	the	opening	of	the	new	school.		Dr	Paget	no	longer	
appeared	to	be	part	of	Excell	3’s	plans.		However,	Cheron	did	introduce	a	
number	of	White	academics	and	business	people,	who	were	now	involved	with	
the	administration	and	curriculum	delivery	of	the	KSIBS.		This	may	not	
necessarily	be	a	good	thing.		If	White	professionals	are	involved	in	decision-
making	at	an	operational	level,	but	are	not	prepared	to	prioritise	Black	
interests,	the	direction	taken	by	the	school	might	be	in	conflict	with	the	aims	
and	aspirations	of	the	parents	who	supported	the	project.		Consequently,	there	
could	be	a	risk	that	the	education	of	Black	children	becomes	secondary	to	
individual	career	interests,	market	concerns	and	Government	targets.		This	
demonstrates	the	problem	of	financial	dependency	in	the	neo-liberal	
educational	market,	and	how	Whiteness	is	a	signifier	of	symbolic	capital	
(Bourdieu,	2010	[1984]).		Although	Excell	3	tried	to	utilise	the	AA2010	to	
support	Black	Caribbean	interests,	the	organisation’s	application	was	refused	
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State	funding	until	its	plans	for	the	KSIBS	conformed	to	the	perceived	norms	of	
so-called	British	values146.	
	
	
Whilst	working	with	Excell	3,	Rosemary	was	also	involved	with	Kajan’s147	
successful	Studio	School148	bid.	Kajan	school	received	£2.5m	from	the	
Government	to	set	up	their	catering	Studio	School.		However,	unlike	KSIBS,	they	
had	very	few	White	sponsors.		In	April	2014,	the	school	was	served	with	a	
closure	notice	just	a	year	after	opening.		The	Government	withdrew	the	
school’s	funding	because	it	had	not	reached	its	enrolment	target,	as	‘fewer	
than	75	people	had	registered	to	study	[…]	from	September’	of	2014	(BBC	News	
2014).		The	difference	between	success,	with	White	support	and	failure	where	
																																								 																				
146	The	idea	of	so-called	British	values	comes	under	the	2002	Education	Act’s	spiritual,	moral,	
social	and	cultural	development	of	children	(DfE,	2014).		The	notion	is	now	appropriated	by	
Government	to	underpin	notions	of	Whiteness	and	White	supremacy	in	the	educational	
market,	whilst	Othering	the	culture	of	minority	ethnic	groups.		Excell	3	had	two	applications	for	
a	Free	School	refused	before	the	third	was	accepted.		However,	each	application	became	
increasingly	focused	on	White	interests	and	less	concerned	with	the	educational	attainment	of	
Black	children.		Ideas	of	racial	inequality	in	education,	and	the	need	for	Black	teachers	to	
deliver	a	curriculum	that	did	not	discriminate	against	African	Caribbean	pupils,	were	slowly	
eroded.		What	emerged	in	its	place	was	a	more	market-led	approach	to	education,	which	
involved	White	business	professionals	rather	than	Black	academics.		Although	Excell	3	is	
affiliated	with	the	Black	Churches,	the	Government	only	approved	the	organisation’s	
application	after	a	number	of	concessions.		A	major	compromise	was	that	the	KSIBS	had	to	be	
incorporated	into	the	Christian	Woodhouse	Schools,	which	is	a	White-led	religious	
organisation.		This	suggests	that	Excell	3’s	vision	of	Free	School	conflicted	with	the	
Government’s	idea	of	British	values,	which	appears	to	promote	a	‘normalised	and	taken	for	
granted’	(Gillborn,	2005:	486)	notion	of	White	supremacy	whilst	overlooking	the	perpetuity	of	
racial	inequality.	
147	Kajan	is	an	African	Caribbean	vocational	educational	organisation,	which	specialises	in	
training	local	students	to	work	in	the	catering	industry.		They	were	based	in	Witton	Road	in	
Aston	at	the	time	of	writing.	
148	Studio	Schools	also	come	under	the	AA2010	and	were	launched	in	September	2010.		They	
are	similar	to	Free	Schools,	as	they	are	also	funded	directly	by	the	Government	and	to	a	great	
extent	are	free	from	local	education	authority	control.		They	are	aimed	at	the	14-19	cohort	and	
‘address	the	growing	gap	between	the	skills	and	knowledge	that	young	people	require	to	
succeed,	and	those	that	the	current	education	system	provides’	(Studio	Schools	Trust,	2011).		
Their	main	focus	is	the	development	of	work-based	vocational	skills	demanded	by	local	
businesses.			
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it	appears	to	be	invisible,	demonstrates	how	difficult	it	is	for	Black	community	
educational	organisations	to	prioritise	the	needs	of	their	supporters	in	the	
contemporary	educational	market.		It	also	reveals	how	the	market	can	steer	the	
direction	of	the	agency	of	Black	organisations.		This	is	especially	if	they	have	to	
rely	on	State	funding	or	support	from	private	sponsors,	that	do	not	share	the	
interests	of	their	supporters	in	the	transitional	sphere.			
	
	
ACFAS	closed	in	September	2014	because	it	was	no	longer	able	to	acquire	
funding.		The	organisation	fell	victim	to	the	problem	of	match	funding,	which	
constrains	the	agency	of	not-for-profit	organisations	that	operate	on	the	same	
basis	as	charities	(Cantle,	2002:	Para.	5.5.3:	39).		ACFAS	was	originally	set	up	to	
address	the	specific	educational	disadvantage	encountered	by	members	of	the	
Black	Caribbean	community.		However,	like	Excell	3,	ACFAS	also	had	to	make	
compromises	to	obtain	sponsorship.		It	was	previously	declined	funding	for	
several	projects,	because	its	remit	was	too	specific	to	the	needs	of	one	
community.		As	a	consequence,	ACFAS	had	to	modify	its	educational	aims	and	
provide	an	inclusive	educational	provision	for	all	communities	to	access.		
Although	ACFAS	adapted	the	way	in	which	it	presented	its	interests	regarding	
the	Caribbean	community,	the	organisation’s	inability	to	financially	sustain	
itself	was	the	cause	of	its	eventual	demise.			
	
	
The	political	ideology	of	community	cohesion	overlooks	the	impact	that	
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structural	inequality	has	on	persisting	disadvantages	(BRAP,	2004).		No	
consideration	is	given	to	the	impact	of	racial	discrimination,	and	class	
inequalities,	in	which	Black	and	minority	ethnic	(BME)	‘communities	experience	
a	more	pronounced	deprivation’	(ibid,	2004:	8).		The	fate	of	ACFAS	highlights	
the	problem	of	grassroots	interventions,	which	can	only	be	funded	if	they	
support	the	aims	of	community	cohesion.		Although	the	material	needs	of	
African	Caribbeans	are	specific	to	their	ethnic	group,	they	have	to	be	shared	by	
other	communities	in	order	to	receive	State	or	private	sector	investment.		What	
is	also	problematic	for	African	Caribbeans	is	that	the	level	of	poverty	they	
generally	experience	makes	it	difficult	for	them	to	self-fund	projects	that	could	
empower	them.		
	
	
Conclusion	
	
The	organisations	featured	in	this	chapter	do	not	provide	their	supporters	with	
housing	or	direct	employment.		Their	contribution	to	African	Caribbean	social	
mobility	is	assessed	by	the	capacity	they	have	to	obtain	educational	Goods	and	
provide	labour	market	assistance.		The	issue	of	funding	is	of	major	concern	to	
all	the	Black	organisations	I	have	engaged	with	during	this	research.		Financial	
capital	is	the	common	and	dominant	theme	constraining	their	agency	and	
organisational	capacity.		Although	there	has	been	an	African	Caribbean	
presence	in	Birmingham	and	the	UK	for	over	sixty	years	(Sivanandan,	1981;	
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Fryer,	1984),	it	seems	that	few	Black	organisations	have	financial	autonomy.		
Bini	Brown	told	me:	
	
‘There	were	27	groups	in	this	community,	all	of	which	were	funded	
by	the	State	and	grant	aid.		They	couldn’t	put	up	political	posters	in	
their	office	or	make	political	statements.		ACSHO	was	never	in	that	
position.		Even	if	you	gave	us	a	grant,	like	Saturday	School,	you	can’t	
tell	us	what	to	teach.		If	you	want	to	tell	us	what	statements	to	make,	
then	keep	your	damn	money’	(Bini	Brown,	20th	August	2013,	
Birmingham).	
	
Self-sufficiency	has	to	be	the	ultimate	aim	of	any	organisation.		However,	
increasingly	more	Black	organisations	will	share	the	same	fate	as	ACFAS	and	
Kajan	unless	they	develop	the	capacity	to	generate	their	own	finances.		Excell	3	
is	due	to	open	their	Free	School	in	2016.		However,	it	remains	to	be	seen	if	they	
have	compromised	the	interests	of	their	community	in	order	to	secure	
Government	funding.		Although	the	targets	set	by	Government	might	constrain	
their	immediate	agency,	Excell	3	must	develop	strategies	in	the	future	to	
generate	income	to	free	KSIBS	from	the	yoke	of	State	funding	and	private	
sector	interests.		Although	UBL	continues	to	play	an	important	role	in	bringing	
together	Black	organisations	and	championing	specific	causes,	it	relies	on	the	
City	Council	for	premises.		As	such,	UBL	would	find	it	difficult	to	challenge	the	
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Council,	if	its	agenda	conflicted	with	the	needs	and	interests	of	the	Black	
Caribbean	community149.		
	
	
Out	of	the	organisations	I	have	observed	during	this	research,	those	associated	
with	the	Council	of	Black	Led	Churches	appear	more	adept	at	appropriating	the	
transitional	sphere	as	a	resource	to	engage	with	the	free-market.		However,	
The	NTCG	is	far	from	perfect.		Its	inclusive	ideology	is	problematic	in	terms	of	
addressing	the	specific	disadvantages	faced	by	its	supporters	in	the	Black	
Caribbean	community.		ACSHO	is	more	capable	of	articulating	the	specific	
needs	of	African	Caribbeans.		However,	ACSHO	has	not	developed	new	
strategies,	to	address	the	persistence	of	racial	disadvantage,	in	the	
contemporary	market	sites	of	struggle.		The	church’s	message	of	religious	love	
and	unity,	tends	to	overlook	that	the	needs	of	the	Black	community	are	specific	
																																								 																				
149	In	2012	I	attended	a	meeting	at	UBL’s	base,	the	Grassroots	Centre,	which	is	situated	on	the	
corner	of	Soho	Road	and	Thornhill	Road	in	Handsworth.		The	meeting	was	organised	by	GK,	
who	had	invited	along	various	religious	and	political	Black	organisations,	as	well	as	local	Black	
politicians.		He	used	the	meeting	as	a	platform	to	argue	that	the	organisations	in	attendance	
should	allow	UBL	to	represent	their	collective	interests,	which	would	effectively	mean	that	he	
would	be	recognised	as	the	official	leader	of	Birmingham’s	Black	community.		Needless	to	say,	
his	argument	did	not	go	down	very	well.		In	October	2014,	I	attended	a	meeting	chaired	by	
Councilor	James	McKay	at	the	City’s	Town	Hall.		The	meeting	was	officially	entitled	“A	Big	
Conversation	with	the	African	Caribbean	Community”.		Several	representatives	of	the	African	
Caribbean	community,	including	GK,	were	present.		It	was	supposed	to	be	a	dialogue	of	how	
best	the	Council	could	support	the	Caribbean	community	within	the	present	climate	of	
austerity	and	cuts	in	Council	services.		However,	it	was	effectively	a	means	of	generating	
evidence	that	the	Council	was	engaging	with	the	city’s	communities,	under	the	Government’s	
community	cohesion	strategy	(Cantle,	2002:	Para.	2.16:	11).		A	number	of	those	who	attended	
were	not	pleased	with	the	patronising	and	dismissive	way	in	which	Councilor	McKay	attempted	
to	avoid	the	questions	he	was	asked.		However,	what	I	found	even	more	concerning	was	the	
silence	of	GK.		It	appears	that	he	had	a	conflict	of	interest:	he	is	employed	by	the	City	Council	
and	he	depends	on	them	for	the	premises	in	which	his	organisation	is	based.		This	illustrates	
how	the	agency	of	Black	organisations	can	be	compromised	if	they	are	not	financially	
independent.		Although	GK	has	ambitions	to	be	recognised	as	the	leader	of	the	Black	
community,	he	is	unable	to	represent	their	interests	if	they	conflict	with	those	of	the	City	
Council	that	provides	his	organisation	with	its	premises.	
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and	not	necessarily	valorised	by	all	who	profess	to	share	the	same	faith.		This	is	
demonstrated	above	in	the	case	of	Excell	3	and	its	KSIBS.		It	remains	to	be	seen	
if	organisations	such	as	ACSHO,	which	have	not	diluted	their	message	of	Black	
liberation,	will	be	able	to	appropriate	the	free-market	to	serve	the	interests	of	
its	supporters.		This	inquiry	now	moves	forward	to	assess	the	past-race	
experiences	of	African	Caribbeans	in	Birmingham	schools,	against	the	higher	
education	progress	made	by	their	contemporaries	in	a	supposedly	post-race	
society.	
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5. Education,	ideology	and	racial	inequality		
	
This	chapter	examines	the	educational	experiences	of	African	Caribbeans	
alongside	changes	in	education	policies,	practices	and	political	ideologies.		The	
aim	of	this	approach	is	to	establish	the	extent	to	which	equality	legislation	in	
the	education	sector	may	have	improved	or	inhibited	the	educational	
attainment	of	African	Caribbeans.		Access	to	higher	education	is	a	means	of	
increasing	one’s	life-chances	(Bourdieu,	2010	[1984]).		Therefore,	a	further	aim	
of	this	investigation	is	to	determine	if	educational	policies	might	have	played	a	
part	in	reducing	the	barrier	of	racial	discrimination,	which	blocked	
opportunities	and	impeded	the	social	mobility	of	the	children	of	West	Indian	
immigrants.			
	
	
The	experiences	of	the	first	generation	of	Black	children	to	enter	the	British	
educational	sector	are	the	primary	focus	of	this	research.		However,	there	is	a	
dearth	of	data	regarding	their	educational	attainment.		This	is	because	the	
statutory	duty	to	record	ethnicity	data	is	a	relatively	recent	phenomenon	
(Macpherson,	1999;	Ratcliffe,	2004).		Therefore,	data	highlighting	the	
contemporary	educational	situations	of	African	Caribbeans	are	examined	
against	the	narratives	of	those	who	were	first	‘schooled	in	Babylon’	(Carby,	
1982:	183),	to	determine	if	their	experiences	of	discrimination	resonate	with	
the	present	generation.		This	chapter	will:	
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• analyse	African	Caribbean	schooling	under	different	phases	of	
educational	policies;	
• identify	some	of	the	various	disadvantages	that	have	dissected	the	
educational	experiences	of	African	Caribbeans	in	Birmingham;	
• explore	the	narratives	of	African	Caribbean	subjects	against	sociological	
debates,	educational	policies,	higher	education	(H.E.)	and	school	
exclusion	data;	
• highlight	‘disruptions	and	continuities’	(Islam,	2000:	39)	between	the	
lived	experiences	of	African	Caribbean	subjects	and	the	current	
situation	of	their	contemporary	peers	in	the	educational	market;	
• examine	differences	in	the	age	and	rate	at	which	African	Caribbeans	in	
Birmingham	are	accessing	H.E.;		
• assess	the	relationship	between	potential	social	mobility,	age	and	ethnic	
participation	in	Russell	group	and	other	universities.				
	
	
Many	observers	have	noted	the	importance	of	education	to	social	mobility	(Rex	
and	Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981;	2004;	Carby,	1982;	Troyna,	1992;	Mason,	
2000;	Shiner	and	Modood,	2002;	Bourdieu,	2010	[1984]).		The	education	sector	
should	represent	‘a	ladder,	the	successful	scaling	of	which	will	permit	pupils	to	
enter	the	competition	for	employment	and	social	rewards	on	equal	terms’	
(Mason,	2000:	68).		However,	academic	success	is	not	always	‘easy	and	typical’	
(Weber,	1920	in	Smith,	2007:	87)	for	everyone	competing	in	the	educational	
market.		This	has	certainly	been	the	case	for	Black	Caribbeans.		Their	
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educational	experiences	have	been	mediated	by	racism	and	the	type	of	
material	deprivation	that	is	often	a	consequence	of	their	general	working-class	
status.			
	
	
The	past-race150	educational	experiences	of	African	Caribbeans	have	been	well-
documented	(Carby,	1982;	Coard,	1971)	and	one	would	think	that	between	the	
passing	of	the	1976	Race	Relations	Act	(RRA1976)	and	the	2010	Equality	Act	
(EA2010),	legislation	would	have	ameliorated	discrimination	in	the	education	
sector.		This	is	especially	as	the	current	equality	agenda	seems	to	imply	that	
racial	inequalities	are	not	significantly	greater,	than	those	of	the	eight	other	
protected	characteristics151.		If	that	is	indeed	the	case,	and	racism	in	the	
educational	market	is	no	longer	a	major	barrier	to	African	Caribbean	social	
mobility,	then	21st	century	post-race152	equality	policies	may	actually	be	playing	
a	discernible	role	in	reducing	ethnic	discrimination.		
	
	
To	establish	if	racism	in	education	continues	to	constrain	African	Caribbean	
social	mobility,	it	is	important	to	recognise	that	the	education	system	must	be	
viewed	as	segments	of	a	whole,	rather	than	as	separate	tertiary	entities	
(McClean	in	Troyna	1984:	154).		Although	the	transition	from	one	educational	
age-stage	to	another	can	appear	fragmented,	it	is	a	joined-up	process	that	
																																								 																				
150	See	Chapter	One	for	a	brief	discussion	of	the	reality	of	past-race	and	the	myth	of	post-race.	
151	See	the	Equality	Act	2010	(EA2010)	(HM	Government,	2010).			
152	See	Chapter	One	for	a	brief	discussion	of	what	I	define	as	post-race	legislation.	
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often	determines	labour	market	success.		Thus,	it	is	important	to	analyse	the	
ubiquity	of	racial	discrimination	in	each	educational	stage,	and	its	impact	on	
achieving	academic	Goods.		What	now	follows	is	an	examination	of	the	past-
race	educational	experiences	of	the	research	subjects.		Their	narratives	are	
analysed	against	social,	political	and	legislative	changes,	and	also	data	relating	
to	their	contemporaries	in	the	post-race	educational	market.		
	
	
Past-race	experiences	of	assimilation	
	
During	the	mid-1960s	the	Labour	Government	produced	a	White	Paper,	viewed	
by	some	as	‘a	“Little	England	policy”	[…]	in	respect	of	immigration	control’	
(Solomos,	2003:	59).		The	report	outlined	the	need	to	continue	Commonwealth	
immigration,	whilst	integrating	migrants	through	various	assimilation	
policies153.		As	a	consequence	of	policies	supporting	integration	via	assimilation	
many	Black	children	were	labelled	educationally	sub-normal	(ESN)	and	
transferred	to	special	schools154,	which	were	generally	reserved	for	children	
with	behavioural	problems.			
	
	
Coard	(1971:	44)	contends	that	in	1967	West	Indian	children	made	up	75%	of	
the	total	population	in	UK	ESN	schools.		This	figure	is	also	supported	by	DES	
data	which	reveals	that	in	January	1971	‘of	the	5,500	immigrant	children	in	
																																								 																				
153	See	Chapter	Two	for	an	outline	of	assimilation	policies.	
154	See	Coard	(1971)	and	also	Carby	(1982).	
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special	schools,	70%	were	of	West	Indian	origin’	(McKenley,	2001:	319).		There	
can	be	little	doubt	of	the	devastating	long-term	effects	of	ESN	practices.		At	the	
very	least	ESN	Schools	disrupted	the	education	of	Black	Children	and,	at	worst,	
destroyed	their	life	chances	and	aspirations	for	a	positive	future.		The	practice	
of	referring	Black	children	to	ESN	schools	limited	their	labour	market	
opportunities,	and	consequently	constrained	their	social	mobility	(Coard,	1971:	
5).	
	
	
Subject	A	is	a	fifty-five-year-old	African	Caribbean	male,	who	lives	with	his	wife	
in	Erdington,	Birmingham.		He	was	born	in	Jamaica	and	came	to	live	with	his	
parents	in	Bradford	during	1969,	when	he	was	ten.		He	first	attended	a	
mainstream	State	school,	but	after	a	few	months	he	was	referred	to	an	ESN	
school	by	his	teachers.		As	a	result,	he	did	not	have	the	opportunity	to	obtain	
any	educational	qualifications	and	is	currently	employed	as	a	security	guard.		
He	enjoys	his	job,	but	thinks	he	could	have	improved	his	current	occupational	
position	if	he	had	received	a	normal	State	school	education.		Subject	A	refers	to	
the	ESN	School	as	a	boarding	school155.		He	told	me	that	the	majority	of	the	
pupils	at	the	State	school	he	attended	were	White.		The	entire	teaching	staff	
were	also	White.	
	
																																								 																				
155	There	was	a	reluctance	on	the	part	of	Subject	A	to	refer	to	his	former	school	as	one	for	the	
educationally	sub-normal.		However,	he	is	not	deluding	himself	about	the	type	of	school	that	it	
actually	was.		The	teachers	who	referred	him	described	the	ESN	School	to	his	parents	as	a	
boarding	school.		The	embarrassment	of	not	being	educated	in	a	“normal”	school,	and	how	the	
ESN	School	was	sold	to	his	parents,	probably	explains	why	he	still	refers	to	it	as	a	boarding	
school.	
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Subject	A’s	teachers	referred	him	to	an	ESN	school	following	a	playground	fight.		
They	met	with	his	parents	and	used	the	incident	to	convince	them	that	he	was	
isolating	himself	from	other	pupils	and	having	problems	integrating156.		His	
parents	signed	the	documents	that	sanctioned	his	referral,	because	they	
believed	the	teachers	were	acting	in	their	son’s	best	interests.		Within	a	few	
months	of	arriving	in	the	UK,	Subject	A	was	removed	from	the	safety	and	
security	of	his	family	environment	and	placed	in	the	care	of	the	State.		In	
hindsight,	he	realises	his	parents	made	a	big	mistake.		However,	he	also	
concedes	that	the	teachers	deceived	them,	by	making	them	think	they	were	
doing	what	was	best	for	him.		Each	time	his	parents	visited	him	at	the	ESN	
School	they	asked	him	if	he	wanted	to	come	home.		However,	he	consistently	
refused:	
	
‘My	parents	always	gave	me	the	choice	to	come	home.		But	when	I	
went	to	the	boarding	school	I	made	friends	for	the	first	time	in	this	
country.		I	told	them	that	I	liked	the	school	because	I	had	made	some	
friends’	(Subject	A,	10th	August	2013,	Birmingham).	
	
																																								 																				
156	Coard	(1971:	13-14)	defines	three	forms	of	teacher	biases,	which	influenced	the	ESN	School	
referral	of	West	Indian	children:	cultural	bias;	middle-class	bias;	and	emotional-disturbance	
bias.		Subjects	A	was	a	victim	of	all	three.		His	status	as	a	new	immigrant	would	have	made	him	
susceptible	to	cultural	bias.		He	would	also	have	been	subjected	to	the	middle-class	prejudice	
of	his	teachers.		The	shock	of	“sudden	removal	from	the	West	Indies	to	a	half-forgotten	family	
and	into	an	unknown	and	generally	hostile	environment”	would	also	have	emotionally	
disturbed	him	(ibid,	1971:	14).		
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Unfamiliarity	with	the	culture	of	his	new	country	increased	the	value	Subject	A	
placed	on	friendships.		He	thought	that	leaving	the	ESN	school	would	also	mean	
having	to	make	new	friends	in	another	State	school.		He	decided	that	staying	at	
the	school	was	a	better	option	than	having	to	endure	the	alienation	he	had	
experienced	in	mainstream	State	education.		Looking	back,	he	now	understands	
how	the	ESN	school	constrained	his	life-chances.		He	told	me	that	the	teachers	
spent	most	of	their	time	trying	to	control157	the	other	children.		The	ESN	regime	
was	designed	to	keep	the	kids	active	and	physically	engaged	so	they	would	be	
easier	to	manage.		The	curriculum	revolved	around	sports,	art	and	athletics,	
with	no	emphasis	on	academic	development.		The	activities	suggested	that	
Black	children	would	thrive	in	an	environment	in	which	real	learning	was	
insignificant:	a	‘basketball	and	steel	bands	approach’	(Fryer,	1984:	389)	to	
education.		No	consideration	was	given	to	the	impact	that	a	non-academic	
curriculum	would	have	on	the	future	life-chances	of	the	children	and	how	it	
would	limit	their	labour	market	opportunities.	
	
	
Subject	D	recalled	how	racism	intersected	(Crenshaw,	1991)	her	school	
experiences	in	1960s	Britain.		She	is	fifty-five	years	old	and	left	Jamaica	when	
she	was	seven.		Subject	D	was	diagnosed	with	dyslexia	in	2013	and	finished	
secondary	education	without	obtaining	any	qualifications.		She	currently	lives	
																																								 																				
157	Control	was	used	as	a	euphemism,	meaning	the	teachers	tried	to	stop	the	pupils	from	
stealing,	fighting	and	running	away.	
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with	her	adopted	daughter	in	the	Smethwick	area158,	not	far	from	where	she	
grew	up.		Subject	D	had	difficulty	adjusting	to	British	culture,	and	remembers	
how	her	Jamaican	accent159	and	skin	colour	signified	her	Otherness.		She	has	
since	lost	all	vestiges	of	her	Caribbean	patois	and	now	speaks	in	a	broad	Black	
Country	dialect.		Subject	D	grew	up	in	a	very	tight-knit	family	unit.		She	
maintains	that	her	kinship	bonds	protected	her	from	racism,	inside	and	outside	
of	school.		She	and	her	siblings	often	fought	with	the	local	White	children	in	the	
streets	and	school	playground.		The	fights	were	almost	always	triggered	by	
racist	taunting.	
	
	
Subject	D’s	West	Indian	culture,	compounded	with	her	undiagnosed	dyslexia,	
contributed	to	racialised	assumptions	about	her	supposed	backwardness160	in	
school.		However,	such	assumptions	overlooked	the	impact	of	Empire	on	the	
Jamaican	education	system	and	how	it	contributed	to	the	poverty	of	former	
slaves	and	their	descendants161.		Black	(1991)	contends	that	one	of	the	legacies	
of	slavery	in	Jamaica	was	the	lack	of	a	standard	education	system	on	the	island.		
It	was	not	until	1973	that	the	Jamaican	Government	introduced	a	free	
education	policy	(ibid,	1991:	138).		Subject	D	recalled	her	school	experiences	
and	feelings	about	England:	
	
																																								 																				
158	See	Chapter	Seven	for	an	account	of	the	politics	of	racism,	immigration	and	housing	in	
1960s	Smethwick.	
159	See	footnote	63	in	Chapter	Two.	
160	See	Carby	(1982):	Chapter	Two.	
161	See	Black	(1991)	in	Chapter	Two.	
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‘England?		I	just	didn’t	like	it!		It	was	alien	to	me.		I	didn’t	go	to	school	
when	I	was	in	Jamaica.		My	grandmother	kept	me	and	we	lived	in	the	
country.		When	I	came	here	I	couldn’t	spell	my	name;	I	didn’t	know	
my	A,	B,	C	or	anything’	(Subject	D,	1st	May	2014,	Birmingham).	
	
Although	cultural	differences	were	used	to	explain	the	poor	educational	
attainment	of	Black	children	in	the	1960s,	the	idea	of	West	Indian	culturally	
induced	backwardness162,	is	reductionist.		Subject	D’s	academic	attainment	was	
constrained	by	what	was	an	unrecognised	disability	at	the	time,	which	was	
compounded	by	her	late	entry	into	the	British	educational	system.		Her	family	
could	not	afford	to	educate	her	in	Jamaica.		Therefore,	poverty	was	also	a	
factor	in	her	educational	disadvantage.	
	
	
Racism	intersected	the	educational	experiences	of	Subjects	A	and	D.		However,	
their	narratives	depart	regarding	the	ways	in	which	they	dealt	with	racial	
discrimination.		Subject	A	was	oblivious	to	how	wider	structural	racism	was	
linked	to	the	agency	of	his	teachers	and	their	individual	prejudices.		Moreover,	
his	parents	were	also	unaware	that	the	teachers	saw	them	as	part	of	his	
perceived	problem.		Assimilation	policies	viewed	West	Indian	culture,	and	its	
reproduction	within	the	family	structure,	as	pathological	(Carby,	1982).		
Therefore,	Subject	A’s	playground	fight,	lack	of	interaction	with	other	pupils	
																																								 																				
162	This	was	cited	in	the	NFER	Report	(Carby,	1982)	as	an	explanation	of	the	comparatively	low	
attainment	of	West	Indian	[sic]	children.		See	Chapter	Two.	
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and	failure	to	integrate	into	the	school	culture,	only	served	to	confirm	his	
teachers’	expectations	of	his	supposed	cultural	backwardness.	
	
	
Subject	A	wanted	acceptance	and	to	fit	into	the	ESN	school	culture.		However,	
to	Subject	D	resisting	racism	–	in	the	playground	and	on	the	streets	–	was	about	
maintaining	rather	than	losing	her	identity	(Troyna,	1992:	67).		She	understood	
that	racism	connected	her	school	to	Britain’s	alien	culture.		Contrary	to	Subject	
A,	her	family	provided	a	canopy	and	stable	environment	that	sheltered	her	
from	racism,	which	reinforced	–	rather	than	relinquished	–	her	social	identities,	
as	both	Black	and	Jamaican.		Therefore,	despite	the	assimilationist	ideologies	
which	constructed	West	Indian	family	structures	as	pathological	(Parekh,	1992:	
97),	the	kinship	bonds	of	Subject	D	defended	her	against	the	alienation	she	
experienced	inside	and	outside	of	school.	
	
	
In	the	1960s	and	1970s	the	politics	of	immigration	increased	public	concern	of	
the	perceived	problem	of	cultural	differences	between	indigenous	and	minority	
ethnic	children	in	English	schools	(McKenley,	2001:	314).		Local	Birmingham	
newspapers	contributed	to	the	moral	panic163	by	stating	that	33	per	cent	of	
																																								 																				
163	The	concept	of	a	moral	panic	was	first	used	by	Stan	Cohen	(2002)	[1972])	to	explain	how	
the	media	amplifies	issues	of	public	concern	to	reinforce	social	control.		Moral	panics	create	a	
deviance	amplification	spiral.		For	example,	public	concern	regarding	deviance	leads	to	
increasing	media	coverage	of	the	issue	in	question.		The	political	classes	respond	by	tightening	
legislation	in	an	effort	to	control	the	source	of	concern.		The	process	then	becomes	cyclical:	
political	reaction	further	amplifies	public	feelings	regarding	the	threat	of	deviance,	which	leads	
to	more	media	attention	and	increasing	social	control.		Every	moral	panic	has	a	folk	devil	[i.e.	a	
group	that	becomes	a	scapegoat	for	the	perceived	social	problem].		Labels	are	attached	to	the	
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minority	ethnic	children,	in	any	given	school,	should	be	enough	to	trigger	the	
dispersal	policy164.		Between	1968	and	1974,	Subject	B	attended	a	primary	
school	in	Handsworth.		She	is	fifty-one-years	old,	dyslexic	and	a	mother	of	four	
children.		She	left	school	without	gaining	any	academic	qualifications.		Subject	B	
attended	a	primary	school	in	the	1960s	that	was	the	focus	of	local	media	
concerns	about	immigration165.		Her	primary	school	had	a	non-White	cohort	
that	was	80%	of	its	total	pupil	population.166	Therefore,	according	to	national	
policy	directives	her	school	was	deemed	“ripe	for	dispersal”167.		Subject	B	
recalled	an	incident	involving	a	teacher	and	her	sister	at	the	primary	school	
they	attended:	
	
‘A	teacher	told	my	elder	sister,	in	front	of	the	class,	that	she	was	dirty	
and	that	Black	people	did	not	know	how	to	wash	themselves’	
(Subject	B,	1st	May	2014,	Birmingham).	
	
Coard	(1971:	18)	acknowledges	that	the	racial	prejudice	of	‘a	teacher	can	
seriously	affect	the	performance	of	a	child’.		To	some	extent	the	assimilation	
ideologies	of	the	time	contributed	to	normalising	the	notion	that	other	cultures	
were	inferior	and	legitimated	teacher	racism.		What	the	narratives	of	the	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 													
folk	devils,	who	are	then	seen	as	the	embodiment	of	the	deviant	issue.		Moral	panics	can	also	
create	a	self-fulfilling	prophecy,	where	actors	accept	the	deviant	label	they	are	given	by	society	
and	behave	according	to	how	they	are	perceived.		Hall	et	al	(1978)	also	uses	the	concepts	of	
moral	panics	and	folk	devils	to	articulate	the	scapegoating	of	Black	youths	in	relation	to	the	
issue	of	“mugging”	in	the	1970s.		In	the	context	of	education	in	the	1960s	and	1970s,	the	folk	
devils	are	West	Indians	and	their	children,	whilst	the	moral	panic	is	the	issue	of	immigration.	
164	Birmingham	City	Council	Library	Services	Archives.	
165	ibid.	
166	Birmingham	City	Council	Library	Services	Archives.	
167	ibid	(1966:	5).	
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research	subjects	above	demonstrate	is	that	the	racism	of	teachers	could	not	
be	separated	from	the	context	of	public	opinion,	and	the	issue	of	immigration	
that	dominated	the	political	and	social	landscapes	of	that	time.			
	
	
The	educational	policy	of	dispersing	minority	ethnic	children	was	never	
implemented	in	the	city	of	Birmingham168.		However,	to	some	extent	the	racist	
and	discriminatory	attitudes	of	Subject	B’s	teachers	would	have	been	
reinforced	at	the	time	by	the	actions	of	neighbouring	Sandwell	LEA169.		Her	
statement	below	also	provides	an	insight	into	why	Subject	A’s	parents	did	not	
question	the	decision	made	by	his	teachers	to	refer	him	to	an	ESN	School.		It	
appears	that	some	West	Indian	parents	were	ignorant	of	the	racism	their	
children	were	experiencing	in	State	education:			
	
‘They	sent	us	to	school	and	they	expected	the	teachers	to	be	
teaching	us.		But	were	they?		Our	parents	took	it	at	face	value	that	if	
they	sent	us	to	school	we	would	learn.		I	think	that	because	of	the	
teachers	some	of	the	Black	kids	unlearned’	(Subject	B,	1st	May	2014,	
Birmingham).	
	
Britain	was	revered	as	the	mother	country	in	the	British	Caribbean	(Fryer,	
1984);	it	was	packaged	and	sold	to	West	Indians	as	the	land	of	hope	and	
																																								 																				
168	See	Chapter	Two.	
169	West	Bromwich	Local	Education	Authority	implemented	the	policy	of	bussing	minority	
ethnic	children	(Troyna,	1992:	68).		Although	the	south	of	West	Bromwich	borders	Handsworth	
in	northwest	Birmingham,	the	region	falls	under	the	Borough	of	Sandwell.	
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dreams	(Taylor,	1993).		They	valorised	the	British	education	system	
(Chamberlain,	1999:	255;	Fryer,	1984:	374)	and	implicitly	trusted	teachers	to	
teach	without	prejudice.		Although	Caribbean	migrants	had	direct	experience	of	
racism	in	the	housing	and	labour	markets	(Rex	and	Moore,	1967;	Rex	and	
Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981;	Sivanandan,	1981;	Fryer,	1984;	Taylor,	1993),	
they	overlooked	its	existence	in	the	education	sector.		Some	Black	parents	
naively	believed	that	White	teachers	were	unaffected	by	racism.		They	also	
failed	to	recognise	how	racial	discrimination	would	constrain	their	children’s	
education	and	subsequent	life-chances.		
	
	
Past-race	experiences	of	multiculturalism	and	anti-racism		
	
Although	multicultural	education	(MCE)	policies	should	have	been	
implemented	in	all	British	schools	in	the	mid-1970s,	they	were	only	deployed	in	
some	local	education	authority	areas	that	had	a	disproportionate	
representation	of	Black	children.		The	idea	behind	these	polices	was	to	
integrate,	rather	than	assimilate,	minority	ethnic	children	into	British	society	
(Troyna,	1992).		MCE	strategies	aimed	to	reduce	ethnic	disparities	in	
educational	attainment,	and	overcome	discrimination,	by	allowing	children	to	
learn	about	and	respect	other	cultures	(ibid,	1992:	69).		However,	they	did	not	
directly	address	the	problem	of	racism	within	the	education	sector.		Whilst	MCE	
appeared	to	celebrate	cultural	diversity,	middle-class	White	teachers	still	
expected	Black	children	to	fail.		Therefore,	MCE	policies	ignored	‘the	influence	
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of	social	class	on	attitudes,	beliefs	and	behaviour’	(Troyna	and	Carrington,	
1990:	2).		The	‘rotten	apple	theory	of	racism’	(Henriques,	in	Troyna	and	
Carrington,	1990:	3)	underpinned	the	delivery	of	MCE	teaching.		This	is	the	idea	
that	racism	stems	from	individual	prejudices,	and	is	not	embedded	within	
structural	and	institutional	processes	and	practices.		Thus,	celebrating	cultural	
diversity	by	teaching	children	about	‘saris,	samosas	and	steel	bands’	(Troyna,	
1992:	74),	subtlety	reinforced	rather	than	challenged	the	racism	of	previous	
assimilation	policies.		
	
	
MCE	celebrated	cultural	diversity	by	emphasising	the	competence	of	Black	
children’s	musical	or	athletic	abilities,	over	their	academic	integrity.		This	was	
evident	in	the	school	experiences	of	Subject	E,	a	dyslexic	forty-nine-year-old	
male	who	lives	alone	in	Handsworth	Wood	and	also	left	school	without	any	
qualifications.		His	teachers’	idea	of	multicultural	education	meant	focusing	on	
what	they	assumed	he	was	good	at:	i.e.	sport	and	specifically	boxing	in	his	case.		
He	won	a	boxing	trophy	during	his	first	year	at	secondary	school.		His	
Headmaster	asked	him	to	bring	it	into	school	so	that	he	could	present	it	to	him	
during	the	assembly:	
	
‘By	doing	that	he	gave	me	a	character	reference	in	front	of	the	whole	
school	[it]	made	everyone	fear	me’	(Subject	E,	16th	October	2012,	
Birmingham.).	
	
	 191	
Although	his	teachers	were	unaware	he	was	dyslexic,	they	realised	he	had	
serious	difficulty	reading,	writing	and	spelling170	difficulties.		However,	they	
viewed	his	poor	academic	development	as	normative,	whilst	celebrating	his	
athletic	capabilities.		Despite	Subject	E’s	learning	difficulties,	his	Headmaster	
often	took	him	out	of	lessons	to	show	potential	parents	the	school’s	facilities.		
No	consideration	was	given	to	the	adverse	impact	that	interrupting	his	
education	would	have	on	his	immediate	attainment	and	future	employment	
prospects.		Although	extra	tuition	may	well	have	helped	Subject	E	to	develop	
cognitive	strategies	to	cope	with	his	dyslexia,	his	teachers	assumed	he	was	not	
naturally	academic.	
	
	
Some	White	teachers	make	stereotypical	assumptions	about	Black	pupils,	
which	are	reinforced	in	their	day-to-day	practices	and	interactions	with	them	
(Green	in	Troyna,	1984:	157).		In	most	instances,	Black	pupils	were	‘generally	
seen	as	boisterous,	aggressive,	unable	to	concentrate	for	long	periods	and	
more	interested	in	non-academic	pursuits’	(ibid,	1984:	157),	which	was	
demonstrated	with	Subject	E.		Although	MCE	promoted	cultural	diversity	as	the	
solution	to	racism,	teachers	continued	to	assume	that	cultural	differences	
explained	the	problem	of	Black	educational	attainment.		The	MCE	emphasis	on	
sport	and	the	arts,	over	real	education,	was	in	many	ways	quite	similar	to	the	
ESN	school	curriculum	(Coard,	1971).			
	
																																								 																				
170	For	a	detailed	analysis	of	dyslexia,	as	a	cognitive	condition,	and	its	reading,	writing	and	
spelling	symptoms,	see	Nosek	(1997).	
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I	have	stated	above	that	some	Black	parents	were	unaware	of	the	
consequences	that	racism	in	the	educational	sector	would	have	on	their	
children’s	life-chances.		However,	it	should	also	be	noted	that	most	had	‘a	
deep-rooted	mistrust	of	the	system’	(Troyna	and	Carrington,	1990:	38).		To	
some	extent	their	concerns	about	the	disproportionately	high	number	of	Black	
children	referred	to	ESN	schools	influenced	the	conception	of	the	Committee	of	
Inquiry	into	the	Education	of	Children	from	Ethnic	Minority	Groups	(ibid,	1990:	
33).		The	Committee’s	specific	focus	was	the	educational	and	attainment	needs	
of	minority	ethnic	children,	and	especially	those	of	West	Indian	parentage.		
Although	the	Committee’s	1981	Rampton	Interim	Report171	acknowledged	the	
problem	of	institutional	and	individual	racism	in	the	education	sector,	its	1985	
Swann	successor	nevertheless	reified	the	notion	of	cultural	differences	to	
explain	ethnic	disparities	in	educational	attainment.	
	
	
The	Swann	Report	(1985)	suggested	that	the	comparatively	low	rates	of	
educational	attainment	amongst	West	Indian	children	could	be	explained	by	
their	tendency	to	protest,	whereas	South	Asians	kept	‘their	heads	down’	(DES,	
1985	in	Troyna	and	Carrington	1990:	47).		Anti-racist	education	(ARE)	was	
adopted	by	equality	proponents,	who	were	unhappy	with	the	cultural	deficit	
																																								 																				
171	The	Rampton	Report	‘called	for	the	collection,	analysis	and	use	of	valid	and	reliable	
statistics’	(Parekh	et	al.,	2002:	145)	where	the	educational	attainment	of	African	Caribbean	
children	was	concerned,	something	which	was	only	implemented	several	years	later.		Despite	
references	to	cultural	differences,	the	Swann	Report	nevertheless	conceded	there	was	a	need	
for	more	Black	teachers	and	racial	awareness	training	(R.A.T.),	see	also	Chapter	Two.	
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model	used	in	the	report	to	explain	ethnic	differences	in	educational	
attainment.		Whereas	MCE	portrayed	‘racism	as	[…]	intolerance	[…]	which	
stems	from	an	individual’s	irrationality	and	ignorance’,	ARE	recognised	that	
‘racism	[…]	is	lodged	squarely	in	the	policies,	structures,	practices	and	beliefs	of	
everyday	life’	(ibid,	1990:	2-3).		Policies	supporting	supplementary	schools	and	
the	Black	Studies	programmes172	(Andrews,	2013)	were	created	under	ARE	
initiatives.		However,	ethnic	inequalities	in	mainstream	State	schools	continued.		
Parekh	(in	Troyna	and	Carrington,	1990:	43)	notes	that	since	1976	‘the	
percentage	of	Afro-Caribbean	children	failing	to	take	O	and	CSE	level	
examinations	[…]	increased’.		Although	African	Caribbeans	obtaining	five	or	
more	higher	grades	also	increased	from	under	two	per	cent	to	over	four	per	
cent	by	1986,	their	grades	were	‘only	half	as	good	as	the	Whites’	(ibid,	1990:	
43).	
	
	
What	the	above	analysis	reveals	is	that	despite	ideological	shifts	in	educational	
policy,	‘the	more	things	change,	the	more	they	appear	the	same’	(Mirza,	2007:	
1).		The	British	education	sector	systematically	failed	Black	children	regardless	
of	assimilation,	MCE	or	ARE	policy	approaches.		The	narratives	above	also	
demonstrate	that	teachers	overlooked	individual	and	institutional	
discrimination	in	the	education	of	Black	children.		They	failed	to	identify	the	
Special	Educational	Needs	(SENs)	of	some	Black	pupils	and	took	the	view	that	
their	learning	deficiencies	was	a	consequence	of	their	culture.		In	the	1980s	the	
																																								 																				
172	See	Chapter	Two.	
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political	right	took	the	stance	that	for	too	long	schools	‘have	been	treated	as	
instruments	for	equalising	rather	than	instructing	children’	(Troyna	and	
Carrington,	1990:	36).		The	then	Conservative	Government	set	out	to	reform	
the	education	sector,	and	restore	fundamental	‘educational	principles	[…],	
expedited	through	the	Education	Reform	Act	1988’	(ERA1988)	(ibid,	1990:	82).		
The	ERA1988	(HM	Government,	1988)	was	the	instrument	used	to	transform	
the	educational	sector	into	a	market,	encouraging	individualism,	choice	and	
competition.	
	
	
The	reputations	of	teachers	are	to	a	great	extent	influenced	by	the	success	or	
failure	of	their	pupils	in	the	educational	market.		In	the	pre-1988	education	
sector,	competition	between	pupils	was	regulated	by	an	educational	triage173.		
This	is	a	three-stage	process	in	which	the	teacher’s	time	and	attention	are	
resources	to	be	allocated	effectively.		In	stage	one,	those	with	the	ability	to	
succeed	receive	little	of	the	teacher’s	time.		In	stage	two,	those	who	are	
precariously	positioned	between	success	and	failure	receive	support,	to	ensure	
they	do	not	fail.		In	stage	three,	those	viewed	by	the	teacher	as	failures	are	
ignored.			
	
	
Subject	C	was	only	too	aware	of	the	educational	triage.		He	is	a	fifty-one-year-
old	grandfather	and	artist,	who	is	also	dyslexic	and	lives	alone	in	a	two-
																																								 																				
173	See	Gillborn	and	Youdell	(2000).	
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bedroomed	house	in	Handsworth	that	he	also	uses	as	a	studio.		Despite	his	
artistic	talent,	he	left	secondary	education	without	acquiring	any	qualifications:	
	
‘They	had	a	curriculum	to	follow	and	they	didn’t	have	time	for	you.		
In	my	day	it	was	like	[…]	yoh!		You	didn’t	learn	that!		You’re	not	quite	
on	the	ball!		We’re	on	the	next	page	now!		We’ve	moved	on!		And	
that	was	it’	(Subject	C,	6th	August	2013,	Birmingham)!	
	
Ratcliffe	(2004:	79)	notes	that	teachers	had	effectively	been	trained	to	see	
Black	educational	failure	as	normative.		Therefore,	in	the	context	of	the	
classroom	where	time	is	often	the	enemy,	Black	children	were	unwanted	Bads	
in	the	post-1988	education	system.		Their	perceived	inability	to	learn	was	seen	
as	a	metaphor	for	failure.		Therefore,	teachers	might	observe	their	low	
attainment	and	‘not	question	its	existence’	(ibid,	2004:	79).	Sivanandan	(2013:	
3)	notes	that	within	the	marketplace	of	the	market	State	‘men	and	women	are	
consumers,	not	producers’.		Consequently,	in	the	post-1988	education	sector,	
where	the	success	of	schools	is	increasingly	measured	by	the	attainment	of	its	
pupils,	teachers	might	employ	practices	to	off-load	children	they	view	as	toxic	
consumers	in	the	educational	market.	
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Policies	and	practices	of	educational	exclusion	
	
The	Commission	for	Racial	Equality	(CRE)	revealed	that	between	1974	and	1980	
a	pattern	of	discrimination	existed	within	Birmingham	State	schools,	whereby	
teachers	referred	a	disproportionate	number	of	Black	children	to	educational	
guidance	centres	or	suspension	units	(Troyna	and	Carrington,	1990).	There	is	
also	evidence	that	Black	Children	of	both	genders	were	over-represented	in	
school	exclusions,	during	the	academic	year	1986-7,	within	the	Inner	London	
Education	Authority	(ILEA)	(ibid,	1990).		The	disproportionate	exclusion	of	Black	
children	in	State	education	is	a	national	phenomenon	that	has	continued	into	
the	twenty-first	century.	
	
	
School	exclusion	policies	are	guided	by	the	Education	Act	1996	(EA1996);	the	
Education	Act	2002	(EA2002);	and	the	Education	and	Inspections	Act	2006	
(EIA2006)	(DfE,	2012a:	14).		The	EA1996	places	a	statutory	duty	on	local	
authorities	to	arrange	suitable	educational	provision	for	children	who	have	
been	excluded	from	school.		The	EA2002	defines	the	appeals	process	regarding	
permanent	exclusions,	whilst	the	EIA2006	places	the	responsibility	on	
governing	bodies	to	arrange	suitable	education	for	children	who	have	been	
excluded	for	a	fixed	period.		The	Acts	do	not	constrain	the	power	of	teachers	to	
exclude	children;	they	only	define	the	parameters	within	which	permanent	and	
fixed	period	exclusions	operate.	
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In	the	academic	year	2009-10	‘Black	Caribbean	pupils	were	nearly	four	times	
more	likely	to	receive	a	permanent	exclusion	than	the	school	population	as	a	
whole’	(DfE,	2012a:	4).		Their	MWBC	peers,	are	three	times	more	likely	to	be	
permanently	excluded	than	their	White	British	counterparts	(ibid,	2012a:	32).		
Fifty-eight	per	cent	of	children	of	any	White	background	attained	five	or	more	
A*-C	grade	CGSEs	in	2010-2011,	which	is	in	line	with	the	national	average	of	
58.2%	(DfE,	2012b:	3).		This	compares	to	only	54.3%	of	children	of	any	Black	
background.		Moreover,	only	the	Travellers	of	Irish	Heritage/Gypsy/Roma	
ethnic	group	had	a	lower	GCSE	attainment	than	Black	Caribbean	children	and	
their	MWBC	counterparts	in	the	academic	year	2010-2011	(ibid,	2012b:	4).		This	
disparity	in	GCSE	attainment	is	significant.		If	Good174	educational	qualifications	
are	not	acquired	at	secondary	school	level,	then	the	chances	of	higher	
education	participation	at	the	appropriate	age-stage	are	low175.		Consequently,	
early	entry	into	the	labour	market	and	subsequent	opportunities	for	social	
mobility	are	also	limited.		
	
	
There	were	5,740	exclusions	in	English	schools	during	the	academic	year	2009-
10,	of	which	28%	were	girls	(DfE,	2012a:	22).		Eighty-seven	per	cent	of	
permanent	exclusions	occurred	in	secondary	schools	(ibid,	2012a:	13).		Most	
pupils	were	excluded	in	years	9	and	10,	when	they	are	aged	13	and	14	
																																								 																				
174	Specifically,	A*-C	grade	GCSEs.	
175	See	Chapter	Two	for	a	brief	discussion	of	Bourdieu’s	(2010,	[1984])	idea	of	the	normative	
age-stage	of	educational	success	
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respectively	(ibid,	2012a:	21).		Exclusions	in	Years	9	and	10	are	particularly	
significant,	because	it	is	the	age-stage	where	pupils	are	being	prepared	for	their	
GCSE	entries.		It	is	also	the	start	of	the	process	where	schools	attempt	to	obtain	
the	highest	possible	position	in	Ofsted’s	School	League	Tables.		As	permanent	
exclusions	occur	more	frequently	during	this	time,	and	proportionately	more	
Black	children	are	excluded	than	any	other	ethnic	group,	it	could	be	argued	that	
some	schools	might	adopt	the	practice	of	excluding	them	to	support	their	
position	in	the	A*-C	economy176.	What	is	also	significant	is	that	‘the	majority	of	
pupils	who	are	excluded	have	either	Special	Educational	Needs	[SENs],	are	
eligible	for	Free	School	Meals	or	are	Black	Caribbean	[…].		Only	15.8%	of	pupils	
permanently	excluded	did	not	have	any	of	these	characteristics’	(ibid,	2012a:	
21).	
	
	
The	DfE	data	above	indicates	that	class	and	disability	also	mediate	the	
educational	experiences	of	Black	children.		Moreover,	regardless	of	gender,	
Black	children	from	low-income	families	with	SENs	are	permanently	excluded	
more	so	than	other	pupils	(ibid,	2012a:	34-38).		This	demonstrates	that	
discrimination,	disability,	poverty	and	ethnicity	continue	to	resonate	in	the	
contemporary	educational	experiences	of	African	Caribbeans,	in	much	the	
same	way	as	they	did	in	the	narratives	of	the	research	subjects	above.		
	
	
																																								 																				
176	Gillborn	and	Youdell	(2000);	Gillborn’s	concept	of	Rationing	is	also	referred	to	by	Ratcliffe	
(2004:	83).	
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The	main	reason	for	the	fixed	period	school	exclusions	of	Black	pupils	is	
physical	assault	against	another	pupil	(ibid,	2012a).		This	accounted	for	
approximately	27	%	of	their	exclusions	in	comparison	to	just	over	17%	for	
White	pupils	who	committed	the	same	offence.		However,	persistent	and	
disruptive	behaviour	is	considered	to	be	the	most	serious	cause	of	permanent	
exclusions	(ibid,	2012a:	16)	and	is	the	major	offence	committed	by	the	majority	
of	excluded	White	pupils.		Approximately	25%	of	White	pupils	are	permanently	
excluded	for	persistent	and	disruptive	behaviour	in	comparison	to	16%	of	Black	
pupils	(ibid,	2012a:	18).		This	shows	that	in	comparison	to	their	White	peers,	
Black	pupils	are	punished	disproportionately.		They	have	higher	rates	of	school	
exclusions,	despite	committing	offences	that	are	deemed	to	be	less	serious	
than	those	committed	by	their	White	peers.			
	
	
As	a	consequence	of	being	permanently	excluded	from	school,	a	number	of	
Black	pupils	are	denied	the	opportunity	to	compete	for	GCSE	Goods	at	the	
appropriate	age-stage177.		Thus,	the	insidious	impact	of	racism	in	the	
contemporary	education	sector	is	just	as	devastating	on	the	life-chances	of	
Black	children,	as	it	was	in	the	1960s	and	1970s.		It	is	also	recognised	in	the	
secondary	education	sector	that	‘being	a	pupil	with	any	level	of	Special	
Educational	Needs	(SENs)	provision	has	a	stronger	effect	on	the	odds	of	being	
excluded	than	gender,	Free	School	Meals	(FSMs)	eligibility	or	ethnicity’	(ibid,	
2012a:	22).		In	comparison	to	other	ethnic	groups,	Black	Caribbeans,	and	
																																								 																				
177	As	noted	much	earlier,	16	years	of	age	is	the	appropriate	age-stage	during	which	individuals	
are	normatively	expected	to	acquire	the	GCSE	Goods	on	offer.	
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MWBC	pupils	record	the	highest	levels	of	FSMs	and	SENs	characteristics	(ibid,	
2012a:	38-41).		Thus,	when	poverty	is	intersected	by	disability	–	as	was	the	case	
in	the	past-race	experiences	of	some	of	my	research	participants	–	the	
likelihood	of	school	exclusion	increases	for	African	Caribbeans	in	the	
contemporary	educational	market.	
	
	
The	majority	of	the	subjects	in	this	research	did	badly	in	the	education	sector	
during	the	1970s	and	80s.		The	data	regarding	school	exclusions	(DfE,	2012a;	
2012b)	also	suggest	that	Black	children	continue	to	be	disproportionately	
discriminated	against	in	secondary	education.	However,	what	now	follows	is	an	
examination	of	the	position	of	those	educated	in	the	1990s,	to	distinguish	if	
they	are	accessing	higher	education	at	the	appropriate	18-24	age-stage.		
University	education	was	not	always	a	realistic	option	for	British	Blacks	
educated	in	the	1970s	(Carby,	1982).		However,	if	their	contemporaries	are	
increasing	their	higher	education	participation	at	the	right	age,	they	might	also	
be	improving	their	chances	of	upward	social	mobility	at	the	earliest	
opportunity.			
	
	
Participation,	discrimination	and	the	distribution	of	Goods		
	
Where	the	free-market	policies	of	the	Conservative	Government	overlooked	
inequalities	in	education	(Gillborn,	2005),	New	Labour	promoted	social	
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inclusion178	(Levitas,	1998)	with	the	proposed	aim	of	reducing	material	
disadvantage.		The	Macpherson	Report	(1999)179,	which	highlighted	
institutional	racism	as	a	factor	in	the	social	exclusion	of	African	Caribbeans,	was	
a	key	driver	behind	New	Labour’s	equality	policies.		Their	2003	White	Paper,	
The	Future	of	Higher	Education	(TLRP,	2008)	outlined	new	reforms	to	widen	the	
higher	education	(H.E.)	participation	of	socially	disadvantaged	groups	by	
reducing	‘attainment,	aspirations,	application	and	admission’	barriers	to	
university	(DfES,	2003:	5;	DfES,	2006).		African	Caribbeans	generally	experience	
more	economic	disadvantage	in	comparison	to	the	White	majority	(Dorling,	
2009;	Gillborn,	2013)180.		Therefore,	widening	participation	policies	presented	
an	opportunity	to	reduce	the	risk	of	trans-generational	poverty,	by	obtaining	
university	degrees	that	could	be	exchanged	for	economic	capital	(Bourdieu,	
2010	[1984]).		
	
	
For	the	reasons	outlined	in	Chapter	Three181	it	is	not	possible	to	make	any	
meaningful	comparisons	between	ethnic	group	data	for	students	prior	to	2007.		
However,	the	following	is	a	heuristic	contrast	of	the	national	H.E.	participation	
of	Black	Caribbean	and	White	British	18-24	year	olds,	and	the	distribution	of	
their	H.E.	Goods.		Table	5.1	below	reveals	that	in	the	academic	years	between	
2003	and	2013	females	had	a	higher	rate	of	H.E.	participation	than	their	male	
																																								 																				
178	New	Labour	did	not	attempt	to	reverse	Thatcher’s	marketisation	of	the	education	sector.		
The	ideology	of	social	inclusion	was	conceived	as	‘a	“third	way”	distanced	both	from	the	free-
market	and	[…]	social	democracy’	(Levitas,	1998:	33).	
179	See	Chapter	Two.	
180	See	Rhamie	and	Hallam	(2010).	
181See	Appendix	iii.,	for	a	more	detailed	explanation	from	the	HESA.	
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counterparts.		As	education	often	provides	a	route	into	skilled	employment,	
this	trend	could	be	explained	by	the	long-term	decline	of	industrial	work	and	
the	rise	of	occupations	in	the	service	sector,	which	provide	more	opportunities	
for	female	employment	(Fawcett,	2013).		Despite	New	Labour’s	political	demise	
in	2010,	the	trend	of	higher	female	participation	in	H.E.	has	continued.		
	
Table	5.1:	National	Annual	Distribution	and	Gender	Participation	of	All	Home	
Domiciled	First	Year	Full-Time	Students	by	Gender.	
	
Academic	year	 Total	1st	Year	FT	
Participation	
Female	
Totals	
Female	
Participation	[%]	
Male	Totals	 Male	
Participation	
[%]	
2003/04	 320290	 174040	 54.33	 146250	 45.66	
2004/05	 320865	 175875	 54.81	 144990	 45.18	
2005/06	 339930	 186410	 54.83	 153520	 45.16	
2006/07	 325550	 178825	 54.93	 146725	 45.06	
2007/08	 338720	 186530	 55.06	 152175	 44.92	
2008/09	 361425	 198930	 55.04	 162495	 44.95	
2009/10	 370325	 203130	 54.85	 167195	 45.14	
2010/11	 367135	 200810	 54.69	 166325	 45.30	
2011/12	 390835	 215325	 55.09	 175510	 44.90	
2012/13	 354080	 197955	 55.90	 156115	 44.09	
Source:	Higher	Education	Statistics	Agency	[HESA],	(2014).	
	
Table	5.2:	National	White	British	(WB)	and	Black	Caribbean	(BC)	18-24	Home	
Domiciled	Full-Time	Students’	Higher	Education	Participation:	2003-2013182.	
	
3-Year	
Cohorts	
WB	18-24	H.E.	
Participation	
WB	18-24	
Population	
Totals*	
WB	Student	
Pop.	%		
National		
18-24	Pop.	
BC	18-24	H.E.	
Participation	
BC	18-24	
Population	
Totals*	
BC	
Student	
Pop.	%	
National		
18-24	
Pop.	
2003-05	 502,635	 3,719,707	 13.47	 8,445	 49,794	 16.96	
2004-06	 518,535	 3,754,922	 13.79	 9,110	 50,678	 17.98	
2005-07	 519,405	 3,790,138	 13.66	 9,630	 51,561	 18.68	
2006-08	 515,155	 3,825,352	 13.45	 10,005	 52,445	 19.08	
2007-09	 540,630	 3,860,567	 14.00	 11,085	 53,328	 20.79	
2008-10	 570,215	 3,895,782	 14.60	 12,195	 54,211	 22.49	
2009-11	 581,115	 3,930,997	 14.76	 12,050	 54,095	 22.27	
2010-12	 595,805	 3,966,212	 15.01	 12,030	 55,978	 21.49	
2011-13	 577,145	 4,001,427	 14.37	 11,940	 56,862	 20.99	
Source:	Higher	Education	Statistics	Agency	[HESA],	(2014)	
*Ethnic	group	population	totals	estimated	on	the	basis	of	interpolations	from	2001	
and	2011	Census	data.	
	
																																								 																				
182	The	18-24	data	are	based	on	revised	estimates	from	age	16-24	data.	
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Table	5.2	above	indicates	that	between	2003	and	2013,	a	higher	proportion	of	
African	Caribbeans	in	the	18-24	age-range	accessed	H.E.	than	their	White	
British	counterparts.		However,	Table	5.1	above	indicates	that	African	
Caribbean	university	participation	is	being	driven	by	female	students.		Although	
the	propensity	for	African	Caribbean	H.E.	participation	is	higher	than	that	of	
their	White	counterparts	at	the	appropriate	age-stage,	it	is	not	matched	by	the	
grade	of	qualifications	they	acquire.				
	
	
Figures	1.5	and	2.5	below	provides	a	heuristic	comparison	of	national	
differences	between	First	Class	and	Second	Class	Degrees	acquired	by	Black	
Caribbean	and	White	British	18-24	university	students	nationally.		There	is	
considerable	disparity	between	African	Caribbeans	and	their	White	
counterparts	gaining	first	and	second	class	first	division	degrees.		Black	and	
White	students	must	have	the	required	A-level	entry	grades	in	order	to	be	
accepted	by	the	university	of	their	choice.		Therefore,	it	is	difficult	to	see	why	
students	entering	different	universities	with	similar	qualifications	leave	with	
such	a	wide	disparity	in	their	final	grades.			
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Sources:	Higher	Education	Statistics	Agency	[HESA],	(2014);	Higher	Education	Information	Database	for			
Institutions	[HEIDI],	(2014).	
	
Figure.	2.5	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Sources:	Higher	Education	Statistics	Agency	[HESA],	(2014);	Higher	Education	Information	Database	for	
Institutions	[HEIDI],	(2014).	
*	Averages	based	on	interpolations	from	student	ethnic	group	H.E.	population	data	(see	Table	5.2	above).	
	
	
The	Higher	Education	Funding	Council	for	England	(HEFCE)	(2014)	reveal	that	
‘female	students	are	more	likely	to	achieve	an	upper	second,	or	higher,	than	
male	students	with	the	same	prior	educational	attainment’.		Therefore,	Figures	
1.5	and	2.5	suggest	that	Black	females	have	consistently	outperformed	their	
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male	counterparts	since	New	Labour’s	widening	participation	policies	were	
implemented	in	2003.		The	disparity	in	first	and	second	class	degrees,	between	
Black	and	White	university	students,	cannot	be	explained	by	political	change.		It	
might	be	indicative	of	discriminatory	practices	within	universities183.		
	
	
Although	“race”	is	a	protected	characteristic	under	the	2010	Equality	Act	
(EA2010),	there	is	evidence	to	suggest	that	racial	discrimination	continues	to	be	
a	cause	for	concern	in	higher	education.		Research	by	the	HEFCE	(2014)	reveals	
that	despite	achieving	the	same	BBB	grades	at	A-level,	there	is	a	great	deal	of	
‘variation	in	degree	outcome	for	students	from	different	ethnicities’.		Overall,	
53%	of	Black184	students	entering	university	with	the	same	required	entry	
grades	as	their	ethnic	counterparts	gain	a	first	or	upper	second	Class	degree.		
This	is	in	comparison	to	72%	of	White	students	(ibid,	2014).		UCAS	data	
supports	Table	5.2	above	by	revealing	that	there	are	more	university	
applications	made	by	Black	teenagers	than	their	White	counterparts	(Coughlan,	
2014).		Thirty-nine	per	cent	of	Black	teenagers	applied	for	a	university	place	in	
comparison	to	31%	of	their	White	peers	(ibid,	2014).		However,	research	by	the	
London	School	of	Economics	suggest,	‘ethnic	minority	candidates	were	less	
likely	to	be	offered	places	than	their	similarly	qualified	white	counterparts’	
																																								 																				
183	Strand	(2008)	implies	the	same	in	regard	to	schools	and	differences	in	the	education	of	
middle-class	Black	and	White	boys.	
184	It	must	be	noted	here	that	the	HEFCE	is	referring	to	data	that	conflates	all	Black	ethnic	
groups	into	a	single	category.	
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(ibid,	2014).		This	is	especially	the	case	where	places	at	the	prestigious	Russell	
Group	Universities185	are	concerned	(Sellgren,	2014).	
	
	
Noden,	Shiner	and	Modood	(2014)	reveal	that,	in	comparison	to	their	White	
British	counterparts,	Black	Caribbeans	received	three	fewer	places	per	100	
applications	at	Russell	Group	universities.		This	is	despite	Black	students	being	
more	likely	than	their	White	counterparts	to	seek	admission	into	the	elite	
universities	and	less	likely	to	apply	to	the	‘lower	ranking	institutions’	(ibid,	
2014:	3).		On	average	71%	of	applications	made	by	White	applicants	result	in	
the	offer	of	a	place.		Shiner	(in	Sellgren,	2014)	acknowledges	that	even	when	
age	and	A-level	qualifications	are	taken	into	account	the	‘chances	of	receiving	
an	offer	varies,	according	to	[…]	ethnicity,	[…]	type	of	school	[…]	and	family	
background’.		Consequently,	in	comparison	to	their	White	peers,	more	Black	
students	have	to	depend	on	the	UCAS	clearing	process	to	enter	the	elite	
universities	rather	than	relying	on	straightforward	admissions	(Noden,	Shiner	
and	Modood,	2014:	1).			
	
	
The	above	observations	suggest	that	discriminatory	practices	are	embedded	in	
the	selection	processes	of	some	higher	education	institutions.		However,	to	
attribute	them	solely	to	racism	might	be	an	oversimplification,	as	it	should	not	
																																								 																				
185	I	have	discussed	the	significance	of	Russell	Group	universities	to	social	mobility	in	Chapter	
Three.		In	terms	of	labour	market	outcomes,	some	employers	would	valorise	first	and	second	
class	Goods	from	Russell	Group	institutions,	more	so	than	they	would	those	from	their	other,	
new	and	former	polytechnic	counterparts	(see	also	Shiner	and	Modood,	2002).	
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be	overlooked	that	the	education	sector	is	a	competitive	market	situation.		
Students	develop	labour	market	skills	in	universities,	therefore	they	are	
commodities	in	a	transition	between	the	education	and	employment	sectors.		
In	the	current	climate	of	economic	austerity,	universities	might	view	African	
Caribbean	students	as	high-risk	Bads:	they	are	effectively,	toxic	commodities.		
The	success	rate	of	universities	is	documented	in	league	tables	and	also	
assessed	by	value-added	measures,	such	as	how	many	students	find	
employment	after	completing	their	course.		In	historical	economic	downturns	
Blacks	have	often	been	last-in	and	first-out186.		Universities	also	recognise	that	
in	times	of	recession	it	is	more	difficult	for	Blacks	to	find	employment187.		Thus,	
limiting	the	enrolment	of	Black	students,	might	be	a	strategy	employed	by	
universities	to	negotiate	the	risk	of	acquiring	a	low	league	table	position.		
	
	
The	social	class	of	applicants	might	also	be	a	clandestine	factor	when	
universities	are	sifting	and	sorting	through	student	applications.		Noden,	Shiner	
and	Modood	(2014:	7)	reveal,	‘candidates	from	lower	social	class	groups	were	
less	likely	to	receive	offers	than	their	more	privileged	counterparts’.		Therefore,	
as	African	Caribbeans	are	more	likely	to	reside	in	working-class	areas,	with	high	
levels	of	material	deprivation,	they	might	also	be	subject	to	class	discrimination	
in	the	higher	education	admission	processes.		Their	social	class	status,	and	
comparatively	lower	levels	of	income	than	their	middle-class	counterparts,	
might	also	be	perceived	as	a	risk	to	the	attainment	and	success	of	particular	
																																								 																				
186	See	Fryer,	(1984).	
187	See	Castles	and	Kosack,	(1973);	Dorling	(2009);	Gillborn	(2013).	
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H.E.	institutions.		
	
	
The	higher	education	experiences	of	non-White	students	are	also	mediated	by	
the	prejudices	of	their	White	peers.		Black,	international	and	other	non-White	
students	at	the	University	of	Oxford	have	set	up	a	social	media	site	called	I,	Too,	
am	Oxford	(2014)	to	demonstrate	how	racism	mediates	their	day-to-day	
academic	experiences188.		The	site	was	inspired	by	the	stance	against	racism	
taken	by	Black	students	at	the	University	of	Harvard,	USA.		Oxford	students	
have	filmed	themselves	using	storyboards	to	emphasise	how	they	are	‘made	to	
feel	different	and	Othered	from	the	Oxford	community’	(ibid,	2014),	during	
their	daily	interactions	with	White	students	and	teachers.		Students	at	other	
Russell	Group	and	higher	education	establishments	have	also	adopted	the	
practice	of	Internet	protest.		This	demonstrates	that	despite	the	prevalence	of	
anti-discriminatory	policies,	subtle	and	overt	forms	of	racism	still	exist	within	
the	education	system.		Moreover,	universities	do	not	exist	in	a	vacuum.		
Therefore,	the	views	of	White	teachers	and	students	are	undoubtedly	informed	
by	racist	perceptions	and	practices	in	wider	society,	just	as	they	were	in	the	
1960s	and	1970s	when	most	of	the	participants	of	this	research	entered	the	
education	sector.	
	
	
																																								 																				
188	A	student	at	the	University	of	Warwick	tweeted	a	photo	of	racist	slurs	that	had	allegedly	
been	written	on	bananas	she	bought,	by	a	student	sharing	her	accommodation	(Guardian,	
2016).		The	victim	complained	that	Warwick	took	no	action	until	the	photo	went	viral	on	social	
media.	
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Gender	differences	in	the	national	and	local	educational	market	
	
Despite	the	widening	participation	policies	implemented	by	New	Labour,	Black	
Caribbean	males	were	under-represented	in	H.E.	(House	of	Commons,	2009:	7).		
This	trend	continued	after	2010	under	the	Coalition	Government.		Tables	5.3;	
5.4	and	5.5	below	reveal	that	between	2007	and	2013	a	total	of	117,	623	Black	
Caribbean,	White	British,	and	MWBC189		students,	of	all	ages	residing	in	
Birmingham,	have	accessed	161	universities	nationally.		Regardless	of	ethnic	
differences,	the	H.E.	participation	rates	of	females	have	consistently	remained	
higher	than	that	of	males.		When	the	data	for	the	three	ethnic	groups	are	
compared,	Birmingham’s	African	Caribbean	females	have	the	highest	
proportional	gender	representation	in	H.E.	whilst	their	male	counterparts	have	
the	lowest.				
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																								 																				
189	As	noted	in	Chapter	Three,	prior	to	2007	in	most	cases	HESA	and	HEIDI	conflate	the	data	for	
all	Mixed	ethnic	groups	into	a	single	category.		The	MWBC	data	for	Birmingham	students	has	
been	provided	by	HESA	on	request.	
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Table	5.3:	White	British	Birmingham	Students	Accessing	National	Higher	Education	
Institutions*.	
	
Academic	Year	 No.	of	Students	 Female	Students	 Male	Students	
2007/08	 15444	 9246	[59.86%]	 6198	[40.13%]	
2008/09	 16104	 9727	[60.40%]	 6377	[39.59%]	
2009/10	 16877	 10127	[60.00%]	 6750	[39.99%]	
2010/11	 16949	 10131	[59.77%]	 6818	[40.22%]	
2011/12	 16937	 10021	[59.16%]	 6916	[40.83%]	
2012/13	 15373	 9117	[59.30%]	 6256	[40.69%]	
Source:	Higher	Education	Statistics	Agency	[HESA],	(2014).	
	
Table	5.4:	Black	Caribbean	Birmingham	Students	Accessing	National	Higher	
Education	Institutions*.	
	
Academic	Year	 No.	of	Students	 Female	Students*	 Male	Students*	
2007/08	 2469	 1811	[73.34%]	 658	[26.65%]	
2008/09	 2627	 1879	[71.52%]	 748	[28.47%]	
2009/10	 2706	 1925	[71.13%]	 781	[28.86%]	
2010/11	 2600	 1859	[71.49%]	 741	[28.49%]	
2011/12	 2621	 1860	[70.96%]	 761	[29.03%]	
2012/13	 2380	 1681	[70.63%]	 699	[29.36%]	
Source:	Higher	Education	Statistics	Agency	[HESA],	(2014).	
	
Table	5.5:	MWBC	Birmingham	Students	Accessing	National	Higher	Education	
Institutions.	
	
Academic	Year	 No.	of	Students	 Female	Students	 Male	Students	
2007/08	 597	 425	[71.18%]	 172	[28.81%]	
2008/09	 702	 489	[69.65%]	 213	[30.34%]	
2009/10	 755	 539	[71.39%]	 216	[28.60%]	
2010/11	 807	 566	[70.13%]	 241	[29.86%]	
2011/12	 820	 546	[66.58%]	 274	[33.41%]	
2012/13	 855	 552	[64.56%]	 303	[35.43%]	
Source:	Higher	Education	Statistics	Agency	[HESA],	(2014).	
	
	
The	respective	differences	between	female	and	male	H.E.	participation	have	
remained	stable	over	time:	White	British	60/40;	Black	Caribbean	70/30	and	
MWBC	65/35.		Although	MWBCs	are	the	smallest	group	in	terms	of	their	
national	population	size,	the	females	have	a	higher	proportional	gender	
representation	than	their	White	British	peers.		However,	what	is	problematic	
for	Black	Caribbean	social	mobility	is	the	comparatively	low	number	of	males	
who	are	accessing	H.E.		This	is	a	worrying	trend	for	upward	social	mobility,	as	
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university	participation	is	generally	acknowledged	as	a	means	of	improving	
one’s	occupational	status.			
	
	
Without	acquiring	H.E.	Goods,	the	potential	for	social	mobility	is	reduced	for	
Black	males.		However,	there	has	been	a	marginal	increase	in	male	university	
participation	in	the	last	six	years,	which	cannot	be	easily	explained.		This	is	
particularly	as	the	increase	applies	to	males	across	all	three	ethnic	groups.		If	
New	Labour’s	widening	participation	policies	facilitated	the	increase	of	more	
working-class	students	into	H.E.,	then	post-2010	austerity	measures	may	have	
affected	them	more	adversely	than	their	middle-class	counterparts.		This	might	
be	particularly	so	for	single	female	parents	from	disadvantaged	backgrounds.	
	
	
Tables	5.3;	5.4	and	5.5	above	relate	to	all	ages.		However,	one	of	the	ways	in	
which	New	Labour’s	Widening	Participation	policies	facilitated	H.E.	access	for	
female	parents,	who	were	outside	of	the	appropriate	age-stage	of	university	
access,	was	by	providing	free	childcare	places.		By	2008,	1,035	Sure	Start	
Children’s	Centres	had	been	established	nationwide,	and	by	2010	they	had	
increased	to	3,500	(DfES,	2006:	7).		Sure	Start	childcare	provisions	were	
established	in	some	of	the	country’s	most	deprived	areas.		Rhamie	and	Hallam	
(2010:	166)	have	noted	that	African	Caribbeans	often	live	in	‘inner-city	areas	
characterised	by	poverty	and	high	unemployment’.		Moreover,	according	to	
Platt	(2011:	12)	there	are	‘higher	rates	of	lone	parenthood	amongst	Black	
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Caribbeans’,	which	in	turn	exposes	them	to	a	higher	risk	of	poverty.		Thus,	free	
childcare	provisions	might	have	benefited	socially	disadvantaged	Black	females	
by	allowing	them	to	access	employment	and	education.		Childcare	policies,	and	
those	that	reduced	university	admission	fee	(TLRP,	2008),	could	also	have	
contributed	to	facilitating	the	higher	education	participation	of	African	
Caribbean	females	who	experience	poverty.		However,	it	must	also	be	noted	
that	poverty	transcends	ethnicity	and	therefore	it	is	not	unique	to	Back	
females.		All	females	who	experience	the	same	class	disadvantages	may	well	
have	benefitted	from	New	Labour’s	widening	participation	policies.		
	
	
Since	the	Coalition	Government	came	to	power	in	2010,	a	total	of	281	Sure	
Start	Centres	have	been	closed	as	a	direct	result	of	their	austerity	policies	
(4Children,	2012:	5).		In	addition,	over	60%	of	the	remaining	Sure	Start	Centres	
are	operating	on	decreased	budgets	(ibid,	2012:	10).		The	current	neo-liberal190	
target	culture	which	rationalises	cuts	as	a	means	of	maximising	outcomes	and	
market	efficiency,	leaves	Sure	Start	Centres	with	little	choice	other	than	to	
‘deliver	more	for	less’	(ibid,	2012:	5).		Whilst	childcare	provisions	have	been	
reduced,	Sure	Start	Centres	have	had	to	increase	relationship	counselling	and	
parental	advice	services	(ibid,	2012:	6)	to	balance	their	books.		This	represents	a	
paradigm	shift	from	previous	State	funded	family	services.			
	
																																								 																				
190	See	Footnotes	12	in	Chapter	One	and	Footnote	101	in	Chapter	Four,	for	explanations	neo-
liberalism	and	how	it	supports	the	reduction	of	State	intervention	in	market	situations.	
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The	increase	in	advocacy	services,	at	the	expense	of	practical	assistance	for	
poor	families,	supports	the	victim-blaming	perspective	of	neo-liberalism.		It	
suggests	that	those	afflicted	by	poverty	are	to	blame	for	the	circumstances	in	
which	they	find	themselves.		Although	Sure	Start	nurseries	still	operated	in	
areas	of	high	material	deprivation	after	2010,	the	reduction	of	free	childcare	
services	following	the	election	of	the	Coalition	Government	could	have	
constrained	the	H.E.	participation	of	a	number	of	working-class	females.		
Austerity	policies	might	also	account	for	the	marginal	increase	in	the	university	
participation	of	African	Caribbean	males.		Suggestions	that	Black	families	have	
high	rates	of	single	female	parents191,	indicate	that	the	H.E.	access	of	males	–	
unlike	their	female	counterparts	–	might	not	have	been	restricted	by	policy	
changes,	which	reduced	the	entitlement	to	free	childcare.			
	
	
Birmingham:	Gender,	age,	Russell	Group	and	other	institutions	
	
Tables	5.6,	5.7	and	5.8	below	highlight	differences	in	higher	education	
participation	between	the	three	Birmingham	ethnic	groups	nationally	and	in	
Russell	Group	universities.		All	females	have	a	higher	female	representation	of	
18-24	students	accessing	Russell	group	institutions.		However,	when	the	gender	
representations	are	compared	between	the	ethnic	groups,	the	disparity	
between	African	Caribbean	females	and	their	male	counterparts	is	the	greatest.		
																																								 																				
191	This	is	Platt’s	(2011)	view,	which	is	highlighted	earlier.	
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There	is	an	almost	even	gender	split	between	White	British	males	and	females	
in	Russell	Group	universities.		The	difference	between	MWBCs	is	approximately	
60/40	in	favour	of	females,	whereas	for	African	Caribbeans	it	is	about	70/30.		
The	data	reinforces	my	earlier	point	regarding	the	potential	social	mobility	of	
African	Caribbeans.		The	high	gender	disparity	in	the	top	universities	increases	
the	likelihood	that	Black	females	will	have	better	employment	prospects	than	
their	male	counterparts.		
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Table	5.6:	Birmingham	White	British	18-24	Students’	National	and	Russell	Group	
H.E.	Participation	by	Gender:	2007-2013.	
	
Annual	
Intakes	
National	
Participation	
Total	Russell	
Group	
Students	
Russell	Group	
Students	[%]	
Female	Russell	
Group	
Students	
Male	Russell	
Group	Students	
2007-08	 8,601	 3504	 40.74	 1993	[56.87%]	 1511	[43.12%]	
2008-09	 8,778	 3758	 42.81	 2135	[56.81%]	 1623	[43.18%]	
2009-10	 9,211	 3798	 41.23	 2169	[57.10%]	 1629	[42.89%]	
2010-11	 9,310	 3767	 40.46	 2165	[57.47%]	 1602	[42.52%]	
2011-12	 9,537	 3756	 39.38	 2112	[56.23%]	 1644	[43.76%]	
2012-13	 8,981	 3617	 40.27	 2015	[55.70%]	 1602	[44.29%]	
Sources:	HESA,	(2014);	ONS,	(2001);	Infuse,	(2014).	
	
Table	5.7:	Birmingham	Black	Caribbean	18-24	Students’	National	and	Russell	Group	
H.E.	Participation	by	Gender:	2007-2013.	
	
Annual	
Intakes	
National	
Participation	
Total	Russell	
Group	
Students	
Russell	Group	
Students	[%]	
Female	Russell	
Group	
Students	
Male	Russell	
Group	
Students	
2007-08	 1,121	 213	 19.00	 155	[72.76%]	 58	[27.23%]	
2008-09	 1,214	 229	 18.86	 154	[67.24%]	 75	[32.75%]	
2009-10	 1,295	 254	 19.61	 182	[71.65%]	 72	[28.34%]	
2010-11	 1,268	 228	 17.98	 174	[76.31%]	 54	[23.68%]	
2011-12	 1,245	 193	 15.50	 136	[70.46%]	 57	[29.53%]	
2012-13	 1,228	 183	 14.90	 123	[67.21%]	 60	[32.78%]	
Sources:	HESA,	(2014);	ONS,	(2001);	Infuse,	(2014).	
	
Table	5.8:	Birmingham	MWBC	18-24	Students’	National	and	Russell	Group	H.E.	
Participation	by	Gender:	2007-2013.	
	
Annual	
Intakes	
National	
Participation	
Total	Russell	
Group	
Students	
Russell	Group	
Students	[%]	
Female	
Russell	
Group	
Students	
Male	Russell	
Group	
Students	
2007-08	 424	 79	 18.63	 53	[67.08%]	 26	[32.91%]	
2008-09	 487	 112	 23.00	 78	[69.64%]	 34	[30.35%]	
2009-10	 518	 110	 21.24	 77	[69.99%]	 33	[29.99%]	
2010-11	 558	 113	 20.25	 69	[61.06%]	 44	[38.93%]	
2011-12	 577	 96	 16.64	 54	[56.24%]	 42	[43.74%]	
2012-13	 610	 105	 17.21	 67	[63.80%]	 38	[36.19%]	
Sources:	HESA,	(2014);	ONS,	(2001);	Infuse,	(2014).	
	
	
Table	5.9	below	highlights	differences	in	Birmingham	students	accessing	H.E.	
between	2007	and	2013.		It	can	be	seen	that	out	of	the	total	H.E.	participation	
of	White	students,	almost	a	quarter	are	attending	Russell	Group	institutions.			
In	contrast,	less	than	a	tenth	of	Birmingham’s	Black	Caribbean	university	
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students	attend	the	elite	universities,	whilst	Russell	Group	participation	is	also	
higher	for	their	MWBC	counterparts.		As	noted	above,	African	Caribbeans	have	
a	higher	proportional	representation	of	18-24	year-olds	accessing	universities	
outside	of	the	Russell	Group.		However,	they	also	have	the	highest	rate	of	
university	participation	in	the	35-49	age-range,	which	is	outside	of	the	
appropriate	age-stage.			
	
Table	5.9:	Birmingham	H.E.	Students	and	Their	National	and	Russell	Group	
Distributions:	2007-2013.	
	
	
Ethnic	Group	
H.E.	
Student	
Totals	
Total	in	
Russell	Group	
Universities	
Total	in	
Other	
Universities	
White	British	 97,684	 22,200	
[22.73%]	
75,484	
[77.27%]	
African	
Caribbean	
15,403	 1,300	
[8.43%]	
14,103	
[91.56%]	
MWBC	 4,536	 615	
[13.56%]	
3,921	
[86.44%]	
			 	 																Source:	HESA,	(2014).			
	
Some	of	the	students	at	the	higher	end	of	the	35-49	age-range,	and	those	in	the	
50	and	over	category,	would	belong	to	the	same	generation	as	the	subjects	
interviewed	for	this	research.		Racism	might	have	blocked	H.E.	opportunities	for	
them	at	the	normative	age-stage.		However,	their	current	participation	suggests	
that	university	access	might	be	the	means	by	which	they	are	negotiating	the	
future	risk	of	poverty,	in	a	political	climate	dominated	by	austerity	policies.		
Acquiring	H.H.	Goods	might	also	be	the	only	means	that	might	allow	them	to	
climb	the	occupational	ladder	in	their	current	employment.		Nevertheless,	only	
heuristic	assumptions	can	be	made	regarding	the	comparatively	high	
representation	of	Black	university	students	from	Birmingham	in	the	35-49	age	
cohort.			
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Table	5.10	below	reveals	that	two	thirds	of	White	British	Birmingham	students,	
who	are	within	the	appropriate	18-24	age-range,	are	studying	at	the	prestigious	
Russell	Group	institutions.		In	comparison	to	less	than	half	of	their	Black	peers.		
Although	MWBCs	have	a	comparatively	smaller	demographic	population192,	
three	quarters	of	those	in	the	18-24	age-range	are	studying	at	Russell	Group	
universities.		This	suggests	that	in	comparison	to	their	White	counterparts,	
there	is	a	comparatively	lower	potential	for	social	mobility	amongst	Black	
Caribbeans.		I	reiterate	that	their	future	social	status	is	even	more	precarious	
considering	the	disparity	between	Black	males	and	females	attending	
universities	nationally,	and	the	higher	rate	of	females	studying	at	Russell	Group	
institutions.	
	
Table	5.10:	Birmingham	H.E.	Students	and	Their	National,	Russell	Group	and	Age-
Range	Distributions:	2007-2013.	
	
	
Ethnic	Group	
All	
Students	in	
H.E.		
18-24	[%]	
All	
Students	in	
H.E.		
25-34	[%]	
All	
Students	in	
H.E.		
35-49	[%]	
All	
Students	in	
H.E.	
50+	[%]	
18-24	
Students	
in	Russell	
Group	Unis.	
White	British	 55.75	 22.54	 16.51	 5.15	 14,805	
[66.69%]	
African	
Caribbean	
47.85	 22.0	 25.35	 4.77	 634	
[48.77]	
MWBC	 69.97	 19.64	 9.32	 1.05	 458	
[74.47%]	
										Source:	HESA,	(2014).			
	
	
																																								 																				
192	See	Appendix	ii.	
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In	the	academic	year	2011/12,	Government	policy	raised	student	fees	from	
approximately	£3,000	to	£9,000	(Universities	UK,	2013:	26).		Prior	to	that	the	
Coalition	Government	also	abolished	Educational	Maintenance	Allowances	
(EMAs)	in	2011.		EMAs	were	a	Widening	Participation	policy	designed	to	bridge	
inequalities	in	income,	between	middle-class	and	working-class	students,	by	
providing	funds	to	purchase	extra	resources.		New	Labour’s	EMA	policy	was	
supposed	to	benefit	working-class	students	‘from	a	lower	socio-economic	
background’	(Kiely,	2014).		This	would	have	included	African	Caribbeans	as	‘75%	
of	Britain's	minority	communities	live	in	88	of	Britain's	poorest	wards’	(ibid,	
2014).			
	
	
The	hike	in	university	tuition	fees,	and	abolishing	the	EMA	grant,	has	
contributed	toward	the	disadvantage	faced	by	Black	undergraduates	(ibid,	
2014).		In	terms	of	income	and	the	relationship	between	Black	Caribbean	
students	and	poverty,	new	proposals	to	privatise	students’	loans	would	more	
than	double	the	current	interest	rate	on	university	fees	(Kiely,	2014).		If	the	
policy	is	implemented	‘black	students	could	become	even	more	excluded	from	
higher	education.		Moreover,	Black	and	female	graduates	[…]	take	longer	to	pay	
off	their	student	debts,	due	to	persistent	discrimination	in	employment’	(ibid,	
2014).		Shifting	the	debt	collection	of	university	fees,	from	the	State	to	the	
market,	is	problematic	for	working-class	African	Caribbeans.		Although	H.E.	
participation	is	about	rationalising	risk,	the	immediate	gains	of	a	university	
degree	might	be	supressed	by	the	burden	of	future	debt	and	poverty.			
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Although	class	and	poverty	conflate	to	constrain	the	achievement	of	African	
Caribbeans	in	the	contemporary	educational	market,	the	reduction	of	racial	
discrimination	is	much	more	of	a	problem.		Its	detrimental	impact	on	their	
education	and	subsequent	life-chances	is	being	overlooked	by	both	
Government	and	academics.		Ideas	of	class	disparities	incorporate	Whiteness,	
whereas	racism	is	specific	to	Blackness.		This	is	acknowledged	by	Professor	
David	Gillborn,	who	contends:		
	
‘Part	of	the	problem	is	trying	to	get	funding	for	critical	“race”	
research.		This	is	a	field	where	the	funding	is	not	there.		It’s	often	
seen	as	being	too	political,	too	specialist.		This	is	a	time	where	if	you	
use	the	word	“race”	people	kind	of	turn	their	noses	up	and	say	
“Really!		That’s	rather	crude	isn’t	it”.		The	discourses	that	circulate	
have	material	consequences	and	this	myth	of	White	
underachievement	has	had	some	very	material	consequences.		Ethnic	
minority	achievement	groups	have	been	closed	in	some	local	
authorities.		In	other	local	authorities,	the	money	is	being	directed	to	
White	kids.		The	Government	thinks	that	“race”	isn’t	an	issue	
anymore’	(Professor	David	Gillborn,	19th	June	2013,	Birmingham).	
	
The	Centre	for	Research	in	Race	and	Education	(CRRE),	which	is	led	by	Professor	
Gillborn	at	the	University	of	Birmingham,	is	the	only	university	based	research	
centre	in	the	country	that	explicitly	focuses	on	issues	and	problems	revolving	
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around	race	in	education.		However,	it	is	not	a	separate	department	within	the	
university	with	its	own	building,	offices	or	rooms.		It	is	a	virtual,	rather	than	
physical,	entity	that	exists	without	Government	funding.		The	centre	is	
Professor	David	Gillborn.		Wherever	he	is	located,	that	is	where	the	CRRE	can	
be	found.		Birmingham	University	is	struggling	against	the	tide	to	raise	the	
profile	of	“race”	on	the	political	agenda.		However,	the	difficulty	of	obtaining	
funding	suggests	there	is	a	lack	of	political	will	to	ameliorate	racial	inequality.		It	
also	indicates	that	the	long-term	future	of	developing	research,	to	standardise	
anti-racist	practices	in	the	education	sector,	might	be	limited.	
	
	
Conclusion	
	
This	chapter	has	articulated	the	perpetuity	of	Black	educational	disadvantage,	
despite	several	political	and	ideological	changes.		Integration	through	
assimilation	policies	in	the	1960s	and	1970s,	influenced	the	practice	of	ESN	
school	referrals	(Coard,	1971;	Carby,	1982).		MCE	policies	of	the	1970s	failed	to	
directly	address	the	problem	of	racism.		They	subtlety	contributed	to	the	
perception	that	the	comparatively	low	educational	attainment	of	Black	children	
was	normative	and	that	they	were	naturally	athletic,	rather	than	academic	
(Troyna,	1984;	1992).		Despite	the	implementation	of	ARE	policies	in	the	late	
1970s	(ibid,	1992),	and	an	increased	focus	on	community	learning	to	address	
the	inadequacies	of	the	ethnocentric	curriculum,	Black	children	continued	to	do	
less	well	than	their	ethnic	peers	in	State	education.		The	narratives	of	the	
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research	subjects	reveal	how	racism	mediated	their	educational	experiences,	
and	the	ways	in	which	poverty	disability	reinforced	the	notion	that	Black	
culture	was	pathological.	
	
	
Competition	in	the	classroom	between	students,	and	outside	of	the	school	
between	similar	institutions,	has	always	existed	within	the	education	sector.		
However,	the	marketisation	of	education	introduced	by	the	ERA1988	is	a	new	
phenomenon.		Although	the	Rampton	Interim	Report	(1981),	its	Swann	(1985)	
successor	and	the	Macpherson	Report	(1999)	all	acknowledged	the	existence	of	
institutional	racism	as	a	factor	in	the	educational	attainment	of	Black	children,	
it	was	ignored	by	the	market	philosophy	of	the	Conservative	Government	in	
favour	of	colour-blind	educational	initiatives	(Gillborn,	2005).		Policies	and	
practices	of	school	exclusion	have	continued	under	New	Labour	and	its	
Coalition	successor	(DfE,	2012a;	2012b).		However,	following	the	introduction	
of	New	Labour’s	widening	participation	policies	in	2003,	there	is	evidence	of	
increasing	H.E.	access,	particularly	where	African	Caribbean	females	are	
concerned.		Despite	improving	their	university	participation,	Black	Caribbeans	
have	a	comparatively	lower	presence	in	Russell	Group	universities.		There	is	
also	evidence	to	suggest	they	are	being	discriminated	against	in	the	university	
selection	process	and	also	in	terms	of	degree	outcomes.		Black	pupils	are	
viewed	as	toxic	consumers	in	the	GCSE	market,	whereas	their	university	peers	
are	seen	as	toxic	commodities	in	the	transition	between	the	educational	and	
labour	markets.	
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Despite	“race”’	being	a	protected	characteristic	under	the	EA2010,	it	seems	
that	teachers	continue	to	arbitrarily	discriminate	against	Black	students	who	
they	view	as	high-risk	Bads.		This	is	especially	when	notions	of	racial	inferiority	
are	compounded	with	myopic	middle-class	assumptions	of	the	perceived	
inadequacies	of	students	from	working-class	backgrounds.		Nevertheless,	the	
factor	that	differentiates	the	past-race	educational	experiences	of	African	
Caribbeans,	from	those	of	their	contemporaries,	is	the	way	in	which	the	market	
has	replaced	State	intervention	as	the	perceived	mediator	of	fairness.		
Disparities	in	market	situations	are	no	longer	considered	to	be	consequences	of	
material	inequalities,	but	are	instead	perceived	as	evidence	of	individual	
cultural	or	moral	failings.		Things	have	changed,	but	on	the	other	hand	they	
have	also	remained	the	same	(Mirza,	2007).		The	politics	of	difference	has	come	
full-circle	where	victim-blaming	is	concerned.		Ideas	of	cultural	differences,	
which	formerly	explained	Black	educational	failure	in	the	1960s	and	1970s,	are	
now	reified	within	the	educational	market	in	which	competition	for	success	
blurs	the	impact	of	external	factors	such	as	racism	and	material	inequalities.	
	
	
As	increasing	H.E.	participation	is	an	indicator	of	social	mobility,	then	the	future	
might	be	promising	where	African	Caribbean	females	are	concerned.		However,	
the	same	cannot	be	said	for	their	male	counterparts.	Out	of	the	three	ethnic	
groups	in	this	study,	Black	males	have	the	lowest	proportional	rate	of	university	
	 223	
participation.		They	also	have	poorer	degree	outcomes	than	their	female	
counterparts.		Despite	the	barrier	of	institutional	racism	in	the	educational	
experiences	of	African	Caribbeans,	they	are	accessing	H.E.	at	the	appropriate	
age-stage	of	18-24	and	at	a	proportionally	higher	rate	than	their	White	peers.		
However,	it	remains	to	be	seen	if	the	marketisation	of	education,	and	the	
burden	of	increasing	financial	risks	incurred	by	student	debt,	is	going	to	have	an	
adverse	impact	on	those	currently	in	H.E.		The	decision	between	a	university	
education,	certain	debt	and	the	likelihood	of	employment,	which	may	not	have	
potentially	rewarding	prospects,	is	something	the	next	generation	of	African	
Caribbeans	will	have	to	contemplate.		The	extent	to	which	their	current	gains	in	
the	H.E.	sector	is	being	exchanged	for	economic	capital	(Bourdieu,	2010	
[1984]),	is	examined	in	the	following	chapter.	
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6. Penalties,	privileges	and	labour	market	competition	
	
The	previous	chapter	examined	how	educational	legislation,	policies	and	
practices	may	have	constrained	or	enabled	the	social	mobility	of	African	
Caribbeans,	by	restricting	or	facilitating	their	access	to	academic	Goods.		
Despite	the	negative	educational	experiences	of	the	British	born	children	of	
West	Indian	migrants,	their	contemporaries	have	been	able	to	participate	in	
higher	education.		However,	high	rates	of	school	exclusions	–	and	
comparatively	low	academic	attainment	–	have	reinforced	the	perception	that	
the	present	generation	of	African	Caribbeans	are	toxic	consumers	in	the	
secondary	education	sector	(DfE,	2012a).		Exclusionary	practices	in	universities	
also	suggest	they	are	viewed	as	toxic	commodities	in	higher	education	(Shiner	
and	Modood,	2002).		African	Caribbean	organisations	continue	to	appropriate	
the	transitional	community	sphere	(Shukra	et	al.,	2004)	to	support	the	
educational	needs	of	Black	children.		However,	financial	constraints	have	placed	
limits	on	their	agency	and	organisational	capacity.	
	
	
The	education	and	employment	markets	are	key	sites	of	struggle	for	life-
changing	resources.		However,	unlike	the	education	sector,	the	labour	market	is	
at	the	vanguard	of	competition	for	the	forms	of	symbolic	capital	which	signify	
status	and	success	(Bourdieu,	2010	[1984]).		Not	everyone	who	is	successful	in	
the	labour	market	would	have	acquired	higher	education	capital.		Nevertheless	
	 225	
‘there	are	strong	links	between	educational	success	and	labour	market	success’	
(Heath	and	Cheung,	2006:	3).		As	the	most	typical	means	of	improving	one’s	
social	mobility	is	by	acquiring	educational	Goods	and	exchanging	it	for	
economic	capital	in	the	labour	market	(Bourdieu,	2010	[1984]),	this	chapter	
will:	
• examine	the	barriers	African	Caribbeans	experience	obtaining	and	
sustaining	meaningful	employment;		
• assess	the	role	of	policies	and	practices	in	constraining	or	facilitating	
changes	in	their	occupational	positions;	
• map	changes	in	the	National	Statistics	Socio-economic	Classifications	
(NS-SEC)	of	African	Caribbean	between	1991	and	2011;	
• establish	if	the	occupational	status	of	Black	Caribbeans	has	improved,	
stagnated	or	deteriorated	over	time,	and	how	their	employment	
positions	differentiate	by	age	and	gender.		
	
	
Regardless	of	whether	paid	employment	is	full	or	part-time,	only	skilled	labour	
can	generate	the	necessary	level	of	income	to	enable	upward	social	mobility.		
Remuneration	within	the	skilled	occupations	reduces	insecurity	and	minimises	
the	risk	of	poverty.		Hence,	occupations	in	the	NS-SEC	professional	and	higher	
managerial	employment	classes193	can	also	be	perceived	as	labour	market	
Goods.		The	professions	provide	more	opportunities	for	economic	progression,	
																																								 																				
193	See	Chapter	Three	
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allow	social	actors	to	improve	their	class	situation,	increase	life-chances	and	
enhance	inter-generational	upward	social	mobility.			
	
	
Age	is	also	a	crucial	factor	of	social	mobility194	.		Individuals	are	expected	to	
acquire	educational	Goods	at	an	expected	age-stage	and	then	enter	the	labour	
market	at	the	earliest	opportunity.		As	such,	the	age-range	of	25	to	49	is	
significant	to	the	analysis	of	upward	social	mobility.		Twenty-five	is	the	
approximate	age	when	individuals	might	be	expected	to	enter	the	labour	
market	after	higher	education.		At	the	other	end	of	the	spectrum,	as	individuals	
approach	50	(and	the	lower	one	is	positioned	within	the	occupational	
structure),	there	is	the	expectancy	of	diminishing	economic	returns.		Age	
diminishes	the	duration	of	an	employee’s	working	life	and,	in	some	
occupations,	prospects	for	promotion	might	also	be	reduced.		Hence	25-49	is	
the	optimum	age-stage	in	which	workers	are	expected	to	take	advantage	of	
labour	market	opportunities,	to	improve	their	economic	status.	
	
	
During	the	1950s	and	1960s	the	unskilled,	low-waged	occupations	of	West	
Indians	could	have	been	explained	by	their	status	as	newly	arriving	migrants	
(Peach,	1968).		Moreover,	racism,	discriminatory	employment	policies	and	
practices,	constrained	West	Indian	labour	to	the	lower	tiers	of	the	economy	
(Rex	and	Moore,	1967;	Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981;	Sivanandan,	
																																								 																				
194	See	Chapter	Five	
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1982;	Phizacklea	and	Miles,	1984;	Taylor,	1993).		Ratcliffe	(1981:	237)	notes	
that,	‘in	a	fiercely	competitive	labour	market	Blacks	who	enter	directly	from	
British	schools	will	have	the	edge	on	those	who	have	grown	up	in	a	very	
different	society’.		However,	that	was	not	necessarily	the	case	for	those	who	
first	entered	the	British	education	system	(Coard,	1971;	Carby,	1982).	
	
	
The	majority	of	my	research	subjects	left	school	and	entered	the	labour	market	
at	the	end	of	the	1970s.		This	was	during	the	time	when	Rex	and	Tomlinson’s	
(1979)	research,	and	Ratcliffe’s	(1981)	interpretation	of	their	survey,	was	
conducted.		Ratcliffe	(1981:	234)	highlighted	the	over-representation	of	West	
Indian	males	in	the	lower	tiers	of	the	economy,	and	that	relatively	few	‘were	
being	promoted	into	responsible	positions’.		In	comparison	to	post-war	
migrants,	the	labour	market	positions	of	the	Caribbean	population	in	the	late	
1970s	indicated	there	was	‘little	evidence	of	improved	social	mobility	[…]	if	
anything	the	reverse	is	the	case’	(ibid,	1981:	235).		Although	African	Caribbeans	
are	now	accessing	higher	education195,	it	remains	to	be	seen	what	–	if	anything	
–	has	changed	regarding	their	previous	and	contemporary	occupational	
positions.		It	also	needs	to	be	established	if	they	are	exchanging	their	
educational	capital	for	economic	capital	(Bourdieu,	2010	[1984]).		
	
	
	
																																								 																				
195	ibid.		
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Economic	Bads:	Risk	and	precarious	work	
	
Standing	(2011:	7)	contends	that	‘we	need	a	new	vocabulary,	one	reflecting	
class	relations	in	the	global	market	system	of	the	twenty-first	century’,	to	
describe	those	employed	in	the	lower	tiers	of	the	labour	market.		The	term	
precariat	(ibid,	2011)	defines	the	situation	of	nascent	workers	in	the	
contemporary	service,	information	and	technology	sectors.		Whereas	working-
class	labour	was	exploited	in	long-term,	low-paid	work,	in	the	post-war	
industrial	and	manufacturing	economy,	their	contemporary	counterparts	are	
engaged	in	short-term,	insecure	employment	with	few	contractual	rights.		
Precarious	employment	is	often	mediated	through	agencies,	rather	than	
directly	by	employers.		Consequently,	precariat	workers	might	have	several	
employers	in	a	relatively	short	space	of	time.		Agency	work	also	erodes	
employment	rights,	and	increases	the	risk	of	poverty	in	the	long-term.		Subject	
F	epitomises	the	work	ethic	and	spirit	of	the	precariat.		She	left	school	without	
any	academic	Goods	and	entered	the	labour	market	in	the	early	1980s.		Her	
employment	experiences	have	been	constrained	to	various	forms	of	precarious	
work.		However,	she	has	not	given	up	hope	of	obtaining	long-term	employment	
and	financial	security	from	a	regular	income.	
	
	
Subject	F	was	fifty-three	years	old	when	I	interviewed	her.		Her	father	was	a	
former	shop	floor	worker	at	Imperial	Chemical	Industries	(ICI):	a	large	British	
chemical	manufacturing	company.		Her	late	mother	was	a	factory	worker.		She	
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was	referred	to	a	secondary	school	for	children	with	behavioural	problems	by	
her	primary	school	teachers196	and	subsequently	left	school	without	any	
qualifications:	
	
‘Yeah,	I’ve	had	quite	a	few	jobs	on	the	side	[laughs].		I	worked	at	the	
Birmingham	Post	and	Mail,	I’ve	worked	in	the	food	business;	I’ve	
done	nights	at	McDonalds,	I’ve	worked	at	a	printer	–	printing	shoe	
soles,	I	worked	for	this	company	making	curry	patties,	but	their	pay	
cheques	always	bounced.		I	did	screen	printing	as	well.		I’ve	had	lots	
of	jobs.		Lots’	(Subject	F,	1st	May	2014,	Birmingham)!	
	
By	on	the	side	Subject	F	meant	working	whilst	claiming	benefits.		She	often	
worked	without	a	contract,	and	was	paid	by	cheque	or	received	cash-in-hand	
payments.		These	forms	of	remuneration	made	it	easier	for	her	employers	to	
exploit	her	labour	in	the	short-term.		However,	she	did	not	complain,	because	
she	also	claimed	welfare	benefits	whilst	working.		The	only	permanent	work	
she	has	ever	had	was	with	the	Birmingham	Post	and	Mail,	which	she	left	
because	of	problems	with	childcare.			
	
	
Although	Subject	F	realises	that	claiming	benefits	whilst	working	is	illegal,	she	
insists	that	she	has	little	choice.		The	only	work	she	can	get	does	not	guarantee	
																																								 																				
196	Subject	F	is	dyslexic;	however,	her	disability	was	only	diagnosed	in	2013.		The	circumstances	
of	her	ESN	referral	is	in	some	ways	similar	to	that	of	Subject	A	(see	Chapter	Five).		Her	parents	
also	believed	the	teachers	were	acting	in	their	daughter’s	best	interests.		They	were	told	that	
the	ESN	school	would	be	more	appropriate	for	her	needs.	
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her	a	regular	wage,	and	those	that	did	could	only	do	so	in	the	short-term.		She	
had	previously	stopped	claiming	benefits	after	finding	a	job.		However,	her	
employment	only	lasted	a	few	weeks	and	she	then	had	to	sign	on	again.		Her	
claim	took	so	long	to	process	that	she	got	into	debt	and	could	not	afford	to	pay	
her	rent,	household	bills	or	provide	for	her	son.		Although	she	was	not	
employed	when	I	interviewed	her,	she	admitted	that	if	she	did	find	a	job	she	
would	continue	to	claim	benefits:			
	
‘I’m	on	Jobseeker’s	Allowance,	plus	I	get	Child	Benefit	and	Child	Tax	
Credit.		I	have	to	pay	my	rent,	the	concierge	charge197,	then	there’s	
gas,	electricity	and	water.		I	couldn’t	afford	to	do	all	that	–	and	have	
enough	to	live	on	–for	what	they	would	give	me	to	work	full-time.		I’d	
love	a	full-time	job,	but	I	don’t	want	to	be	in	debt	again’	(Subject	F,	
1st	May	2014,	Birmingham)!	
	
Subject	F’s	situation	is	a	common	predicament	of	the	precariat.		Standing	
(2011:	144)	notes	that	welfare	claimants	take	risks	by	applying	for	jobs	that	are	
short-term	and	‘give	up	benefits	that	may	have	taken	months	to	obtain	in	the	
first	place’.		When	precarious	work	is	the	only	employment	option	available,	
welfare	benefits	function	as	a	comfort	blanket.		However,	they	should	be	an	
economic	safety	net	to	protect	the	poor	whilst	they	are	out	of	work.		Subject	F’s	
lack	of	qualifications	and	skills	condemn	her	to	low-wage	labour,	which	pays	
																																								 																				
197	‘Concierge	charge’	might	be	slightly	misleading.		However,	those	were	the	words	used	by	
Subject	F	to	refer	to	the	communal	costs	she	shares	with	other	tenants	in	her	maisonette,	for	
the	cleaning	and	maintenance	of	shared	spaces.	
	 231	
less	than	the	welfare	benefits	she	is	forced	to	claim.		Moreover,	the	minimum	
wage	198		that	she	would	earn	is	not	enough	to	meet	her	basic	material	needs.		
	
	
Beck	(2000:	81)	argues	that	contemporary	Western	societies	are	undergoing	a	
paradigm	shift	in	which	‘a	new	kind	of	capitalism,	a	new	kind	of	economy,	a	
new	kind	of	global	order’	creates	new	forms	of	insecurity	and	employment	
risks.		Unlike	the	old	manufacturing	and	production	industries,	which	offered	a	
high	degree	of	financial	security	in	low-paid,	long-term	masculine	work,	
contemporary	employment	is	short-term,	insecure	and	often	feminised.		The	
distinction	between	gendered	work	in	the	modern	service	sector	has	become	
blurred,	and	is	to	some	extent	viewed	as	symmetrical.		This	is	noticeable	in	the	
way	that	male	labour	is	sometimes	commodified	in	emotion	work	(Hochschild,	
2003),	whilst	females	are	employed	in	work	that	was	traditionally	seen	as	
masculine.		Examples	of	this	anomaly	is	demonstrated	in	the	care	sector	and	
the	security	industry.		The	increase	of	female	consumers	in	the	retail	sector	and	
night-time	economy	has	intensified	the	demand	for	their	labour	as	security	
personnel.		The	only	requirement	of	employment	in	the	security	industry	is	a	
license,	which	is	obtained	by	completing	a	three-day	course199.		The	minimum	
																																								 																				
198	The	minimum	wage	was	£6.50	per	hour	when	Subject	F	was	interviewed.		It	rose	to	£7.20	in	
April	2016.	
199	The	Private	Security	Industry	Act	2001	regulates	the	security	sector.		Those	who	are	
unemployed	can	obtain	licenses	by	having	their	courses	paid	for	by	their	local	Jobcentre.		
Although	State	sponsorship	might	appear	to	be	a	benign	act,	it	is	effectively	an	attempt	to	
create	low-paid	and	high-risk,	employment	opportunities	for	the	long-term	unemployed,	
whilst	reducing	their	welfare	needs	in	the	short-term.	
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skills	requirement	makes	the	vocation	appealing	to	those	who	left	education	
without	any	academic	Goods.			
	
	
The	growth	of	employment	in	the	care	sector	has	been	a	consequence	of	
different	factors.		For	example,	increased	longevity	has	contributed	to	the	
expanding	ageing	population	and	there	has	been	a	rise	in	the	number	of	
children	referred	to	social	services	(Cracknell,	2010;	DfE,	2014).		The	decline	in	
traditional	semi	and	unskilled	industrial	work	(Standing,	2011)	has	also	created	
new	forms	of	employment	in	the	care	sector	for	males.		Care	work	is	often	
mediated	through	agencies	and	involves	short-term	contingent	labour200.		
Workers	are	contracted	to	employment	agencies,	rather	than	to	the	place	
where	they	actually	work.		Consequently,	these	employment	arrangements	are	
precarious	and	increase	the	risk	of	future	poverty.		Contingent	workers	are	
often	unable	to	rely	on	a	regular	salary.		Therefore,	they	cannot	make	any	long-
term	plans	in	regard	to	their	future.		
	
	
Despite	being	a	qualified	carpenter,	fifty-five-year-old	Subject	A	explained	to	
me	how	his	recent	labour	market	participation	was	constrained	to	agency	work	
in	the	care	sector.		He	had	previously	worked	for	thirteen	years	as	a	shop	fitter.		
However,	his	employer’s	organisation	was	taken	over	by	a	company	that	
subsequently	made	him	redundant:	
																																								 																				
200	This	is	short-term	work	that	often	becomes	available	due	to	unforeseen	circumstances,	
which	result	in	a	sudden	demand	for	labour	in	a	specific	sector.		
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‘I	signed	up	with	four	or	five	different	agencies	for	two	years.		They	
sent	me	here,	there	and	everywhere.		The	jobs	only	lasted	for	a	day	
or	two	and	they	were	mainly	cleaning	and	care	work.		I	lost	count	of	
the	amount	of	jobs	I	applied	for.		One	of	the	agencies	phoned	me	one	
morning;	they	told	me	there	was	security	work	available	the	same	
day	at	a	hospital	car	park.		I	had	never	done	anything	like	that	before,	
but	I	gave	it	a	try’	(Subject	A,	10th	August	2013,	Birmingham).	
	
Subject	A	described	his	period	of	agency	work	as	a	crisis	in	his	masculinity.		
Soon	after	he	was	made	redundant	his	wife	became	the	main	breadwinner	and	
he	never	knew	if	he	would	be	working	from	one	day	to	the	next.		Standing	
(2011:	18)	argues	‘the	precariat	is	defined	by	short-termism,	which	could	evolve	
into	a	mass	incapacity	to	think	long-term’.		This	was	indeed	the	case	for	Subject	
A,	who	confided	that	he	often	felt	depressed	because	of	his	inability	to	find	
secure	employment.		The	insecurity	generated	by	agency	work	subjected	him	
to	the	four	A’s	of	‘anger,	anomie,	anxiety	and	alienation’	(ibid,	2011:	21).		
Although	Subject	A	successfully	applied	for	his	current	security	job	when	it	was	
advertised	directly	by	the	NHS,	prior	to	that	he	experienced	feelings	of	anxiety.		
This	was	mainly	because	he	did	not	know	how	long	his	employment	would	last.		
He	told	me	that	he	often	turned	his	anger	inwards	and	blamed	himself	for	
letting	his	family	down.		Lack	of	a	regular	income	changed	his	lifestyle,	forcing	
him	to	endure	a	hand-to-mouth	existence.		He	became	alienated	from	his	wider	
circle	of	family	and	friends,	as	he	simply	could	not	afford	to	socialise.	
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Subject	D	is	now	55	years	old.		After	leaving	school	without	any	academic	
Goods	she	began	working	for	a	plastics	factory	in	1976.		At	18	she	was	made	
redundant	and	then	found	work	with	a	large	vehicle	manufacturer.		When	she	
was	20	she	began	working	for	Birmingham	Social	Services	as	a	home-helper.		
She	worked	on	a	rota	basis,	in	which	she	cared	for	elderly	residents	and	carried	
out	cleaning	and	cooking	duties	in	different	residential	homes.		She	stopped	
working	in	the	care	sector	in	the	late	1980s	when	National	Vocational	
Qualifications	(NVQs)	became	a	prerequisite	of	her	employment.		Since	then	
she	has	worked	for	a	number	of	agencies	as	a	cleaner	and	school	dinner	lady.	
Gilchrist	and	Kyprianou	(2011:	8)	note	that	‘for	second	generation	[…]	people,	
ethnic	networks	can	be	beneficial	in	terms	of	employment’.		This	is	
demonstrated	below	in	the	case	of	Subject	D,	whose	friendship	network	has	
provided	her	with	information	regarding	potential	employment	in	the	security	
industry:	
	
‘I	still	get	work	in	the	residential	homes	sometimes,	but	now	the	
agencies	only	employ	me	to	do	the	cleaning,	because	I	haven’t	got	
the	qualifications.		I	tried	to	get	the	NVQs,	but	the	course	was	
difficult	because	of	my	dyslexia.		In	those	days	you	used	to	cook,	
clean	and	care	for	the	residents.		You	didn’t	need	a	qualification;	you	
just	knew	what	to	do!		I	haven’t	heard	from	the	agencies	for	a	while.		
My	friend	got	an	SIA	badge201	and	she’s	had	lots	of	work	since.		She	
																																								 																				
201	A	Security	Industry	Authority	license,	which	sanctions	employment	in	the	security	industry.	
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said	the	training	course	was	easy,	so	I’m	going	to	try	it’	(Subject	D,	1st	
May	2014,	Birmingham).	
	
	
The	idea	of	risk	‘presupposes	decisions,	[…]	and	negotiable	standards	of	shared	
rights	and	duties,	costs	and	compensation’	(Beck,	2000:	95).		When	risk	is	
applied	in	the	context	of	the	labour	market,	Subject	D’s	unqualified	status	is	
potentially	hazardous	in	relation	to	the	tasks	she	used	to	perform	for	Social	
Services.		Although	nothing	has	changed	regarding	her	capability	to	perform	
her	former	labour	responsibilities,	her	employment	agency	now	has	a	duty	of	
care	that	is	shared	equally	with	its	partner	organisations.		Interactions	with	
vulnerable	service	users	are	defined	as	regulated	activities202.		As	such,	Subject	
D’s	employment	agency	have	a	statutory	duty	to	ensure	employees	are	
appropriately	trained.		A	complaint	can	incur	serious	financial	consequences	for	
employers	if	they	are	deemed	liable	for	harmful	or	potentially	hazardous	
actions	undertaken	by	their	employees.			
	
	
Subject	D	is	now	forced	to	accept	less	money	and	worse	conditions	of	
employment	for	the	same	work	she	performed	under	the	security	of	an	
employment	contract.		Moreover,	she	no	longer	has	the	stability	of	a	regular	
income.		Her	predicament	demonstrates	the	way	in	which	precarious	work	now	
																																								 																				
202	The	Safeguarding	Vulnerable	Groups	Act	(2006)	lists	actions	that	constitute	regulated	
activities	between	vulnerable	service	users,	providers	and	their	agents	(HM	Government,	
2006).		See	also	Chapter	Four.	
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involves	a	high	risk	of	insecurity	regarding	remuneration.		This	is	especially	as	
employment	agencies	are	increasingly	reverting	to	the	use	of	zero	hour	
contracts	‘whereby	somebody	is	given	a	contract	but	left	unsure	how	many	
hours,	if	any,	they	will	be	required	to	work	or	how	much	if	anything	they	will	be	
paid’	(Standing,	2011:	36).				
	
	
Subject	D’s	employment	situation	also	demonstrates	how	economic	and	
legislative	changes	can	constrain	the	labour	market	participation	of	the	
precariat.		Although	she	has	no	academic	Goods	Subject	D	was	always	able	to	
find	employment,	until	work	in	the	manufacturing	and	production	sectors	
disappeared.		Legislation,	which	promotes	the	acquisition	of	qualifications	as	a	
means	of	regulating	risk	in	the	labour	market,	has	now	become	a	barrier	to	her	
employment.		When	Subject	D	worked	for	Social	Services	she	had	to	lift	
patients	out	of	their	beds,	which	was	similar	to	the	heavy	lifting	tasks	allocated	
to	West	Indian	nurses	in	the	post-war	labour	market	(Bryan,	Dadzie	and	Scafe,	
1985).		However,	the	increasing	focus	on	managing	risk	in	the	service	industry	
means	that	she	now	requires	qualifications	to	perform	tasks,	which	she	
formerly	took	for	granted	203.		The	narratives	of	Subjects	A	and	D	demonstrate	
how	the	risk	of	poverty	is	intensified	by	short-term,	low-paid,	insecure,	
precarious	work,	in	the	new	global	economy.	
	
	
																																								 																				
203	Manual	handling	legislation	came	into	effect	in	1982	and	was	subsequently	updated	in	2002	
(HSE,	2012).	
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Class	positions	in	the	occupational	structure	
	
Racism	mediated	the	educational	experiences	of	the	subjects	of	this	research,	
and	for	many	of	them	dyslexia204	was	also	a	barrier	to	their	educational	
attainment.		Therefore,	it	is	not	surprising	that	their	subsequent	labour	market	
misfortunes	would	be	a	consequence	of	their	negative	experiences	of	school	in	
Babylon	(Carby,	1982).		However,	in	recent	times	African	Caribbeans	are	
obtaining	higher	education	(H.E.)	Goods,	which	are	the	prerequisite	capital	of	
the	professions205.		Nevertheless,	for	inter-generational	social	mobility	to	be	
‘easy	and	typical’,	H.	E.	success	must	translate	into	labour	market	participation	
at	the	earliest	opportunity	(Weber,	1920	in	Smith,	2007:	87).		The	extent	to	
which	this	transition	is	occurring	can	be	assessed	by	comparing	changes	in	the	
occupational	positions	of	the	present	Caribbean	population	to	those	of	their	
White	counterparts	in	the	same	economic	sectors.	
	
	
Table	6.1,	below,	highlights	the	differences	between	the	1991	Registrar	General	
Social	Class	(RGSC)	schema,	based	on	occupations,	and	the	2001	and	2011	NS-
SEC	version:	
	
	
																																								 																				
204	Although	dyslexia	is	now	recognised	as	a	hidden	disability,	and	is	a	protected	characteristic	
under	the	EA2010,	its	significance	as	a	barrier	to	educational	attainment	was	widely	
overlooked	in	the	latter	part	of	the	previous	century	(Nosek,	1997).	
205	See	Chapter	Five.	
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Table	6.1:	The	Registrar	General	Social	Classes206	and	the	National	Statistics	Socio-Economic	
Classifications	2001	and	2011.	
	
Registrar	General	Social	
Classes	(1991)	
NS-SEC	Classes	
(2001	and	2011)	
I.	Professional	Occupations	 										1.	Higher	Managerial	and	Professional	Occupations	
II.	Managerial	and	Technical	 										2.	Lower	Managerial	and	Professional	Occupations	
IIIN.	Skilled	Occupations	
(Non-manual)	
										3.	Intermediate	Occupations	
IIIM.	Skilled	Occupations	
(Manual)	
										4.	Small	Employers	and	Own	Account	Workers	
IV.	Partly	Skilled	Occupations	 										5.	Lower	Supervisory	and	Technical	Occupations	
V.	Unskilled	Occupations	 										6.	Semi-routine	Occupations	
	 										7.	Routine	Occupations	
	 										8.	Never	Worked	and	Long-term	Unemployed	
Source:	CASWEB	(2015);	(ONS	2015).	
	
A	major	difference	between	the	RGSC	and	the	NS-SEC	is	that	the	latter	
distinguishes	between	‘service	relationship,	[…]	labour	contract	and	[…]	
intermediate	working	regulations’	(ONS,	2010a:	3)	in	employment.		The	high-
income	occupations	of	the	NS-SEC	have	a	service	relationship,	which	is	more	
pronounced	in	Class	1	and	weaker	in	Class	2.		They	are	also	the	occupational	
classes	that	have	greater	opportunities	for	career	progression	and	long-term	
security.		In	contrast,	the	labour	contract	is	characteristic	of	Class	7	
occupations,	where	workers	exchange	their	labour	for	a	fixed	salary	calculated	
by	time	worked	(ONS,	2015).		The	intermediate	occupations	in	Class	3	combines	
both	the	labour	contract	and	service	relationships,	whereas	Class	4	consists	of	
the	self-employed.		Therefore,	the	occupations	in	Classes	1,	and	2	can	be	
viewed	as	labour	market	Goods,	because	of	the	level	of	skill	they	require	and	
their	potential	to	earn	a	higher	income	than	those	in	Classes	5,	6	and	7,	which	
represent	high-risk	economic	Bads.		Technical,	Routine	and	Semi-routine	
employment	are	generally	associated	with	declining	production	activities,	
																																								 																				
206	Although	the	RGSC	occupational	classes	were	used	in	the	1991	Census,	they	were	renamed	
Social	Class	Based	on	Occupation	in	1990	(Rose,	1995).	
	
	 239	
which	provide	very	little	financial	security	and	have	limited	opportunities	for	
long-term	career	progression.		A	number	of	occupations	in	Classes	3	and	4	are	
involved	in	consumption	activities.		Paradoxically,	it	could	mean	that	they	have	
more	security	and	the	potential	to	earn	a	high	income.		However,	it	could	also	
be	the	case	that	they	are	precarious	activities	with	little	financial	stability.		
	
	
Although	the	NS-SEC	is	an	improvement	on	the	occupational	schema	of	the	
RGSC,	it	is	nevertheless	far	from	flawless.		Crompton	(2008)	suggests	that	the	
divisions	between	categories	are	arbitrary.		For	example,	a	large	business	might	
only	have	two	more	employees	than	a	similar	sized	organisation	that	is	
classified	as	small	(ibid,	2008;	ONS,	2010a:	8).		Thus,	despite	the	occupational	
and	organisational	similarities	of	such	establishments,	those	employed	by	them	
would	fall	in	different	NS-SEC	classes	(Crompton,	2008:	68).		The	NS-SEC	is	also	
supposed	to	be	a	reliable	indicator	of	health	outcomes	based	on	quality	of	life,	
which	is	predicted	by	income	and	occupational	skill	level.		However,	Classes	4	
and	8	(Small	Employers	and	Own	Account	workers,	and	Never	Worked	and	
Long-term	Unemployed,	respectively)	are	incompatible	with	the	idea	of	an	
employment	hierarchy	derived	on	that	basis	(ibid,	2008:	67).		This	is	because	
Class	4	employees	can	be	relatively	successful,	despite	a	lower	level	of	skill	and	
without	having	a	regular	service	contract.		Accountants,	high-income	
entrepreneurs	and	relatively	low-income	newsagents	can	all	fall	within	NS-SEC	
Class	4.		Moreover,	in	regard	to	Class	8,	highly	educated	individuals	can	have	
long-term	illnesses,	which	leaves	them	unable	to	work.		Consequently,	despite	
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their	high	skill	level,	they	can	be	classified	as	Never	Worked	and	Long-term	
Unemployed.	
	
	
Occupations	in	the	service,	information,	technology	and	communication	sectors	
respond	to	the	rapidly	changing	needs	of	the	global	market.		This	makes	it	
increasingly	problematic	to	assign	them	into	a	distinct	class	bracket.		As	the	NS-
SEC	reflects	modern	changes	in	the	economic	base,	classical	Marxian	and	
Weberian	notions	of	class	–	as	position,	situation	and	status207	within	an	
occupational	hierarchy	–	are	still	relevant	indicators	of	social	mobility.		
However,	the	contemporary	notion	of	a	social	class	has	to	be	more	nuanced	to	
reflect	the	fetishism	of	modern	consumption,	and	also	the	new	modes	of	
production	in	cultural,	technological	and	intellectual	capital.		Bourdieu’s	(2010	
[1984])	notion	of	cultural	capital,	and	the	conceptualisation	of	class	as	a	
habitus208,	can	add	meaning	to	the	NS-SEC	classifications.		Where	the	NS-SEC	
can	capture	changes	in	social	mobility,	and	occupational	disparities	between	
ethnic	groups,	Bourdieu’s	(2010,	[1984]),	notions	of	habitus	and	field	can	reveal	
the	significance	of	cultural	dispositions	in	class	actions.		The	concept	of	field	
also	provides	an	understanding	of	the	social	structures	in	which	the	agency	of	
actors	operates.		This	is	to	some	extent	demonstrated	in	the	narratives	of	the	
labour	market	experiences	of	the	research	subjects.	
	
																																								 																				
207	See	Morrison	(1995).	
208	I	have	argued	earlier	(see	Chapter	Three)	that	where	Marx	sees	class	as	a	social	position	and	
Weber	interprets	class	as	a	social	situation	(Morrison,	1995),	to	Bourdieu	(2010,	[1984])	class	
also	incorporates	a	disposition.	
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Changes	in	the	occupational	structure	have	to	some	extent	resulted	in	upward	
and	downward	shifts	in	the	reclassification	of	labour.		Occupations	once	
classified	as	unskilled	may	now	be	categorised	as	semi-skilled	or	even	technical,	
whilst	work	formerly	viewed	as	skilled	might	now	fall	within	the	unskilled	
category.		Moreover,	‘many	jobs	labelled	as	“services”	[…],	are	in	fact	
productive	activities’	(Crompton,	2008:	85).		Therefore,	African	Caribbean	
labour	may	still	be	exploited	in	similar	types	of	unskilled	occupations	to	those	
that	existed	in	the	1970s209.		Moreover,	skilled	occupations	that	formerly	
incorporated	various	forms	of	unskilled	tasks	may	now	be	segmented.		This	is	
demonstrated	in	the	case	of	Subject	D	above.		Her	heavy	lifting	duties	in	the	
care	sector	was	formerly	part	of	the	tasks	carried	out	by	nurses,	which	is	a	
skilled	profession	(Bryan,	Dadzie	and	Scafe,	1985).		Therefore,	changes	in	the	
occupational	structure	also	suggest	that	caution	is	necessary	when	mapping	
transitions	in	the	employment	positions	of	African	Caribbeans.		However,	it	
should	also	be	acknowledged	that	NS-SEC	labour	market	positions	provide	a	
heuristic	insight	of	material	disparities	between	ethnic	groups.		As	the	
occupational	class	structure	is	hierarchical	it	can	be	a	reliable	indicator	of	
differences	in	resources	between	ethnic	groups,	based	on	income	variations.	
	
	
	
	
																																								 																				
209	See	Rex	and	Tomlinson	(1979);	Ratcliffe	(1981);	Taylor	(1993).	
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Ethnicity	and	occupational	class	positions:	1991		
	
This	inquiry	now	proceeds	to	map	African	Caribbean	social	mobility	by	
identifying	and	comparing	changes	in	their	past	and	contemporary	
occupational	positions.		Although	‘employment	is	not	the	only	determinant	of	
life-chances’	(ONS,	2010a:	3),	occupational	status	is	nevertheless	a	significant	
factor.		As	the	White	British	population	are	the	majority	ethnic	group,	their	NS-
SEC	Class	positions	are	the	yardstick	against	which	those	of	African	Caribbeans	
are	compared.		If	Black	Caribbeans	are	indeed	improving	their	social	status,	
then	one	would	expect	to	see	a	narrowing	gap	between	them	and	their	White	
British	peers	in	the	same	occupational	classes.		Moreover,	the	unemployment	
rates	of	African	Caribbeans	should	also	be	proportionate	to	those	of	their	
White	British	counterparts.		The	1991	Census	is	the	preferred	analytical	starting	
point,	as	it	was	the	first	Census	in	which	ethnic	categories	were	used.		It	also	
followed	the	Handsworth	inquiries	of	Rex	and	Tomlinson	(1979)	and	Ratcliffe	
(1981)210.		Rex	and	Tomlinson	(1979)	examined	the	economic	positions	of	West	
Indians	and	their	British	born	children,	the	latter	are	the	same	generation	as	
those	who	participated	in	this	research.		However,	as	noted	above,	only	
tentative	comparisons	can	be	made	between	the	1991	Census	and	later	
versions.				
	
	
																																								 																				
210	As	noted	earlier,	Ratcliffe	(1981)	reinterpreted	Rex	and	Tomlinson’s	(1979)	data.		His	work	
highlighted	gender	differences	between	ethnic	groups	in	Birmingham’s	labour	market.	
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Table	6.2	below	reveals	that	the	national	representation	of	working-age	White	
Britons	employed	in	the	high-skilled	Class	I	Professional	Occupations	in	1991,	
was	over	two	and	a	half	times	greater	than	that	of	their	Black	Caribbean	
counterparts.		In	Birmingham,	the	disparity	was	much	higher.		Although	White	
Britons	had	higher	proportional	representations	in	Classes	I	and	II,	the	gap	
between	them	and	their	Caribbean	peers	was	much	closer	in	the	latter	
occupational	class.		However,	what	is	more	problematic	for	Black	Caribbean	
social	mobility	is	their	higher	national	and	local	proportional	representations	in	
the	manual,	partly	skilled	and	unskilled	occupations.		The	data	demonstrates	
that	the	occupational	positions	of	Black	Caribbeans	in	1991	is	similar	to	what	it	
was	in	the	1970s	(Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981;	Taylor,	1993).		It	is	
noticeable	that	the	bulk	of	Black	Caribbean	workers	are	concentrated	in	manual	
and	partly-skilled	occupations.	
	
Table	6.2:	16	and	Over	Social	Class	Based	on	Occupation	by	Ethnicity,	1991	[%].	
	
NS-SEC	
Classes	
White	
British:	
England	
&	Wales	
Black	
Caribbean:	
England	&	
Wales	
White	
British:	
Birmingham	
Black	
Caribbean:	
Birmingham	
I.	Professional	
Occupations	
4.88	 1.83	 5.00	 1.29	
II.	Managerial	and	
Technical	
29.08	 25.44	 24.54	 23.95	
IIIN.	Skilled	
Occupations		
(Non-manual)	
23.72	 22.52	 24.19	 17.73	
IIIM.	Skilled	
Occupations	
(Manual)	
21.12	 22.48	 22.80	 23.72	
IV.	Partly	Skilled	
Occupations	
15.39	 20.01	 17.73	 25.54	
V.	Unskilled	
Occupations	
5.72	 7.70	 5.73	 7.75	
n	=	100%	 2,006,023	 20,507	 30,142	 1,703	
Source:	CASWEB	and	ONS	(2015).	
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Ethnicity,	gender,	age	and	occupational	class	positions:	2001	and	2011	
	
Unlike	its	1991	predecessor,	the	2001	National	Census	captured	the	
employment	data	of	MWBCs211.		Tables	6.3	and	6.4	below	reveal	national	and	
local	occupational	disparities	by	ethnicity	and	gender	in	2001	and	2011.		African	
Caribbean	national	representations	in	Class	1	occupations	in	2011	has	
deteriorated	from	what	it	was	in	2001.		However,	in	Birmingham	there	is	a	
marginal	improvement	in	their	positions	within	the	same	occupational	class.		
Tables	6.3	and	6.4	also	reveal	that	in	2011	MWBC	national	representations	in	
Class	1	occupations	have	decreased,	whilst	their	positions	in	the	same	
occupational	class	in	Birmingham	has	slightly	improved.		There	is	only	a	
marginal	difference	between	White	British	and	Black	Caribbean	national	and	
local	representations	in	Class	2	occupations.		However,	the	biggest	national	
disparities	between	them	are	in	Classes	4	and	8.		This	indicates	that	relatively	
few	Black	Caribbeans	are	self-employed	and,	more	significantly,	a	higher	
proportion	of	them	are	unemployed.		Out	of	the	three	ethnic	groups	MWBCs	
have	the	highest	rate	of	unemployment,	which	is	three	times	higher	than	their	
White	counterparts.	
	
	
	
	
																																								 																				
211	As	noted	in	Chapter	Three,	this	ethnic	group	is	ontologically	significant	in	relation	to	
changes	in	the	social	status	of	Black	Caribbeans.		Prior	to	the	introduction	of	the	MWBC	
category	in	2001,	members	of	this	group	may	have	classified	themselves	as	Black	or	even	
White.		This	affects	the	validity	of	previous	data	pertaining	to	both	Black	Caribbeans	and	White	
British	ethnic	groups.	
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Table	6.3:	16-74	Socio-Economic	Classifications	by	Ethnicity,	2001	[%].	
	
NS-SEC		
Classes	
White	
British	
National	
Black	
Caribbean:	
National	
MWBC:	
National	
White		
British:	
Birmingham	
Black	
Caribbean:	
Birmingham	
MWBC:	
Birmingham	
1.	Higher	Managerial	and	
Professional		Occupations	
10.80	 7.73	 6.84	 9.69	 5.06	 4.17	
2.	Lower	Managerial	and	
Professional	Occupations	
24.81	 25.47	 20.57	 22.98	 21.62	 16.09	
3.	Intermediate	
Occupations	
12.60	 16.13	 13.28	 13.01	 15.44	 13.71	
4.	Small	Employers	and	
Own	Account	Workers	
9.30	 4.95	 5.31	 6.28	 3.42	 3.27	
5.	Lower	Supervisory	and	
Technical	Occupations	
9.85	 8.41	 8.80	 10.19	 8.80	 7.74	
6.	Semi-routine	
Occupations	
15.63	 17.25	 18.64	 17.79	 19.10	 20.42	
7.	Routine	Occupations	 12.27	 11.02	 13.62	 13.27	 13.72	 14.03	
8.	Never	Worked	and	Long-
term	Unemployed	
3.72	 9.02	 12.94	 6.77	 12.83	 20.57	
n	=	100%	 24,744,617	 326,562	 72,705	 332,468	 25,909	 4,741	
Source:		ONS	(2001)	Census:	Aggregate	Data	(England	and	Wales).	
	
Table	6.4:	16-74	Socio-Economic	Classifications	by	Ethnicity,	2011	[%].	
	
NS-SEC		
Classes	
White	
British:	
National	
Black	
Caribbean:	
National	
MWBC:	
National	
White		
British:	
Birmingham	
Black	
Caribbean:	
Birmingham	
MWBC:	
Birmingham	
1.	Higher	Managerial	and	
Professional	Occupations	
10.26	 6.93	 6.05	 9.33	 4.90	 4.19	
2.	Lower	Managerial	and	
Professional	Occupations	
22.17	 22.75	 18.79	 20.44	 20.31	 17.41	
3.	Intermediate	
Occupations	
14.47	 15.54	 13.54	 15.11	 13.93	 13.32	
4.	Small	Employers	and	
Own	Account	Workers	
9.87	 6.71	 7.23	 6.98	 5.20	 5.28	
5.	Lower	Supervisory	and	
Technical	Occupations	
7.87	 7.10	 7.17	 8.19	 6.96	 6.53	
6.	Semi-routine	
Occupations	
15.41	 17.43	 18.03	 17.67	 19.91	 19.20	
7.	Routine	Occupations	 12.41	 13.08	 13.59	 14.30	 15.93	 12.78	
8.	Never	Worked	and	
Long-term	Unemployed	
4.89	 10.43	 15.58	 7.97	 12.85	 21.29	
n	=	100%	 34,758,320	 441,914	 191,707	 432,640	 34,954	 10,272	
Source:		ONS	(2011)	Census:	Aggregate	Data	(England	and	Wales).	
	
	
Table	6.5	below	reveals	that	the	national	difference	between	White	British	and	
Black	Caribbean	females	in	Class	1	occupations	is	quite	marginal.		In	contrast,	
White	British	male	representation	in	the	same	professions	is	approximately	two	
thirds	more	than	that	of	their	Black	Caribbean	counterparts.		Table	6.6	(also	
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below)	reveals	that	by	2011	the	position	of	Black	Caribbeans	is	deteriorating	in	
Class	1.		Their	proportional	representation	has	reduced	from	two	thirds	and	is	
about	half	that	of	their	White	peers.		The	position	of	Black	Caribbean	females	in	
Class	1	has	also	decreased	in	2011,	but	not	noticeably	so.	
	
Table	6.5:	16-74	National	Socio-Economic	Classifications	by	Ethnicity	and	Gender,	2001	[%].	
	
NS-SEC	
Classes	
White		
British:	
Males	
Black	
Caribbean:	
Males	
MWBC:	
Males	
White		
British:	
Females	
Black	
Caribbean:	
Females	
MWBC:	
Females	
1.	Higher	Managerial	and	
Professional	Occupations	
15.05	 9.68	 8.84	 6.26	 6.08	 4.99	
2.	Lower	Managerial	and	
Professional	Occupations	
23.39	 18.83	 18.14	 26.59	 31.07	 22.81	
3.	Intermediate	
Occupations	
6.29	 8.46	 7.92	 19.58	 22.60	 18.20	
4.	Small	Employers	and	
Own	Account	Workers	
12.91	 8.49	 8.05	 5.45	 1.96	 2.78	
5.	Lower	Supervisory	and	
Technical	Occupations	
13.70	 12.40	 12.02	 5.74	 5.06	 5.84	
6.	Semi-routine	
Occupations	
10.67	 15.84	 15.33	 21.18	 18.43	 21.69	
7.	Routine	Occupations	 14.01	 15.79	 17.26	 10.48	 6.99	 10.27	
8.	Never	Worked	and	
Long-term	Unemployed	
3.18	 10.49	 12.43	 4.36	 7.79	 13.41	
n	=	100%	 12,883,625	 149,412	 34,836	 11,860,992	 177,150	 37,869	
Source:		ONS	(2001)	Census:	Aggregate	Data	(England	and	Wales).	
	
Table	6.6:	16-74	National	Socio-Economic	Classifications	by	Ethnicity	and	Gender,	2011	[%].	
	
NS-SEC	
Classes	
White	
British:	
Males	
	
Black		
Caribbean:	
Males	
MWBC:	
Males	
White	
British:	
Females	
Black	
Caribbean:	
Females	
MWBC:	
Females	
1.	Higher	Managerial	and	
Professional	Occupations	
14.66	 7.67	 7.10	 6.60	 6.29	 5.03	
2.	Lower	Managerial	and	
Professional	Occupations	
21.44	 16.66	 16.60	 23.98	 27.95	 20.95	
3.	Intermediate	
Occupations	
7.40	 8.95	 8.41	 21.87	 21.16	 18.55	
4.	Small	Employers	and	
Own	Account	Workers	
14.49	 10.65	 10.49	 5.98	 3.35	 4.04	
5.	Lower	Supervisory	and	
Technical	Occupations	
11.77	 10.68	 9.73	 4.56	 4.06	 4.67	
6.	Semi-routine	
Occupations	
11.30	 16.00	 14.94	 20.10	 18.66	 21.06	
7.	Routine	Occupations	 14.42	 17.40	 16.53	 11.13	 9.41	 10.70	
8.	Never	Worked	and	
Long-term	Unemployed	
4.32	 11.99	 16.19	 5.68	 9.10	 14.99	
n	=	100%	 16,917,381	 203,209	 94,898	 17,840,939	 238,705	 96,839	
Source:		ONS	(2011)	Census:	Aggregate	Data	(England	and	Wales).	
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Between	2001	and	2011,	Black	Caribbean	female	representation	in	Class	1	
occupations	has	remained	in	line	with	their	White	counterparts.		They	have	also	
maintained	a	higher	national	representation	than	White	British	females	in	Class	
2	occupations.		Class	2	occupations	consist	of	employment	in	Levels	4,	5	and	6	
of	the	SOC2010	(Rose	and	Pevalin,	2010:	8-9).		They	range	from	National	
Government	Administrative	Occupations	at	the	top	of	Level	4,	to	Caring	and	
Personal	Services	at	the	bottom	of	Level	6.		Nurses	and	care	workers	are	
examples	of	professions	located	towards	the	bottom	of	Level	6.		The	dominant	
representation	of	African	Caribbean	females	in	Class	2	occupations	seems	to	
indicate	they	are	improving	their	class	status.		However,	it	is	difficult	to	tell	
exactly	which	occupations	they	are	accessing.		They	could	be	concentrated	in	
the	lower	tier	Caring	and	Personal	Services	within	Level	6	of	the	SOC2010,	
rather	than	the	higher	tier	Government	and	Related	Organisations;	and	
Administrative	and	Finance	Occupations	of	Level	4	(ibid,	2010).		Therefore,	
there	could	still	be	a	tendency	for	Black	females	to	choose	nursing	as	a	
profession,	just	as	they	did	in	the	1970s	(Ratcliffe,	1981).		
	
	
The	national	difference	between	White	and	Black	females	in	Class	8	has	
remained	stable	between	2001	and	2011.		However,	there	are	comparatively	
more	African	Caribbean	females	employed	in	routine	employment	over	the	
same	period.		Unemployment	amongst	MWBC	females	has	remained	constant	
between	2001	and	2011,	at	approximately	three	times	higher	than	their	White	
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counterparts.		Tables	6.7	and	6.8	below	reveal	that	in	contrast	to	their	female	
peers,	Black	Caribbean	males	in	Birmingham	have	a	higher	representation	in	
routine	employment.		There	are	also	less	Black	Caribbean	males	employed	in	
Class	1	occupations	in	2011.		The	disparity	between	Black	Caribbean	males	and	
their	White	counterparts	in	Class	8	is	marginally	less	in	2011	than	it	was	in	
2001.		However,	the	2011	representation	of	Black	males	in	Class	2	occupations	
is	almost	six	times	less	than	in	the	previous	decade.		During	the	same	period,	
White	British	males	and	females	have	increased	their	representation	over	their	
Black	Caribbean	counterparts	in	the	Class	3	Intermediate	Occupations.		
However,	Birmingham’s	Black	Caribbean	females	have	improved	their	
representation	in	Class	1	and	2	in	2011.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 249	
Table	6.7:	16-74	Birmingham	Socio-Economic	Classifications	by	Ethnicity	and	Gender,	2001	
[%].	
	
NS-Sec	
Classes	
White	
British:	
Males	
Black	
Caribbean:	
Males	
MWBC:	
Males	
White	
British:	
Females	
Black	
Caribbean:	
Females	
MWBC:	
Females	
1.	Higher	Managerial	and	
Professional	Occupations	
13.11	 6.23	 5.07	 6.04	 4.07	 3.45	
2.	Lower	Managerial	and	
Professional	Occupations	
20.98	 13.96	 14.02	 25.10	 28.05	 17.74	
3.	Intermediate	
Occupations	
6.52	 6.87	 7.44	 19.90	 22.64	 18.73	
4.	Small	Employers	and	
Own	Account	Workers	
9.27	 5.57	 5.21	 3.09	 1.61	 1.71	
5.	Lower	Supervisory	and	
Technical	Occupations	
14.39	 12.86	 10.42	 5.72	 5.37	 5.58	
6.	Semi-routine	
Occupations	
14.30	 19.63	 19.00	 21.48	 18.65	 21.55	
7.	Routine	Occupations	 15.09	 18.58	 17.72	 11.34	 9.62	 11.06	
8.	Never	Worked	and	
Long-term	Unemployed	
6.29	 16.24	 21.09	 7.28	 9.96	 20.14	
n	=	100%	 171,330	 11,835	 2,110	 161,138	 14,074	 2,631	
Source:		ONS	(2001)	Census:	Aggregate	Data	(England	and	Wales).	
	
Table	6.8:	16-74	Birmingham	Socio-Economic	Classifications	by	Ethnicity	and	Gender,	2011	
[%].	
	
NS-SEC	
Classes	
White		
British:	
Males	
Black	
Caribbean:	
Males	
MWBC:	
Males	
White	
British:	
Females	
Black	
Caribbean:	
Females	
MWBC:	
Females	
1.	Higher	Managerial	and	
Professional	Occupations	
12.47	 5.36	 4.75	 6.39	 4.53	 3.68	
2.	Lower	Managerial	and	
Professional	Occupations	
18.81	 12.92	 15.04	 21.96	 26.39	 19.57	
3.	Intermediate		
Occupations	
7.98	 7.36	 8.69	 21.77	 19.33	 17.54	
4.	Small	Employers	and	
Own	Account	Workers	
10.78	 8.34	 7.90	 3.43	 2.62	 2.89	
5.	Lower	Supervisory	and	
Technical	Occupations	
11.88	 10.43	 8.45	 4.74	 4.10	 4.77	
6.	Semi-routine	
Occupations	
14.50	 19.75	 16.20	 20.63	 20.05	 21.95	
7.	Routine	Occupations	 15.87	 20.12	 15.45	 12.82	 12.48	 10.35	
8.	Never	Worked	and	
Long-term	Unemployed	
7.69	 15.72	 23.52	 8.24	 10.50	 19.25	
n	=	100%	 208,923	 15,768	 4,901	 223,717	 19,186	 5,371	
Source:		ONS	(2011)	Census:	Aggregate	Data	(England	and	Wales).	
	
	
Class	3	occupations	fall	within	Level	7	of	the	SOC2010	(Rose	and	Pevalin,	2010:	
8).		They	include	clerical,	administrative,	technical,	auxiliary,	engineering	and	
service	occupations	(ONS,	2010a:	8),	which	all	require	specific	skills.		In	regard	
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to	the	social	mobility	of	Black	males	between	2001	and	2011,	it	is	problematic	
that	they	are	losing	ground	to	their	White	peers	in	this	occupational	class,	
whilst	increasing	their	representation	in	routine	occupations.		In	contrast,	Black	
females	have	practically	closed	the	gap	with	their	White	counterparts	in	Class	7	
occupations,	between	2001	and	2011,	to	the	extent	where	there	is	only	a	
nominal	difference	between	them.		Routine	employment	requires	fewer	skills	
and	consist	of	the	types	of	precarious	occupations	that	are	familiar	to	the	
majority	of	participants	in	this	research.		Over	the	same	period,	Black	Caribbean	
females	have	marginally	reduced	their	rate	of	unemployment	in	comparison	to	
that	of	their	White	female	peers.		In	comparison,	MWBCs	had	approximately	
three	times	the	rate	of	unemployment	as	their	White	British	peers.		Although	
the	unemployment	rate	of	MWBC	females	was	still	quite	high	in	2011,	it	is	
down	by	approximately	a	sixth	from	2001.	
	
	
The	situation	in	Birmingham	is	more	nuanced	where	Black	Caribbean,	and	
MWBC,	males	are	concerned.		The	disparity	in	unemployment	representations	
between	White	British	and	Black	Caribbean	males	is	slightly	less	than	it	was	in	
2001.		However,	despite	having	a	lower	representation	in	routine	employment	
in	2011,	MWBC	male	representation	in	Class	8	is	three	times	greater	than	that	
of	their	White	peers.		Moreover,	their	unemployment	situation	is	worse	than	it	
was	in	the	previous	decade.		Although	there	were	proportionally	two	and	a	half	
times	more	White	British	males	employed	in	Class	1	in	2001,	in	comparison	to	
their	MWBC	counterparts,	the	disparity	between	their	representations	
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marginally	decreased	by	2011.		Class	2	representations	between	the	same	
ethnic	groups	in	2011,	have	reduced	to	half	of	what	it	was	in	the	previous	
decade.		The	national	data	in	Tables	6.5	and	6.6	above	also	reveal	a	different	
trend	to	the	Birmingham	data.		MWBCs	males	have	improved	their	
representation	in	Class	2	occupations,	whereas	their	situation	has	deteriorated	
in	respect	of	Class	1.		Moreover,	their	propensity	for	unemployment	has	also	
increased	and	it	is	still	approximately	four	times	higher	than	that	of	their	White	
British	peers.	
	
	
Table	6.9	below	reveals	the	national	25-49212	age	representations	of	African	
Caribbeans,	and	their	MWBC	counterparts	in	Class	1	and	Class	2	occupations,	
have	deteriorated	between	2001	and	2011.		African	Caribbeans	also	have	over	
twice	the	representation	of	their	White	British	peers	in	Class	8,	and	the	
numbers	have	increased	over	the	decade.		MWBCs	have	approximately	three	
time	the	representation	of	their	White	British	peers	in	Class	8	and	that	position	
has	hardly	changed	from	2001	to	2011.		Out	of	the	three	ethnic	groups	there	
are	proportionally	more	White	British	workers	employed	as	routine	workers	in	
2001.		However,	by	2011	there	was	very	little	difference	between	them	and	
Black	Caribbeans	in	this	class,	whereas	MWBCs	have	significantly	increased	
their	representation	in	Class	7.		Black	Caribbeans	have	the	highest	proportional	
																																								 																				
212	As	noted	earlier	and	argued	in	Chapter	Five,	the	optimum	age-stage	of	upward	social	
mobility	is	between	the	ages	of	25	and	49.		It	is	usually	the	case	that	by	their	late	40s,	most	
individuals	would	have	achieved	their	highest	labour	market	position.		Thus,	if	educational	
capital	is	to	be	exchanged	for	economic	capital	at	the	earliest	opportunity,	then	the	process	
should	commence	whilst	actors	are	in	their	early	to	mid-twenties.				
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representation	in	the	Intermediate	Occupations.		However,	all	the	data	above	
suggests	that	females,	rather	than	males	are	driving	this	position.		Changes	in	
the	top	and	bottom	NS-SEC	classes,	between	2001	and	2011,	suggest	that	
nationally	African	Caribbeans	are	not	improving	their	occupational	status	in	the	
crucial	25-49	age-range.		
	
Table	6.9:	25-49	National	Socio-Economic	Classifications	by	Ethnicity,	2001*-2011	[%].	
	
NS-SEC	
Classes	
White	
British:	
2001	
Black		
Caribbean:		
2001	
MWBC:	
2001	
White	
British:	
2011	
Black	
Caribbean:	
2011	
MWBC:	
2011	
1.	Higher	Managerial	and	
Professional	Occupations	
12.60	 9.80	 9.17	 13.09	 9.18	 7.80	
2.	Lower	Managerial	and	
Professional	Occupations	
27.41	 27.58	 25.24	 26.71	 25.85	 21.96	
3.	Intermediate	Occupations	 12.49	 17.53	 13.24	 14.61	 17.65	 13.85	
4.	Small	Employers	and	Own	
Account	Workers	
8.80	 5.16	 5.54	 9.85	 6.83	 8.13	
5.	Lower	Supervisory	and	
Technical	Occupations	
10.00	 7.95	 9.23	 7.56	 6.18	 6.96	
6.	Semi-routine	Occupations	 14.32	 14.93	 15.54	 13.33	 14.57	 16.12	
7.	Routine	Occupations	 10.91	 8.92	 9.76	 9.87	 9.15	 12.11	
8.	Never	Worked	and	Long-term	
Unemployed	
3.45	 8.12	 12.28	 4.65	 10.57	 13.06	
n	=	100%	 733,497	 11,423	 4,961	 14,445,436	 230,498	 109,725	
Source:	UK	Data	Service	Small	Area	Micro	data	[S.A.M.]	(2001)	Census;	ONS	(2011)	Census:	Aggregate	Data	(England	
and	Wales).	
*The	2001	data	is	calculated	from	a	five	per	cent	sample	of	Census	Anonymised	Records	Small	Area	Microdata	(SAM).	
	
	
The	national	gender	data	for	the	25-49	age-range	reveals	significant	
employment	differences	between	males	and	females.		Tables	6.10	and	6.11	
below	highlight	the	general	trend	of	higher	female	national	representation	in	
Classes	1	and	2.	Proportionally	more	Black	Caribbean	females	are	obtaining	
employment	within	the	higher	occupational	sectors	of	the	labour	market,	in	
comparison	to	their	male	counterparts.		Although	the	representation	of	Black	
females	in	Class	8	is	practically	double	that	of	their	White	female	counterparts,	
there	are	proportionally	fewer	of	them	in	Class	7.		Black	females	also	have	a	
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higher	representation	than	White	females	in	Class	2	and	there	has	been	little	
variation	in	their	Class	1	positions	between	2001	and	2011.		This	supports	the	
data	above,	which	suggests	that	females	are	doing	better	in	this	age-range	than	
their	male	counterparts.	
	
Table	6.10:	25-49	National	Socio-Economic	Classifications	by	Ethnicity	and	Gender,	2001	[%].	
	
NS-SEC	
Classes	
White	
British:	
Males	
Black	
Caribbean:	
Males	
MWBC:	
Males	
White	
British:		
Females	
Black		
Caribbean:		
Females	
MWBC:	
Females	
1.	Higher	Managerial	and	
Professional	Occupations	
17.10	 12.58	 11.63	 7.84	 7.62	 7.04	
2.	Lower	Managerial	and	
Professional	Occupations	
25.46	 20.89	 22.18	 29.48	 32.83	 27.89	
3.	Intermediate	
Occupations	
6.06	 8.49	 7.68	 19.27	 24.62	 18.07	
4.	Small	Employers	and		
Own	Account	Workers	
12.26	 9.23	 8.38	 5.15	 1.97	 3.09	
5.	Lower	Supervisory	and		
Technical	Occupations	
14.10	 11.98	 12.72	 5.68	 4.79	 6.21	
6.	Semi-routine	
Occupations	
9.40	 13.79	 12.28	 19.51	 15.82	 18.36	
7.	Routine	Occupations	 12.65	 13.87	 13.28	 9.08	 5.04	 6.70	
8.	Never	Worked	and		
Long-term	Unemployed	
2.95	 9.17	 11.85	 3.98	 7.31	 12.64	
n	=	100%	 376,551	 5,017	 2,304	 356,946	 6,406	 2,657	
Source:	UK	Data	Service	Small	Area	Micro	data	[S.A.M.]	(2001)	Census	(5	per	cent	sample).	
	
Table	6.11:	25-49	National	Socio-Economic	Classifications	by	Ethnicity	and	Gender,	2011	[%].	
	
NS-SEC	
Classes	
White	
British:	
Males	
Black	
Caribbean:	
Males	
MWBC:	
Males	
White	
British:	
Females	
Black	
Caribbean:	
Females	
MWBC:	
Females	
1.	Higher	Managerial	and	
Professional	Occupations	
16.24	 9.70	 8.98	 9.94	 8.74	 6.67	
2.	Lower	Managerial	and	
Professional	Occupations	
24.43	 20.84	 19.55	 28.98	 30.14	 24.27	
3.	Intermediate	
Occupations	
7.79	 10.54	 8.57	 21.42	 23.74	 18.90	
4.	Small	Employers	and	
Own	Account	Workers	
13.80	 10.55	 11.90	 5.89	 3.65	 4.52	
5.	Lower	Supervisory	and	
Technical	Occupations	
10.85	 9.12	 9.38	 4.28	 3.65	 4.65	
6.	Semi-routine	
Occupations	
9.86	 13.08	 12.77	 16.81	 15.85	 19.34	
7.	Routine	Occupations	 12.15	 13.93	 15.35	 7.60	 5.06	 9.01	
8.	Never	Worked	and	
Long-term	Unemployed	
4.44	 12.23	 13.49	 4.86	 9.15	 12.64	
n	=	100%	 7,214,314	 106,313	 53,672	 7,231,032	 124,185	 56,053	
Source:				ONS	(2011)	Census:	Aggregate	Data	(England	and	Wales).	
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Table	6.12	below	for	Birmingham	also	reveals	that	Black	Caribbean	females	are	
improving	their	social	mobility	more	so	than	their	male	peers	in	the	25-49	age-
range.		Although	White	males	have	more	than	double	the	representation	of	
their	Black	Caribbean	peers	in	Class	1	occupations,	Black	females	is	
approximately	a	third	lower	than	their	White	British	counterparts.		The	
disparity	between	White	and	Black	females	in	Class	8	is	also	similar	to	that	in	
Class	1.		In	comparison,	their	male	counterparts	have	more	than	double	the	
rate	of	unemployment	of	their	White	peers.		Although	Black	Caribbean	females	
have	a	higher	representation	than	their	White	counterparts	in	the	Routine	
Occupations,	the	gap	between	them	is	marginal	in	comparison	to	the	20	per	
cent	higher	representation	of	African	Caribbean	males	over	their	White	peers.		
There	is	also	a	greater	proportion	of	Black	females	than	White	females	
employed	in	Class	2	occupations.	
	
Table	6.12:	25-49	Birmingham	Socio-Economic	Classifications	by	Ethnicity	and	Gender,	2011	
[%].	
	
NS-SEC	
Classes	
White	
British:	
Males	
Black	
Caribbean:	
Males	
MWBC:	
Males	
White	
British:	
Females	
Black	
Caribbean:	
Females	
MWBC:	
Females	
1.	Higher	Managerial	and	
Professional	Occupations	
14.82	 6.68	 5.93	 9.80	 6.53	 4.52	
2.	Lower	Managerial	and	
Professional	Occupations	
22.22	 17.08	 17.67	 27.72	 29.30	 23.75	
3.	Intermediate	Occupations	 8.74	 9.10	 8.70	 21.49	 22.38	 18.03	
4.	Small	Employers	and		
Own	Account	Workers	
11.01	 8.64	 9.36	 3.51	 2.83	 3.34	
5.	Lower	Supervisory	and	
Technical	Occupations	
10.41	 9.08	 8.32	 4.34	 3.75	 4.86	
6.	Semi-routine	Occupations	 11.93	 15.62	 14.55	 16.87	 17.00	 19.46	
7.	Routine	Occupations	 12.77	 16.08	 14.24	 8.38	 7.33	 9.22	
8.	Never	Worked	and		
Long-term	Unemployed	
8.09	 17.72	 21.23	 7.88	 10.85	 16.80	
n	=	100%	 91,299	 7,722	 2,886	 92,269	 9,806	 3,166	
Source:		ONS	(2011)	Census:	Aggregate	Data	(England	and	Wales).	
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Regardless	of	their	gender,	Black	Caribbeans,	and	MWBCs,	have	higher	
proportional	representations	than	their	respective	counterparts	have	in	Semi-
routine	Occupations	in	Birmingham.		However,	the	disparity	between	White	
and	Black	females	is	marginal.		In	line	with	the	national	data,	MWBCs	have	the	
highest	representations	in	Class	8,	which	is	almost	three	times	higher	than	their	
White	peers.		In	contrast	the	proportion	of	their	female	counterparts	in	the	
same	occupational	class	is	twice	as	high	as	that	of	White	British	females.		
Overall,	the	25-49	age-range	data	indicates	that	the	occupational	status	of	
Black	Caribbean	females	is	gradually	improving,	as	their	employment	positions	
are	similar	to	those	of	their	White	female	peers.		Their	representation	in	
Classes	1	and	2	also	suggest	that	as	Black	females	are	getting	older	their	
employment	opportunities	and	income	are	increasing	in	a	normative	way.		This	
facilitates	the	process	in	which	social	mobility	can,	to	some	extent,	become	
‘easy	and	typical’	(Weber	in	Smith,	2007:	87),	as	they	might	be	exchanging	their	
educational	capital	for	economic	capital.		However,	the	comparatively	higher	
representations	of	their	male	counterparts	in	the	lower	NS-SEC	occupations	
clearly	indicates	their	social	status	is	deteriorating.		Whereas	Black	females	are	
increasing	their	acquisition	of	labour	market	Goods,	Black	males	are	procuring	
more	economic	Bads.	
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Labour	market	penalties	and	discouraged	workers	
	
Heath	and	Cheung’s	(2006)	analysis	of	ethnic	competition	in	the	labour	market	
conflates	the	data	of	first	and	second-generation	immigrants213.		They	argue	
that	Black	Caribbeans	can	be	perceived	as	‘discouraged	workers’	(ibid,	2006:	10	
[my	emphasis]).		This	is	because	‘difficulty	in	obtaining	work	[…]	might	
discourage	some	workers	eventually	from	even	looking	for	work’	(ibid,	2006:	
10).		Out	of	the	three	ethnic	groups	analysed	in	this	research,	MWBCs	have	the	
youngest	population.		Their	relative	youth	suggests	they	might	not	yet	have	
developed	the	requisite	skills	needed	for	particular	types	of	employment.		This	
may	also	explain	their	comparatively	high	rates	of	unemployment.		However,	
the	prevalence	of	racial	discrimination	in	the	labour	market	might	still	be	
discouraging	unemployed	Black	Caribbeans	from	engaging	in	the	competition	
for	economic	Goods.			
	
	
Heath	and	Cheung	(2006:	2)	suggest	that	‘unequal	treatments	on	the	grounds	
of	race	or	colour’	are	examples	of	ethnic	penalties	experienced	by	Black	
																																								 																				
213	In	Chapter	Two	I	argued	that	applying	the	label	of	second-generation	immigrants	to	British-
born	Blacks	reifies	racism.		This	is	because	it	implies	that	Whiteness	constitutes	Britishness,	
whereas	Blackness	is	perceived	as	Otherness.		This	racialised	Othering	overlooks	the	
commonalty	of	a	shared	British	national	identity.		The	epistemological	problem	of	the	label	is	
epitomized	in	the	way	that	White	children	of	Irish	parentage	are	referred	to	as	British,	rather	
than	second-generation	Irish.		Moreover,	Ed	Miliband,	the	former	leader	of	the	Labour	Party	–	
whose	Polish	and	Belgian	parents	speak	English	as	a	second	language	–	has	never	been	labelled	
as	a	second-generation	Polish	or	Belgian	immigrant.		However,	children	born	in	the	UK	of	
Jamaican	parentage,	who	may	never	have	been	to	the	Caribbean,	are	classified	as	second-
generation	immigrants.		This	is	despite	their	English-speaking	parents	originating	from	an	
island	that	was	ruled	by	Britain	for	hundreds	of	years	(Black,	1991).		The	common	denominator	
of	identity,	in	the	examples	of	the	Irish	and	Miliband	above,	is	their	Whiteness.	
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Caribbeans	in	labour	market	situations.		Heath	and	McMahon	(1997,	in	ibid,	
2006:	5)	define	ethnic	penalties	as,	‘the	disadvantages	that	ethnic	minorities	
experience	in	the	labour	market	compared	with	British	Whites	of	the	same	age	
and	human	capital’.		Therefore,	such	penalties	might	account	for	net	
differentials	in	labour	market	Bads:	i.e.	disparities	in	unemployment,	income,	
and	occupational	positions,	between	ethnic	groups.		Nevertheless,	evidence	of	
ethnic	penalties	does	not	explain	why	they	occur	in	the	first	place	(ibid,	2006:	
20).		Structural	inequalities	in	the	employment	sector,	such	as	gender	
discrimination	and	institutional	racism,	are	macro-level	factors	of	ethnic	
penalties.		However,	the	example	of	Subject	G	also	highlights	the	micro-level	
choices	and	constraints	that	can	discourage	labour	market	participation.		
	
	
Subject	G	is	a	forty-three-year-old	African	Caribbean	female	who	lives	with	her	
seven-year-old	daughter	and	mother	in	a	council	owned	property	in	Newtown,	
Birmingham.		It	is	a	working-class	area	with	a	high	proportion	of	social	housing.		
She	has	two	children:	her	son,	who	she	had	at	16,	is	27	and	lives	in	Bristol.			
Subject	G	left	school	without	any	qualifications,	she	has	never	worked	and	has	
always	lived	with	her	mother.		Her	habitus	has	been	constructed	around	
notions	of	motherhood,	within	the	field	of	the	family:	
	
‘I	just	see	myself	as	a	mum;	someone	who’s	trying	to	do	her	best.		
I’ve	never	worked	or	thought	about	going	to	college.		I	just	went	
through	life	as	a	mother,	taking	care	of	my	son	and	then	later	on	I	
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had	my	daughter.		I	get	Disability	Living	Allowance	for	my	seven-year	
old	daughter	who	has	Type	1	diabetes,	so	I	can’t	really	work.		It’s	
really	difficult	living	off	benefits,	but	I	have	to	be	there	for	my	
daughter’	(Subject	G,	8th	August	2013,	Birmingham).	
	
To	many	African	Caribbean	females	their	families	are	social	capital,	providing	
‘values	[…]	and	resources	[…]	they	can	access	[…],	which	[…]	are	the	result	of	
collective	and	socially	negotiated	ties	and	relationships’	(Reynolds,	2006:	1088).		
However,	Subject	G’s	unemployed	status	is	a	gender	penalty,	which	is	a	
consequence	of	her	family	attachments.		She	is	unable	to	work	because	she	
cares	for	her	diabetic	daughter.		Moreover,	her	decision	to	raise	her	children	
without	the	support	of	a	male	partner	can	also	be	viewed	as	a	‘non-marriage	
penalty’214	(Gottfried,	2013:	241).		Unemployed	lone-parent	females	often	have	
to	exist	on	welfare	payments	and	live	in	households	that	have	below	the	
accepted	minimum	standard	of	income	(Padley,	Valadez	and	Hirsch,	2015:	18).		
The	escalating	cost	of	nursery	care	also	constrains	their	labour	market	
participation.		Since	2010,	‘Britain’s	poorest	families	are	having	to	find	
substantial	sums	to	make	up	the	shortfall	between	part-time	childcare	costs,	
and	the	maximum	amount	[…]	they	can	claim	under	working	tax	credits’	(Hill	
and	Adams,	2015),	which	further	compounds	their	welfare	dependency.		
	
	
																																								 																				
214	Patriarchy	is	to	some	extent	a	feature	of	Japanese	society.		Successful	male	executives	are	
supported	in	the	private	domain	by	their	“stay-at-home	wives”	(Gottfried,	2013:	241),	whilst	
unmarried	females	incur	institutional	disadvantages.	
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Reynolds	(2006:	1094)	contends	that	Caribbean	families	are	historically	
resilient,	as	they	are	able	to	‘modify	and	reconfigure	themselves	to	suit	the	
specific	social	and	political	context’,	which	is	to	some	extent	demonstrated	by	
Subject	G.		Her	responsibility	as	a	carer	discourages	her	labour	market	
engagement,	whilst	incurring	a	poverty	penalty.		Although	her	‘emotion	work’	
(Hochschild,	2003:	7)	is	undertaken	within	the	private	context	of	her	home,	it	
does	not	translate	into	economic	capital.		Therefore,	it	is	not	considered	as	real	
work.		Subject	G’s	domestic	responsibilities	highlight	how	the	relatively	high	
unemployment	rates	of	Black	Caribbean	–	and	other	precariat	–	females	might	
not	just	be	a	consequence	of	ethnic	penalties	in	the	labour	market.		Lifestyle	
choices	and	family	constraints	might	also	incur	gender	penalties,	which	
discourage	their	labour	market	participation.		Thus,	the	NS-SEC	Class	8	status	of	
Black	females	can	be	a	consequence	of	structural	and	political	changes	
affecting	the	labour	market,	and	the	dearth	of	available	employment	
opportunities	for	unskilled	workers	(Standing,	2011).		However,	the	
employment	status	of	females	can	also	be	influenced	by	their	attachments	in	
the	domestic	sphere.		
	
	
Whiteness	as	privilege	and	social	capital	
	
Bourdieu	(2010	[1984])	contends	that	the	middle-classes	maintain	their	
dominant	social	positions	by	accumulating	and	exchanging	three	forms	of	
capital:	i)	educational	capital;	ii)	economic	capital;	and	iii)	cultural	capital.		
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Bourdieu	defines	cultural	capital	as	the	knowledge,	tastes	and	pursuits	which	
distinguishes	the	middle-classes	from	their	working-class	counterparts215.		
However,	Bourdieu	overlooks	that	Whiteness	is	also	a	form	of	capital;	it	
denotes	power	and	bestows	privileges	by	virtue	of	individuals	sharing	the	same	
skin	colour.		Whiteness	is	therefore	‘a	kind	of	social	currency’	(Jacobson,	1998:	
11).		Hage	(2000,	in	Garner,	2007:	51)	also	concedes	that	‘Whiteness	[…]	can	be	
exchanged	for	Anglo	culture’.		Therefore,	the	disposition	–	or	habitus	–	of	
Whiteness	is	also	Goods,	which	can	be	commodified	in	labour	market	
interactions.		Whiteness	maintains	the	power	to	‘invent	and	change	the	rules	
[…],	transgress	them	with	impunity;	and	[…]	define	the	“Other”’	(ibid,	2007:	14).		
Thus,	in	the	Bourdieusian	sense,	Whiteness	is	a	fourth	type	of	social	capital	that	
can	be	appropriated	in	economic	relations.		However,	Whiteness	is	not	unique	
to	the	middle-classes,	as	it	is	skin	colour	that	signifies	membership	and	the	
power	to	exercise	its	rights	and	privileges.		It	could	therefore	be	argued	that	in	
the	context	of	labour	market	competition,	the	White	working-classes	can	
exchange	their	Whiteness	for	economic	capital.			
	
	
Tables	6.3	and	6.4	above	reveal	that	between	2001	and	2011	nationally,	White	
British	and	MWBCs	have	had	higher	national	representation	than	African	
Caribbeans	in	Class	4	Occupations.		The	idea	that	Whiteness	can	give	its	
members	advantages	in	economic	situations	might	explain	this	phenomenon.		
Although	anti-discriminatory	policies,	such	as	the	Equal	Pay	Act	1970,	the	Sex	
																																								 																				
215	The	middle-classes	exchange	university	degrees	for	occupations	in	the	higher	tiers	of	the	
NS-SEC.		Their	leisure	and	cultural	pursuits	often	reflect	their	high	income	status.		
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Discrimination	Act	1975,	The	Race	Relations	Act	1976	(and	its	2000	
Amendment)	and	the	Equality	Act	2010,	apply	to	both	the	private	and	public	
sectors,	they	are	difficult	to	monitor	–	and	therefore	regulate	–	within	the	
private	sector.		The	occupations	in	Class	4	are	those	in	Levels	Eight	and	Nine	of	
the	SOC2010,	which	includes	the	self-employed	(Rose	and	Pevalin,	2010:	8-9).		
Class	4	is	to	some	extent	representative	of	the	petite	bourgeoisie	in	an	
occupational	hierarchy:	i.e.	small	and	medium	sized	self-employed	businesses	
and	individuals,	competing	to	provide	a	range	of	services	for	larger	companies	
or	directly	to	consumers.		Class	4	occupations	might	appeal	to	Black	workers	
with	low	level	educational	capital,	as	‘there	are	no	formal	academic	entry	
requirements,	though	some	GCSE	grades	can	be	an	advantage’	(ONS,	2010b:	
214).		Moreover,	the	occupational	skills	required	are	often	learned	within	the	
workplace.		This	also	means	that	employers	would	have	to	invest	time	and	
capital	in	their	employees,	in	order	to	maximise	the	growth	and	development	
of	their	businesses.			
	
	
Small,	independent	organisations	often	deal	face-to-face	with	their	consumers	
and	are	conscious	of	how	they	perceive	racial	Others.		Consequently,	Class	4	
employers	might	choose	not	to	employ	–	or	restrict	the	numbers	of	–	Black	
workers,	because	of	the	negative	way	they	are	generally	perceived	by	their	
customers216.		They	might	instead	employ	more	MWBCs	who	they	might	see	as	
																																								 																				
216	Taylor	(1993:	120)	highlights	how	employers	perceived	West	Indian	workers	in	the	1950s.		
Although	racial	discrimination	might	not	be	as	pronounced	in	the	contemporary	labour	
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being	more	similar217.		Moreover,	MWBCs	may	also	commodify	their	Whiteness	
and	exchange	it	for	economic	capital	in	business	transactions	with	White	
consumers.		Class	4	employers	might	also	validate	decisions	to	restrict	the	
number	of	Black	employees	by	referring	to	market	factors,	rather	than	
attributing	their	judgment	to	personal	prejudices.		This	is	not	a	new	
phenomenon.		In	the	1950s	Birmingham’s	Transport	Department	justified	the	
colour	bar	on	Black	workers	by	citing	their	ineptitude,	and	that	their	presence	
would	cause	resentment	amongst	White	workers218.		Although	it	is	no	longer	
easy	for	public	sector	employers	to	racially	discriminate	in	the	same	manner,	
the	same	equality	duties	that	apply	to	small	organisations	are	more	easily	
circumvented	in	the	private	sector.	
	
	
Garner	(2007:	47)	argues	that	Whiteness	bestows	social	privileges	upon	White	
people,	whereas	‘it	impacts	negatively	on	people	of	colour’.		The	power	of	
Whiteness	is	reinforced	through	a	racial	contract,	in	which	‘all	Whites	are	
beneficiaries	[…],	though	some	Whites	are	not	signatories	to	it’	(Miles,	1997	in	
Garner,	2007:	25).		The	racial	contract	is	a	‘set	of	formal,	informal	or	meta-
agreements	between’	those	who	are	identified	by	the	racial	marker	of	their	skin	
colour	as	being	White	(ibid,	2007:	25).		As	such,	White	consumers	might	also	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 													
market,	there	is	nothing	to	suggest	that	the	racialised	perceptions	of	Black	workers	in	the	
1950s	no	longer	resonate	with	the	experiences	of	their	modern	counterparts.	
217	I	have	argued	in	Chapter	Three	that	not	all	MWBCs	see	themselves	as	Black.		Moreover,	
their	social	networks	will	also	contain	Whites	as	both	friends	and	relatives.		Therefore,	they	
might	be	more	successful	operating	self-employed	businesses	than	their	Caribbean	
counterparts,	because	they	are	able	to	attract	a	wider	range	of	consumers.	
218	See	Chapter	2	(Gunter,	1954).	
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appropriate	their	Whiteness	as	a	commodity	in	business	interactions.		
Whiteness	can	expedite	transactions	involving	goods	and	services,	and	facilitate	
the	flow	of	capital	between	those	who	have	the	same	physical	and	cultural	
markers.		Although	Blacks	might	have	a	business	that	provides	the	same	service	
as	their	White	competitors,	White	consumers	may	choose	not	to	use	them.		As	
the	majority	of	the	UK’s	population	is	White	British	they	represent	the	
dominant	provider	of	market	services	and	they	are	also	the	major	consumer	
group.		In	contrast,	African	Caribbeans	are	a	minority	population	and	their	
businesses	are	often	based	in	areas	of	high	social	and	material	deprivation,	
which	are	populated	by	low-income	consumers.		Therefore,	the	limited	
spending	powers	of	their	customer	base	constrains	the	growth	of	African	
Caribbean	businesses.		This	highlights	how	Blackness	is	conceived	as	Bads	in	
economic	relations	and	incurs	sanctions	in	the	form	of	limited	opportunities.		
This	explanation	might	account	for	the	perpetual	dearth	of	self-employed	Black	
workers	and	businesses.	
	
	
Whiteness	as	a	labour	market	class	habitus		
	
Heath	and	Cheung	(2006:	66)	contend	that	labour	market	‘prejudice	tends	to	
rely	on	stereotyping,	on	the	basis	of	irrelevant	visible	characteristics	such	as	
skin	colour’.		Although	racial	prejudice	influences	ethnic	disparities	in	
occupational	class	positions,	it	is	often	overlooked	in	its	analysis.		In	2013	the	
West	Midlands	had	the	highest	number	of	people	nationally	who	admitted	to	
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being	racially	prejudiced	(NatCen	Social	Research,	2014).		Moreover,	the	
Personal	Services	and	Supervisor	occupations,	which	consist	of	the	kinds	of	
face-to-face	consumer	services	that	are	predominant	in	NS-SEC	Class	4,	also	
recorded	a	high	degree	of	racial	prejudice	amongst	its	workforce	(ibid,	2014).		
This	suggests	that	racial	discrimination	remains	a	persisting	problem	for	Black	
workers	trying	to	improve	their	occupational	status,	despite	the	passing	of	the	
RRA1976,	RRAA2000	and	the	EA2010.		However,	public	sector	organisations	
tend	to	offer	more	protection	against	racial	discrimination	than	those	in	the	
private	sector.		This	is	because	the	RRA1976,	and	its	2000	Amendment,	was	
never	regulated	as	rigorously	in	the	private	sector	as	it	was	in	the	public	sector	
(Heath	and	Cheung,	2006).			
	
	
Whiteness	also	advantages	White	workers,	in	the	lower	tiers	of	the	economy,	
where	the	competition	to	improve	one’s	occupational	status	is	fiercest.		White	
workers	in	the	Semi-routine	and	Routine	Occupations	of	Classes	6	and	7	can	
create	spaces	of	White	privilege	in	which	their	habitus	is	reproduced	by	
practices	in	the	field	of	work219	(Bourdieu,	2010	[1984]).		This	is	also	
acknowledged	by	Gwaltney	(1980,	in	Garner,	2007:	14)	who	argues	‘White	
people	think	you	are	your	work	[…]	Black	people	think	that	my	work	is	just	what	
I	have	to	do	to	get	what	I	want’.		The	proximity	of	Blacks	in	the	workplace	can	
make	White	workers	feel	that	their	working-class	habitus	is	being	
compromised.		
																																								 																				
219	Bourdieu	(2000,	[1984])	defines	the	habitus	as	a	class	disposition	and	field	are	the	social	
spaces	(or	structures)	in	which	the	habitus	is	reproduced.	
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The	feeling	of	not	wanting	to	be	seen	as	“White	trash	or	a	Chav”	(Garner,	2007:	
75	[emphasis	added])	can	facilitate	hegemonic	Whiteness.		White	workers	
might	perceive	they	have	fallen	to	the	bottom	of	the	social	ladder,	because	
they	share	the	same	occupational	status	as	racially	subordinated	Others.		As	
such,	the	daily	visibility	of	Black	Others	in	the	workplace	reaffirms	what	it	feels	
like	to	be	White	trash	(ibid,	2007).		This	collective	sense	of	social	inadequacy	
can	sometimes	reproduce	a	habitus	of	White	supremacy	(Gillborn,	2005).		In	
the	context	of	the	workplace	this	can	be	expressed	by	appropriating	spaces	to	
advantage	White	workers,	whilst	disadvantaging	their	Black	counterparts.		This	
can	also	have	the	effect	of	discouraging	(Heath	and	Cheung,	2006)	Blacks	to	
apply	for	vacancies	in	places	of	employment	where	they	form	a	highly	visible	
minority.				
	
	
The	unavailability	of	work	in	Birmingham,	which	demands	specific	skills,	might	
to	some	extent	account	for	the	comparatively	high	rate	of	Black	Caribbeans	
employed	in	the	Semi-routine	and	Routine	Occupations.		However,	it	does	not	
explain	why	some	might	be	discouraged	from	applying	for	unskilled	
employment	–	and	as	a	consequence	contribute	to	the	unemployment	statistics	
of	those	in	Class	8.		In	the	1950s	Birmingham	had	a	colour	bar	policy	in	private	
and	public	sector	workplaces	(Gunter,	1954;	Taylor,	1993).		Although	the	colour	
bar	has	been	officially	outlawed	by	successive	Race	Relations	Acts	(Ratcliffe,	
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2004),	subtle	exclusionary	practices	might	be	covertly	operating	within	the	field	
of	paid	employment.			
	
	
Subject	E	became	a	victim	of	workplace	violence,	for	invading	a	space	that	
represented	the	‘psychological	wages	of	Whiteness’	(Garner,	2007:	27).		This	
idea	maintains	that	Whites	believe	they	have	a	higher	social	status	than	Blacks,	
which	demands	preferential	treatment	in	every	social	situation.		Subject	E	
started	working	in	a	Birmingham	car	production	plant	in	the	early	1990s.		
However,	he	was	unaware	of	the	workplace’s	racial	contract,	which	
underpinned	the	psychological	wages	of	Whiteness.		White	workers	designated	
specific	spaces	of	the	factory	as	zones	of	White	privilege.		Although	there	were	
no	physical	markers	demarcating	boundaries,	it	was	generally	accepted	that	a	
shop	floor	apartheid	existed.		White	workers	benefitted	from	this	practice	by	
excluding	Black	workers	from	using	the	facilities	in	their	racialised	space:	
	
‘I	was	really	green	when	I	first	started	working	there.		I	didn’t	realise	
what	was	going	on.		Me	and	this	White	kid	started	at	the	same	time	
and	we	worked	together	on	the	production	line.		After	breaks	and	
lunch	I	would	go	looking	for	him	in	the	area	that	he	hung	out.		The	
guys	‘round	there	used	to	give	me	funny	looks.		I	got	the	vibe	that	I	
weren’t	welcome.		I	just	ignored	it!		I	could	tell	it	was	a	racial	thing,	
but	I’ve	always	had	White	friends	and	I’m	the	type	of	person	who	
gets	on	with	everyone.		I	just	thought	that	once	they	got	to	know	me,	
all	the	dirty	looks	would	stop.		I	had	no	idea,	none	at	all!		I	didn’t	
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know	how	serious	they	felt	about	me,	until	things	started	to	happen’	
(Subject	E,	16th	October	2012,	Birmingham).		
	
At	first	his	locker	was	broken	into	and	human	excrement	was	left	inside.		Then	
his	work	clothes	went	missing,	only	to	turn	up	in	the	toilet	soaked	in	urine.		
Gollywogs,	and	other	derogatory	racial	caricatures,	were	left	by	his	workstation	
with	the	words	“nigger”	and	“fucking	coon”	written	on	them	next	to	his	name.		
He	nevertheless	persisted	in	entering	the	space	of	White	privilege.		White	
workers	would	deliberately	bump	into	him,	and	ask	him,	‘Since	when	were	
niggers	allowed	‘round	here’?		The	racist	bullying,	intimidation	and	threats,	
escalated	each	time	he	reported	them	to	his	manager.		A	few	days	after	Subject	
E	complained	that	he	was	the	target	of	racial	discrimination,	he	was	called	to	
his	manager’s	office.		His	manager	told	him	that	his	complaint	had	no	
substance,	and	that	he	must	stop	causing	trouble	by	going	into	areas	where	he	
had	no	business:	
	
‘It	just	got	worse	and	worse!		I	turned	into	a	nervous	wreck.		I	
couldn’t	eat,	I	couldn’t	sleep,	but	I	had	to	go	there	every	day	because	
I	needed	the	job.		I	even	stopped	going	to	their	areas,	but	they	kept	
on	harassing	me.		Each	incident	I	told	the	manager	about	just	made	
things	worse	and	nothing	was	ever	done.		The	final	straw	was	when	
they	left	a	note	in	my	locker	telling	me	that	I	would	be	dead	before	
the	end	of	the	week.		When	I	went	to	the	manager’s	office	and	
showed	him	the	note,	he	said	that	I	must	stop	harassing	people!		
That	was	it	for	me.		I	had	nowhere	else	to	turn,	so	I	thought	I’m	going	
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to	end	it.		Right	here,	right	now’	(Subject	E,	16th	October	2012,	
Birmingham)!	
	
	
Subject	E	tried	to	commit	suicide	in	his	manager’s	office	by	repeatedly	stabbing	
himself	with	a	screwdriver.		He	was	taken	to	hospital	by	ambulance	and	never	
returned	to	his	job.		However,	he	received	financial	compensation	albeit	a	
derisory	amount.	His	labour	market	experiences	of	racism	have	discouraged	
him	from	seeking	paid	work.		He	has	not	worked	since	leaving	his	job	in	the	car	
plant.		During	our	interview,	Subject	E	showed	me	his	self-inflicted	wounds.		
The	scars	are	deep	and	have	disfigured	his	body.		His	injuries	are	an	
embodiment	of	the	psychological	trauma	of	racism.		Although	it	is	many	years	
since	he	left	hospital,	he	takes	anti-depressants	daily	and	does	not	feel	that	he	
is	capable	of	holding	down	a	full-time	job.		His	narrative	demonstrates	how	
racism	reinforces	White	privilege.		Subject	E’s	colleagues	and	manager	were	
signatories	of	the	racial	contract.		Their	White	privilege	allowed	them	to	
appropriate	symbolic	spaces,	which	organised	working	relationships	in	a	racial	
hierarchy.		Despite	his	employer’s	legal	duty	to	outlaw	racial	discrimination220,	
Subject	E	did	not	feel	protected	by	legislation.		His	experiences	reveal	how	easy	
it	is	for	private	sector	organisations	to	flaunt	race	legislation,	and	how	difficult	
it	is	for	employees	to	invoke	the	law	for	protection.			
	
	
																																								 																				
220	As	outlined	in	the	1976	(and	its	2000	Amendment)	Race	Relations	legislation.	
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There	is	no	simple	explanation	as	to	why	Black	Caribbeans,	and	MWBCs,	have	
three	and	four	times	the	representation	of	their	White	peers	in	NS-SEC	Class	8.		
Black	Caribbeans	may	consciously	avoid	seeking	employment	in	organisations	
where	they	believe	the	psychological	wages	of	Whiteness	regulate	working	
relations.		However,	it	might	not	be	the	fear	of	workplace	racism	that	
discourages	them	from	applying	for	particular	forms	of	employment.		They	
might	see	employment	applications	as	a	futile	exercise	if	they	believe	that	
White	applicants	would	take	priority	over	them,	because	of	the	colour	of	their	
skin	colour.		The	statutory	duty	of	organisations	to	monitor	inequalities	
requires	job	applicants	to	enter	their	ethnicity	on	application	forms.		However,	
this	process	is	a	double-edged	sword	for	minority	ethnics.		Blacks	applicants	
might	be	selected	for	interviews	by	organisations	that	have	no	intention	of	
employing	them,	just	so	that	it	appears	as	if	they	are	fulfilling	their	statutory	
duties.		Employers	can	also	hide	behind	bureaucratic	administration	procedures	
and	disregard	the	applications	of	minority	ethnic	candidates	for	reasons	that	
appear	to	be	legitimate.		
	
	
African	Caribbeans	employed	in	the	public	sector,	‘might	be	more	successful	in	
larger	firms,	which	have	more	formal	recruitment	and	promotion	procedures’	
(Heath	and	Cheung,	2006:	53).		Not	only	does	the	public	sector	offer	better	
employment	security	than	the	private	sector,	there	are	also	more	females	
employed	within	it:	22	per	cent	compared	to	12	per	cent	of	males	(Fawcett	
Society,	2013:	8).		As	highlighted	above,	Black	Caribbean	females	have	a	higher	
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rate	of	participation	in	Classes	1	and	2	than	their	male	counterparts.		The	
professions	in	those	Classes	can	include	employment	in	the	Public	
Administration,	Education	and	Health	sectors,	which	are	in	theory	more	
rigorously	regulated	by	equality	legislation	(Heath	and	Cheung,	2006:	52).		
Therefore,	it	is	possible	that	policies,	which	encourage	institutions	and	
organisations	to	monitor	diversity	and	equality,	may	have	facilitated	the	
occupational	status	of	African	Caribbean	females	in	public	sector	employment.			
	
	
Although	the	introduction	of	the	Equality	Acts	in	2006	and	2010,	has	to	some	
extent	downplayed	the	significance	of	racial	inequality	on	life	chances	and	
opportunities,	Black	Caribbean	females	continue	to	have	better	occupational	
positions	than	their	male	counterparts.		However,	the	Fawcett	Society	(2013)	
reveals	that	the	austerity	measures	of	the	present	government,	which	includes	
moving	more	jobs	from	the	public	to	the	private	sector,	will	have	a	detrimental	
impact	on	the	career	progression	of	all	females.		This	is	especially	as	‘the	
private	sector	tends	to	offer	women	reduced	pay	prospects	[…]	in	lower	paid	
work	[…],	part-time	work’	(ibid,	2013:	5).		Moreover,	although	the	gender	pay	
gap	may	have	narrowed,	females	in	different	employment	sectors	still	earn	on	
average	between	15-49	per	cent	less	than	their	male	counterparts	(Revesz,	
2016),	and	their	occupational	progress	has	practically	‘ground	to	a	halt	since	
the	recession’	(Fawcett,	2013:	5).		Nevertheless,	despite	these	structural	
obstacles,	African	Caribbean	females	–	in	Birmingham	and	nationally	–	have	
improved	their	occupational	status	over	the	past	two	decades.		
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Conclusion	
	
In	the	1970s	and	1980s	racism	mediated	the	employment	experiences	of	Black	
Britons,	just	as	it	had	for	their	West	Indian	forebears.		However,	routine	work	in	
the	manufacturing	and	production	industries	was	to	some	extent	long-term.		It	
provided	Black	males	with	the	security	of	contractual	employment	and	a	
regular	wage,	which	enabled	them	to	negotiate	the	immediate	risk	of	poverty.		
However,	masculine	industrial	occupations	have	to	a	great	extent	vanished,	
which	creates	new	risks	for	Black	males	in	the	contemporary	labour	market.	
	
	
Tertiary	labour	in	the	new	global	economy	is	often	precarious;	much	of	it	is	low-
paid,	short-term	and	offers	very	little	financial	security.		Employment	agencies	
mediate,	negotiate,	exploit	and	sanction	the	contractual	rights	of	workers.		
Legislation	also	regulates	the	suitability	of	workers	to	engage	in	particular	
forms	of	risk	related	employment	activities.		There	is	no	gendered	division	of	
labour	in	the	modern	economy,	and	individuals	are	encouraged	to	participate	
in	areas	that	were	previously	gender	specific.		Black	females	have	made	the	
most	of	available	opportunities	within	the	new	modes	of	production	in	services,	
information	and	technology.		However,	their	male	counterparts,	who	are	now	
forced	to	compete	with	them	for	similar	types	of	employment,	are	regressing	
rather	than	progressing	on	the	occupational	ladder.			
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The	higher	education	attainment	of	Black	females	might	explain	why	they	have	
a	greater	proportional	representation	in	the	professional	occupations,	than	
their	male	counterparts.		However,	government	intervention	to	reduce	the	role	
of	the	State	and	bring	increasingly	more	public	services	in	line	with	the	private	
sector,	has	implications	for	the	future	employment	prospects	and	working	
conditions	of	African	Caribbean	females.		If	Black	females	are	in	high-income	
positions,	they	are	more	likely	to	be	employed	within	the	public	sector.		
However,	a	number	of	them	are	still	employed	in	routine	private	sector	
occupations,	which	traditionally	pay	lower	salaries.		It	is	also	increasingly	
difficult	to	monitor	the	effectiveness	of	anti-discriminatory	legislation	in	the	
private	sector.		Therefore,	the	gradual	erosion	of	public	sector	employment	
creates	emerging	risks	for	the	social	mobility	of	both	Black	males	and	females.		
This	is	because	the	principles	of	free	market	capitalism,	which	supports	the	idea	
of	reducing	policy	interventions,	will	make	workplace	racism	and	gender	
inequality	increasingly	difficult	to	detect,	monitor	and	regulate	within	private	
sector	employment.	
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7. Social	change	and	spatial	transition:	Space	–	the	final	frontier	
	
This	chapter	will	examine	how	the	spatial	patterns	of	Birmingham’s	African	
Caribbean	population	have	changed.		The	aim	is	to	establish	how	variations	in	
the	urban	movements	of	African	Caribbeans,	between	1991	and	2011,	relate	to	
their	social	mobility.		In	previous	chapters	I	revealed	some	of	the	disadvantages	
encountered	by	African	Caribbeans	in	the	educational	and	labour	markets,	
which	have	generally	constrained	their	occupational	status	and	income.		As	
homeowners	generally	acquire	property	by	translating	educational	and	
economic	Goods	into	residential	capital221,	the	nexus	between	education	and	
employment	is	significant.		This	is	especially	as	financial	capital	can	influence	
choices	and	constraints	regarding	urban	locations	and	differences	in	housing	
tenure.			
	
	
Racial	discrimination	and	low	financial	capital	mediated	the	housing	constraints	
of	post-war	West	Indians	(Rex	and	Moore,	1967;	Flett,	Henderson	and	Brown,	
1979).		To	some	extent	exclusionary	practices	also	confined	them	to	the	bottom	
of	the	housing	ladder	(Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979).		Moreover,	the	British	born	
descendants	of	West	Indian	migrants	have	tended	to	rent,	rather	than	
purchase,	housing	(Ratcliffe,	2004)222.		As	adjustments	in	housing	tenure	and	
																																								 																				
221	I	make	a	distinction	between	residential	capital	and	property	capital.		In	the	case	of	the	
latter,	individuals	might	own	property	that	they	do	not	necessarily	reside	in	(i.e.	commercial	
property).	
222	See	Chapter	One.	
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spatial	positions	often	reflect	changes	in	social	class	status,	this	investigation	
will	now:	
• examine	the	relationship	between	migration,	labour	market	policies	and	
the	post-war	settlement	patterns	of	West	Indians;	
• compare	the	material	characteristics	of	the	urban	spaces	in	which	the	
ethnic	groups	surveyed	in	this	research	are	concentrated;	
• map	ethnic	group	spatial	transitions	and	ascertain	the	age-stage	in	
which	home	ownership	is	more	pronounced;		
• identify	differences	in	ethnic	group	tenure	and	how	they	compare	over	
time	and	space;	
• establish	the	nexus	between	education,	employment	and	spatial	
location;	
• analyse	the	lived	experiences	of	African	Caribbeans,	and	the	influence	of	
social	and	political	changes	on	their	relationship	with	the	housing	
market.	
	
	
In	the	1950s	and	1960s,	the	communities	of	West	Indians	were	constrained	
within	the	high	deprivation	Bad	Lands223	of	Britain’s	major	cities,	such	as	
London,	Birmingham,	Manchester,	Liverpool,	Bristol,	Nottingham,	Derby	and	
Sheffield	(Peach,	1968).		Areas	with	a	high	concentration	of	Black	residents	
																																								 																				
223	I	reiterate	that	I	do	not	use	the	term	Bad	Land	pejoratively;	it	is	merely	an	objective	label	
relating	to	the	physical	environment	and	not	necessarily	how	social	actors	feel	about	the	
spaces	they	reside	in.		I	also	argue	that	Bad	Lands	can	be	perceived	as	cultural	Heart	Lands,	by	
members	of	the	communities	that	reside	within	them.			
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have	also	been	labelled	as	ghettoes224	(Peach,	1968;	Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979;	
Phizacklea	and	Miles,	1980;	Peach,	1996).		This	was	the	case	with	Handsworth	
in	North-West	Birmingham,	a	Bad	Land	where	accommodation	was	to	some	
extent	available	–	if	not	always	relatively	cheap	(Ratcliffe,	1981:	62).		Rex	and	
Tomlinson	(1979:70)	acknowledged	Handsworth	was	significant	to	‘West	Indian	
settlement	in	Birmingham	and	[to]	Black	immigrant	settlement	in	Britain	as	a	
whole’.		The	name	of	Handsworth	was	synonymous	with	Caribbean	culture	in	
Britain,	and	a	euphemism	for	Black	resistance	against	White	racism	and	racial	
inequality225.			
	
	
The	majority	of	subjects	who	participated	in	this	research	grew	up	in	or	near	
Handsworth,	between	the	1960s	and	1980s,	in	houses	acquired	by	their	West	
Indian	parents.		In	the	1960s	and	1970s	Handsworth,	like	Sparkbrook	in	the	
South	of	the	city,	was	perceived	as	a	‘Twilight	Zone’	(Rex	and	Moore,	1967:	31).		
The	area	has	numerous	Victorian	houses,	and	large	period	properties,	which	
were	formerly	homes	for	wealthy	factory	owners	and	their	servants.		Cross	and	
Johnson	(in	Owen	and	Johnson,	1996:	231)	note	that	Birmingham’s	‘largely	
																																								 																				
224	Peach	and	Rossiter	(1996:	114)	argue	that	the	term	ghetto	‘is	too	often	infected	by	the	
looseness	of	everyday	discourse	and	a	variety	of	pejorative	connotations	linking	urban	decay	
with	the	alleged	moral/cultural	identity	of	the	residents	of	such	areas’.		Nevertheless,	they	also	
concede	that	a	ghetto	is	‘a	residential	district	which	is	almost	exclusively	the	preserve	of	one	
ethnic	or	cultural	group’	(ibid,	1996:	114).		Anderson	(2012)	refers	to	the	“iconic	ghetto”,	which	
is	the	stereotypical	image	that	wider	society	attaches	to	the	notion	of	a	ghetto.		This	definition	
has	its	roots	in	chattel	slavery	and	is	signified	by	skin	colour.		As	such,	wherever	Blacks	are	their	
skin	colour	reifies	the	image	of	the	iconic	ghetto.		This	demonstrates	the	way	in	which	the	term	
“ghetto”,	and	ideas	of	what	constitutes	it,	is	contested.			
225	An	example	of	the	syncrecity	between	Handsworth	and	the	Caribbean	community	and	their	
culture	was	the	reggae	band	Steel	Pulse.		The	band	originated	from	Handsworth	and	supported	
Bob	Marley	and	the	Wailers	during	their	European	tour.		Steel	Pulse’s	1978	album,	Handsworth	
Revolution,	was	a	critically	acclaimed	international	hit.	
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Victorian	terraced	housing	was	built	to	accommodate	the	burgeoning	
proletariat	of	the	industrial	revolution’.		Handsworth’s	deterioration	started	in	
the	early	20th	century,	and	gathered	pace	as	production	and	manufacturing	
work	declined,	which	also	triggered	the	outward	movement	of	indigenous	
labour	(Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979).		By	the	time	that	West	Indian	migrants	
arrived	in	Birmingham	in	the	late	1950s	and	early	1960s,	many	properties	in	
Handsworth	were	in	a	State	of	disrepair	and	undesirable	to	many	of	the	local	
White	population.		Nevertheless,	the	houses	were	located	near	to	the	existing	
industries	experiencing	labour	shortages	and	sizeable	enough	to	cater	for	West	
Indians	and	their	families226.			
	
	
On	the	surface,	residential	locations	can	appear	to	be	a	result	of	class	
differences	driven	by	differentials	based	on	‘poverty,	low	status	work,	
unemployment	and	so	on’	(Ratcliffe,	1996:	16).		However,	notions	of	“race”	and	
culture	might	also	inform	spatial	movements,	social	positions	and	urban	
concentration.		Those	with	enough	financial	capital	might	relocate	to	increase	
the	social	distance227	between	them	and	dissimilar	Others,	whilst	also	
reaffirming	cultural	ties	in	the	process.		As	such,	the	politics	of	difference	where	
																																								 																				
226	Areas	of	early	post-war	West	Indian	settlement,	such	as	Handsworth	in	Birmingham,	Brixton	
and	Notting	Hill	in	London,	Moss	Side	in	Manchester,	Toxeth	in	Liverpool	and	St	Paul’s	in	
Bristol	all	have	an	abundance	of	deteriorating	Victorian	and	Edwardian	properties.	
227	Social	distance,	as	defined	by	Park	(1924:	339),	is	‘an	attempt	to	reduce	to	something	like	
measureable	terms	the	grades	and	degrees	of	understanding	[…]	which	characterise	personal	
and	social	relations	generally’.		As	such,	social	distance	also	incorporates	spatial	distance	
between	ethnic	groups,	which	can	be	calculated	by	using	the	Index	of	Dissimilarity	(ID).		
According	to	Peach	and	Rossiter	(1996:	111)	the	ID	‘measures	the	proportion	of	a	group	which	
would	have	to	shift	its	area	of	residence	in	order	to	have	the	same	distribution	as	the	group	
with	which	it	is	being	compared’.			
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‘race’,	ethnicity	and	class	are	concerned,	often	intersect	any	examination	of	
disparities	in	spatial	positions.		Moreover,	the	material	characteristics	of	the	
environments	in	which	African	Caribbeans	reside	might	also	reveal	something	
about	their	contemporary	class	status.		Housing	is	symbolic	capital	(Bourdieu,	
2010	[1984]),	and	an	important	aspect	of	social	mobility.		Moreover,	property	
values	are	often	determined	by	location.		Thus,	houses	in	the	most	desirable	
locations	are	also	symbolic	of	hierarchical	social	positions.		Therefore,	
competition	for	housing	can	be	considered	as	a	class	situation228	within	a	
market,	where	the	demand	for	property	often	exceeds	the	supply.		However,	it	
is	also	important	to	note	that	for	West	Indians	and	their	descendants,	the	
housing	market	has	been	much	more	than	just	competition	in	a	market	
situation;	it	continues	to	be	a	significant	site	of	conflict	in	their	struggle	against	
racial	adversity.	
	
Mixing	the	unmixables229	
	
The	1948	Nationality	Act	granted	passports	and	British	citizenship	to	
Commonwealth	subjects	(Fryer,	1984;	372;	Pilkington,	2003:	35),	a	number	of	
																																								 																				
228	Rex	and	Moore	(1967)	posited	the	Weberian	inspired	idea	of	housing	classes	(see	also	Rex	
and	Tomlinson,	1979	and	Ratcliffe,	1981)	as	property	owning	status	groups,	which	is	distinct	
from	the	Marxian	understanding	of	bourgeoisie	and	proletariat	class	relations	formed	from	an	
economic	base	(Marx,	1867	in	McLellan,	1999).		As	such,	members	of	housing	classes	can	be	
conceived	as	‘persons	whose	standard	of	life,	rights	of	property,	accumulation	and	profession	
conferred	social	prestige	and	privilege’	(Weber	in	Morrison,	1995:	228).	
229	The	“mixing	of	the	unmixables”	was	a	term	used	in	a	memo	by	a	Government	official,	R.H.	
Bindloss	CBE,	in	which	he	recommended	the	separation	of	West	Indian	and	White	labour	in	
State	run	hostels	(Searle,	2013:	55).		
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whom	arrived	in	Britain	on	the	Empire	Windrush230.		Despite	the	Birmingham	
Gazette’s	headlines	of	‘work	–	but	no	homes’	(Searle,	2013:	46).,	which	
highlighted	the	perceived	national	problem	of	housing	the	Windrush	labour	
force,	the	entry,	employment	and	settlement	of	many	early	Caribbean	migrants	
were	regulated	by	policies	controlling	the	issue	of	work	permit	(ibid,	2013)		
	
	
Records	indicate	that	‘the	Ministry	of	Labour	initially	accommodated	the	
Windrush	immigrants	in	air	raid	shelters,	in	London’s	Clapham	South.		The	
closest	labour	exchange	was	on	Coldharbour	Lane	in	Brixton’	(ibid,	2013:	61).		
As	the	Brixton	Labour	Exchange	issued	work	permits,	and	generally	assigned	
employment	locally,	many	Windrush	migrants	settled	in	the	area.		Immigrants	
also	travelled	north	to	Birmingham231	and	other	cities	in	search	of	work.		The	
example	of	Brixton,	in	which	Caribbean	settlement	was	constrained	within	the	
vicinity	of	Government	labour	exchanges,	can	also	be	applied	to	Handsworth232	
in	the	northwest	of	Birmingham.		The	Handsworth	Labour	Exchange233	was	on	
Soho	Road	and	is	where	migrant	workers	obtained	their	work	permits.		
																																								 																				
230	The	Empire	Windrush	docked	in	Tilbury,	Essex	during	June	of	1948.		There	were	492	
migrants	on	board,	most	of	who	were	Jamaican	(ibid,	2013).		The	Windrush	generation	is	a	
phrase	often	used	to	describe	the	first	major	influx	of	post-war	Caribbean	migrants	(Wambu,	
1998).			
231	Peach	(1968)	notes	that	Birmingham	was	the	largest	post-war	centre	of	West	Indian	
settlement	outside	of	London.	
232	The	1961	Census	reveals	that	in	comparison	to	other	immigrant	groups,	Handsworth	had	a	
large	West	Indian	population	(Ratcliffe,	1981:	60).		See	also	Rex	and	Tomlinson	(1979).			
233	See	Taylor	(1993)	for	an	account	of	racist	employment	practices	undertaken	by	labour	
exchange	officials	in	Birmingham.	
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Handsworth	was	also	within	walking	distance	of	the	Black	Patch234	area	of	
Winson	Green	in	the	Soho	ward,	which	contained	a	significant	number	of	
foundries235.		Thus,	the	need	to	obtain	work	permits	from	labour	exchanges,	
and	their	proximity	to	industries	with	labour	shortages,	were	significant	factors	
in	the	early	settlement	patterns	of	West	Indians.	
	
	
Policies	regulating	the	operation	of	State	hostels	also	influenced	the	early	
settlement	patterns	of	Black	post-war	migrants.		In	the	late	1940s,	Ministry	of	
Labour	hostels	accommodated	both	Jamaican236	and	European	Voluntary	
Workers	(EVWs).		In	Birmingham,	there	were	National	Service	Hostels	
Corporation	(NSHC)	237	properties	located	in	Winson	Green,	Highgate,	and	also	
in	the	Causeway	Green	area	of	West	Bromwich	(ibid,	2013:	48).		Many	of	the	
EVWs,	perceived	the	hostels	as	spaces	of	White	privilege238.		As	such,	the	
presence	of	Black	workers	was	generally	frowned	upon.		Many	of	the	EVWs	also	
envied	the	British	citizenship	of	Black	workers,	because	their	own	European	
																																								 																				
234	Black	Patch	is	nothing	to	do	with	“race”	or	ethnicity.		It	is	the	name	of	the	area	connecting	
Handsworth,	Winson	Green	and	Smethwick.		The	name	was	probably	derived	from	the	
factories	and	foundries	that	once	dominated	the	area,	of	which	only	a	few	still	remain.		
235	I	speak	from	my	own	experience	here.		The	first	house	my	parents	bought	was	on	Queens	
Head	Road	in	Handsworth	during	1964.		Queens	Head	Road	is	opposite	Rookery	Road	and	near	
to	the	railway	line	that	separates	Handsworth	from	Black	Patch	(Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979:	73;	
Ratcliffe,	1981:	9).		The	foundry	horns	used	to	sound	each	evening	to	signal	the	end	of	work.		A	
few	minutes	later	our	road	would	teem	with	hundreds	of	workers	walking	back	to	their	homes.		
Part	of	that	area,	known	locally	as	“top	Handsworth”,	borders	West	Bromwich.				
236	In	the	early	years	of	post-war	migration,	the	majority	of	Caribbean	labour	migrants	were	
from	Jamaica	(Peach,	1968).	
237	The	NSHC	was	set	up	in	1941	by	Ernest	Bevin,	the	Minister	for	Labour	and	National	Service.		
At	first	it	supported	the	short-term	housing	needs	of	workers	employed	away	from	their	
homes.		However,	‘after	the	War	the	main	function	of	the	NSHC	was	to	provide	
accommodation	for	both	British	and	migrant	workers	employed	on	important	reconstruction	
work’	(Searle,	2013:	45-46).	
238	I	have	articulated	this	concept	previously	in	Chapter	Six;	see	also	Gillborn	(2005).	
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work	permits	restricted	their	labour.		Searle	(2013:	45)	contends	that	the	alien	
status	of	Polish	workers	kept	them	within	‘undesirable	sectors	of	employment.		
This	status	clearly	differentiated	them	from	West	Indian	arrivants	who,	as	
British	citizens,	were	exempt	from	such	controls’.			
	
	
In	August	1949	simmering	racial	tensions	erupted	in	violence	when	Polish	EVWs	
attacked	Jamaican	residents	in	the	Causeway	Green	hostel239.		Despite	the	
antagonism	of	EVWs	and	local	residents,	Caribbean	communities	later	
developed	in	Causeway	Green.		They	also	emerged	in	nearby	Handsworth	and	
Smethwick,	where	labour	shortages	in	specific	industrial	sectors	remained	high.		
West	Indian	labour	was	not	just	confined	to	semi	and	unskilled	occupations.		By	
1955	a	‘Caribbean	intelligentsia	of	practicing	professionals	especially	in	
medicine	[…]	with	predominantly	White	clients’	(Taylor,	1993:	112)240	was	
established	in	Birmingham.		Many	nurses	and	medical	students	also	trained	at	
																																								 																				
239	The	1958	“race”	riots239	in	Notting	Hill	and	Nottingham	have	been	widely	documented	
(Sivanandan,	1982;	Fryer,	1984;	Pilkington,	2003;	Solomos,	2003).		However,	they	were	
preceded	by	a	number	of	less	known	racist	attacks	against	Jamaicans,	several	of	which	
occurred	during	the	1940s	in	various	NSHC	hostels	throughout	Britain.		The	main	instigators	of	
these	attacks	were	Polish	European	Voluntary	Workers	(EVWs),	although	some	Irish	workers	
were	also	involved.		From	1946	onwards,	racist	attacks	on	Jamaican	workers	were	also	
reported	in	NSHC	hostels	in	Hertfordshire,	Leeds,	Pontefract,	Derbyshire	and	Nottingham	
(Searle,	2013:	47).		The	Causeway	Green	violence	was	used	to	justify	subsequent	government	
legislation	reducing	the	quota	of	West	Indian	migrants	–	staying	in	any	single	hostel	–	to	10	per	
cent	of	a	hostel’s	total	capacity.		The	rationale	was	that	fewer	West	Indian	residents	would	
reduce	the	potential	for	violence	(ibid,	2013:	55).		Fighting	in	the	Causeway	Green	Hostel	
continued	throughout	the	night	and	escalated	into	the	neighbouring	streets	of	West	Bromwich	
and	–	in	some	cases	–	inside	the	gardens	and	homes	of	local	residents	(ibid,	2013).		Every	
available	policeman	in	the	Sandwell	area	was	dispatched	in	an	attempt	to	contain	the	violence.	
Although	West	Indians	were	the	victims	of	assault	by	EVWs,	they	were	portrayed	by	the	media	
as	the	cause	of	rioting	in	West	Bromwich.		The	media	amplified	the	concerns	of	local	residents,	
who	were	worried	that	the	increasing	presence	of	West	Indian	migrants	in	the	area	would	lead	
to	more	violence	and	social	unrest	(ibid,	2013).	
240	The	research	of	Roberts	and	Mills	(1955)	(see	also	Chapter	Two)	puts	to	bed	the	myth	that	
the	majority	of	Caribbean	migrants	were	unskilled	labourers	
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Birmingham’s	Queen	Elizabeth	Hospital.		In	addition,	there	was	an	emerging	
West	Indian	artisan	aristocracy,	in	which	carpenters	and	joiners	were	
prominent	(ibid,	1993).	
	
	
Social	tensions	revolving	around	‘race’,	immigration	and	housing	surfaced	again	
in	Sandwell241	during	the	1964	Smethwick	by-election,	in	which	the	
Conservative’s	Peter	Griffiths	and	Labour’s	Patrick	Gordon	Walker	were	the	
main	contenders	(Solomos,	2003).		Griffiths	exploited	the	concern	of	local	
White	residents,	who	blamed	Labour’s	policy	of	continuing	Commonwealth	
immigration	for	the	influx	of	migrants	in	Smethwick242.		Local	anxieties	were	
amplified	by	national	perceptions	of	incompatible	cultural	differences	between	
the	host	and	guest	populations.		Some	of	Smethwick’s	White	residents	set	up	
pressure	groups243	aimed	at	preventing	Sandwell	Local	Authority	from	
allocating	social	housing	to	West	Indian	and	Asian	families.		The	focus	of	their	
campaign	was	to	keep	Smethwick	White	by	ensuring	that	only	White	families	
were	allocated	housing	in	specific	roads.			
	
	
																																								 																				
241	West	Bromwich	and	Smethwick	are	part	of	the	Sandwell	area.	
242	The	same	was	also	true	for	the	White	residents	of	Sparkbrook	(Rex	and	Moore,	1967:	200).	
243	One	such	group	was	called	“The	Five	Fighting	Housewives	of	Marshall	Street	Smethwick”.		
The	group	held	a	meeting	with	Richard	Crossman,	the	Minister	for	Housing	in	1965.		They	
presented	him	with	a	petition	opposing	his	decision	to	refuse	Smethwick	Council	a	loan	of	
£4,175.00.		Smethwick	Council	wanted	to	buy	two	houses	in	Marshall	Street	and	allocate	them	
to	White	families,	to	‘prevent	it	[Marshall	Street]	from	becoming	a	ghetto’	(Express	and	Star,	
1965).		
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The	Conservative	Party	won	the	by-election	using	Griffiths’	slogan:	“if	you	want	
a	nigger	neighbour	vote	labour”244.		The	idea	of	a	housing	apartheid,	proposed	
by	the	residents	of	Smethwick,	attracted	international	attention.		Malcolm	X	
visited	Smethwick	during	the	height	of	racial	tensions	in	February	1965	(Street,	
2008;	Jeffries,	2014).		His	support	reinforced	solidarity	between	the	racism	
experienced	by	African	Americans	and	immigrant	groups	in	the	UK,	particularly	
local	Pan-Africanists245.		Despite	growing	racial	tension,	and	increasing	racial	
discrimination	in	the	Sandwell	and	Birmingham	housing	markets,	Caribbean	
communities	in	the	city	and	surrounding	areas	continued	to	flourish.			
	
	
Translating	cultural	and	social	capital	into	residential	capital	
	
It	was	against	the	above	backdrop	of	racial	adversity	in	the	1960s,	that	Rex	and	
Moore	(1967)	conducted	their	Weberian246	study	of	ethnic	competition	for	
housing	in	Birmingham’s	Sparkbrook.		They	revealed	how	difficult	it	was	for	
																																								 																				
244	The	1964	Smethwick	by-election	preceded	Enoch	Powell’s	notorious	Rivers	of	Blood	speech,	
which	was	in	1968	at	Birmingham’s	Britannia	Hotel.		Powell	delivered	his	racist	proclamation	of	
the	impact	that	continued	immigration	would	have	on	Britain	and	its	native	White	population	
(Ratcliffe,	1981;	Solomos,	2003).		The	Britannia	Hotel	is	located	in	Birmingham	City	Centre,	a	
short	distance	from	Handsworth	and	Smethwick,	and	only	a	few	miles	away	from	West	
Bromwich.			
245	Searle	(2013:	47)	notes	that	‘the	Universal	African	Improvement	Association	(reminiscent	of	
Marcus	Garvey’s	Universal	Negro	Improvement	Association,	which	was	founded	in	1914)’,	was	
operational	in	Birmingham	during	the	late	1940s.		The	African	Caribbean	Self-Help	
Organisation	(ACSHO)	(Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981;	2004)	was	also	established	in	
Handsworth	during	1964,	a	year	before	Malcolm	X’s	visit	to	Smethwick.		ACSHO	also	supports	
Pan-Africanism,	the	idea	of	a	concerted	universal	Black	struggle	against	racism,	which	is	similar	
to	the	political	views	held	by	Malcolm	X.	
246	Weber	viewed	classes	as	operating	in	three	distinct	categories:	i)	market	situations;	ii)	
actions	arising	from	shared	interests	and	also	iii)	historical	ideas	of	class	struggle,	which	have	
their	origins	in	antiquity,	but	are	more	pronounced	in	modern	economic	relationships	based	
on	waged	labour	(Weber	in	Morrison,	1995:	233).	
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West	Indians	to	obtain	mortgages	from	the	main	banks,	many	of	which	took	the	
view	that	‘English	birth	is	a	necessary	qualification	for	a	mortgage’	(ibid,	1967:	
105).		Moreover,	it	was	also	difficult	to	rent	housing	as	‘no	Blacks,	no	dogs,	no	
Irish	was	the	landlords’	slogan	of	the	day’	(Mirza,	2006:	144).		In	their	efforts	to	
obtain	finance	for	mortgage	deposits,	many	West	Indians	lost	money	invested	
with	disreputable	loan	companies.		However,	despite	the	adversities	they	
encountered	in	the	1950s	and	1960s,	from	mainstream	landlords,	lenders	and	
backdoor	credit	agencies,	West	Indians	appropriated	their	cultural	and	social	
capital	to	support	their	housing	needs.			
	
	
Sterling	(1995:	654)	notes	West	Indians	‘were	able	to	“beat	the	system”	by	
finding	alternative	ways	of	acquiring	quick	credit	for	[…]	access	to	housing’.		The	
informal	cultural	banking	system	of	West	Indians	was	called	the	Partner,	which	
consisted	of	weekly	handouts	(or	hands)247.		Each	hand	was	used	to	purchase	
expensive	items,	such	as	cars,	mini-buses,	furniture	and	–	most	significantly	–	to	
place	deposits	on	houses.		The	Partner	system	depended	heavily	on	socio-
cultural	communal	ties:	where	the	participants	(or	throwers)	trusted	other	
throwers	to	contribute	their	share	each	week,	and	everyone	trusted	the	
‘banker’	to	hold	onto	their	money	and	distribute	it	accordingly.		The	size	and	
durations	of	Partners	varied.		Some	consisted	of	100	throwers	and	lasted	over	a	
year,	whilst	others	were	formed	for	three	or	four	months	with	a	typical	
membership	of	ten	to	twelve	(ibid,	1995:	656).			
																																								 																				
247	The	phrase	“draw	my	hand”	was	used	by	members	when	it	was	their	turn	to	collect	their	
share	of	the	Partner.	
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Only	the	banker	is	required	to	know	each	member	of	the	Partner	personally.		
The	banker	is	the	organiser	and	most	important	person	in	the	Partner.		Sterling	
(1995)	notes	that	bankers,	and	the	majority	of	members	in	the	Partner,	were	
generally	females.		The	gender	of	the	banker	is	quite	significant.		This	is	because	
the	role	of	female	West	Indian	migrants,	in	exchanging	their	cultural	capital	to	
accumulate	financial	capital	to	purchase	property,	has	tended	to	be	
overlooked.		Bourdieu	(2010,	[1984]:	258)	maintains	that	an	essential	
component	of	cultural	capital	is	‘the	qualities	of	friends,	through	which	ethical	
dispositions	are	more	directly	expressed’.		It	was	often	the	case	that	the	banker	
came	from	a	family	of	good	standing	in	the	Caribbean	and	was	a	highly	trusted	
friend	–	who	knew	most	of	the	throwers	before	they	arrived	in	England248.		
Potential	members	heard	of	a	Partner	by	word-of-mouth.		The	Black	
Churches249	were	instrumental	in	sustaining	the	community	and	friendship	
networks	through	which	Partners	were	formed.		However,	membership	could	
																																								 																				
248	Sterling	(1995:	656)	supports	this	observation.		However,	I	also	write	from	my	own	
experience.		My	parents	were	involved	in	a	Partner,	through	my	mother.		The	banker	was	an	
elderly	Jamaican	lady	who	was	employed	in	Birmingham	as	a	seamstress.		However,	my	
mother’s	father	trained	her	as	his	Junior	Accounting	Clerk,	in	Jamaica.		My	grandfather,	
Jonathan	Harvey,	was	the	Book	keeper	for	the	Bounty	Hall	Estate	in	Trelawney	where	the	
banker	and	her	family	came	from.		When	she	died	in	1970	her	daughter,	who	was	familiar	to	
all	the	throwers,	became	the	new	banker.		Thus,	kinship	ties	formed	in	Jamaica	maintained	the	
Partner	system	in	the	UK.	
249	The	power	of	the	Black	Churches,	as	edifices	of	social	solidarity	to	combat	racism,	sustain	
Black	networks	and	mobilise	its	Caribbean	congregation,	is	overlooked	by	Rex	and	Moore	
(1967),	and	also	Rex	and	Tomlinson	(1979).		They	viewed	the	religious	disposition	of	West	
Indians	as	a	“theodicy	of	disprivilege”	(i.e.	the	Weberian	notion	that	religion	justifies	this-
worldly	suffering).		They	did	not	take	into	consideration	that	Black	Churches	perform	much	
more	than	just	religious	functions	for	their	members.		They	are	also	focal	points	for	cultural	
defence	and	political	agency.	
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only	be	sanctioned	by	the	banker.		It	was	her	responsibility	to	be	aware	of	
everyone’s	integrity,	employment	status	and	capability	to	contribute	weekly.			
	
	
If	someone	had	an	urgent	financial	need,	and	wanted	to	draw	their	hand	before	
it	was	due,	they	had	to	obtain	permission	from	the	banker.		She	would	then	
inform	the	other	throwers	of	her	decision.		The	group’s	collective	conscience	
was	galvanised	by	their	common	experiences	of	racial	adversity	in	their	new	
country.		Therefore,	no	one	complained	if	unforeseen	circumstances	meant	
that	someone’s	financial	need	took	priority	over	their	own.		Moreover,	the	
members	were	only	too	aware	that	a	situation	could	arise	where	they	might	
also	need	to	draw	their	hand	earlier	than	planned.		Thus,	central	to	the	success	
of	the	Partner	was	friendship	with	the	banker	and	absolute	trust	in	her	moral	
judgement.		Partners	also	used	their	hands	to	pay	for	family	members	to	join	
them	in	their	new	country.		This	was	the	case	for	both	of	Subjects	A	and	D:	
	
‘Everybody	was	in	a	Partner	in	those	days.		That’s	the	only	way	you	
could	send	for	people.		Partner	money	brought	me	here,	and	my	
cousin	too’	(Subject	D,	1st	May	2014,	Birmingham).		
	
‘My	parents	were	in	a	partner.		Dad	told	me	that’s	how	they	bought	
their	house	and	sent	for	me.		My	wife	is	in	one	with	some	of	the	
church	sisters,	but	it	is	only	small.		There	are	five	or	six	members.		I’m	
not	sure	what	they	throw,	because	I	don’t	get	involved.		It’s	a	woman	
thing,	you	know’	(Subject	A,	10th	August,	2013,	Birmingham)!		
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Twenty	members	contributing	£20.00	per	week	would	mean	a	different	
thrower	drawing	a	hand	of	£400.00	each	week,	until	the	Partner	finished.		
When	the	Partner	started	again	the	person	who	came	in	last	would	have	the	
first	hand.		In	large	Partners	two	throwers	would	draw	their	hand	weekly.		A	
hundred	members	would	yield	£2000	per	week,	which	would	be	shared	equally	
between	two	different	throwers.		The	more	throwers	involved,	the	larger	the	
weekly	hand.		Therefore,	the	Partner	network	in	the	Black	community,	literally	
turned	friendship	bonds	into	capital;	it	paid	dividends	to	know	people	who	you	
could	trust.		The	importance	of	the	Partner	system	in	transforming	Caribbean	
tenure	from	renting	to	home	ownership	is	acknowledged	by	Sterling	(1995:	
657)	who	notes,	‘it	was	not	difficult	to	see	how	the	early	migrants	were	able	to	
accumulate	enough	savings	to	facilitate	the	purchase	of	a	“clearance	house”	in	
the	late	1950s’.		Clearance	houses	were	often	located	in	slum	areas	(Rex	and	
Moore,	1967).		Nevertheless,	owning	the	roof	over	their	heads	reduced	the	risk	
of	poverty	and	provided	newly	arriving	West	Indians	with	security	and	stability	
in	an	alien	country.			
	
	
Although	there	was	a	system	of	informal	borrowing	that	existed	in	rural	areas	
of	Jamaica,	the	Partner	system	was	unique	to	the	UK.		As	crops	in	the	Caribbean	
(i.e.	sugar	cane,	rice	etc.)	were	only	harvested	annually,	people	in	the	
countryside	borrowed	money	from	landowners	and	wealthy	businesspeople	to	
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make	ends	meet	until	harvest	time.		Money	was	often	borrowed	without	
interest,	on	the	basis	of	the	integrity	of	the	individual,	their	ability	to	repay	the	
loan	and	their	kinship	ties	with	the	lender.		These	bonds	of	social	attachment,	
which	developed	over	generations	in	the	Caribbean,	provided	the	infrastructure	
of	the	Partner	system	in	the	UK.		However,	the	fundamental	difference	was	that	
the	Partner	system	functioned	on	collective,	shared	cultural	and	social	–	rather	
than	individual	–	interests.	
	
	
The	development	of	the	Partner	system	in	the	UK	demonstrates	how	West	
Indians	appropriated	their	collective	social	networks,	and	exchanged	their	
cultural	capital	for	residential	Goods	in	Britain’s	Bad	Lands.		Inner-city	areas	in	
which	Caribbeans	settled,	like	Handsworth,	Brixton,	Moss	Side,	Toxeth	and	
Bristol’s	Saint	Paul’s,	were	also	cultural	Heart	Lands:	i.e.	urban	spaces	of	
cultural	defence,	in	which	Caribbean	networks	and	social	bonds	were	able	to	
flourish	with	minimal	interference	from	external	agents.		It	could	be	argued	
that	the	Partner	system	would	never	have	developed	without	the	exclusionary	
practices	that	to	some	extent	isolated	West	Indians	and	constrained	their	social	
and	spatial	mobility.		Although	in	the	1950s	and	1960s	West	Indian	
employment	was	generally	low	paid	(Fryer,	1984),	it	was	nevertheless	secure	
enough	to	guarantee	they	could	maintain	their	financial	commitments	to	the	
Partner250.			
	
																																								 																				
250	Taylor	(1993:	112)	noted	that	although	the	work	was	hard	in	the	1950s	West	Indians	‘could	
earn	real	good	wages,	especially	with	the	overtime	[…]	because	of	the	boom’.	
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Although	the	Partner	system	still	exists,	it	is	no	longer	as	influential	as	it	once	
was.		The	breakdown	of	cultural	ties	within	the	Black	communities,	and	the	
precarious	nature	of	work,	make	it	difficult	for	some	members	to	sustain	their	
payments.		The	gradual	decline	in	West	Indian	migration	following	the	1971	
Immigration	Act	–	and	fragmented	ties	between	the	present	generation	and	
their	extended	families	in	the	Caribbean	–	have	also	weakened	the	cultural	and	
kinship	networks	that	were	the	backbone	of	the	Partner	system.		In	addition,	
changes	in	social	policies	have	to	some	extent	made	the	Partner	system	less	
significant,	as	a	means	of	obtaining	loans	and	large	amounts	of	capital.		
Following	the	1968	and	1976	Race	Relations	Acts	discrimination	and	
exclusionary	practices	have	been	outlawed	in	various	markets,	which	includes	
housing	(Ratcliffe,	2004:	135).		Consequently,	African	Caribbeans	can	now	
obtain	mortgages	and	loans	more	readily	than	West	Indians	could	in	the	1950s	
and	1960s.			
	
	
Promised	Lands	and	cultural	Heart	Lands	
	
In	mid-1970s	Birmingham,	the	Bad	Lands	(or	Caribbean	Heart	Lands)	were	still	
located	in	the	northwest	corridor	of	the	city,	such	as	Handsworth,	Soho	and	the	
surrounding	areas	(Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981;	Taylor,	1993).		My	
inquiry	now	moves	forward	to	establish	if	the	present	Birmingham	Caribbean	
population	remains	concentrated	in	the	same	geographical	terrain,	and	to	
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identify	some	of	the	choices	and	constraints	that	influence	their	movement	and	
settlement	patterns.		The	1991	Census	is	the	preferred	starting	point,	as	it	was	
the	first	to	include	a	question	on	ethnic	identity.		However,	as	with	the	
employment	data	in	the	previous	chapter,	the	1991	Census	can	only	provide	a	
heuristic	snapshot	of	spatial	disparities	between	ethnic	groups.		Unlike	the	
Censuses	of	2001	and	2011,	ethnicity	data	in	the	1991	Census	are	not	
comparable.		
	
	
An	environment’s	material	deprivation	is	often	a	good	indicator	of	the	quality	
of	life	experienced	by	those	who	reside	there.		Thus,	it	is	conceivable	that	as	
individuals	accumulate	more	financial	capital	they	might	move	from	high	
deprivation	Bad	Lands	to	low	deprivation	Good	Lands.		Table	7.1	below	reveals	
the	three	Birmingham	wards	recording	the	lowest	levels	of	deprivation	in	1991.		
The	Sutton	wards	appear	to	be	the	urban	Promised	Lands251,	due	to	their	low	
levels	of	material	deprivation.		Residential	housing	in	these	environments	might	
not	necessarily	be	the	most	expensive.		However,	in	terms	of	quality	of	life	in	
1991,	Sutton	Four	Oaks,	Sutton	Vesey	and	Sutton	New	Hall	offered	the	best	
overall	standard	of	living	in	Birmingham.		Table	7.1	also	highlights	the	spatial	
division	between	Birmingham’s	White	British	and	Black	Caribbean	ethnic	
groups.		The	three	Sutton	wards	contained	the	highest	concentration	of	White	
																																								 																				
251	I	refer	to	Burgess’	(2008,	[1925])	term	of	Promised	Lands	[emphasis	added]	to	describe	the	
low	deprivation	spatial	locations	that	new	migrants,	with	limited	social	and	financial	capital,	
might	aspire	to	live	in	when	their	situation	has	improved.	
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British	residents	in	any	of	Birmingham’s	wards.		However,	by	comparison,	their	
Black	Caribbean	counterparts	had	a	much	lower	representation.		
	
Table	7.1:	Distribution	of	16-74	Aged	White	British	and	Black	Caribbean	Populations	in	the	
Lowest	Deprivation	Birmingham	Wards	[1991].	
	
Ward	 Townsend	
Index	Score	
White	British	 Black	Caribbean	
Sutton	Four	Oaks	 -3.8792	 4.07%	 0.13%	
Sutton	Vesey	 -3.0696	 3.81%	 0.46%	
Sutton	New	Hall	 -1.3734	 4.19%	 0.43%	
	 Mean	=	4.34	 	 	
Total	(n	=	100%)*	 	 n	=	449416	 n	=	29667	
*Total	ethnic	group	population	in	Birmingham’s	thirty-nine	wards.	
Source:	CASWEB	(2015);	Census	UK	Data	Service,	Townsend	scores	for	wards	in	England	and	Wales	1991.	
	
Table	7.2	below	highlights	the	high	levels	of	deprivation	in	the	wards	where	the	
majority	of	Birmingham’s	Black	Caribbeans	resided	in	1991.		They	are	the	same	
Bad	Lands	that	attracted	West	Indian	settlement	in	the	1950s	and	1960s	(Rex	
and	Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981;	Taylor,	1993).		However,	the	high	levels	of	
deprivation	in	these	wards	contrast	starkly	with	the	low	levels	in	the	
predominantly	White	Sutton	areas.		Tables	7.1	and	7.2	reveal	that	in	1991	the	
wards	with	the	highest	concentration	of	Blacks	and	Whites	also	had	polarised	
levels	of	deprivation.		Thus,	the	low	deprivation	Sutton	wards,	and	the	high	
deprivation	areas	of	Soho,	Handsworth,	Ladywood	and	Aston,	could	be	
perceived	as	ethnic	enclaves252	specifically	because	of	their	ethnic	spatial	
clustering253.	
																																								 																				
252	I	earlier	referred	to	Peach	and	Rossiter’s	(1996:	114)	view	that	the	term	“ghetto”	does	not	
necessarily	imply	material	deprivation.		A	ghetto	can	be	defined	as	an	urban	space	that	is	
mainly	dominated	by	a	single	ethnic	group.		In	comparison	to	other	Birmingham	wards	those	in	
Sutton	have	a	high	White	British	concentration.		Thus,	they	can	be	perceived	as	ghettoes,	or	
“White	ethnic	enclaves”,	because	they	are	urban	spaces	in	which	the	cultural	habitus	
(Bourdieu,	2010	[1984])	of	Whiteness	is	reproduced.	
253	Spatial	clustering	(Peach,	1968)	(like	the	term	ghetto	above)	is	too	often	used	to	refer	to	the	
urban	spaces	in	which	minority	ethnic	groups	are	over-represented.		However,	this	suggests	
that	unlike	other	minority	ethnic	groups,	Whites	have	an	even	spatial	distribution.		However,	
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Table	7.2:	Distribution	of	16-74	Aged	White	British	and	Black	Caribbean	Populations	in	High	
Deprivation	Birmingham	Wards	[1991].	
	
Ward		 Townsend	Index	Score	 White	British	 Black	Caribbean	
Soho		 8.5916	 1.27%	 10%	
Handsworth		 8.8138	 0.97%	 9.83%	
Ladywood		 9.0820	 2.0%	 7.39%	
Aston		 11.4373	 1.57%	 9.01%	
	 Mean	=	4.34	 	 	
Total	(n	=	100%)*	 	 n	=	449416	 n	=	29667	
*Total	ethnic	group	population	in	Birmingham’s	thirty-nine	wards.	
Source:	CASWEB	(2015);	Census	UK	Data	Service,	Townsend	scores	for	wards	in	England	and	Wales	1991.	
	
	
Although	property	values	are	influenced	more	so	by	location	than	type,	
analysing	differences	in	tenure	can	provide	a	meaningful	insight	into	the	
character	of	neighbourhoods	during	1991.		Tables	7.3	and	7.4	below	reveal	
differences	between	types	of	housing	tenure	in	Birmingham’s	Good	Lands	and	
Bad	Lands.		There	are	much	higher	levels	of	owner	occupation	in	the	low	
deprivation	wards,	than	there	are	in	their	high	deprivation	counterparts.		This	
suggests	that	Black	Caribbeans	residing	in	the	wards	in	Table	7.4	may	not	be	
homeowners.		Moreover,	the	comparative	dearth	of	owner	occupation,	when	
compared	to	the	high	levels	of	social	renting,	also	suggests	that	those	in	the	
high	deprivation	wards	have	less	economic,	financial	and	social	capital	than	
their	Sutton	counterparts.		Hence,	the	high	concentration	of	Black	Caribbeans	
in	Birmingham’s	1991’s	Bad	Lands,	compounded	with	their	low	levels	of	owner	
occupation,	suggests	that	their	spatial	and	social	mobility	has	changed	very	
little	since	Rex	and	Tomlinson’s	Handsworth	survey	in	the	mid-1970s.		I	
articulated	above	how	West	Indians	used	the	Partner	system	to	purchase	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 													
as	demonstrated	above	with	the	wards	of	Sutton,	that	is	not	the	case.		Whites	are	generally	
under-represented	in	environments	in	which	minority	groups	are	over-represented.		As	such,	
urban	spaces	of	White	clustering	could	also	be	perceived	as	their	cultural	Heart	Lands.		
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clearance	houses.		Although	the	condition	of	such	houses	did	very	little,	if	
anything,	to	improve	the	social	status	of	their	proprietors,	ownership	–	rather	
than	renting	–	provided	West	Indian	families	with	stability	and	security.		
	
Table	7.3:	Types	of	Tenure	and	their	Distribution	in	Low	Deprivation	Birmingham	Wards	
[1991].	
	
Ward	 Mortgage/Loan/Shared	
Ownership	
Rent:	Housing	
Association	
Rent:	Local	
Authority	
Total	
n	=	100%*	
Sutton	Four	Oaks	 78.05	 7.44	 14.52	 5,056	
Sutton	Vesey	 81.06	 5.70	 13.24	 4,683	
Sutton	New	Hall	 62.94	 9.53	 27.53	 4,976	
*Excludes	forms	of	tenure	other	than	those	considered	in	the	table	above.	
Source:	CASWEB	(2015);	Census	UK	Data	Service	England	and	Wales	1991.	
	
Table	7.4:	Types	of	Tenure	and	their	Distribution	in	High	Deprivation	Birmingham	Wards	
[1991].	
	
Birmingham	
Ward	
Mortgage/Loan/Shared	
Ownership	
Rent:	Housing	
Association	
Rent:	Local	
Authority	
Total	
n	=	100%*	
Soho		 37.83	 19.33	 42.84	 5,324	
Handsworth		 38.09	 27.47	 34.44	 4,881	
Ladywood		 17.27	 16.99	 65.75	 7,094	
Aston		 14.14	 14.07	 71.78	 7,290	
*Excludes	forms	of	tenure	other	than	those	considered	in	the	table	above.	
Source:	CASWEB	(2015);	Census	UK	Data	Service	England	and	Wales	1991.	
	
	
Imagining	desired	lands:	2001-2011254	
	
The	analysis	of	ethnic	group	spatial	movements	now	includes	examining	
material	differences,	between	and	within	wards	at	Lower	Super	Output	Area255	
																																								 																				
254	Whereas	I	continue	to	use	the	TID	to	calculate	deprivation	in	2001,	the	preferred	method	of	
analysis	for	the	relevant	Tables	denoting	2011	is	the	more	current	ONS	Index	of	Multiple	
Deprivation	(IMD)	2010.		There	are	seven	indicators	of	overall	deprivation	in	the	IMD	2010:	
Education,	Skills	and	Training;	Employment;	Income;	Barriers	to	Housing	Services;	Living	
Environment;	Crime	and	Health.		Deprivation	scores	in	the	2011	Tables	aggregates	the	seven	
indicators	to	present	an	overall	multiple	deprivation	score.					
255	Material	deprivation	in	2011	is	examined	at	Lower	Super	Output	Area	(LSOA),	which	is	the	
smallest	geographical	measurement.		However,	caution	has	to	be	applied	when	using	LSOAs	to	
establish	deprivation	in	a	given	ward.		Each	ward	will	have	several	postcodes	containing	a	
number	of	LSOAs.		The	LSOAs	tend	to	have	different	levels	of	deprivation.		They	can	sit	within	
	 293	
(LSOA)	level.		Tables	7.5	and	7.6	below	reveal	that	in	2001	and	2011	the	Sutton	
wards	retained	the	lowest	levels	of	deprivation	in	Birmingham.		The	city	also	
underwent	boundary	changes	in	2004,	and	increased	the	number	of	its	wards,	
from	39	to	40.		As	a	result,	there	is	an	additional	Sutton	ward:	Sutton	Trinity.		
The	Handsworth	ward	also	became	East	Lozells	and	East	Handsworth.		There	
are	641	LSOAs	in	Birmingham’s	40	wards,	each	recording	different	levels	of	
deprivation256.		Handsworth	shares	the	B20	postcode	with	Lozells257	and	
Handsworth	Wood.		However,	Handsworth	Wood	has	lower	overall	levels	of	
deprivation	than	Lozells	and	Handsworth.		The	Handsworth	Wood	area	has	an	
abundance	of	privately	owned	detached	and	semi-detached	properties	built	
between	the	1930s	and	1950s,	which	are	similar	to	those	in	the	more	affluent	
wards	of	the	city.		However,	property	prices	in	Handsworth	Wood	are	to	some	
extent	relatively	low	because	of	its	proximity	to	Handsworth	and	Lozells.	
Consequently,	it	is	not	necessarily	the	type	of	housing	that	determines	market	
prices,	but	location,	location,	location.			
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 													
the	same	postcode	area	or	intersect	them	within	the	same	ward.		This	is	demonstrated	in	the	
case	of	Ladywood.		Part	of	the	B15	postcode	of	Ladywood	comes	under	Edgbaston,	which	has	
the	lowest	levels	of	overall	deprivation	outside	of	the	Sutton	wards.		However,	parts	of	
Ladywood	also	share	the	B12	Postcode	with	Sparkbrook,	which	has	the	highest	level	of	overall	
deprivation	in	Birmingham.		Moreover,	when	the	crime	domain	of	the	IMD	is	analysed	
separately,	the	B15	postcode	of	Ladywood	has	the	highest	deprivation	level	in	the	city.	
256	Tables	recording	deprivation	in	2011,	highlight	both	the	lowest	and	highest	deprivation	
levels	in	a	given	ward.		This	is	because	there	is	no	way	of	knowing	in	which	LSOA	actors	reside,	
as	some	wards	may	only	have	pockets	of	high	deprivation.		Therefore,	the	members	of	the	
ethnic	groups	surveyed	may	not	necessarily	live	in	the	most	deprived	part	of	a	ward.	
257	Lozells	was	the	scene	of	social	disturbances	(more	commonly	referred	to	as	“riots”)	in	1985	
and	2011.		In	Chapter	Four,	I	outlined	the	agency	of	the	New	Testament	Church	of	God	in	
mobilising	the	community	for	a	peaceful	resolution.	
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Table	7.5:	Distribution	of	Ethnic	Populations	Aged	25-49	in	Low	Deprivation	Birmingham	
Wards	[2001].	
	
Ward	 Townsend	
Index	Score	
White	
British	
Black	
Caribbean	
MWBC	
Sutton	Four	Oaks	 -2.66	 3.70	 0.37	 0.62	
Sutton	Vesey	 -2.24	 3.80	 0.93	 1.33	
Sutton	New	Hall	 -1.18	 4.83	 0.92	 1.36	
	 Mean	=	5.45	 	 	 	
Total	[n	=	100%]*	 	 216,495	 19,920	 3,084	
															*	Total	ethnic	group	population	aged	25-49	in	Birmingham’s	thirty-nine	wards.	
															Source:	Infuse	(2015);	Office	for	National	Statistics	(2001)	Census:	Aggregate	data	(England	and	Wales).		
	
Table	7.6:	Distribution	of	Ethnic	Populations	Aged	25-49	in	Low	Deprivation	Birmingham	
Wards	[2011].	
	
Ward	 Lowest	LSOA	
IMD	Score	
Highest	LSOA	
IMD	Score	
White	
British	
Black	
Caribbean	
MWBC	
Sutton	Four	Oaks	 3.83	 22.12	 3.27	 0.47	 0.81	
Sutton	Vesey	 5.61	 16.99	 3.19	 0.97	 1.06	
Sutton	New	Hall	 5.46	 31.03	 3.11	 0.70	 0.77	
Sutton	Trinity	 3.63	 42.02	 3.71	 0.71	 0.96	
	 Mean	=	
37.32*	
Mean	=	37.32*	 	 	 	
Total	[n	=	100%]**	 	 	 187,348	 18,366	 6,334	
*The	Mean	represents	the	average	score	of	the	aggregated	seven	IMD	domains	in	Birmingham’s	641	LSOAs.	
**	Total	ethnic	group	population	aged	25-49	in	Birmingham’s	forty	wards.	
Source:	Infuse	(2015);	Office	for	National	Statistics	(2011)	Census:	Aggregate	data	(England	and	Wales).		
	
	
Where	possible,	the	Tables	above	compare	the	25-49	age-range.		This	is	
considered	the	optimum	age-stage	when	actors	might	be	socially	mobile.		By	
the	time	they	are	25,	individuals	may	have	completed	higher	education	and	
entered	the	labour	market.		However,	as	they	approach	50,	opportunities	for	
progression	in	the	labour	market	are	generally	–	but	not	always	–	diminishing.		
Declining	economic	opportunities	might	also	mean	individuals	have	less	
financial	capital	for	spatial	mobility.		As	such,	urban	aspirations	might	be	
modified	to	fall	in	line	with	an	individual’s	age	and	income.		Moreover,	
individuals	might	be	more	inclined	to	marry	and,	in	some	cases,	start	families	
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between	the	ages	of	25	and	49.		Thus,	housing	and	quality	of	environment	–	
particularly	in	relation	to	health	and	education	outcomes	–	may	have	increasing	
significance	during	this	age-stage.		However,	decisions	to	change	
environment258	could	be	influenced	by	any	single	or	combination	of	choices	and	
constraints.	
	
	
If	improvements	in	African	Caribbean	spatial	mobility	were	apparent	–	
according	to	how	their	urban	movements	compare	to	those	of	the	White	British	
population	–	then	one	would	expect	to	see	them	increasing	their	concentration	
in	the	low	deprivation	wards.		One	would	also	expect	to	see	a	lower	
representation	of	African	Caribbeans	in	high	deprivation	wards.		When	
differences	between	White	British	and	Black	Caribbean	ethnic	representations,	
between	2001	and	2011,	are	compared	in	Tables	7.5	and	7.6	above,	African	
Caribbeans	have	slightly	increased	their	proportional	representation	in	three	of	
the	low	deprivation	Promised	Lands	of	Sutton.		The	same	is	also	true	for	their	
MWBC	peers.	
	
	
Tables	7.7	and	7.8	below	reveal	ethnic	representations	in	Birmingham’s	high	
deprivation	Bad	Lands,	between	2001	and	2011.		In	comparison	to	the	
proportional	representation	of	their	White	counterparts,	African	Caribbeans	
																																								 																				
258	In	reference	to	what	she	defines	as	White	flight,	Neal	(2002:	446)	notes	that	‘specific	
distillations	of	this	[phenomenon]	can	be	seen	in	migration	from	urban	to	rural	areas	–	4,900	
people	leave	cities	in	England	each	week	“because	of	the	attraction	of	rural	idyll	[and]	because	
of	perceived	urban	decay”’.	
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have	a	lower	presence	in	Soho.		However,	in	the	same	period	they	have	
increased	their	proportional	representation	in	Handsworth,	which	could	be	a	
result	of	boundary	changes	in	2004.		There	are	also	decreases	in	Caribbean	
concentration	in	Aston	and	Ladywood.		Paradoxically,	the	White	British	
population	has	more	than	tripled	its	representation	in	Ladywood.		This	could	be	
explained	by	Ladywood’s	proximity	to	the	City	Centre	and	its	recent	
gentrification,	which	has	made	certain	sections	of	the	ward	more	attractive	to	
professionals.		Ladywood	demonstrates	the	problem	of	labelling	entire	wards	
as	being	deprived,	when	deprivation	might	be	significantly	low	in	some	LSOAs,	
whilst	higher	in	others.		Therefore,	certain	parts	of	the	ward	can	be	conceived	
as	both	Bad	Lands	and	Good	Lands.	
Table	7.7:	Distribution	of	Ethnic	Populations	Aged	25-49	in	High	Deprivation	Birmingham	
Wards	[2001].	
	
Ward	 Townsend	
Index	Score	
White	
British	
Black	
Caribbean	
MWBC		
Soho		 12.35	 0.91	 9.06	 5.25	
Handsworth		 13.54	 0.56	 7.09	 2.76	
Ladywood		 10.71	 1.81	 7.00	 6.61	
Aston		 16.31	 1.12	 8.94	 5.87	
	 Mean	=	5.45	 	 	 	
Total	[n	=	
100%]*	
	 216,495	 19,920	 3,084	
*	Total	ethnic	group	population	aged	25-49	in	Birmingham’s	thirty-nine	wards.	
Source:	Infuse	(2015);	Office	for	National	Statistics	(2001)	Census:	Aggregate	data	(England	and	Wales).		
	
Table	7.8:	Distribution	of	Ethnic	Populations	Aged	25-49	in	High	Deprivation	Birmingham	
Wards	[2011].	
	
Ward	 Lowest	LSOA	IMD	
Score		
Highest	LSOA	
IMD	Score	
White		
British	
Black		
Caribbean	
MWBC	
Soho		 33.95	 74.60	 0.92	 8.65	 4.88	
Lozells	and	East	
Handsworth		
39.87	 62.88	 0.37	 7.18	 2.56	
Ladywood		 21.77	 61.68	 3.21	 5.66	 5.02	
Aston		 37.92	 64.86	 0.49	 6.40	 3.00	
	 Mean	=	37.32*	 Mean	=	37.32*	 	 	 	
Total	[n	=	100%]**	 	 	 187348	 18366	 6334	
*The	Mean	represents	the	average	score	of	the	total	641,	LSOAs	in	Birmingham	and	not	that	of	the	40	wards.	
**	Total	ethnic	group	population	aged	25-49	in	Birmingham’s	forty	wards.	
Source:	Infuse	(2015);	Office	for	National	Statistics	(2011)	Census:	Aggregate	data	(England	and	Wales).		
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Part	of	Ladywood	is	quite	close	to	Birmingham	City	Centre,	the	finance	capital	
of	the	West	Midlands.		Rosemary	Campbell	lives	in	this	affluent	region	of	
Ladywood,	which	has	undergone	significant	redevelopment	in	recent	years.		
Her	apartment	is	just	a	few	minutes’	walk	from	the	bars,	clubs	and	restaurants,	
located	alongside	the	wharfs	at	the	back	of	Broad	Street.		The	area	is	an	integral	
part	of	Birmingham’s	night-time	economy.		Rosemary	was	bought	up	in	a	house	
owned	by	her	parents,	off	Churchill	Road,	in	bottom259	Handsworth:	
	
‘It	was	a	huge	Victorian	house,	the	kind	that	I	couldn’t	afford	to	buy	
now;	five-bedrooms,	three	reception	rooms,	a	large	kitchen,	with	a	
plot	of	land	at	the	back.		Houses	like	the	one	we	lived	in	on	Saint	
Peters	Road	have	been	turned	into	flats’	(Rosemary	Campbell,	29th	
May	2013,	Birmingham).			
	
She	bought	her	first	house	in	Bearwood,	which	is	in	Sandwell	and	close	to	the	
Soho	area	of	Birmingham.		Her	choice	to	purchase	in	that	area	was	influenced	
by	financial	constraints:	
	
‘Bearwood	had	cheaper	houses	that	I	could	afford.		There	wasn’t	any	
other	reason.		I	could	afford	to	live	there	on	a	teacher’s	salary.		I	now	
																																								 																				
259	When	I	[the	author]	was	nine	my	family	moved	from	Queens	Head	Road,	in	top	
Handsworth,	to	Churchill	Road	in	bottom	Handsworth.		The	ward	is	divided	by	Handsworth	
Park.		Bottom	Handsworth	lies	between	the	Park’s	Hamstead	Road	entrance	and	Birchfield	
Road.		In	contrast,	top	Handsworth	starts	from	the	Park’s	Grove	Lane	entrance	and	stretches	
north-west	toward	Sandwell	and	West	Bromwich.	
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live	in	Birmingham	City	Centre.		I’ve	bought	an	apartment	there	
because	basically	it’s	good	for	commuting.		It’s	B16,	but	as	my	
husband	keeps	saying	to	me,	“That’s	Ladywood!		So	don’t	bother	get	
thinking	you’ve	got	an	apartment	in	the	City	Centre.		It’s	Ladywood”!		
When	we	pay	our	car	insurance	it’s	definitely	Ladywood,	but	it’s	
behind	Broad	Street.		So	that’s	where	we	are’	(Rosemary	Campbell,	
29th	May	2013,	Birmingham)!	
	
	
Rosemary	admits	to	making	mistakes	where	property	is	concerned.		She	regrets	
not	talking	her	mother	out	of	selling	the	family	home	when	her	father	died.		
Although	her	apartment	is	in	a	desirable	location,	she	gave	me	the	impression	
that	if	it	was	possible	she	would	gladly	exchange	it	for	a	rambling	Victorian	
property	in	Handsworth.		Having	grown	up	in	Handsworth	I	empathise	with	
Rosemary	and	remember	the	area	we	knew	as	a	cultural	Heart	Land.		However,	
like	Rosemary	I	also	realise	that	the	Handsworth	we	reminisce	about	no	longer	
exists.		Our	version	of	Handsworth	is	now	an	imagined	community260,	which	will	
always	have	a	special	place	in	our	imaginations.		However,	it	is	no	longer	part	of	
our	day-to-day	reality.		Although	Rosemary	might	wish	to	go	back	to	her	roots,	
she	is	also	an	astute	businesswoman	who	realises	the	impracticalities	of	the	
idea,	particularly	in	terms	of	its	financial	implications.		The	logic	of	the	market	
																																								 																				
260	Benedict	Anderson’s	(1991,	[1983])	notion	of	an	imagined	community	in	some	ways	
supports	my	idea	of	a	cultural	Heart	Land.		Anderson	defines	imagined	communities	in	terms	
of	the	idea	of	nationhood	formed	on	commonalties	such	as	language	(ibid,	1991:	44).		
Although	social	attachments	and	cultural	ties	might	have	originated	in	a	specific	geography,	
the	sense	of	belonging	which	forged	them	tends	to	transcend	the	boundaries	of	time	and	
space.		Moreover,	the	notion	of	community	embodies	a	sense	of	common	identity	and	a	space	
in	which	social	bonds	are	allowed	to	develop	and	flourish.	
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dictates	that	a	property	in	Handsworth	be	a	Bad	investment,	in	comparison	to	
her	present	urban	location.	
	
	
Rosemary’s	narrative	demonstrates	that	the	material	deprivation	of	an	
environment	does	not	necessarily	influence	decisions	involving	spatial	
movement.		The	desire	to	reside	in	particular	spaces	can	overlook	the	housing	
market	logic	that	dictates	where	capital	should	be	invested	to	maximise	
potential	gains.		High	deprivation	Bad	Lands	can	also	be	considered	as	desirable	
Heart	Lands	in	which	the	pursuit	of	happiness	reaps	cultural,	rather	than	
financial,	rewards.		Rosemary	has	all	the	symbolic	educational	and	economic	
capital	of	middle-class	success.		However,	she	does	not	find	the	thought	of	
living	in	the	Bad	Lands	where	she	grew	up	unappealing.		Therefore,	spatial	
positions	are	not	always	reliable	indicators	of	social	status	or	class	dispositions.		
	
	
Unlike	Rosemary,	only	three	of	the	ACFAS	subjects	I	interviewed	were	
homeowners.		Subject	A	had	a	mortgage	on	a	house	in	Erdington	that	he	shared	
with	his	wife.		Subject	D	inherited	a	house	in	Smethwick	where	she	lives	–	
mortgage	free	–	with	her	adopted	daughter.		Subject	E	bought	a	flat	in	
Handsworth	Wood	–	with	the	financial	compensation	received	from	his	
previous	employers.		They	told	me	about	their	Desired	Lands:		the	places	they	
would	choose	to	live	if	money	was	no	object.		None	of	the	research	subjects	
mentioned	anything	about	social	class.		However,	they	considered	notions	of	
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ethnicity,	family	and	intimate	attachments	to	be	important.		Subject	A	liked	
where	he	lived	in	Erdington,	which	was	also	the	area	that	Subject	G,	currently	
living	in	Newtown,	also	desired	to	live:	
	
‘At	the	moment	I’m	quite	settled	and	all	right	where	I	am.		I	just	go	
from	home	to	work,	work	to	home,	home	to	church’	(Subject	A,	10th	
August	2013,	Birmingham).	
	
‘I	like	Erdington	because	it’s	mixed.		There’s	a	good	mixture	of	Black,	
White	and	Asian,	and	everyone	seems	to	get	on’	(Subject	G,	8th	
August	2013,	Birmingham).	
	
‘I’ve	thought	about	this,	only	just	recently	in	fact.		I’d	more	than	likely	
live	in	Great	Barr	or	maybe	Harborne.		I’m	fed	up	of	Smethwick	and	
I’d	just	like	a	change	of	area.		My	friend	isn’t	well	and	she	lives	just	off	
the	Wolverhampton	Road.		If	I	could	afford	to	I’d	buy	a	house	in	
Harborne	to	be	near	her,	so	I	could	help	her	out	a	bit	more’	(Subject	
D,	1st	May	2014,	Birmingham).	
	
Subjects	B,	C	and	F	rent	social	authority,	and	private,	housing.		However,	in	a	
similar	way	to	Subjects,	A,	G	and	D	above,	their	ideas	of	Desired	Lands	are	not	
necessarily	influenced	by	indicators	of	deprivation.		Nevertheless,	their	spatial	
positions	are	constrained	by	their	financial	situation:	
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‘I’d	move	near	my	brother	in	Handsworth	Wood	if	I	could,	but	I	can’t	
afford	a	house	there	and	I	can’t	get	a	transfer.		The	housing	
association	has	changed	the	criteria.		It	used	to	be	only	those	who	are	
over	50	could	get	somewhere	in	Handsworth	Wood,	but	now	they’ve	
changed	it	so	you	have	to	be	over	60’	(Subject	B,	1st	May	2014,	
Birmingham).	
.	
‘I	wouldn’t	live	in	Birmingham	because	I’ve	got	to	the	age	where	I	feel	
that	I	need	to	be	out	in	the	open	air.		I	need	to	be	living	in	the	
country	or	down	by	the	coast.		I’m	in	that	zone	now.		Where	I’m	living	
now	is	affecting	my	quality	of	life’	(Subject	C,	6th	August	2013,	
Birmingham).	
	
‘I	like	being	close	to	my	family	really.		I’ve	never	thought	about	living	
far	from	them.		I	used	to	visit	my	friend	in	Chelmsley	Wood	and	it’s	so	
dead	there,	so	dry.		If	you	want	something	around	here	[Handsworth]	
the	shops	are	open	twenty-four	hours	a	day.		I	really	like	it	where	I	
live	now.		I’m	all	right	here’	(Subject	F,	1st	May	2014,	Birmingham).	
	
For	Subject	F,	Handsworth	is	both	her	cultural	Heart	Land	and	Desired	Land.		
She	has	lived	there	all	her	life	and	finds	the	thought	of	living	elsewhere	
inconceivable.		Only	Subject	E	desired	to	live	in	the	Promised	Lands	of	Sutton.		
However,	his	desire	was	not	influenced	by	ideas	of	high	or	low	deprivation.		He	
grew	up	in	Erdington,	which	is	near	to	Sutton.		After	leaving	home	he	lived	in	
Sutton	with	his	girlfriend.		However,	he	does	not	have	enough	capital	to	
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purchase	a	property	there.		The	above	narratives	demonstrate	that	work,	
culture,	kinship	attachments,	financial	constraints	and	lifestyle	choices,	are	
major	concerns	in	the	spatial	movement	and	settlement	patterns	of	Black	
Caribbeans.			
	
	
Housing	tenure	in	Good	Lands	and	Bad	Lands	
	
Tables,	7.9,	7.10	and	7.11	below	reveal	differences	in	housing	tenure	of	the	
Household	Reference	Person	(HRP),	in	the	Sutton	Good	Lands,	between	2001	
and	2011.		African	Caribbeans	increased	their	home	ownership	in	Sutton	Four	
Oaks	and	Sutton	New	Hall,	relative	to	the	same	tenure	of	their	White	peers.		
They	have	also	reduced	their	local	authority	tenure	in	all	the	Sutton	wards.		If	
home	ownership	is	an	indicator	of	upward	social	mobility	then	the	housing	
tenure	of	Black	Caribbeans,	between	2001	and	2001	in	Sutton’s	Good	Lands,	
suggest	that	their	social	status	is	improving.	
	
	
In	most	cases	the	privately	rented	tenure	of	African	Caribbeans	in	Sutton	has	
increased.		However,	it	is	difficult	to	draw	conclusions	from	the	data	to	
ascertain	why	that	is	the	case.		The	decision	to	rent	privately	could	be	a	
consequence	of	agency	or	necessity.		Individuals	may	rent	in	Sutton	because	it	
is	their	area	of	choice,	or	may	live	there	because	they	have	been	unable	to	
obtain	Council	accommodation	elsewhere.		Moreover,	the	private	housing	
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market	is	not	as	stringently	regulated	as	the	public	sector.		Therefore,	there	is	a	
suggestion	that	tenants	in	private	accommodation	might	endure	worse	housing	
conditions	than	their	peers	renting	local	authority	accommodation.		However,	
African	Caribbeans	renting	privately	in	Sutton	could	have	housing	that	is	
comparable	to	either	the	best	or	worst	forms	of	accommodation	in	the	area.		
Their	housing	condition	could	depend	on	the	environment	of	the	LSOA	they	live	
in	and	also	the	moral	conscience	of	their	landlord.		Moreover,	African	
Caribbeans	who	wish	to	rent	privately	may	also	be	deterred	by	the	
discriminatory	practices	of	private	landlords.		Some	may	refuse	applications	of	
Black	tenants261	if	the	demand	for	housing	in	particular	areas	is	high.	
	
	
In	comparison	to	their	White	British	counterparts,	MWBCs	have	a	decreasing	
rate	of	privately	rented	tenure	in	Sutton	New	Hall.		They	may	also	be	the	
victims	of	discrimination	but,	similarly	to	their	Black	peers,	it	is	difficult	to	say	
with	any	certainty.		MWBC	spatial	mobility	also	shows	variation,	in	comparison	
to	that	of	their	White	British	counterparts.		Their	home	ownership	has	
decreased	in	Sutton	Four	Oaks,	but	increased	in	Sutton	Vesey	and	Sutton	New	
Hall.		Their	pattern	of	home	ownership	and	local	authority	tenure	is	quite	
similar	in	the	same	Sutton	wards.				
	
																																								 																				
261	Landlords	may	overlook	applications	from	Black	tenants	if	they	believe	that	their	economic	
situation	is	precarious.		They	may	also	discriminate	against	them	on	the	ground	of	colour,	see	
CRE	(1990).		Landlords	might	also	view	the	presence	of	Black	tenants	as	an	outward	sign	of	
depreciation,	which	can	potentially	deter	White	tenants.		In	the	context	of	the	US,	poverty	is	
synonymous	with	minority	ethnic	groups.		Anacker	(2010:	58)	argues	that	‘appreciation	in	
neighbourhoods	is	impacted	by	concentrated	poverty,	the	largest	negative	impact	on	housing	
values	of	all	characteristics	considered’.	
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Tables	7.9,	7.10	and	7.11:	Household	Reference	Person	[HRP]	of	Ethnic	Groups	Aged	16	and	
Over	and	their	Tenure	in	Low	Deprivation	Birmingham	Wards.	
	
Table	7.9	
Ward	 White	British	
Owner	Occupied*	
White	British	
Social	Rented**	
White	British	
Private	Rented***	
Total	
[n	=	100%]****	
Year		 2001	 2011	 2001	 2011	 2001	 2011	 2001	 2011	
Sutton	Four	Oaks	 88.96	 84.19	 7.85	 7.33	 3.19	 8.48	 11,024	 8,940	
Sutton	Vesey	 88.04	 83.38	 7.30	 6.20	 4.65	 10.43	 10,463	 8,133	
Sutton	New	Hall	 83.04	 83.68	 12.58	 7.95	 4.38	 8.37	 12,137	 8,151	
Sutton	Trinity	 -	 78.02	 -	 11.22	 -	 10.76	 -	 9,276	
*Owned	outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared	ownership.	
**Local	authority/Other	social	rent.	
***Private	landlord/Letting	agency.	
****Excludes	forms	of	tenure	other	than	those	considered	in	the	table	above.	
Source:	Source:	Infuse	(2015);	Nomis	(2015);	Office	for	National	Statistics	(2001;	2011)	Census:	Aggregate	data	
(England	and	Wales).		
	
Table	7.10	
Ward	 Black	Caribbean	
Owner	Occupied*	
Black	Caribbean	
Social	Rented**	
Black	Caribbean		
Private	Rented***	
Total	
[n	=	100%]****	
Year		 2001	 2011	 2001	 2011	 2001	 2011	 2001	 2011	
Sutton	Four	Oaks	 63.64	 66.27	 36.36	 25.30	 0	 8.43	 88	 83	
Sutton	Vesey	 79.61	 72.08	 17.11	 11.68	 3.29	 16.24	 152	 197	
Sutton	New	Hall	 65.08	 73.28	 29.63	 14.38	 5.29	 12.33	 189	 146	
Sutton	Trinity	 -	 56.00	 -	 31.33	 -	 12.67	 -	 150	
*Owned	outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared	ownership.	
**Local	authority/Other	social	rent.	
***Private	landlord/Letting	agency.	
****Excludes	forms	of	tenure	other	than	those	considered	in	the	table	above.	
Source:	Source:	Infuse	(2015);	Nomis	(2015);	Office	for	National	Statistics	(2001;	2011)	Census:	Aggregate	data	
(England	and	Wales).		
	
Table	7.11	
Ward	 MWBC		
Owner	Occupied*	
MWBC		
Social	Rented**	
MWBC		
Private	Rented***	
Total	[n	=	100%]****	
Year		 2001	 2011	 2001	 2011	 2001	 2011	 2001	 2011	
Sutton	Four	Oaks	 50.00	 41.86	 50.00	 25.58	 0	 32.56	 18	 43	
Sutton	Vesey	 60.98	 60.00	 24.39	 15.56	 14.63	 24.40	 41	 45	
Sutton	New	Hall	 54.29	 63.89	 45.71	 25.00	 0	 11.11	 35	 36	
Sutton	Trinity	 -	 40.35	 -	 31.58	 -	 28.07	 -	 57	
*Owned	outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared	ownership.	
**Local	authority/Other	social	rent.	
***Private	landlord/Letting	agency.	
****Excludes	forms	of	tenure	other	than	those	considered	in	the	table	above.	
Source:	Source:	Infuse	(2015);	Nomis	(2015);	Office	for	National	Statistics	(2001;	2011)	Census:	Aggregate	data	
(England	and	Wales).		
	
	
Tables	7.12,	7.13	and	7.14	for	2011	below,	reveal	the	extent	to	which	the	
majority	of	Sutton	tenure	in	Tables	7.9,	7.10	and	7.11	can	be	attributed	to	their	
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25-49262	aged	HRP.		Only	about	a	third	of	White	British	HRPs	are	aged	25-49.		
However,	over	50	per	cent	of	Black	Caribbean	HRPs	in	Sutton	are	between	the	
ages	of	25	and	49.	Regardless	of	ethnic	group	differences,	the	majority	tenure	
type	in	Sutton	is	owner	occupied.		Therefore,	the	comparatively	higher	rate	of	
African	Caribbean	homeowner	HRPs,	aged	25-49,	reinforces	the	data	above	
that	highlights	their	improved	status	in	Sutton’s	Good	Lands.		Moreover,	the	
data	also	indicates	they	are	achieving	upward	social	mobility	within	the	
appropriate	age-stage.		However,	it	must	also	be	noted	that	the	actual	number	
of	African	Caribbean	owner-occupiers	is	comparatively	small.		Furthermore,	in	
comparison	to	some	of	Birmingham’s	other	wards,	there	are	relatively	few	
African	Caribbeans	–	and	MWBCs	–	living	in	Sutton.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																								 																				
262	The	total	tenure	(n)	of	the	different	ethnic	group	HRPs,	aged	25-49	in	each	Sutton	ward	in	
Tables	7.12,	7.13	and	7.14,	are	calculated	as	a	percentage	of	those	in	Tables	7.9,	7.10	and	7.11.			
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Tables	7.12,	7.13	and	7.14:	Household	Reference	Person	[HRP]	of	Ethnic	Groups	Aged	25-49	
and	their	Tenure	in	Low	Deprivation	Birmingham	Wards	[2011].	
	
Table	7.12	
Ward	 White	British	
Owner	Occupied*	
White	British	
Social	Rented**	
White	British	
Private	Rented***	
Total	
[n	=	100%]****	
Sutton	Four	Oaks	 77.31	 5.78	 16.92	 3,133	
Sutton	Vesey	 75.75	 4.65	 19.61	 2,948	
Sutton	New	Hall	 77.95	 6.17	 15.88	 2,821	
Sutton	Trinity	 87.81	 14.25	 24.88	 3,581	
*Owned	outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared	ownership.	
**Local	authority/Other	social	rent.	
***Private	landlord/Letting	agency.	
****Excludes	forms	of	tenure	other	than	those	considered	in	the	table	above.	
Source:	Source:	Infuse	(2015);	Office	for	National	Statistics	(2011)	Census:	Aggregate	data	(England	and	Wales).		
	
Table	7.13	
Ward	 Black	Caribbean	
Owner	Occupied*	
Black	Caribbean	
Social	Rented**	
Black	Caribbean	
Private	Rented***	
Total	
[n	=	100%]****	
Sutton	Four	Oaks	 67.27	 27.27	 5.45	 55	
Sutton	Vesey	 64.95	 14.43	 20.62	 97	
Sutton	New	Hall	 65.48	 16.68	 17.86	 84	
Sutton	Trinity	 43.82	 40.41	 15.73	 89	
*Owned	outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared	ownership.	
**Local	authority/Other	social	rent.	
***Private	landlord/Letting	agency.	
****Excludes	forms	of	tenure	other	than	those	considered	in	the	table	above.	
Source:	Source:	Infuse	(2015);	Office	for	National	Statistics	(2011)	Census:	Aggregate	data	(England	and	Wales).		
	
Table	7.14	
Ward	 MWBC		
Owner	Occupied*	
MWBC		
Social	Rented**	
MWBC		
Private	Rented***	
Total	
[n	=	100%]****	
Sutton	Four	Oaks	 44.83	 24.14	 31.04	 29	
Sutton	Vesey	 52.78	 19.44	 27.78	 36	
Sutton	New	Hall	 69.23	 26.92	 3.85	 26	
Sutton	Trinity	 30.00	 33.33	 36.67	 30	
*Owned	outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared	ownership.	
**Local	authority/Other	social	rent.	
***Private	landlord/Letting	agency.	
****Excludes	forms	of	tenure	other	than	those	considered	in	the	table	above.	
Source:	Source:	Infuse	(2015);	Office	for	National	Statistics	(2011)	Census:	Aggregate	data	(England	and	Wales).		
	
	
Tables	7.15,	7.16	and	7.17	for	2001	and	2011	below,	highlight	changes	in	ethnic	
tenure	in	Birmingham’s	Bad	Lands,	and	are	compared	to	those	of	White	British	
HRPs.		In	comparison	to	the	Sutton	Good	Lands,	there	is	a	lower	level	of	owner	
occupation	for	all	three	ethnic	groups.		The	home	ownership	representations	
between	White	British	and	Black	Caribbeans	are	quite	similar,	and	greater	than	
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those	of	MWBCs.		However,	there	are	pronounced	differences	in	privately	
rented	tenure.		In	Sutton,	African	Caribbeans	are	more	inclined	to	be	
homeowners.		However,	in	some	Bad	Lands	they	rely	more	on	local	authority	
housing	than	their	White	counterparts	and	are	also	less	inclined	to	rent	
privately,	which	is	not	the	case	where	Ladywood	is	concerned.			
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Tables	7.15,	7.16	and	7.17:	Household	Reference	Person	[HRP]	of	Ethnic	Groups	Aged	16	and	
Over	and	their	Tenure	in	High	Deprivation	Birmingham	Wards.	
	
Table	7.15	
Ward	 White	British	
Owner	Occupied*	
White	British	
Social	Rented**	
White	British	
Private	Rented***	
Total	[n	=	100%]	
Year		 2001	 2011	 2001	 2011	 2001	 2011	 2001	 2011	
Soho		 39.66	 38.43	 43.31	 37.40	 17.03	 24.17	 2,325	 1,837	
Handsworth263		 42.25	 34.71	 41.12	 44.47	 16.63	 20.82	 1,780	 994	
Ladywood		 32.81	 28.90	 49.67	 24.31	 17.53	 46.79	 5,255	 6,706	
Aston		 31.40	 26.34	 59.22	 58.17	 9.38	 15.49	 3,497	 1,401	
*Owned	outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared	ownership.	
**Local	authority/Other	social	rent.	
***Private	landlord/Letting	agency.	
Source:	Source:	Infuse	(2015);	Nomis	(2015);	Office	for	National	Statistics	(2001;	2011)	Census:	Aggregate	data	
(England	and	Wales).		
	
Table	7.16	
Ward	 Black	Caribbean	
Owner	Occupied*	
Black	Caribbean	
Social	Rented**	
Black	Caribbean	Private	
Rented***	
Total	[n	=	100%]	
Year		 2001	 2011	 2001	 2011	 2001	 2011	 2001	 2011	
Soho		 38.69	 37.68	 54.73	 46.09	 6.58	 16.23	 2,158	 1,996	
Handsworth1		 38.25	 30.95	 54.73	 58.28	 7.01	 10.76	 2,039	 1,877	
Ladywood		 22.80	 18.68	 72.48	 69.03	 4.71	 12.29	 1,719	 1,253	
Aston		 25.03	 32.40	 72.22	 62.33	 2.74	 5.27	 2,333	 1,707	
*Owned	outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared	ownership.	
**Local	authority/Other	social	rent.	
***Private	landlord/Letting	agency.	
Source:	Source:	Infuse	(2015);	Nomis	(2015);	Office	for	National	Statistics	(2001;	2011)	Census:	Aggregate	data	
(England	and	Wales).		
	
Table	7.17	
Ward	 MWBC		
Owner	Occupied*	
MWBC		
Social	Rented*	
MWBC		
Private	Rented*	
Total	
[n	=	100%]	
Year		 2001	 2011	 2001	 2011	 2001	 2011	 2001	 2011	
Soho		 20.92	 18.42	 70.66	 57.89	 8.38	 23.68	 167	 266	
Handsworth1		 20.56	 14.21	 65.42	 64.48	 14.02	 21.31	 107	 183	
Ladywood		 10.94	 12.50	 80.86	 64.88	 8.20	 22.62	 256	 336	
Aston		 11.68	 11.94	 78.68	 76.62	 9.64	 11.44	 197	 201	
*Owned	outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared	ownership.	
**Local	authority/Other	social	rent.	
***Private	landlord/Letting	agency.	
Source:	Source:	Infuse	(2015);	Nomis	(2015);	Office	for	National	Statistics	(2001;	2011)	Census:	Aggregate	data	
(England	and	Wales).		
	
	
In	comparison	to	White	Britons,	the	number	of	African	Caribbeans	renting	
privately	in	Ladywood	has	almost	trebled	between	2001	and	2011.		Moreover,	
																																								 																				
263	The	ward	of	Handsworth	became	East	Handsworth	and	Lozells	after	boundary	changes	in	
2004	
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Black	Caribbean	local	authority	tenure	has	practically	doubled	in	the	same	
period.		Nevertheless,	Ladywood	is	an	urban	anomaly,	as	there	are	Good	Lands	
and	Bad	Lands	within	the	ward.		The	area	has	changed	dramatically	since	it	was	
surveyed	in	the	1970s	(Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981).		As	noted	
above,	gentrification	has	improved	some	of	Ladywood’s	LSOAS,	whilst	other	
parts	of	the	ward	remain	highly	deprived.		This	is	problematic	for	the	analysis	of	
African	Caribbean	spatial	and	social	mobility,	because	there	is	no	way	of	
knowing	in	exactly	which	LSOAS	they	are	residing	in.		
	
	
As	noted	by	Ratcliffe	(1996)	above,	disparities	between	owned	and	rented	
tenure	in	Birmingham’s	Good	Lands	and	Bad	Lands	could	be	a	consequence	of	
income	differentials	and	poverty.		However,	it	is	difficult	to	determine	if	the	
contemporary	increase	in	Black	Caribbean	local	authority	tenure	in	Ladywood	is	
a	result	of	individual	choice	or	structural	constraints.		The	dispersal	policy,	
implemented	by	the	City	Council	between	1968	and	1975,	is	an	example	of	how	
the	settlement	patterns	of	those	who	rely	on	social	housing	can	be	constrained	
by	structural	processes.		The	Council	adopted	a	practice	which	denied	‘access	
for	Blacks	to	certain	Council	dwellings	[and	dispersed]	Black	tenants	across	the	
city’	(Flett,	Henderson	and	Brown,	1979:	290).		Although	the	Council’s	dispersal	
policy	only	became	public	knowledge	after	it	ended	in	1975,	it	was	defended	as	
a	benign	means	of	reducing	minority	ethnic	clustering	in	specific	areas,	whilst	
spreading	‘Black	people	thinly	amongst	the	White	population’	(ibid,	1979:	291).			
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Where	dispersal	policies	were	formerly	used	with	the	supposed	aim	of	aiding	
racial	integration,	allocating	social	housing	to	minority	ethnic	groups	in	cultural	
specific	zones264	can	facilitate	the	contemporary	consumption	of	culture.		
Moreover,	the	Council	might	attempt	to	contain	disadvantaged	working-class	
communities	in	areas	where	their	activities	and	interests	do	not	conflict	with	
those	of	the	middle-classes.		On	the	other	hand,	the	rise	in	Black	Caribbean	
local	authority	tenure	in	Ladywood,	relative	to	that	of	White	Britons	between	
2001	and	2011,	could	also	be	an	example	of	de	facto	segregation.		Ladywood	
has	a	large	stock	of	social	housing,	near	to	Birmingham’s	historical	African	
Caribbean	cultural	Heart	Lands.		Therefore,	it	could	be	argued	that	Black	
Caribbeans	might	choose	to	settle	in	high	deprivation	LSOAs,	such	as	those	in	
Ladywood,	to	reaffirm	friendships,	kinship	and	cultural	attachments.		
	
	
Tables	7.18,	7.19	and	7.20	for	2011	below	reveal	that	in	comparison	to	their	
White	counterparts	in	Birmingham’s	Bad	Lands,	there	are	more	Black	
																																								 																				
264	I	use	this	term	to	refer	to	urban	spaces	in	which	the	cultural	pursuits	of	minority	ethnic	
groups	are	appropriated	for	the	wider	market.		Cultural	specific	zones	could	also	be	viewed	as	
a	“cosmopolitan	canopy”	(Anderson,	2004).		These	are	social	spaces	of	cultural	convergence,	in	
which	different	ethnic	groups	interact	and	act	civil	towards	each	other.		The	Birmingham	
Carnival	(formerly	known	as	the	Handsworth	Carnival)	commodifies	Caribbean	culture	for	the	
benefit	of	the	city’s	economy.		It	used	to	be	held	in	Handsworth	park,	but	was	recently	moved	
to	Perry	Barr,	which	also	has	a	high	concentration	of	African	Caribbeans.		Another	example	of	
the	spatial	commodification	of	culture	is	the	ward	of	Sparkbrook.		The	Ladypool	Road	area	has	
several	Asian	restaurants	and	is	often	referred	to	as	Birmingham’s	Balti	Belt.		The	City	Council	
promotes	the	culture	of	minority	ethnic	groups,	for	attracting	tourism	and	as	consumption	
activities	for	the	middle-classes,	to	demonstrate	Birmingham’s	diversity	and	multiculturalism.			
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Caribbeans	in	the	25-49265	age-range	who	are	renting	social	housing.		This	
shows	that	there	is	still	a	tendency	for	Black	Caribbeans	to	rent	rather	than	buy	
in	the	areas	where	they	are	highly	concentrated266		Approximately	a	third	more	
Blacks	than	Whites	are	dependent	on	social	housing	and	the	figure	is	slightly	
higher	for	MWBCs.		The	White	British	population	also	tend	to	have	a	higher	rate	
of	privately	rented	tenure.		This	is	not	easily	explained.		It	could	mean	that	the	
Bad	Lands	are	viewed	by	Whites	as	Zones	of	Transition	(Burgess,	2008	[1925];	
Rex	and	Moore,	1967),	in	which	they	appropriate	the	private	market	to	satisfy	
their	short-term	housing	needs	until	they	have	acquired	enough	financial	
capital	to	relocate.		However,	the	high	rate	of	private	housing	rented	by	Whites	
in	Ladywood,	in	comparison	to	the	other	Bad	Lands,	suggests	that	they	could	be	
professionals	residing	in	the	more	desirable	LSOAs	near	to	the	City	Centre.		
There	are	much	lower	rates	of	African	Caribbeans,	and	MWBCs,	renting	in	the	
private	housing	market.		This	could	indicate	that	they	still	face	discrimination	
from	private	landlords,	which	was	the	case	in	the	late	1980s267,	or	that	they	
cannot	afford	to	rent	privately.			
	
	
	
	
																																								 																				
265	I	have	argued	previously	that	the	25-49	age-range	is	significant	for	social	mobility	(see	
Chapters	Four	and	Five).		Post-university	labour	market	participation	should	have	commenced	
by	age	24.		However,	by	the	time	most	individuals	reach	their	late	forties	their	economic	value	
is	diminishing.		Opportunities	for	career	progression	and	promotion	are	often	mediated	by	age.		
Employers	see	more	value	in	highly-qualified	employees	whose	labour	is	more	easily	
appropriated	by	the	use	of	flexible	contracts,	which	often	offer	less	employment	security	and	a	
lower	wage	(Standing,	2011).		The	proportion	of	African	Caribbeans	aged	25-49,	who	are	
renting	social	housing	in	low	deprivation	areas,	suggests	that	their	spatial	settlement	and	
housing	tenure	are	constrained	by	poverty.	
266	See	Ratcliffe	(1981;	2004).	
267	See	CRE	(1990).	
	 312	
Tables	7.18,	7.19	and	7.20:	Household	Reference	Person	[HRP]	of	Ethnic	Groups	Aged	25-49	
and	their	Tenure	in	High	Deprivation	Birmingham	Wards	[2011].	
	
Table	7.18	
Ward	 White	British	Owner	
Occupied*	
White	British	
Social	Rented**	
White	British	
Private	
Rented***	
Total	
[n	=	100%]****	
Year		 2011	 2011	 2011	 	
Soho		 34.06	 35.34	 30.61	 781	
Lozells	and	E.	
Handsworth		
25.77	 49.02	 25.21	 357	
Ladywood		 29.07	 17.71	 53.22	 4,156	
Aston		 21.00	 62.40	 16.60	 500	
*Owned	outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared	ownership.	
**Local	authority/Other	social	rent.	
***Private	landlord/Letting	agency.	
****Excludes	forms	of	tenure	other	than	those	considered	in	the	tables	above.	
Source:	Source:	Infuse	(2015);	Office	for	National	Statistics	(2011)	Census:	Aggregate	data	(England	and	Wales).		
	
Table	7.19	
Ward	 Black	Caribbean	
Owner	Occupied*	
Black	Caribbean	
Social	Rented**	
Black	Caribbean	
Private	Rented***	
Total	
[n	=	100%]****	
Year		 2011	 2011	 2011	 	
Soho		 25.90	 53.07	 21.03	 1,027	
Lozells	and	E.	
Handsworth		
17.07	 66.83	 16.11	 832	
Ladywood		 15.13	 69.87	 15.00	 760	
Aston		 21.02	 70.95	 8.03	 747	
*Owned	outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared	ownership.	
**Local	authority/Other	social	rent.	
***Private	landlord/Letting	agency.	
****Excludes	forms	of	tenure	other	than	those	considered	in	the	tables	above.	
Source:	Source:	Infuse	(2015);	Office	for	National	Statistics	(2011)	Census:	Aggregate	data	(England	and	Wales).		
	
Table	7.20	
Ward	 MWBC		
Owner	Occupied*	
MWBC		
Social	Rented**	
MWBC		
Private	Rented***	
Total	
[n	=	100%]****	
Year		 2011	 2011	 2011	 	
Soho		 18.65	 57.51	 23.83	 193	
Lozells	and	E.	
Handsworth		
7.14	 69.64	 23.21	 112	
Ladywood		 14.78	 63.04	 22.17	 230	
Aston		 6.92	 81.54	 11.54	 130	
*Owned	outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared	ownership.	
**Local	authority/Other	social	rent.	
***Private	landlord/Letting	agency.	
****Excludes	forms	of	tenure	other	than	those	considered	in	the	tables	above.	
Source:	Source:	Infuse	(2015);	Office	for	National	Statistics	(2011)	Census:	Aggregate	data	(England	and	Wales).		
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Ethnic	Hinter	Lands		
	
Individuals	generally	relocate	at	different	stages	in	their	lives,	often	in	search	of	
their	idea	of	a	Promised	Land.		However,	as	their	circumstances	change,	ideas	
of	what	constitutes	Promised	or	Desired	Lands	are	often	modified	accordingly.		
Some	might	relocate	to	neighbourhoods,	which	they	believe	reflects	their	
improved	labour	market	status,	whilst	others	might	move	to	maintain	family	
and	friendship	attachments.		However,	some	urban	transitions	may	end	in	a	
Hinter	Land	rather	than	a	Promised	Land.		Unlike	Good	Lands	and	Bad	Lands,	
Hinter	Lands	are	not	defined	by	their	polarised	level	of	deprivation.	I	refer	to	
them	as	the	geographical	spaces	in	which	the	ethnic	groups	surveyed	in	this	
research	have	increased	their	representations	in	more	recent	times.		Thus,	in	
another	sense	Hinter	Lands	may	also	perceived	as	new	ethnic	enclaves268.	
	
	
Between	1991	and	2011,	there	has	been	a	gradual	outward	movement	of	the	
Black	Caribbean	population	from	Birmingham’s	Bad	Lands.		This	has	also	
coincided	with	improvements	in	their	status	as	homeowners.		Since	2001	more	
African	Caribbeans	have	purchased	properties	in	the	Sutton	Good	Lands.		
However,	the	majority	of	their	25-49	aged	HRPs	now	reside	in	Hinter	Lands.		
These	wards	have	the	highest	concentration	of	ethnic	group	HRPs	analysed	in	
this	research.		Apart	from	Oscott269,	the	Hinter	Lands	of	White	Britons	are	not	
																																								 																				
268	See	Footnote	252.	
269	Oscott	has	a	proportionately	high	number	of	both	White	British	and	African	Caribbean	HRPs	
in	comparison	to	the	remainder	of	wards	in	Birmingham	that	are	neither	Good	or	Bad	Lands.	
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the	same	wards	as	those	predominantly	populated	by	African	Caribbeans.		In	
contrast,	the	Hinter	Lands	of	MWBCs	are	mainly	a	mixture	of	wards	populated	
by	both	White	British	and	African	Caribbean	ethnic	groups.		For	example,	
Stockland	Green	and	Perry	Barr	are	African	Caribbean	and	MWBC	Hinter	Lands,	
whereas	both	White	British,	and	MWBCs,	have	Longbridge	in	common	and	
Shard	End	is	unique	to	MWBCs.			
	
	
Tables	7.21,	7.22	and	7.23	below	reveal	that	the	majority	of	White	British	
Hinter	Lands	are	located	in	the	south	of	Birmingham.		In	each	ward	the	main	
tenure	of	White	Britons	is	owner	occupation,	followed	by	local	authority	and	
privately	rented	housing.		Bournville	is	a	conservation	area	with	a	number	of	
primary	schools	rated	Outstanding	by	OFSTED.		The	Bournville	Trust	operates	
the	majority	of	social	housing	in	the	area	and	has	an	excellent	reputation	as	a	
landlord.		The	predominance	of	good	schools	and	desirable	social	housing	
might	account	for	the	parity	between	social	and	privately	rented	tenure;	it	
might	also	explain	why	families	and	couples	between	the	ages	of	25	and	49	
might	be	attracted	to	Bournville.			
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Tables	7.21,	7.22	and	7.23:	Household	Reference	Person	[HRP]	of	Ethnic	Groups	Aged	25-49	
and	their	Tenure	in	White	British	Hinter	Lands	[2011].	
	
Table	7.21	
Ward	 White	British	
Owner	Occupied*	
White	British	
Social	Rented**	
White	British	
Private	Rented***	
Total	
[n	=	100%]	
Longbridge	 60.90	 24.90	 14.20	 4,245	
Northfield	 61.80	 24.73	 13.47	 3,971	
Bournville	 61.60	 18.53	 19.87	 3,890	
Oscott	 70.53	 10.50	 18.97	 3,373	
*Owned	outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared	ownership.	
**Local	authority/Other	social	rent.	
***Private	landlord/Letting	agency.	
****Excludes	forms	of	tenure	other	than	those	considered	in	the	table	above.	
Source:	Source:	Infuse	(2015);	Office	for	National	Statistics	(2001;	2011)	Census:	Aggregate	data	(England	and	Wales).		
	
Table	7.22	
Ward	 Black	Caribbean	
Owner	Occupied*	
Black	Caribbean	
Social	Rented**	
Black	Caribbean	
Private	Rented***	
Total	
[n	=	100%]	****	
Longbridge	 46.76	 45.32	 7.91	 139	
Northfield	 38.36	 54.11	 7.53	 146	
Bournville	 41.48	 40.00	 18.52	 135	
Oscott	 77.24	 10.27	 12.50	 312	
*Owned	outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared	ownership.	
**Local	authority/Other	social	rent.	
***Private	landlord/Letting	agency.	
****Excludes	forms	of	tenure	other	than	those	considered	in	the	table	above.	
Source:	Source:	Infuse	(2015);	Office	for	National	Statistics	(2001;	2011)	Census:	Aggregate	data	(England	and	Wales).		
	
Table	7.23	
Ward	 MWBC		
Owner	Occupied*	
MWBC		
Social	Rented**	
MWBC		
Private	Rented***	
Total	
[n	=	100%]	****	
Longbridge	 32.28	 51.18	 16.54	 127	
Northfield	 32.93	 57.32	 9.76	 82	
Bournville	 27.96	 41.92	 30.11	 93	
Oscott	 59.57	 25.53	 14.89	 47	
*Owned	outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared	ownership.	
**Local	authority/Other	social	rent.	
***Private	landlord/Letting	agency.	
****Excludes	forms	of	tenure	other	than	those	considered	in	the	table	above.	
Source:	Source:	Infuse	(2015);	Office	for	National	Statistics	(2001;	2011)	Census:	Aggregate	data	(England	and	Wales).		
	
	
The	proportional	representations	of	Black	Caribbeans	who	privately	rent	in	
Bournville,	indicates	that	the	area	might	attract	them	for	the	reasons	outlined	
above.		In	comparison	to	their	White	British	peers	there	are	proportionately	
less	Black	Caribbeans	homeowners.		However,	there	is	a	good	deal	of	parity	
between	those	who	own	their	properties	and	those	who	rent	social	housing.		
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This	is	also	the	case	for	Longbridge,	which	has	more	local	authority	housing	
than	Bournville.		There	is	also	a	higher	tendency	for	African	Caribbeans	to	rent	
in	Northfield,	which	also	has	a	significant	amount	of	Council	housing	stock.			
	
	
When	Black	Caribbean	and	White	British	representations	are	compared	in	
Oscott,	which	is	in	north	Birmingham,	there	are	proportionately	more	Black	
Caribbeans	who	own	their	homes	and	they	rent	less	social	and	private	housing.		
In	contrast,	MWBCs	are	more	dependent	on	local	authority	tenure.		Apart	from	
in	Oscott,	they	have	the	highest	proportion	of	local	authority	housing	and	
privately	rented	accommodation.		The	other	ethnic	groups	proportionally	have	
more	owner	occupation	in	their	respective	Hinter	Lands.		The	data	suggests	that	
the	reliance	MWBCs	place	on	renting,	could	mean	they	generally	experience	
the	worst	housing	conditions.	
	
	
Oscott	is	close	to	the	Sutton	wards270.		If	Sutton	is	the	Desired	Land	of	
individuals	residing	in	north	Birmingham,	then	Oscott	might	be	a	temporary	
stop	in	their	urban	sojourn.		However,	the	main	direction	of	travel	for	White	
Britons	is	not	north,	but	rather	southbound:	where	the	Longbridge,	Northfield	
and	Bournville	wards	are	situated.			
	
	
																																								 																				
270	See	Appendix	vi.	
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Tables	7.24,	7.25	and	7.26	below,	reveal	the	Black	Caribbean	Hinter	Lands,271	
which	are	invariably	located	towards	the	north	of	Birmingham.		This	contrasts	
to	the	southern	locations	of	their	White	British	counterparts.		There	is	no	easy	
way	to	account	for	this	anomaly,	suffice	it	to	say	that	Black	Caribbeans	might	be	
more	inclined	to	move	into	areas	that	are	closer	to	their	cultural	Heart	Lands	
for	a	number	of	reasons.		When	Black	Caribbean	and	White	British	tenure	is	
compared,	it	can	be	seen	that	African	Caribbeans	have	a	proportionately	higher	
level	of	home	ownership.		However,	they	generally	depend	more	on	local	
authority	housing	than	the	private	rental	market.		The	comparatively	higher	
level	of	Black	Caribbean	local	authority	tenure	suggests	they	still	have	a	
tendency	to	rent	their	accommodation,	which	was	noted	by	Ratcliffe	(2004)	
above.		Although	Shard	End	is	a	MWBC	Hinter	Land,	they	have	lower	levels	of	
owner	occupation	in	the	ward	than	their	African	Caribbean	and	White	British	
counterparts.		Moreover,	MWBCs	also	have	a	higher	propensity	to	rent	local	
authority	housing	in	Shard	End	than	in	other	wards.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																								 																				
271	Shard	End	is	also	included,	but	it	is	a	MWBC	Hinter	Land.	
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Tables	7.24,	7.25	and	7.26:	Household	Reference	Person	[HRP]	of	Ethnic	Groups	Aged	25-49	
and	their	Tenure	in	Black	Caribbean	Hinter	Lands	[2011].	
	
Table	7.24	
Ward	 White	British		
Owner	Occupied*	
White	British		
Social	Rented**	
White	British		
Private	Rented***	
Total	
[n	=	100%]	****	
Perry	Barr	 69.44	 5.72	 24.84	 1695	
Stockland	Green	 53.73	 16.37	 29.90	 2535	
Handsworth	Wood	 38.82	 22.69	 38.49	 595	
Oscott	 70.53	 10.50	 18.97	 3,373	
Shard	End	 48.93	 39.07	 12.00	 4118	
*Owned	outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared	ownership.	
**Local	authority/Other	social	rent.	
***Private	landlord/Letting	agency.	
****Excludes	forms	of	tenure	other	than	those	considered	in	the	table	above.	
Source:	Source:	Infuse	(2015);	Office	for	National	Statistics	(2011)	Census:	Aggregate	data	(England	and	Wales).		
	
Table	7.25	
Ward	 Black	Caribbean	
Owner	Occupied*	
Black	Caribbean	
Social	Rented**	
Black	Caribbean	
Private	Rented***	
Total	
[n	=	100%]	****	
Perry	Barr	 72.27	 9.31	 18.42	 494	
Stockland	Green	 57.99	 19.90	 22.11	 588	
Handsworth	Wood	 39.50	 32.60	 27.90	 681	
Oscott	 77.24	 10.27	 12.50	 312	
Shard	End	 48.22	 42.69	 9.09	 253	
*Owned	outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared	ownership.	
**Local	authority/Other	social	rent.	
***Private	landlord/Letting	agency.	
****Excludes	forms	of	tenure	other	than	those	considered	in	the	table	above.	
Source:	Source:	Infuse	(2015);	Office	for	National	Statistics	(2011)	Census:	Aggregate	data	(England	and	Wales).		
	
Table	7.26	
Ward	 MWBC		
Owner	Occupied*	
MWBC		
Social	Rented**	
MWBC		
Private	Rented***	
Total	
[n	=	100%]	****	
Perry	Barr	 53.95	 18.42	 27.63	 76	
Stockland	Green	 39.02	 21.34	 39.63	 164	
Handsworth	Wood	 23.39	 41.13	 35.48	 124	
Oscott	 59.57	 25.53	 14.89	 47	
Shard	End	 25.93	 64.02	 10.05	 189	
*Owned	outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared	ownership.	
**Local	authority/Other	social	rent.	
***Private	landlord/Letting	agency.	
****Excludes	forms	of	tenure	other	than	those	considered	in	the	table	above.	
Source:	Source:	Infuse	(2015);	Office	for	National	Statistics	(2011)	Census:	Aggregate	data	(England	and	Wales).		
	
	
The	Stockland	Green	ward	is	a	Hinter	Land	for	both	African	Caribbeans	and	
MWBC	ethnic	groups.		It	is	also	the	area	in	which	Bishop	Webley	of	the	New	
Testament	Church	of	God272	lives	with	his	family.		Table	7.27	below	reveals	that	
																																								 																				
272	See	Chapter	Four.	
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although	the	levels	of	deprivation	in	some	Stockland	Green	LSOAs	are	
comparable	with	Bournville,	the	less	desirable	areas	are	comparable	to	the	
poorest	parts	of	Ladywood.		However,	properties	in	north	Birmingham	tend	to	
be	cheaper	than	those	in	the	south	of	the	city.		Therefore,	in	view	of	African	
Caribbeans’	occupational	positions,273	affordable	housing	might	account	for	
their	concentration	in	the	north	of	Birmingham.		However,	there	are	also	other	
factors	influencing	the	spatial	settlement	patterns	of	African	Caribbeans.		
	
						Table	7.27:	Index	of	Multiple	Deprivation	Scores	in	Ethnic	Hinter	Lands	[2011].	
	
Ward	 Lowest	LSOA	Score	 Highest	LSOA	Score	
Longbridge	 23.91	 60.10	
Northfield	 16.73	 56.96	
Bournville		 16.74	 52.93	
Oscott	 17.58	 51.29	
Perry	Barr	 17.11	 40.16	
Stockland	Green	 16.77	 61.12	
Handsworth	Wood	 15.45	 52.23	
Shard	End	 24.54	 61.54	
	 Mean	=	37.32*	 Mean	=	37.32*	
					*The	Mean	represents	the	average	score	of	the	total	641,	LSOAs	in	Birmingham	and	not	that	of	the	40	wards.	
					Source:	Source:	Infuse	(2015);	Office	for	National	Statistics	(2011)	Census:	Aggregate	data	(England	and	Wales).		
	
	
I	asked	Bishop	Webley	why	he	chose	to	live	in	Stockland	Green:	
	
‘Educational	reasons!		Bromford	Junior	and	Infant	School	was	
considered	to	be	a	very	good	school	and	a	number	of	children	who	
left	there	went	onto	grammar	school.		When	we	enquired	how	we	
could	get	our	children	into	that	school,	we	were	told	we	had	to	be	
living	in	the	catchment	area.		My	eldest	daughter	went	there	then	got	
a	place	at	Sutton	Girls’	School’	[a	grammar	school]	(Bishop	Webley,	
23rd	April	2013,	Birmingham).	
																																								 																				
273	See	Chapter	Six.	
	 320	
	
Being	able	to	purchase	property	near	high	achieving	schools	is	an	example	of	
how	the	Black	middle-classes	can	appropriate	their	economic	‘capital	in	
defence	of	their	interests	and	those	of	their	children,	in	a	society	pervaded	by	
White	Privilege’	(Vincent,	et	al.,	2012:	263).		Material	deprivation	was	not	a	
factor	in	Bishop	Webley	and	his	wife’s	decision	to	purchase	a	property	in	
Stockland	Green.		However,	proximity	to	successful	schools	made	it	an	ideal	
location	to	fulfil	their	children’s	educational	needs.		This	suggests	that	
schooling,	and	the	immediate	and	long-term	costs	of	living,	can	be	of	more	
significance	than	how	the	area	is	generally	perceived.		Moreover,	the	case	of	
the	Webleys	demonstrate	that	there	is	not	necessarily	a	correlation	between	
the	social	class	of	individuals	and	their	spatial	location.		Although	Webley’s	
daughter	has	done	well	in	her	schooling,	Table	7.28	below	reveals	that	
approximately	a	quarter	of	the	overall	population	of	Stockland	Green	have	no	
educational	Goods.		Moreover,	only	a	little	over	10	per	cent	of	residents	have	a	
degree	or	higher	qualification.			
	
	
Table	7.28	below	highlights	differences	between	the	number	of	educational	
qualifications	in	Good	Lands,	Bad	Lands,	and	Hinter	Lands.		The	Good	Lands	of	
Sutton	Four	Oaks	has	the	least	amount	of	residents	without	any	qualifications,	
in	comparison	to	approximately	a	third	of	those	living	in	the	Bad	Lands	of	Aston	
and	Soho.		However,	the	number	of	residents	without	any	educational	
qualifications	in	the	White	Hinter	Lands	of	Longbridge	and	Northfield	are	similar	
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to	those	living	in	Stockland	Green.		Although	the	Black	Hinter	Land	of	Oscott	is	
near	to	Sutton,	the	population	without	any	qualifications	is	similar	to	the	Bad	
Lands	of	Aston	and	Soho.		As	noted	above,	the	majority	of	housing	in	Sutton	is	
owner	occupied	and,	as	can	be	seen	in	Table	7.28,	the	population	in	those	Good	
Lands	has	a	relatively	high	ratio	of	A-levels	and	degrees,	when	compared	to	no	
educational	qualifications.		This	suggests	that	the	Sutton	residents	have	
exchanged	their	educational	capital	for	economic	capital	(Bourdieu,	2010	
[1984]),	and	translated	it	into	residential	capital.			
	
	
Proportionately,	the	Aston	and	Soho	Bad	Lands	have	a	higher	concentration	of	
African	Caribbeans	than	Sutton,	and	in	contrast	most	of	the	population	is	
unqualified	and	likely	to	be	in	social	rented	housing.		Although	Ladywood	has	
been	theorised	as	a	Bad	Land	in	previous	analyses274,	it	is	now	something	of	an	
anomaly.		Not	only	does	the	ward	have	the	lowest	level	of	residents	without	
any	educational	qualifications,	it	also	has	more	residents	with	degrees	and	
higher	academic	Goods	than	any	other	Birmingham	ward.		There	is	no	way	of	
knowing	exactly	in	which	Ladywood	LSOAs	these	highly	qualified	individuals	
reside.		However,	the	data	demonstrates	that	regardless	of	disparities	in	
material	deprivation	within	Ladywood’s	LSOAs,	the	gentrification	of	the	area	
near	to	the	city	centre	has	attracted	a	professional	middle-class275.		Their	
educational	qualifications,	occupation,	income	and	residential	capital	mean	
that	the	ward	can	no	longer	be	referred	to	as	a	Bad	Land	in	any	substantive	
																																								 																				
274	See	Rex	and	Moore,	1967;	Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979.	
275	This	is	also	evident	in	extracts	from	the	narrative	of	Rosemary	Campbell	above.	
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sense.		The	narratives	of	Rosemary	Campbell	and	Bishop	Webley,	in	the	
respective	contexts	of	Ladywood	and	Stockland	Green,	demonstrate	that	
housing	choices	are	not	necessarily	informed	by	material	deprivation.			
	
Table	7.28:	Educational	Qualifications	of	Residents	Aged	16-74	Living	in	Birmingham’s	Good	
Lands,	Bad	Lands	and	Hinter	Lands	[2011].	
	
**	For	example,	BA;	BSc;	MA;	PGCE;	PhD.	
***Includes	no	qualifications	and	excludes	vocational	qualifications	and	others	not	considered	in	the	table	above.	
Source:	Source:	Infuse	(2015);	Office	for	National	Statistics	(2011)	Census:	Aggregate	data	(England	and	Wales).		
	
	
Housing	policy	and	poverty	
	
The	housing	policy	introduced	in	April	2013,	which	is	more	commonly	referred	
to	as	the	Bedroom	Tax,	can	potentially	increase	the	risk	of	debt	and	poverty	for	
those	who	depend	on	local	authority	accommodation.		This	is	especially	the	
case	for	African	Caribbeans	–	and	other	tenants	–	in	the	25-49	age-range	whose	
Ward	
	
No	Qualifications	 1-4	
O-levels	/	
CSE	/	GCSE	
5+		
O-levels		
/CSE	/	GCSE		
(Grade	A*-C)	
2+		
A-levels	/	
4+	AS	
levels	
Degree&	
Higher	
Degree**	
Qualifications	n	=	
100%***	
Sutton	Four	Oaks	 11.60	 23.16	 31.86	 17.33	 16.04	 28371	
Sutton	Vesey	 12.25	 24.41	 30.42	 16.81	 16.11	 27787	
Sutton	New	Hall	 14.98	 26.19	 29.68	 15.18	 13.96	 24789	
Sutton	Trinity	 14.11	 25.76	 29.73	 15.69	 14.71	 27898	
Soho		 32.83	 27.13	 18.20	 9.94	 11.89	 21771	
Lozells	and	E.	
Handsworth	
34.96	 25.68	 18.12	 9.63	 11.61	 21779	
Ladywood	 8.07	 19.63	 26.24	 20.97	 25.09	 42103	
Aston	 31.19	 24.90	 20.32	 13.45	 10.13	 24574	
Longbridge	 27.83	 31.66	 22.74	 9.55	 8.23	 21767	
Northfield	 24.42	 31.13	 24.32	 10.90	 9.22	 23579	
Bournville	 15.63	 22.83	 27.17	 17.03	 17.34	 30590	
Oscott	 30.15	 33.10	 21.22	 8.09	 7.44	 20168	
Perry	Barr	 22.54	 30.28	 23.60	 12.43	 11.15	 20457	
Stockland	Green	 25.99	 29.02	 22.12	 10.96	 11.91	 21228	
Handsworth	
Wood	
22.21	 25.48	 23.67	 13.39	 15.25	 24507	
Shard	End	 43.13	 31.85	 15.79	 4.93	 4.29	 19426	
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children	have	left	home.		The	Under	Occupancy	Tax276	penalises	Council	tenants	
for	having	unoccupied	[bed]rooms.		Tenants	are	encouraged	to	obtain	smaller	
properties,	if	they	are	unable	to	pay	the	additional	cost	incurred	for	having	
unused	bedrooms.		Although,	theoretically,	relocation	appears	to	be	the	
solution	to	the	risk	of	debt,	in	practice	the	answer	is	not	so	straightforward.		
Many	of	Birmingham’s	post-war	properties,	built	after	the	1947	Town	and	
Country	Planning	Act,	were	built	for	families,	rather	than	single	person	
occupancy	(Municipal	Dream,	2015).		Consequently,	one	and	two-bedroomed	
Council	accommodation	can	be	difficult	to	obtain	(Wilcox,	2014).		Local	
Authority	tenants,	who	are	unemployed	and	claim	housing	benefit,	can	only	
choose	one	out	of	three	options:	pay	the	Under	Occupancy	Tax,	relocate	or	
incur	debt.		However,	tenants	who	are	employed,	and	whose	income	exceeds	a	
specified	threshold,	are	denied	housing	benefit	and	therefore	unaffected	by	the	
bedroom	tax277.	
																																								 																				
276	The	Under	Occupancy	Tax	is	the	formal	title	of	the	Bedroom	Tax.	
277	It	should	be	noted	here	that	regardless	of	their	employment	status,	not	all	African	
Caribbeans	have	the	middle	‘class	resources’	that	Bishop	Webley	above	was	able	to	activate	
for	the	benefit	of	his	family	(Vincent,	et	al,	2012:	272).		As	articulated	in	Chapter	Six,	
unemployment	and	various	forms	of	flexible	working	arrangements,	such	as	zero-hour	
contractual	employment	and	different	types	of	precarious	labour,	makes	it	difficult	for	
working-class	African	Caribbeans	to	reduce	the	long-term	risk	of	poverty	in	the	short-term.		
Consequently,	when	all	the	variations	of	the	labour	market	‘are	considered,	the	outcome	is	
insecure	working	lives’,	the	instability	of	which	increases	the	risk	of	debt	and	poverty	
(Standing,	2011:	36).		I	have	previously	argued	(see	Chapter	Six)	that	precarious	employment	is	
particularly	problematic	for	many	working-class	actors	aged	25-49,	as	their	employment	
options	tend	to	diminish	when	they	are	over	fifty.		A	number	of	females	can	be	perceived	as	
belonging	to	the	precariat	class	of	workers	(Fawcett	Society,	2013).		They	might	supplement	
their	rent	with	housing	benefit	if	they	are	employed	for	less	than	16	hours	per	week.		
However,	relocating	to	reduce	the	risk	of	debt	incurs	additional	problems.		Moving	out	of	the	
area	–	and	further	away	from	work	–	increases	the	likelihood	of	unemployment	and	future	
poverty.			
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The	bedroom	tax	also	creates	competition	between	older	tenants,	who	have	
relied	on	local	authority	housing	for	a	number	of	years,	against	younger	
individuals	who	may	be	entering	the	housing	market	for	the	first	time.		As	the	
demand	for	social	housing	is	greater	than	its	supply,	need	is	determined	by	the	
amount	of	points	applicants	accumulate	(Birmingham	City	Council,	2009).		The	
Council	refers	to	this	market	situation	of	housing	allocation	as	the	‘Birmingham	
Choice	Based	Letting	Scheme’	(Birmingham	City	Council,	2010).		Eligible	
applicants	are	encouraged	to	visit	the	Council’s	website	each	week	and	place	up	
to	three	bids	for	suitable	accommodation.		Bids	can	also	be	placed	using	Smart	
TVS,	text	messaging	and	an	interactive	voice	recognition	service.		When	a	
property	becomes	available	a	shortlist	is	made	up	of	six	successful	bidders,	who	
are	then	invited	to	view	it.		Allocation	is	decided	by	the	Council	and	determined	
by	assessing	the	applicant’s	points	against	their	specific	housing	needs.				
	
	
A	lack	of	suitable	Local	Authority	housing	sometimes	means	that	those	who	can	
least	afford	it	have	to	rely	on	the	private	housing	market.		Wilcox	(2014:	34)	
notes	landlords	now	incur	additional	expenses	as	a	result	of	‘increased	[…]	rent	
collection	[…],	arrears	management,	welfare	advice	and	support	to	tenants,	
management	of	transfers	and	exchanges,	repair	and	short-term	void	costs’.		
Private	landlords	might	increase	the	cost	of	renting	their	properties,	in	order	to	
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cover	the	cost	of	expenses,	which	could	subsequently	place	tenants	in	rent	
arrears.		However,	court	costs	and	other	expenses	incurred	in	the	process	of	
eviction	are	expensive	and	often	difficult	to	retrieve.		The	rising	cost	of	rent	in	
the	private	housing	market,	combined	with	the	implementation	of	the	Under	
Occupancy	Tax,	creates	risk	and	insecurity	for	African	Caribbeans.		The	
combination	of	both	factors	could	have	the	effect	of	not	just	displacing	the	
Black	community,	but	also	weakening	their	support	networks	and	kinship	
attachments.			
	
	
Subject	F	falls	into	the	category	of	unemployed,	over	fifty	and	being	a	single	
parent	with	a	spare	bedroom.		She	told	me	about	the	financial	burden	imposed	
on	her	by	the	Bedroom	Tax.		She	has	a	three-bedroom	apartment	in	a	Local	
Authority	maisonette.		Her	eldest	son	left	home	a	number	of	years	ago	and	she	
currently	lives	with	her	youngest	son,	who	is	twelve.		She	has	no	educational	
Goods	and	has	only	ever	worked	in	precarious	employment.		Subject	F	was	born	
in	Handsworth	and	has	lived	there	all	her	life.		All	her	family	live	in	the	area	and	
her	son	goes	to	a	local	school.		Therefore,	she	does	not	consider	moving	to	be	
an	option:	
	
‘I’m	struggling	at	the	moment	because	I	have	to	pay	the	Bedroom	
Tax.		It’s	really	hard;	as	soon	as	I	get	my	money	I	have	to	pay	my	bills,	
but	the	Bedroom	Tax	comes	first.		I	pay	£18.50	a	week,	£37.00	every	
fortnight.		I	don’t	get	any	extra	money	but	since	it	[the	Under	
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Occupancy	tax]	came	out	I	have	to	find	£74.00	extra	every	month,	or	
else	they’ll	take	me	to	court.		I’ve	even	got	problems	buying	[her	
son’s]	school	clothes	and	giving	him	lunch	money.		The	Bedroom	Tax	
has	to	be	paid	before	all	that’	(Subject	F,	1st	May	2014,	Birmingham).	
	
Subject	F	sees	the	risk	of	incurring	debt	imposed	by	the	bedroom	tax	as	a	
serious	concern.		However,	she	is	unable	to	find	a	solution	through	
employment.		Although	she	worries	about	finding	money	for	bills,	food	and	
school	clothing	for	her	son,	her	labour	market	participation	is	constrained	by	
‘mother-ism’278	(Joshi	in	Reynolds,	2006:	113).		This	means	that	she	is	not	just	
held	back	by	her	childcare	responsibilities,	but	also	the	negative	attitude	
employers	have	toward	single-mothers	with	young	children.			
	
	
Subject	C	is	also	affected	by	the	Bedroom	Tax.		He	has	been	living	in	the	same	
three-bedroomed	Council	house	in	Handsworth	for	20	years,	which	he	formerly	
shared	with	his	partner	and	their	daughter.		However,	she	left	him	several	years	
ago,	taking	their	daughter	with	her.		He	claims	housing	benefit	and	is	registered	
as	unemployed.		He	supplements	his	benefits	by	working	as	a	freelance	artist:		
	
																																								 																				
278	Joshi	(in	Reynolds,	2006)	contends	that	employers	are	reluctant	to	employ	single	mothers.		
Due	to	their	childcare	responsibilities,	bosses	often	view	them	as	unreliable	and	a	potential	
risk.		Some	employers	also	think	that	single	mothers	might	have	more	children,	for	which	they	
will	receive	maternity	leave	and	be	paid	for	pregnancy	related	absences.		As	pregnancy	is	a	
protected	characteristic	under	the	Equality	Act	2010,	there	are	employers	who	might	avoid	
employing	single	mothers	rather	than	risk	infringing	employment	law.	
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‘I	can’t	even	afford	to	drive	a	car;	I	can’t	do	nothing!		It’s	all	bills,	bills,	
bills!		If	I	could	afford	a	car	it	would	be	easier	to	get	around…do	an	
exhibition.		But	I	can’t	see	how	I	could	maintain	one	[a	car]	with	all	
the	pressure	the	Government	is	putting	on…it’s	just	a	constant	
struggle’	(Subject	C,	6th	August	2013,	Birmingham).	
	
The	situations	of	Subjects	C	and	F	demonstrates	the	disproportionate	gender	
impact	that	the	Bedroom	Tax	can	have	on	women,	whose	social	identities	are	
intersected	by	motherhood,	class	and	their	labour	market	status.		Unlike	
Subject	C,	the	labour	market	participation	of	Subject	F	is	constrained	by	
childcare	responsibilities.		Employment	is	her	only	way	out	of	the	impending	
threat	of	debt	imposed	by	the	Bedroom	Tax,	and	only	full-time	work	could	
generate	enough	income	to	pay	her	rent	and	living	expenses.		If	she	were	
working	she	would	be	entitled	to	benefits	that	would	supplement	some	of	her	
childcare	costs279.		However,	full-time	employment	would	also	mean	she	risks	
losing	her	entitlement	to	Council	Tax	Support,	(Barry-Born,	Bushe	and	
MacInnes,	2015).		Thus,	reducing	one	risk	of	housing	debt	potentially	exposes	
her	to	another.				
	
	
	
	
	
																																								 																				
279	See	Chapter	Five.	
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Conclusion	
	
During	the	1960s	and	1970s,	the	main	areas	of	West	Indian	settlement	in	
Birmingham	were	in	Twilight	Zones	located	in	the	north	of	the	city.		These	so-
called	Bad	Lands	included	areas	such	as	Handsworth,	Smethwick,	Ladywood	
and	Soho.		Housing	policy	restricted	the	volume	of	Local	Authority	housing	
allocated	to	West	Indians.		Policies	and	discriminatory	lending	practices	(Rex	
and	Tomlinson,	1967)	also	made	it	difficult	for	West	Indians	to	obtain	
mortgages.		Yet	despite	the	discrimination	they	encountered,	both	socially	and	
in	the	housing	market,	West	Indians	appropriated	their	cultural	capital	to	
generate	the	financial	capital	they	required	to	become	homeowners.			
	
	
It	is	important	to	acknowledge	that	changes	in	tenure	and	spatial	positions	do	
not	necessarily	reflect	improvements,	stagnations	or	deteriorations	in	social	
status.		Although	some	West	Indians	became	owner-occupiers	in	the	1960s	and	
1970s,	the	areas	in	which	they	generally	lived	were	deprived.		More	recently,	
middle-class	African	Caribbeans	may	choose	to	either	rent	or	buy	housing	in	
low	deprivation	environments,	because	it	satisfies	their	individual	needs.		
However,	African	Caribbeans	may	also	choose	to	purchase	properties	in	high	
deprivation	areas	to	reinforce	intimate	and	cultural	ties.		Nevertheless,	there	
has	been	a	gradual	increase	in	African	Caribbean	owner	occupancy	in	low	
deprivation	areas	between	2001	and	2011.		This	tends	to	suggest	there	is	an	
upward	trend	in	both	spatial	and	social	mobility,	particularly	as	these	changes	
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are	taking	place	within	the	25-49	age-stage.		It	must	also	be	noted	that	the	
number	of	Black	Caribbean	HRPs	living	in	the	low	deprivation	Good	Lands	is	
relatively	small	in	comparison	to	their	White	British	counterparts.		However,	
the	data	does	reveal	that	the	Caribbean	population	is	moving	away	from	their	
former	cultural	Heart	Lands,	which	still	remain	Zones	in	Transition	(Rex	and	
Moore,	1967).			
	
	
Ladywood,	however,	is	something	of	an	anomaly	and	can	no	longer	be	referred	
to	as	a	Bad	Land.		Certain	LSOAs	in	the	ward,	which	are	in	close	proximity	to	the	
City	Centre,	have	undergone	significant	gentrification.		Urban	renewal	has	
increased	the	prices	of	property	in	the	area,	making	Ladywood	a	des	res	
location	for	prospective	purchasers	–	and	private	landlords.		In	contrast,	other	
parts	of	Ladywood	are	highly	deprived	and	have	a	significant	volume	of	Local	
Authority	housing.		As	LSOAs	can	overlap	it	is	difficult	to	establish	the	difference	
between	the	number	of	African	Caribbeans	living	in	the	low	deprivation	parts	of	
Ladywood,	in	comparison	to	its	more	affluent	areas.		This	demonstrates	that	
the	social	class	status	of	individuals	cannot	necessarily	be	distinguished	by	
analysing	their	spatial	locations.		The	data	above	suggests	that	the	material	
deprivation	of	a	ward	is	not	the	primary	concern	of	African	Caribbeans	
homeowners.		The	middle-class	narratives	of	Rosemary	Campbell	and	Bishop	
Webley	reveal	that	the	level	of	material	poverty	in	any	given	ward	is	not	
necessarily	important	to	African	Caribbeans.		Factors,	such	as	the	proximity	to	
work	and	schools,	are	often	of	more	significance.			
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The	majority	of	African	Caribbeans	who	own	their	own	homes	are	not	living	in	
Birmingham’s	Bad	Lands	or	Good	Lands,	but	are	settling	in	Hinter	Lands	located	
in	the	north	of	the	city.		The	higher	propensity	to	own,	rather	than	rent,	
housing	in	the	Hinter	Lands	to	some	extent	indicates	that	African	Caribbeans	
may	be	moving	into	areas	that	are	more	affluent	than	their	cultural	Heart	
Lands.		However,	the	higher	levels	of	material	deprivation	in	those	
environments,	in	comparison	to	the	so-called	Good	Lands,	appear	irrelevant.		
Maintaining	cultural	ties	seems	to	be	of	more	significance	than	notions	of	social	
status	when	relocating	to	particular	areas.		This	is	indicated	by	the	proximity	of	
African	Caribbean	Hinter	Lands	to	their	cultural	Heart	Lands	in	the	north	of	
Birmingham.	
	
	
There	is	evidence	to	suggest	there	is	a	growing	African	Caribbean	property	
owning	housing	class	(ibid,	1967)	in	Birmingham.		However,	the	situation	of	
their	unemployed	working-class	counterparts,	who	rely	on	Local	Authority	
housing,	is	fraught	with	risk.		The	Under	Occupancy	Tax	can	leave	African	
Caribbeans	susceptible	to	the	risk	of	debt	and	force	them	into	the	private	
housing	market,	which	tends	to	be	more	expensive	and	often	has	worse	
housing	conditions.		Housing	risks,	in	regard	to	instability	and	poverty,	are	more	
pronounced	amongst	those	in	the	upper	end	of	the	25-49	age-range	–	who	are	
unemployed	and	have	a	spare	bedroom.		Full	employment	is	one	way	of	
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negotiating	the	risk	of	debt.		However,	the	option	of	precarious	employment,	
particularly	for	those	with	low	educational	capital,	might	not	provide	enough	
income	to	meet	both	their	housing	and	living	expenses.	
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8. ‘One	step	forward,	two	steps	backward	[…],	ina	Babylon’280	
	
Since	the	1960s,	the	social	and	political	struggles	of	West	Indians	and	their	
descendants	have	contributed	toward	major	legislative	changes	(Rex	and	
Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981;	2004;	Sivanandan,	1981;	Fryer,	1984;	
Macpherson,	1999;	Parekh	et	al.,	2002;	Gillborn,	2005).		However,	the	impact	
that	legislation	may	have	had	on	ameliorating	inequality	in	market	situations,	
to	create	a	level	playing	in	which	African	Caribbeans	might	increase	their	social	
mobility	in	Birmingham,	has	not	been	examined	in	any	detail	since	the	late	
1970s	(Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981).		This	research	has	
contributed	to	rectifying	those	omissions.		I	have	articulated	the	relationship	
between	Empire	and	the	Black	British	presence	in	Birmingham.		The	agency	of	
Black	Caribbean	organisations	has	been	explored	in	terms	of	their	operational	
capacity	to	obtain	life-changing	resources	for	their	community.		I	have	also	
examined	how	the	experiences	of	Birmingham’s	Caribbean	population,	in	
education,	labour	and	housing	market	situations,	are	mediated	by	age,	class,	
gender	and	ethnicity.		This	investigation	has	attempted	to	assess	the	impact	
that	changes	in	legislation,	policies	and	practices	have	had	on	the	
contemporary	social	and	spatial	mobility	of	African	Caribbeans	in	Birmingham.		
	
	
																																								 																				
280	The	title	of	this	chapter	is	taken	from	the	1976	song	“War	ina	Babylon”,	sung	by	Max	
Romeo	and	the	Upsetters,	and	produced	by	Lee	“Scratch”	Perry	in	Kingston,	Jamaica.	
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During	the	seventeenth	century	Britain	was	the	major	European	player	in	the	
business	of	human	trafficking,	in	which	Africans	were	forcibly	migrated	and	
subsequently	enslaved	in	the	Americas	(Black,	1991;	Williams,	2005	[1944]).		
Slavery	was	legitimated	by	the	British	Navigation	Acts,	and	under	
Parliamentary	law	Africans	were	classified	as	chattel:	property	with	no	legal	
rights	or	social	status	(Edwards,	1988).		For	hundreds	of	years	slave	laws281	
regulated	practices	of	racial	segregation	in	the	Americas.		They	normalised	
notions	of	Black	servitude	and	White	domination,	and	sustained	the	
hierarchical	order	of	labour	relations.		Between	the	17th	and	19th	centuries,	
Jamaica	was	the	most	prosperous	of	Britain’s	overseas’	colonies.		Slave	labour,	
and	the	island’s	natural	resources,	significantly	contributed	to	Britain’s	global	
economic	domination	(Williams,	2005	[1944];	Hobsbawm,	1969;	Black,	1991;	
Walvin,	2001).		However,	the	combination	of	natural	disasters	and	British	
mercantilism	ruined	Jamaica’s	post-emancipation	economy	(Black,	1991)	and	
influenced	successive	labour	flows	(ibid,	1991).			
	
	
In	the	nineteenth	century	Jamaicans	migrated	between	the	countryside	and	
the	island’s	capital	in	search	of	work.		In	the	twentieth	century,	South	America,	
and	much	later	the	mainland	US	and	Canada,	also	became	labour	destinations	
																																								 																				
281	Although	Britain	imposed	legislation	to	regulate	racial	segregation,	and	deny	the	human	
rights	of	Africans	to	facilitate	the	exploitation	of	slave	labour,	slave	laws	created	in	England	
had	no	jurisdiction	outside	of	the	Americas.		See	Van	Cleve	(2006),	regarding	the	case	of	the	
slave	Somerset	who	escaped	from	his	master	whilst	visiting	England	and	could	not	be	
reclassified	as	a	slave	under	British	law.	
	 334	
for	Jamaican	migrants	(Black,	1991).		However,	US	and	Canadian,	immigration	
legislation	restricted	Caribbean	labour	whilst	facilitating	the	influx	of	European	
workers	(Fryer,	1984;	Black,	1991;	US	Department	of	State,	Office	of	the	
Historian,	2012).		As	a	consequence,	the	flow	of	Jamaican	labour	was	
redirected	to	Britain	(Fryer,	1984).		However,	despite	the	1948	British	
Nationality	Act,	which	granted	British	passports	to	Commonwealth	citizens	
(ibid,	1984),	Caribbean	migration	did	not	significantly	increase	until	the	mid	
1950s	(Peach,	1968).			
	
	
Most	post-war	Commonwealth	migrants	were	Jamaicans	(ibid,	1968),	and	the	
majority	of	them	settled	in	Britain’s	decaying	inner	cities.		West	Indian	
communities	subsequently	developed	near	to	Labour	Exchanges	(Searle,	2013),	
that	assigned	them	low-paid	work	in	economic	areas	experiencing	labour	
shortages	(ibid,	2013).		Thus,	policies	influencing	the	allocation	of	labour	
contributed	to	the	growth	of	Birmingham’s	Caribbean	community	in	
Handsworth	(Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979).		The	ward	was	near	to	the	foundries	
and	factories	of	Black	Patch282	and	Smethwick	and	Handsworth	also	had	a	
Labour	Exchange	on	Soho	Road.		Thus,	the	role	of	Birmingham	in	the	
exploitation	of	Black	labour	had	transcended	time	and	space.		The	city	had	
benefitted	from	the	unfree	labour	of	Africans	in	its	Caribbean	colonies,	as	the	
majority	of	guns,	implements	and	chains	that	were	used	to	maim,	fetter	and	
																																								 																				
282	See	Chapter	Seven.	
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kill	slaves	were	made	in	Birmingham’s	foundries	(Hobsbawm,	1969;	Harris,	
2008).		A	hundred	years	after	Emancipation	the	free	labour	of	West	Indian	
slave	descendants	was	exploited	in	low	paid,	menial	labour	in	Birmingham’s	
manufacturing	and	production	industries.	
	
	
It	is	widely	documented	how	the	social	mobility	of	post-war	West	Indian	
migrants	was	constrained	by	exclusionary	policies	and	practices	Rex	and	
Moore,	1967;	Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979;	Phizacklea	and	Miles,	1980;	Ratcliffe,	
1981;	Fryer,	1984;	Taylor,	1993)	that	influenced	their	acquisition	of	what	I	have	
characterised	as	Bads	(Curran,	2013).		West	Indian	labour	was	exploited	in	
menial	work	(Gunter,	1954;	Phizacklea	and	Miles,	1980;	Fryer,	1984;	Taylor,	
1993)	and	their	settlement	was	generally	confined	to	high	deprivation	urban	
spaces,	where	they	formed	a	replacement	population	for	socially	mobile	White	
workers	(Rex	and	Moore,	1967;	Peach,	1968).		Poverty	and	prejudice	also	
restricted	the	housing	choices	of	newly	arriving	Black	migrants,	many	rented	
rather	than	purchase	their	accommodation	(Rex	and	Moore,	1967;	Rex	and	
Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981;	2004).		However,	unlike	their	West	Indian	
predecessors,	British	born	Blacks	have	had	the	opportunity	to	acquire	Goods	–	
in	the	form	of	UK	educational	qualifications	–	to	improve	their	social	and	
spatial	mobility.		Moreover,	equality	legislation	from	the	Race	Relations	Act	
1965	(RRA1965)	to	the	Equality	Act	2010	(EA2010),	should	have	ameliorated	
the	forms	of	discrimination	that	blocked	the	social	mobility	of	their	
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antecedents.		This	inquiry	has	examined	if	Birmingham’s	African	Caribbean	
population	has	been	able	to	exchange	educational	Goods	for	labour	market	
Goods	(Bourdieu,	2010	[1984]),	how	those	market	situations	might	influence	
their	spatial	mobility	and	the	extent	to	which	fairness	in	competitive	processes	
is	mediated	by	social	policies.	
	
	
The	1991	Census	data	provided	a	heuristic	snapshot	of	the	occupational	
positions	of	African	Caribbeans	leaving	school	in	the	late	1970s	and	1980s.		
However,	Census	datasets	for	2001	and	2011	revealed	a	more	accurate	picture	
of	their	labour	market	status,	spatial	positions,	housing	tenure,	and	also	those	
of	their	contemporaries.		HESA	and	HEIDI	data	mapped	changes	in	Black	
Caribbean	educational	capital.		Narratives,	documenting	the	past-race	
experiences	of	a	sample	of	African	Caribbeans	living	in	Birmingham	was	
examined	in	the	context	of	social	and	political	changes.		The	lived-experiences	
of	first	generation	Black	Britons	were	also	scrutinized	alongside	data	
highlighting	the	current	situation	of	their	contemporaries	in	the	higher	
education	sector.		Ethnic	group	comparisons,	in	relation	to	class,	gender	and	
age	differences,	were	explored	in	the	educational,	labour	and	housing	markets,	
to	ascertain	how	African	Caribbeans	negotiate	the	contemporary	risk	of	
poverty.		I	now	conclude	this	research	by	pooling	the	data	and	answering	the	
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main	questions	of	my	investigation,	which	were	highlighted	earlier283	and	are	
repeated	below:	
	
i. What	impact	have	changes	in	legislation,	policies	and	practices	had	on	
the	operational	capacity	and	agency	of	Black	Caribbean	community	and	
religious	organisations	in	Birmingham?	
ii. How	are	the	education	and	labour	market	experiences	of	African	
Caribbeans	in	Birmingham	mediated	by	their	gender	and	ethnicity?	
iii. To	what	extent	does	legislation,	allied	to	policies	and	practices,	enable	
or	constrain	African	Caribbean	social	mobility	in	market	situations?	
iv. What	shifts	have	taken	place	in	the	spatial	patterns	of	Birmingham’s	
African	Caribbean	population	over	the	past	thirty	years?		
v. How	have	thirty	years	of	social	change	impacted	on	the	social	mobility	
of	Birmingham’s	African	Caribbean	population?			
	
	
	
	
	
																																								 																				
283	See	Chapter	One.	
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What	impact	have	changes	in	legislation,	policies	and	practices	had	on	the	
operational	capacity	and	agency	of	Black	Caribbean	community	and	religious	
organisations	in	Birmingham?	
	
Black	community	and	religious	organisations	in	Birmingham	have	never	
provided	housing	for	their	supporters,	or	long-term	employment	with	
opportunities	for	career	progression.		Their	main	contribution	to	social	mobility	
has	been	their	capacity	to	deliver	education	as	a	resource	in	the	community	
(Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981;	Andrews,	2013).		However,	over	the	
past	thirty	years	there	have	been	significant	shifts	in	legislation.		This	is	
particularly	in	regard	to	how	the	equality	agenda	has	changed	since	the	Race	
Relations	Act	1976	(RRA1976),	and	the	increasing	marketisation	of	education	
(Richardson	and	Monro,	2012;	Sivanandan,	2013;	Gillborn,	2013;2014).		I	have	
examined	the	agency	of	African	Caribbean	organisations	in	the	context	of	
these	changes.		My	aim	was	to	establish	the	factors	that	have	constrained	or	
enabled	their	capacity,	to	continue	providing	education	and	labour	market	
assistance	for	their	supporters.	
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The	politics	of	difference,	in	which	the	interests	of	African	Caribbeans	
converged284	in	the	struggle	against	racial	discrimination	in	the	1970s	and	
1980s,	is	no	more.		The	EA2010,	which	has	superseded	the	RRA1976	and	the	
Race	Relations	(Amendment)	Act	2000	(RRAA2000),	articulates	ideas	of	
difference	in	terms	of	protected	characteristics.		“Race”	is	still	included,	but	so	
too	are	other	inequalities	such	as	gender,	disability,	and	also	marriage	and	
even	pregnancy,	amongst	others.		Consequently,	“race”	and	racial	equity	is	no	
longer	at	the	forefront	of	the	political	agenda	and	therefore	is	not	considered	
to	be	of	major	concern.		Moreover,	individualism	now	occupies	the	political	
centre	ground	where	notions	of	collectivism	once	flourished	(Sivanandan,	
2013).		Although	racism	continues	to	impede	life-chances	and	opportunities,	
racial	discrimination	is	now	much	more	insidious.		I	have	argued	that	the	
political	right	views	racial	inequality	as	collateral	damage:	an	unfortunate,	but	
unavoidable,	consequence	of	competition	in	market	situations.		Therefore,	like	
all	contemporary	social	problems	racial	inequality	is	politically	articulated	as	
individual	failing,	rather	than	the	result	of	structural	processes	that	are	beyond	
the	individual’s	control.		Neo-liberalism	is	now	the	dominant	political	
discourse.		Hence,	the	invisible	hand	of	the	free	market	shapes	the	politics	of	
the	transitional	community	sphere	(Shukra	et	al.,	2004),	in	which	African	
Caribbean	organisations	operate.	
																																								 																				
284	Interest-convergence	and	interest-divergence	are	perspectives	of	critical	race	theory	
expounded	by	Derick	Bell	(Gillborn,	2013).		Interest	convergence	contends	that	‘advances	in	
racial	justice	must	be	won	through	political	protest	and	mobilisation	that	create	a	situation	
where	[…]	taking	some	action	against	racism	becomes	the	lesser	of	two	evils’	(ibid,	2013:	479	
[emphasis	in	original]).		Interest-divergence,	however,	asserts	that	notions	of	racial	difference	
are	manipulated	to	maintain	the	status	quo	of	White	supremacy	in	social,	political	and	
economic	relations	(ibid,	2013).	
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Mirza	(2007:	1)	argues	that	‘the	more	things	change	the	more	they	remain	the	
same’,	which	summarises	my	assessment	of	ACSHO’s	capacity	for	action	within	
Birmingham’s	Black	Caribbean	community.		Although	time	has	moved	on,	the	
organisation	has	to	a	great	extent	stood	still.		The	persistence	of	racism	
indicates	that	Pan-Africanism	is	still	as	relevant	today	as	it	ever	was285.		
However,	the	means	ACSHO	employs	to	achieve	its	aim	of	liberating	the	minds	
of	peoples	of	African	heritage	are	not	easily	measured.		The	organisation’s	
agency	is	also	constrained	by	a	chronic	shortage	of	capital.		It	appears	ill-
equipped	for	what	I	refer	to	as	the	long-game	of	community	advocacy286.		
Community	organisations,	which	do	not	possess	the	necessary	capital	to	
develop	their	capacity	for	action,	have	little	option	other	than	to	obtain	private	
sector	investment	or	charitable	sponsorship.		The	rise	of	the	free	market,	to	
the	detriment	of	Government	intervention,	has	effectively	changed	the	rules	of	
political	engagement	in	the	transitional	sphere.		In	order	to	continue	playing	
the	game	of	community	politics,	African	Caribbean	religious	and	grassroots	
organisations	have	to	comply	with	legislation	implemented	to	reduce	various	
forms	of	risk	in	the	market	society	(Sivanandan,	2013).	
																																								 																				
285	Rex	and	Tomlinson	(1979)	argued	that	due	to	the	persistence	of	racism,	and	exclusionary	
practices	in	UK	society,	Pan-Africanism	would	have	increasing	importance	in	developing	a	Black	
identity.		There	has	been	little	substantive	change	in	regard	to	reducing	racial	inequality	since	
their	Handsworth	survey.	
286	I	argue	that	Black	community	organisations	have	to	adopt	long-term	strategies,	which	take	
into	consideration	social	and	political	changes,	in	order	to	achieve	goals	that	are	impossible	to	
attain	in	the	short-term.		For	example,	liberating	the	minds	of	African	peoples	and	overcoming	
racial	disadvantage	are	long-term	goals,	the	success	of	which	have	to	be	measured	in	the	
short-term	by	setting	milestones	to	indicate	progress	at	different	stages.	
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During	the	1970s	and	1980s	ACSHO	mobilised	community	support	to	deliver	its	
supplementary	educational	programmes	(Andrews,	2013).		Community	
education	was	used	to	address	the	failings	of	the	ethnocentric	State	
curriculum,	and	the	systematic	exclusion	of	Black	children	(ibid,	2013).		The	
Black	community	also	made	modest	financial	contributions	to	the	education	of	
their	children,	which	reduced	ACSHO’s	operational	costs.		However,	legislative	
change	now	constrains	the	organisation’s	agency.		ACSHO	has	not	developed	
safeguarding	policies	and	procedures,	where	the	protection	of	children	is	
concerned	(HM	Government	2006).		As	a	consequence,	the	labour	of	
volunteers	from	the	Black	community	can	no	longer	be	effectively	
appropriated	for	regulated	activities287.		The	organisation	is	unable	to	ensure	
its	staff	have	Disclosure	and	Barring	Service	(DBS)	clearances,	as	all	
organisations	working	with	children	now	have	a	statutory	safeguarding	duty	
towards	their	care.		This	require	employees,	regardless	of	whether	they	are	
paid	or	volunteers,	to	acquire	a	DBS	certificate.		Moreover,	rooms	that	could	
potentially	be	utilised	as	classrooms	might	not	meet	health	and	safety	
regulations	(HSE,	2011;	OFSTED,	2013),	and	would	therefore	be	deemed	unfit	
for	educational	purposes.	
	
	
																																								 																				
287	See	the	Safeguarding	Vulnerable	Groups	Act	2006	(HM	Government,	2006;	ISA	2014).	
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ACSHO	is	also	reluctant	to	apply	for	funding	that	would	help	the	organisation	
to	achieve	its	community	objectives.		However,	I	understand	why.		The	
organisation	is	proud	of	its	independent	status,	and	does	not	wish	to	
compromise	its	aims	by	having	to	prioritise	the	politics	of	potential	sponsors.		
Nevertheless,	ACSHO	operates	in	the	public	sphere	and	therefore	it	has	to	
comply	with	statutory	requirements	regarding	financial	due	diligence.		ACSHO	
has	been	operating	since	1964,	and	must	file	annual	accounts	and	enlist	the	
services	of	registered	accountants.		However,	the	secrecy	surrounding	the	
organisation	makes	such	information	difficult	to	obtain.		Even	if	ACSHO	
decided	to	seek	public	sector	investment,	its	specific	racial	aims288	and	secret	
organisational	structure	would	more	than	likely	deter	potential	sponsors.			
	
	
ACSHO’s	exclusive	Pan-African	objectives	does	not	conform	to	the	
Government’s	ideas	of	a	single	equality	regime	or	community	cohesion289.		
Nevertheless,	a	major	strength	of	the	organisation	is	its	ethnic	specific	
interests.		This	contrasts	with	the	inclusive	ideology	of	the	Black	church,	which	
sees	itself	as	providing	religion	for	all,	rather	than	prioritising	the	spiritual	and	
material	needs	of	African	Caribbeans.		Although	legislation	undoubtedly	erects	
barriers	to	ACSHO’s	agency,	they	are	by	no	means	insurmountable.		All	of	the	
above	legislative	constraints	can	be	interpreted	as	the	organisation’s	failure	to	
																																								 																				
288	ACSHO	are	not	willing	to	compromise	their	aim	of	liberating	the	minds	of	the	Black	
community,	nor	is	it	interested	in	helping	other	ethnic	groups.	
289	See	HM	Government	(2010);	Cantle	(2002).	
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comply	with	statutory	requirements.	Thus,	it	can	be	argued	that	ACSHO’s	
reduced	operational	capacity	over	time	cannot	wholly	be	attributed	to	
legislative	changes	alone.		Some	of	the	barriers	encountered	by	the	
organisation	are	a	result	of	decisions	made	by	individuals	within	the	
organisation.	
	
	
The	continuity	of	Black	community	organisations	to	a	great	extent	depends	on	
their	capacity	to	recruit	young	members.		Although	Pan-African	ideology	has	
lost	some	of	its	appeal	to	young	Black	males	and	females,	that	is	not	
necessarily	the	case	with	religion.		Due	to	its	flourishing	young	membership,	
the	Black	church	has	continuity	within	the	community.		This	contrasts	with	
ACSHO	whose	mainly	male	membership	is	–	as	far	as	I	could	see	–	substantially	
over	the	age	of	forty.		Although	most	UBL290	members	are	affiliated	with	the	
Black	church,	the	meetings	I	attended	did	not	have	any	young	people	present.		
This	might	be	explained	by	the	fact	that	the	majority	of	UBL’s	members	are	
employed	in	the	professions.		Members	below	the	age	of	twenty-four	are	
therefore	excluded	by	default.		This	is	because	the	professional	occupations,	in	
which	UBL	members	are	employed,	generally	require	a	university	degree	
followed	by	a	few	years	climbing	the	occupational	ladder.		Nevertheless,	UBL	
actively	engages	with	young	people	in	the	Black	community.		For	example,	the	
																																								 																				
290	United	in	Building	Legacy	(UBL)	is	a	Black	organisation	led	by	GK	MBE,	who	is	employed	in	a	
senior	position	within	Birmingham	City	Council,	a	Christian	and	also	an	ex-member	of	ACSHO.		
The	organisation’s	members	are	all	employed	in	professional	occupations	and	most	of	them	
are	connected	to	the	Black	Churches	(see	Chapter	Four).	
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organisation’s	legal	professionals	deliver	projects	that	raise	awareness	of	
young	people’s	rights,	particularly	if	they	are	stopped	and	searched	by	the	
police.	
	
	
Financial	self-sufficiency	is	the	major	barrier	constraining	the	agency	and	
operational	capacity	of	the	Black	organisations	I	observed.		Moreover,	cuts	in	
public	spending,	mediated	through	various	austerity	policies291,	makes	it	
increasingly	difficult	for	many	community	organisations	to	obtain	financial	
support.		It	is	now	practically	impossible	to	obtain	funds	through	the	public	
purse,	or	from	NGOs	or	State	agencies,	to	cover	the	costs	of	acquiring	
premises.		Although	UBL’s	members	are	in	well-paid	occupations,	the	
organisation	does	not	own	any	property	and	their	meetings	are	held	in	a	
building	owned	by	Birmingham	City	Council292.		The	same	cannot	said	be	said	
for	ACSHO.		Despite	considerable	financial	difficulties	over	the	years,	the	
organisation	has	managed	to	hold	on	to	its	imposing	headquarters	in	
Handsworth.			
	
	
																																								 																				
291	Since	2010,	the	neo-liberal	agenda	has	been	driven	by	austerity	measures	in	the	form	of	
cuts	to	public	spending	(Sivanandan,	2013),	by	both	Coalition	and	Conservative	Governments.	
292	See	Chapter	Four.	
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The	New	Testament	Church	of	God	(NTCG)	owns	a	few	properties	in	the	
community.		I	cannot	be	certain	if	the	Rock	in	Spring	Hill	is	owned	outright	or	
has	a	mortgage.		Nevertheless,	the	NTCG	Rock	does	own	outright	an	older	and	
much	smaller	church,	which	is	situated	a	few	hundred	yards	away	from	the	
current	building	in	Spring	Hill.		Although	they	no	longer	hold	services	there,	it	is	
still	used	for	various	activities.		The	NTCG	in	Lozells	has	had	a	major	and	costly	
refurbishment,	for	which	it	had	to	obtain	a	mortgage	from	one	of	the	major	
banks.		However,	it	has	also	invested	in	a	nursery	adjacent	to	the	Church,	
which	brings	in	additional	finances293.		Property	ownership	is	crucial	for	
stability	in	the	short-term	and	security	in	the	long-term;	it	also	provides	Black	
organisations	with	a	point	of	contact	and	presence	in	the	community.		Having	
access	to	their	own	buildings	means	that	Black	organisations	can	mobilise	their	
supporters	without	interference	from	outside	agencies294.		However,	not	
owning	the	property	in	which	they	are	based	can	reduce	their	capacity	for	
action.		This	is	especially	the	case	if	their	organisational	interests	conflict	with	
those	of	their	landlords295.	
	
	
																																								 																				
293	The	nursery	is	not	for	the	exclusive	use	of	African	Caribbeans	or	members	of	the	NTCG.		
However,	it	does	provide	valuable	childminding	assistance	for	Black	parents	–	especially	
females	–	who	participate	in	education	and	the	labour	market.		See	Chapter	Four.	
294	This	was	demonstrated	during	the	2011	disturbances	in	Birmingham	(see	Chapter	Four).	
295	I	have	highlighted	this	problem	in	Chapter	Four,	using	the	example	of	the	UBL	leader	GK,	
who	appeared	unable	to	challenge	the	City	Council	because	it	provides	his	organisation	with	
their	premises.	
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Since	the	Education	Reform	Act	1988	(ERA1988)	the	powers	of	LEAs	have	been	
gradually	eroded	(Troyna,	1992),	to	the	extent	where	they	can	now	no	longer	
build	new	schools.		However,	the	Government	is	encouraging	private	sector	
involvement	to	create	more	Academies	and	Free	Schools	under	the	2010	
Academies	Act.		Excell	3’s296	successful	application	for	a	Free	School	to	some	
extent	demonstrates	the	possibilities	for	empowerment	that	lie	within	
contemporary	legislation.		The	organisation’s	foresight	is	also	highlighted	by	
the	announcement	in	the	March	2016	Conservative	Budget	to	convert	all	
primary	and	secondary	schools	into	Academies	by	2020	(Cook,	2016)	297.			
	
	
The	King	Solomon	International	Business	School	(KSIBS)	opened	in	September	
2016.		However,	the	finished	product	is	quite	different	from	that	which	was	
originally	envisaged	by	Excell	3298.		Indeed,	on	the	surface	it	might	appear	that	
																																								 																				
296	In	Chapter	Four	I	outlined	Excell	3’s	Free	School	application,	which	received	substantial	
support	from	UBL’s	Rosemary	Campbell-Stephens.		Rosemary	emigrated	to	Jamaica	with	her	
husband	in	late	2015	and	received	an	OBE	in	the	2016	New	Year’s	Honours	List.		Excell	3	
generated	support	for	their	Free	School	application	by	organising	meetings	in	the	Caribbean	
community,	with	Black	parents	who	were	concerned	about	their	children’s	education	in	State	
schools.		As	noted	in	Chapters	Three	and	Four,	the	majority	of	the	meetings	were	held	in	the	
New	Testament	Church	of	God	in	Lozells.	
297	The	Government	announced	in	the	2016	Budget	that	it	intends	to	impose	academisation	on	
all	schools	within	six	years,	see	Unison	(2016).		However,	on	May	6th	2016	the	Government	
made	a	political	U-turn.		It	has	now	decided	to	use	the	DfE	as	its	vehicle	‘to	force	schools	in	
“underperforming”	local	authorities	to	convert	to	academy	status’	(Adams,	2016).		Local	
authorities	that	run	successful	schools	will	be	able	to	decide	if	academisation	is	best	for	them.	
298	The	school’s	website	portrays	a	Christian	educational	institution	with	a	multi-ethnic	pupil	
cohort.		This	is	in	stark	contrast	to	the	vision	of	a	Black	led	school,	which	was	first	sold	to	
African	Caribbean	parents	at	the	pre-application	meetings.		Although	there	are	still	a	number	
of	Black	academics	involved	with	KSIBS,	the	school’s	Principal	is	White,	and	so	is	one	third	of	
the	Board	of	Governors	(King	Solomon	International	Business	School,	2016).		None	of	the	
present	White	members	of	the	school	were	at	the	pre-application	meetings	I	attended	(See	
Chapter	Four).	
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the	organisation’s	aims	have	to	a	great	extent	been	compromised.		However,	
appearing	to	adopt	the	perceived	virtues	of	Whiteness	might	be	a	strategy	
employed	to	play	the	long-game	of	community	advocacy.		It	is	said	that	he	who	
pays	the	piper	calls	the	tune.		Consequently,	Black	organisations	that	engage	in	
the	market	without	their	own	capital	sometimes	have	to	dance	to	the	tune	of	
the	piper.		Free	School	legislation	might	seem	emancipatory.		However,	
financial	dependency	increases	the	risk	of	interest-divergence	and	State	
ideological	enslavement.		As	ACSHO	is	only	too	well	aware,	accepting	State	
funding	compromises	Black	Caribbean	organisations	to	the	extent	where	they	
often	have	to	relinquish	their	ethnic	specific	objectives.		Despite	“race”	being	a	
protected	characteristic	under	the	EA2010,	and	the	evidence	that	clearly	
indicates	African	Caribbean	children	experience	discrimination	in	schools,	the	
Government	is	more	concerned	with	promoting	British	values	than	it	is	about	
ameliorating	racial	inequity	in	education299.	
	
	
																																								 																				
299	Since	New	Labour’s	2002	Education	Act	(EA2002),	increasingly	more	religious	organisations	
have	been	encouraged	to	sponsor	Academies	(Gillard,	2007).		However,	in	the	aftermath	of	the	
2013	Trojan	Horse	affair	in	Birmingham	(BBC	News,	2015;	Robinson,	2015),	the	Government	
added	the	caveat	of	“British	values”	from	the	EA2002,	which	pertains	to	the	spiritual,	moral,	
social	and	cultural	development	of	children	(DfE,	2014).		On	the	surface	this	appears	to	be	an	
attempt	to	promote	so-called	Christian,	liberal	democratic	principles	to	regulate	the	behaviour	
of	private	sector	organisations	appropriating	the	Academies	Act	2010.		Nevertheless,	British	
values	are	not	necessarily	about	subordinating	cultural	differences	that	are	sometimes	
promoted	in	non-Christian	religious	beliefs,	it	is	a	pseudonym	for	Whiteness	and	White	
interests.		This	is	demonstrated	in	Chapter	Four	in	the	case	of	Excell	3.		Although	Excell	3	is	a	
Christian	organisation,	and	despite	“race”	being	a	protected	characteristic	under	the	EA2010,	
the	organisation	was	at	first	not	allowed	to	open	a	Free	School.		By	refusing	Excell	3’s	Free	
School	application,	the	Government	used	symbolic	violence	(Bourdieu,	2010	[1984])	to	deny	
the	organisation	the	opportunity	to	address	the	problem	of	racial	inequality	in	State	education.		
Excell	3’s	application	was	only	granted	when	it	conceded	to	forego	its	specific	ethnic	interests	
in	favour	of	the	Government’s	vision	of	British	values.	
	 348	
Racism	has	been	a	persistent	factor	in	the	comparatively	low	attainment	of	
Black	children	studying	at	CSE,	O-level	and	GCSE	level	(Swann,	1985;	Troyna	
and	Carrington,	1990;	Gillborn	and	Youdell,	2000;	Gillborn,	1997;	2005;	2008;	
2013).		However,	the	problem	is	now	much	wider	and	systematically	
entrenched	in	the	present	educational	market	than	it	was	in	previous	years.		
Although	the	existence	of	institutional	racism	has	long	been	acknowledged	as	a	
social	reality	by	both	the	1981	Rampton	and	1985	Swann	Reports	(Mamon,	
2004),	and	subsequently	by	Macpherson	(1999),	there	has	been	no	political	
will	to	ameliorate	its	debilitating	impact	in	the	education	sector.		Academies	
and	Free	Schools	are	now	being	encouraged	by	Government	to	deliver	the	
English	Baccalaureate	(E.	Bacc.),	which	might	eventually	replace	GCSEs.		
However,	Gillborn	(2013:	483)	contends	that	‘the	government’s	own	data	
suggest	that	Black	students	do	not	draw	equitable	rewards	from	attending	
academy	schools’.		
	
	
The	DfE	(in	ibid,	2013)	reveals	that	roughly	20	per	cent	of	students	take	
examinations	in	the	subjects	required	for	E.	Bacc.	entry	(English,	Maths,	two	
Sciences,	a	modern/ancient	foreign	language	and	a	Humanities	subject).		
Moreover,	teachers	tend	to	enter	those	who	they	consider	to	be	the	most	
proficient.		This	has	consequences	for	Black	students,	who	tend	to	be	
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perceived	by	White	middle-class	teachers	as	toxic	consumers300.		The	
International	Baccalaureate	is	part	of	the	KSIBS	curriculum,	which	suggests	the	
school	could	take	one	of	two	directions:	I)	Black	children	are	indiscriminately	
selected	for	the	E	Bacc.	based	on	their	ability;	or	II)	they	are	overlooked	and	
become	the	victims	of	symbolic	violence301	(Bourdieu,	2010	[1984]).		If	the	
KSIBS	takes	the	latter	approach	it	would	reinforce	the	perception	that	Black	
students	are	not	as	intellectually	competent	as	their	White	counterparts	
(Coard,	1971;	Carby,	1982;	Gillborn,	2016).		The	evidence	does	suggest	that	the	
E.	Bacc.	assessment	can	potentially	compound	the	current	disadvantages	
experienced	by	Black	pupils.		However,	only	time	will	tell	if	that	will	indeed	be	
the	case		
	
	
Considering	the	original	aims	behind	Excell	3’s	Free	School	application,	it	could	
be	argued	that	the	contract	between	the	organisation	and	the	Government	is	
an	educational	Faustian	pact.		Excell	3	had	to	make	concessions,	which	appear	
to	overlook	the	interests302		of	Black	children.		The	organisation	had	to	
																																								 																				
300	I	have	argued	that	teachers	view	Black	pupils	in	the	educational	market	as	toxic	consumers	
who	are	too	hot	to	handle.		African	Caribbean	children	are	generally	perceived	as	posing	a	
significant	risk	to	the	retention	and	success	targets	of	White	middle-class	teachers,	because	of	
their	general	level	of	educational	attainment	and	cultural	Otherness,	see	Chapter	Five.	
301	In	this	context,	symbolic	violence	is	denying	Black	children	the	opportunity	to	acquire	
educational	capital.			
302	Gillborn	(2013:	477)	contends	that	‘moments	of	racial	progress	are	won	when	White	power	
holders	perceive	self-interest	in	accommodating	the	demands	of	minoritised	groups’.		
Considering	the	Government’s	myopic	view	of	race	equality,	it	seems	highly	unlikely	that	racial	
progress	will	be	achieved	without	interest-convergence	on	the	part	of	Black	Caribbean	
organisations,	and	their	supporters.		I	take	the	view	that	African	Caribbeans	will	have	to	
prioritise	and	address	their	own	needs	without	compromising	them.		
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prioritise	the	needs	of	the	educational	market,	which	maintains	the	status	quo	
of	White	privilege	and	White	supremacy	(Gillborn,	2005;	2008a;	2016).		
Therefore,	whilst	the	KSIBS	is	a	step	forward	in	the	right	direction,	it	might	also	
be	two	steps	backward	because	of	Black	interest-divergence.		The	vision	of	a	
Black	led	school	was	sold	to	African	Caribbean	parents303.		However,	after	two	
unsuccessful	applications	it	was	clear	that	the	Government	would	not	consent	
to	the	school	if	its	leadership	team	was	entirely	Black.			
	
	
The	case	of	KSIBS	demonstrates	the	ambiguity	of	the	market	State	
(Sivanandan,	2013).		Applications	for	Free	Schools	are	encouraged	from	
interest	groups,	within	the	context	of	the	free	market.		However,	the	State	
intervened	to	reject	Excell	3’s	applications,	because	they	were	too	specific	to	
the	needs	of	Black	Caribbean	children.		Excell	3’s	initial	rejection	by	the	
Government	highlights	how	Whiteness	is	a	form	of	capital.		It	can	be	
exchanged	for	Goods	in	market	situations,	whereas	Blackness	is	conceived	as	
Bads.		It	remains	to	be	seen	if	the	KSIBS	will	be	able	to	maintain	their	original	
aims	and	prioritise	the	learning	needs	of	African	Caribbean	children.		State	
dependency	could	shift	the	school’s	focus	from	the	attainment	of	Black	
Caribbean	pupils	to	prioritising	survival	in	a	competitive	educational	market.	
	
																																								 																				
303	Hundreds	of	parents	signed	a	petition	that	formed	part	of	Excell	3’s	Free	School	application,	
in	which	they	provisionally	consented	to	their	children	attending	the	organisation’s	school.	
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The	supposedly	“laissez-faire”	market	State304	is	here	to	stay.		It	is	not	going	to	
roll-back	and	re-assert	the	State’s	former	policy	agenda,	particularly	where	
racial	equity	is	concerned.		Therefore,	prospects	for	the	future	empowerment	
of	African	Caribbeans	will	to	a	great	extent	depend	on	how	effectively	their	
organisations	appropriate	legislation	and	engage	with	the	private	sector.		
Moreover,	the	agency	and	interests	of	African	Caribbean	community	groups	
risk	being	compromised,	if	they	enter	the	free	market	without	having	first	
accumulated	their	own	capital.		Previous	equality	policies	and	reports	(i.e.	
those	of	Scarman	and	Macpherson)	have	been	implemented	or	commissioned	
after	major	protests	(Sivanandan,	1981;	Fryer,	1984;	Parekh	et	al.,	2002;	
Solomos,	2003).		However,	as	the	market	becomes	increasingly	dominant,	so	
too	does	State	control	over	the	movement	of	citizens	and	their	freedom	to	
mobilise305.		Consequently,	there	will	be	fewer	opportunities	in	future	for	
protests	that	might	influence	the	State	to	converge	its	interests	with	those	of	
African	Caribbeans.		Black	community	organisations	have	to	be	aware	of	the	
different	ways	in	which	individualism	erects	barriers	to	their	collective	
interests	and	impedes	mobilisation.		Black	Caribbean	community	and	religious	
organisations	possess	limited	capital	and	political	power.		Therefore,	interest-
convergence	must	take	the	form	of	accumulating	and	pooling	finances	and	
organisational	assets,	to	collectively	challenge	racial	inequality.			
																																								 																				
304	Sivanandan	(2013)	argues	that	the	notion	of	the	laissez-faire	market	State	is	a	myth.		This	is	
because	State	intervention	imposes	legislation,	which	dismantles	the	public	sector	whilst	
allowing	private	enterprise	to	flourish.	
305	New	police	powers	to	disperse	groups	in	public	spaces	are	documented	in	the	Anti-Social	
Behaviour	Crime	and	Policing	Bill,	see	Home	Office	(2013).			
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The	Caribbean	community	in	Birmingham	has	had	very	little	political	
representation	in	recent	years.		In	2012	Bishop	Webley	and	Desmond	
Jaddoo306	unsuccessfully	campaigned	for	the	post	of	West	Midlands	Police	and	
Crime	Commissioner,	and	in	March	2016	Yvonne	Mosquito	was	suspended	
from	her	position	as	Deputy	of	that	office307.		The	African	Caribbean	population	
in	Birmingham	is	considerably	smaller	in	size	than	their	White,	Indian	and	
Pakistani	counterparts308.		Moreover,	the	Caribbean	population	is	now	
displaced	throughout	Birmingham’s	wards,	and	they	are	no	longer	the	majority	
ethnic	group	in	their	Traditional	Heart	Lands309.			
	
	
The	spatial	movement	of	the	African	Caribbean	community	is	also	problematic	
in	terms	of	their	political	representation	and	empowerment.		Their	low	
numbers	in	any	given	ward	makes	it	practically	impossible	for	them	to	elect	
someone	from	their	ethnic	group	who	is	capable	of	articulating	their	interests.		
Consequently,	the	Black	vote	by	itself	does	not	carry	any	significant	political	
																																								 																				
306	See	Chapter	Four.	
307	See	Birmingham	Mail	(2016).		There	is	a	video	featuring	Desmond	Jaddoo,	in	which	he	
articulates	the	problem	of	interest	divergence	regarding	the	concerns	and	political	
representation	of	Birmingham’s	Caribbean	community,	embedded	on	this	website.	
308	ONS	Census	data	reveals	that	Birmingham’s	2011	Caribbean	population	is	considerably	
smaller	in	size	than	their	White	British,	Indian	and	Pakistani	counterparts.		Moreover,	all	the	
other	minority	ethnic	groups	highlighted	in	Table	3.5,	apart	from	African	Caribbeans	show	
increases	in	their	population	sizes	between	2001	and	2011.	
309	See	Chapter	Eight.	
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sway.		This	ultimately	leads	to	specific	Black	concerns	being	secondary	to	those	
of	larger	ethnic	groups.		This	contemporary	dilemma	is	very	different	to	the	
1950s	and	1960s,	when	the	West	Indian	population	had	a	significantly	larger	
national	representation	(Peach,	1968).		The	political	situation	has	also	changed	
since	the	late	1970s	in	Birmingham,	when	James	Hunte	was	successfully	
elected	as	an	independent	Parliamentary	candidate310.		As	African	Caribbeans	
in	Birmingham	have	no	voice	in	the	mainstream	political	sphere,	there	is	a	risk	
that	the	ethnic	inequalities	they	experience	are	overlooked	by	both	White	
British	or	South	Asian	politicians.		This	highlights	how	interest	divergence	is	just	
as	problematic	for	the	mainstream	political	representation	of	Birmingham’s	
Black	Caribbeans,	as	is	the	lack	of	financial	independency	amongst	their	
community	organisations.			
	
	
How	are	the	education	and	labour	market	experiences	of	African	Caribbeans	
in	Birmingham	mediated	by	their	gender	and	ethnicity?		
[and]	
To	what	extent	does	legislation,	allied	to	policies	and	practices,	enable	or	
constrain	African	Caribbean	social	mobility	in	market	situations?	
	
I	have	examined	narratives	of	first	generation	Black	Britons,	against	educational	
and	labour	market	data,	which	map	changes	in	the	positions	of	their	
																																								 																				
310	See	Rex	and	Tomlinson	(1979)	and	also	Chapter	Four.	
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contemporary	Birmingham	peers.		This	comparative	approach	has	enabled	me	
to	identify	continuities	and	departures	in	their	experiences	of	ethnic	and	
gender	discrimination	over	time.		I	have	argued	in	support	of	Bourdieu	(2010,	
[1984])	and	Weber	(1920	in	Smith,	2007:	90)	that	the	probability	for	African	
Caribbean	social	mobility	increases	by	exchanging	educational	capital	for	
economic	capital	and	‘from	the	relative	control	over	goods	[…],	skills	and	their	
income-producing	uses	within	a	given	economic	order’	(emphasis	added).		
However,	to	optimise	the	probability	of	increasing	one’s	life-chances,	the	
process	by	which	university	Goods	is	traded	for	labour	market	Goods311	must	
take	place	within	what	I	refer	to	as	the	appropriate	age-stage312.			
	
	
Regardless	of	gender	differences,	racial	discrimination	continues	to	block	
educational	and	economic	opportunities	for	Black	Caribbeans.		Nevertheless,	
African	Caribbean	females	have	been	more	successful	than	their	male	
counterparts	in	their	efforts	to	obtain	symbolic	capital	in	the	education	and	
labour	markets.		Policies	and	practices	have	played	an	ambivalent	role	in	the	
success	of	Caribbean	females.		Moreover,	this	research	has	highlighted	that	
social	mobility	is	neither	‘easy	or	typical’	(ibid,	2007:	87),	for	Black	Caribbean	
competing	in	the	contemporary	market	society	(Sivanandan,	2013).		Improving	
their	social	status	is	not	an	elementary	process,	achieved	by	simply	acquiring	
																																								 																				
311	I	define	university,	educational	and	H.E.	Goods	as	First	Class	and	Second	Class	First	Division	
degrees,	see	Chapter	Five.		Economic,	or	labour	market	Goods	are	the	high-income	professions	
in	NS-SEC	Classes	1	and	2,	see	Chapter	Six.	
312	See	Chapters	Three	and	Five	for	in-depth	explanations.	
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and	exchanging	Goods.		A	major	consequence	of	social	change	is	the	way	in	
which	the	old	wine	of	racism	is	now	mediated	through	the	new	bottle	of	neo-
liberalism.		The	shift	from	an	interventionist	to,	what	appears	to	be,	a	laissez-
faire	market	State	(ibid,	2013)	has	downplayed	the	perpetuation	of	racial	
discrimination.		It	has	also	reduced	the	importance	of	implementing	policy	to	
eliminate	inequalities	in	market	situations.			
	
	
The	1968	Race	Relations	Act	(RRA1968)	was	the	first	piece	of	legislation	to	
extend	the	scope	of	anti-racist	legislation	to	the	education	sector	(Ratcliffe,	
1981;	2004).		However,	as	noted	earlier	and	above,	subsequent	educational	
policies	that	were	supposedly	implemented	to	integrate	the	immediate	
descendants	of	Caribbean	migrants,	often	resulted	in	practices	of	dispersal	and	
referrals	to	schools	for	the	educationally	sub-normal	(ESN)	313	(Coard,	1971;	
Carby,	1983).		The	disproportionate	exclusion	of	Black	children	in	State	schools	
is	a	phenomenon	that	has	persisted	from	the	late	1960s	to	the	present	(Troyna	
and	Carrington,	1990;	CRE,1997;	DfE,	2012a).		This	suggests	that	past-race	
practices	of	racial	discrimination	resonate	with	the	contemporary	experiences	
of	African	Caribbeans.		The	only	real	difference	is	that	Black	children	who	are	
now	excluded	from	State	education	are	sent	to	pupil	referral	units	(DfE,	2015),	
rather	than	to	ESN	Schools.		Moreover,	what	is	also	problematic	for	the	future	
life-chances	and	employment	opportunities	of	African	Caribbeans	is	that,	
																																								 																				
313	See	the	research	subjects’	narratives	in	Chapter	Five.	
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regardless	of	gender,	Black	pupils	are	being	expelled	at	the	age-stage	when	
they	should	be	preparing	for	their	GCSEs	(DfE,	2012a).			
	
	
Without	good314	grade	GCSE	qualifications,	African	Caribbean	children	will	not	
be	able	to	access	the	A-level	courses	that	provide	the	most	typical	route	into	
universities.		Furthermore,	they	will	also	not	be	able	to	enter	the	labour	
market	at	the	appropriate	age-stage	to	facilitate	their	upward	social	
mobility315.		LEAs	can	no	longer	build	State	schools,	and	their	powers	are	being	
eroded	by	Government	in	favour	of	private	sector	intervention.		Nevertheless,	
LEAs	still	have	a	statutory	duty	for	the	educational	welfare	of	permanently	
excluded	school	children.		This	duty	has	been	imposed	under	the	1996	and	
2002	Education	Acts	and	also	the	Education	and	Inspections	Act	2006	(ibid,	
2012a).		However,	Academies	are	exempt	from	the	financial	penalties	State	
institutions	incur	for	excluding	pupils	(Gillard,	2007)316.		Therefore,	under	the	
increasing	marketisation	of	education,	the	practice	of	permanently	excluding	
Black	children	seems	set	to	continue317.		This	is	particularly	as	the	evidence	
																																								 																				
314	These	are	specifically	A*-C	grades.	
315	I	have	argued	that	the	highest	level	of	educational	qualifications	must	be	obtained	at	the	
appropriate,	or	expected,	age-stage	to	facilitate	early	entry	into	the	labour	market	and	
subsequent	opportunities	for	social	mobility	through	employment	progression,	see	Chapters	
Five	and	Six.	
316	See	also	DfE	(2015),	Paragraph	9;	Section	181.	
317	See	BBC	(2012).	
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suggests	that	teachers	generally	view	Black	children	as	what	I	refer	to	as	toxic	
consumers318.			
	
	
Government	policies	now	encourage	private	sector	investment	in	Free	
Schools319,	which	have	complete	autonomy	over	their	management	and	
operational	procedures.		The	curriculums	of	these	schools	are	often	tailored	to	
support	the	interests	and	pursuits	of	middle-class	children,	whose	parents	
generally	have	more	financial	and	symbolic	capital	than	their	Black	working-
class	counterparts320.		Free	Schools	can	also	exclude	children	within	their	
catchment	area,	because	they	have	the	autonomy	to	set	their	own	entry	
criteria321.		Thus,	despite	“race”	being	a	protected	characteristic	under	the	
current	equality	agenda	(Richardson	and	Monro,	2012),	the	intersectionality	of	
racial	discrimination	and	class	disadvantage	persists.		The	only	thing	that	has	
changed	is	how	they	are	now	reproduced	and	legitimated	by	the	insidious	
practices	of	schools,	within	the	culture	of	competition	in	the	educational	
market.			
	
																																								 																				
318	ibid,	also	see	Chapter	Five.		
319	ibid.		Free	Schools	and	Studio	Schools	were	created	under	the	2010	Academies	Act	and	are	
free	from	LEA	control.	
320	Although	schooling	appears	to	be	free,	the	cost	of	learning	resources	and	equipment,	
necessary	for	the	study	of	specific	subjects,	can	be	problematic	for	children	from	a	poor	
background.		They	might	also	be	unable	to	afford	extra-curricular	activities,	such	as	overseas	
trips,	that	could	develop	their	cultural	capital	(Bourdieu,	2010	[1984]).	
321	Only	Gypsy	Roma	Travelers	have	lower	GCSE	attainment	than	Black	Caribbeans	(DfE,	
2012b).		If	transfer	to	a	Free	School	depended	on	predicted	GCSE	exam	grades,	some	African	
Caribbean	children	might	be	refused	entry	based	on	their	anticipated	achievement.	
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There	are	more	African	Caribbean	females	progressing	into	higher	education	
than	their	male	peers322.		The	majority	of	Black	Caribbean	females	are	also	
accessing	university	at	the	appropriate	age-stage.		This	is	positive	for	their	
social	mobility,	as	it	enables	them	to	compete	on	equal	terms	with	their	ethnic	
counterparts	for	subsequent	labour	market	opportunities.		The	national	trend	
of	higher	female	university	participation	may	have	been	influenced	by	New	
Labour’s	policies	after	2003.		However,	it	is	difficult	to	assess	the	extent	to	
which	they	may	have	benefitted	African	Caribbean	females	specifically.		
Policies,	such	as	Sure	Start,	may	have	enabled	older	Black	females	with	
children	to	participate	in	higher	education.		Nevertheless,	they	do	not	account	
for	the	success	of	their	younger	counterparts,	particularly	in	Birmingham.			
	
	
Between	2007-2013,	almost	half	of	Birmingham’s	higher	education	students,	
were	within	the	appropriate	age-stage323.		However,	out	of	the	three	ethnic	
groups	surveyed	Black	Caribbean	students	have	the	highest	35-49	age-range	in	
H.E.	institutions324.		Moreover,	over	half	the	total	of	Black	students	from	
Birmingham	attending	Russell	Group	universities	are	outside	of	the	18-24	age	
group325.		The	high	number	of	African	Caribbean	students	outside	of	the	
																																								 																				
322	See	Chapter	Five	and	DfE	(2012a).	
323	See	table	5.10.	
324	ibid.	
325	ibid.	
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appropriate	age-stage	is	problematic	for	their	inter-generational	social	
mobility.		Russell	Group	students	have	better	career	prospects	than	their	
counterparts	in	other	H.E.	institutions.		However,	older	workers	are	generally	
perceived	as	having	less	economic	value	to	employers.		Younger	workers	are	
mainly	healthier,	prepared	to	be	more	flexible,	and	often	accept	lower	wages	
than	their	older	counterparts	who	tend	to	have	more	responsibilities	and	
financial	commitments.		Although	age	is	a	protected	characteristic326	only	
those	in	particular	age	groups,	such	as	the	elderly,	are	protected	from	
discrimination.		Therefore,	it	can	be	a	quite	subtle	and	often	overlooked	
practice.		Consequently,	there	is	no	way	of	knowing	with	any	certainty	if	high	
rates	of	unemployment	amongst	African	Caribbeans	is	a	consequence	of	age,	
rather	than	“race”	discrimination.		It	could	be	the	case	that	older	Black	
Caribbeans	may	have	H.E.	degrees	but	are	unable	to	exchange	them	for	
economic	capital.		Nevertheless,	“race”,	more	so	than	age	discrimination,	
might	explain	the	comparatively	high	rates	of	Black	Caribbean	unemployment	
in	Birmingham.		For	example,	MWBCs	have	a	higher	representation	of	16-24	
year-olds327.		However,	they	also	have	the	highest	rates	of	unemployment	out	
of	the	three	ethnic	groups	surveyed	in	this	research.	
	
	
Although	New	Labour	policies	might	have	facilitated	access	to	universities,	
there	is	no	evidence	to	suggest	that	they	have	actually	reduced	racial	
																																								 																				
326	See	HM	Government	(2010).	
327	See	Appendix	ii.:	Table	3.4	and	also	Chapter	Six.	
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inequalities	within	the	higher	education	sector.		Black	students	entering	
universities	with	the	same	qualifications	as	their	White	counterparts	generally	
leave	with	lower	degree	grades328.		This	suggests	they	may	be	encountering	
racial	discrimination	within	universities.		Shiner	and	Noden	(2014:	9)	initially	
revealed	that	regardless	of	class	or	gender	differences,	Black	Caribbeans	‘tend	
to	target	lower-ranking	or	middle-ranking	institutions	than	elite	institutions.’		
This	observation	is	to	some	extent	supported	by	Table	5.9	for	Black	Caribbean	
Birmingham	students.		In	comparison	to	their	ethnic	counterparts,	they	have	a	
higher	proportional	representation	of	students	in	universities	outside	of	the	
Russell	group.			
	
	
Other	H.E.	institutions	do	not	acquire	as	much	funding	as	their	Russell	Group	
counterparts,	and	therefore	do	not	have	the	same	level	of	available	resources	
(Havergal,	2015).		However,	the	comparatively	lower	Russell	Group	
applications	by	African	Caribbean	students	do	not	necessarily	suggest	a	lack	of	
ambition	on	their	part.		Noden,	Shiner	and	Modood	(2014)	reassessed	the	
original	position	of	Shiner	and	Noden	(2014)	and	revealed	that	elite	
universities	discriminate	against	Black	Caribbean	applicants.		Consequently,	
African	Caribbeans	in	Birmingham	may	also	concede	that	it	is	unlikely	they	will	
be	offered	a	place	in	a	Russell	Group	institution,	because	of	the	locked-in	
																																								 																				
328	See	Figures	1	and	2	in	Chapter	Five.	
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inequality329	(Gillborn,	2008b)	within	the	education	system.		Thus,	it	appears	
that	the	exclusionary	selection	processes	of	elite	universities	(Shiner	and	
Modood,	2002),	and	discriminatory	practices	within	them,	may	have	
contributed	towards	discouraging330	(Heath	and	Cheung,	2007)	Birmingham’s	
Black	students	from	applying.			
	
	
The	persistence	of	racial	discrimination	in	universities	has	recently	been	
acknowledged	by	the	former	Prime	Minister	David	Cameron.		He	has	suggested	
imposing	a	‘transparency	duty’	with	the	aim	of	‘tearing	down	the	barriers	at	
elite	universities’	(Gov.	UK,	2016).		Shiner	and	Noden	(2014:	3)	also	note	that	
‘more	needs	to	be	done	to	improve	access,	particularly	to	the	most	selective	
institutions’331.		However,	David	Cameron’s	statement	overlooks	how	
discriminatory	practices	in	the	secondary	education	sector	reduces	the	
likelihood	of	university	participation	for	Black	Caribbean	children.		This	is	
particularly	the	case	where	Russell	Group	applications	are	concerned.		As	
noted	above,	GCSEs	at	Grade	C	or	higher	must	first	be	acquired,	in	order	to	
obtain	the	various	A-level	and	Level	3	qualifications	that	are	needed	to	enter	
universities	at	the	appropriate	age-stage.		Therefore,	it	is	not	just	the	
																																								 																				
329	This	is	the	idea	that	racism	is	embedded	into	the	processes	and	practices	of	the	education	
system	to	such	an	extent	that	it	is	inevitable.		
330	I	have	argued	in	Chapter	Six	that	racism	and	discriminatory	practices	in	the	labour	market	
may	have	contributed	to	discouraging	Black	Caribbeans	from	applying	for	jobs	where	they	
would	constitute	a	highly	visible	minority.		In	much	the	same	way,	African	Caribbeans	may	
think	that	applying	for	a	place	in	an	elite	university	is	an	exercise	in	futility.	
331	See	also	Grove	(2015).	
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exclusionary	practices	of	universities	that	is	a	barrier	to	the	higher	education	
participation	of	African	Caribbean	students	(particularly	Black	males),	but	also	
their	high	rate	of	permanent	school	exclusions332.		Thus,	it	is	not	new	
legislation	that	is	required,	but	rather	the	political	will	to	sanction	institutions	
that	transgress	their	statutory	duties	under	the	existing	equality	agenda.		
Imposing	heavy	fines	on	educational	establishments,	that	discriminate	against	
Black	Caribbean	pupils,	applicants	and	students,	is	a	means	by	which	the	
market	could	be	appropriated	to	reduce	inequalities	and	mediate	fairness.	
	
	
In	contrast	to	their	female	counterparts,	African	Caribbean	males	appear	to	be	
regressing	rather	than	progressing	in	market	situations.		As	noted	above,	in	
comparison	to	their	female	peers	there	is	a	growing	disparity	in	their	higher	
education	participation	and	they	are	not	faring	as	well	in	the	labour	market.		In	
Birmingham	between	2001	and	2011,	there	has	been	a	decline	in	the	number	
of	Black	males	employed	in	the	high-income	Class	1	occupations,	whereas	the	
exact	opposite	is	the	case	in	respect	of	their	female	counterparts.		Gender	
differences	in	the	labour	market	positions	of	Birmingham’s	African	Caribbean	
population	are	also	reflected	nationally.		What	is	also	a	concern	for	their	social	
mobility	is	the	employment	differences	in	the	crucial	25-49	age-range.		Both	
nationally	and	in	Birmingham,	Black	females	are	improving	their	occupational	
status	in	this	age-range,	whereas	the	position	of	their	male	counterparts	is	
																																								 																				
332	See	Chapter	Five	and	DfE	(2012a).	
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deteriorating333.		This	is	not	just	in	terms	of	their	occupational	positions	in	the	
higher-tiers	of	the	labour	market,	but	also	their	increasing	representation	in	
Routine	Occupations	and	amongst	the	Never	Worked	and	Long-term	
Unemployed334.			
	
	
The	narrative	of	Subject	E335	highlights	how	workplace	racism	can	discourage	
some	Black	workers	from	applying	for	positions	where	they	are	form	a	visible	
and	distinct	minority.		Moreover,	the	decreasing	concern	of	the	State	in	
neutralising	labour	market	discrimination	suggests	there	is	little	hope	that	the	
situation	of	Black	males	will	be	improved	by	the	Government	implementing	
new	legislation,	or	enforcing	existing	policies.		Thus,	the	future	social	mobility	
of	Caribbean	males	will	rely	on	their	own	agency,	rather	than	in	the	hope	that	
equality	policies	will	somehow	mediate	fairness	on	their	behalf.		As	highlighted	
above	in	the	case	of	Black	community	organisations,	African	Caribbeans	–	and	
particularly	Black	males	–	have	to	appropriate	the	free	market	to	cater	for	their	
immediate	and	long-term	material	needs.		This	might	be	achieved	by	
improving	their	position	within	self-employed	NS-SEC	Class	4	occupations.	
	
	
																																								 																				
333	See	Tables	6.9;	6.10;	6.11	and	6.12.	
334	ibid.	
335	See	Chapter	Six.	
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National	disparities	in	the	proportional	representations	of	African	Caribbeans	
and	their	White	British	counterparts	in	the	Small	Employers	and	Own	Account	
Workers	Class	have	remained	virtually	stagnant	between	2001	and	2011.		
However,	the	slight	but	noticeable	improvement	in	Birmingham336	indicates	
that	increasingly	more	African	Caribbean	males	are	self-employed.		However,	
the	problem	they	face	is	somewhat	similar	to	that	encountered	by	Excell	3	
above,	in	terms	of	negotiating	and	overcoming	ideas	of	Whiteness	and	White	
hegemony	in	the	consumer	market.		African	Caribbeans	have	a	much	smaller	
consumer	base	in	Birmingham,	when	their	population	size	is	compared	to	the	
combined	Asian	ethnic	populations	and	the	larger	White	majority337.		Thus,	
most	Black	businesses	can	only	flourish	by	appealing	to	the	wider	population	of	
consumers,	who	have	the	benefit	of	choice	in	a	saturated	service	industry.		
However,	the	logic	of	the	market,	which	presupposes	that	consumers	will	
purchase	the	best	available	service	at	the	lowest	price,	might	not	necessarily	
apply	where	notions	of	cultural	identity	are	concerned.			
	
	
Crossley	(2001:	83)	interprets	Bourdieu’s	(2010,	[1984])	notion	of	habitus	as	
social	practices,	which	‘function	below	the	threshold	of	consciousness	[…]	
beyond	the	reach	of	introspective	scrutiny’338.		As	such,	there	are	hidden	social	
practices	that	influence	the	construction	of	a	hegemonic	White	cultural	
																																								 																				
336	See	Tables	6.5;	6.6;	6.7	and	6.8.	
337	See	Table	3.5	in	Appendix	ii.		
338	See	Chapter	One.	
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habitus.		This	suggests	that	cultural	dissimilarity	might	influence	the	majority	
White	consumer	group	to	overlook	Black	businesses	in	favour	of	White	
companies	who	they	perceive	as	culturally	similar.		Fanon	(in	Garner,	2007:	19)	
also	contends	that	‘the	construction	of	a	White	identity	[is]	based	on	a	number	
of	assumptions	about	human	agency’,	which	also	highlights	the	significance	of	
how	Others	are	socially	constructed.		The	negative	media	portrayal	of	Blacks	
(ibid,	2007)	to	some	extent	reinforces	the	notion	they	lack	the	skills	and	
competency	needed	for	particular	economic	services.		Therefore,	a	problem	
that	Black	entrepreneurs	have,	in	appealing	to	the	wider	market,	is	how	they	
are	perceived	by	the	gaze	of	the	dominant	White	majority.		There	are	no	easy	
solutions	to	this	age	old	problem.		However,	it	is	possible	that	if	the	economic	
gap	between	Black	males	and	females	continues	to	increase	it	could	have	a	
detrimental	impact	on	the	future	of	their	ethnic	group	and	cultural	identities.			
	
	
Intimate	relationships	are	often	formed	in	public	spaces,	such	as	educational	
institutions	and	places	of	employment	where	opportunities	exist	for	gender	
interactions.		However,	the	relative	dearth	of	Black	males	in	universities	and	the	
professions	reduces	the	likelihood	of	Black	females	having	opportunities	to	
form	intimate	relationships	with	them.		This	observation	is	supported	by	ONS	
(2014:	8)	data	revealing	that	the	‘16-24	age-group	have	the	highest	rates	of	
inter-ethnic	relationships’,	which	is	the	appropriate	age-stage	when	higher	
education	Goods	is	being	obtained	and	exchanged	for	labour	market	capital.		
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Moreover,	the	most	common	inter-ethnic	relationships	–	outside	of	those	
within	the	different	White	ethnic	groups	–	were	those	between	MWBC	and	
White	British,	followed	by	Black	Caribbean	and	White	British	(ibid,	2014).		This	
suggests	that	the	increase	of	social	distance	(Park,	1924)	in	public	spaces	
between	Black	Caribbean	males	and	females	is	leading	to	a	disparity	in	their	
lifestyles	and	relationships.		Consequently,	the	structure	of	Caribbean	families	
appears	to	be	undergoing	gradual,	but	significant,	long-term	change	–	and	not	
necessarily	just	in	terms	of	the	growth	of	lone-parent	matriarchal	families.	
	
	
The	acute	increase	in	the	MWBC	population	might	be	evidence	of	the	gradual	
cultural	and	ethnic	assimilation	of	African	Caribbeans.		Between	2001	and	2011	
the	national	Black	Caribbean	population	increased	by	approximately	six	per	
cent,	whereas	their	MWBC	counterparts	increased	by	84	per	cent339.		Over	the	
same	period	in	Birmingham	there	has	been	a	decrease	of	less	than	one	per	cent	
in	those	identifying	as	African	Caribbean.		In	contrast,	the	MWBC	population	
has	increased	by	58	per	cent	and	have	a	much	younger	16-24	age	population.		
Although	there	are	increasingly	more	Black	Caribbeans	forming	intimate	
partnerships	with	White	Britons,	it	is	difficult	to	establish	whether	the	data	is	
being	driven	by	a	growing	trend	in	relationships	between	Black	females	and	
White	males,	or	Black	males	and	White	females.	
	
																																								 																				
339	See	Appendix	
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The	role	that	legislation	might	have	played	in	ameliorating	cultural	differences	
between	Blacks	and	Whites,	to	a	level	where	–	in	some	instances	–	they	appear	
to	be	only	skin	deep,	cannot	be	established	with	any	certainty.		Successive	
changes	to	the	equality	agenda	might	have	ameliorated	intolerance	and	
gradually	adjusted	public	attitudes.		It	might	also	be	the	case	that	the	growth	of	
inter-ethnic	relationships	is	the	result	of	several	years	of	geographical	
proximity,	between	Blacks	and	Whites.		Nevertheless,	there	does	seem	to	be	a	
correlation	between	the	improving	social	mobility	of	African	Caribbean	females,	
the	rise	of	inter-ethnic	relationships	and	the	increase	of	the	MWBC	population.		
If	there	is	indeed	a	growing	trend	of	more	African	Caribbean	females	forming	
intimate	partnerships	with	White	British	males,	then	better	life-chances	and	
increasing	opportunities	for	Black	women	might	be	incurring	a	cultural	penalty,	
in	the	form	of	gradual	ethnic	assimilation.		Further	research	is	necessary	to	
examine	the	impact	that	differences	in	social	status,	between	Black	males	and	
females,	is	having	on	the	changing	structure	of	African	Caribbean	families.	
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What	shifts	have	taken	place	in	the	spatial	patterns	of	Birmingham’s	African	
Caribbean	population	over	the	past	thirty	years?		
	
The	relationship	between	social	and	spatial	mobility	is	not	necessarily	a	
straightforward	one,	as	there	are	a	myriad	of	choices	and	constraints	that	
influence	where	individuals	live.		It	cannot	be	taken	for	granted	that	individuals	
will	move	from	high	deprivation	Bad	Lands	to	low	deprivation	Good	Lands	
(Burgess,	2008	[1925])	as	their	material	situation	and	social	status	improves.		
Nevertheless,	the	spatial	patterns	of	post-war	West	Indian	migrants	were	to	a	
great	extent	influenced	by	constraints,	rather	than	choices.		These	included,	but	
were	not	limited	to:	their	family	networks	in	the	UK;	the	proximity	of	labour	
exchanges;	discriminatory	practices	in	the	private	and	public	housing	markets;	
their	low-income	occupations;	and	the	availability	of	affordable	housing,	
capable	of	accommodating	their	families	(Rex	and	Moore,	1967;	Rex	and	
Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981;	Fryer,	1984;	Taylor,	1993;	Chamberlain,	1999;	
Searle,	2013).		A	combination	of	these	factors	influenced	the	growth	of	African	
Caribbean	communities	in	urban	spaces,	which	I	also	refer	to	as	their	cultural	
Heart	Lands.		The	majority	of	Birmingham’s	African	Caribbean	population	is	still	
located	in	the	north	of	the	city340.		However,	over	the	past	thirty	years	there	has	
																																								 																				
340	I	emphasise	that	these	areas	had	the	largest	African	Caribbean	populations,	as	there	were	
also	sizeable	Black	communities	in	the	south	of	the	city,	see	Gunter	(1954)	and	Rex	and	Moore	
(1967).	
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been	a	gradual	outward	movement	from	their	cultural	Heart	Lands	to	areas	I	
define	as	Hinter	Lands341.	
	
	
If	the	low	deprivation	Good	Lands	of	Birmingham’s	Sutton	wards	can	be	
considered	as	Promise	Lands	(Burgess,	2008	[1925]),	where	minority	ethnic	
groups	might	aspire	to	live	as	they	accumulate	financial	capital,	then	the	
housing	situation	of	the	Caribbean	population	is	gradually	improving.			
Ratcliffe	(1981;	2004)	revealed	that,	in	the	late	1970s	and	early	1980s,	African	
Caribbeans	had	a	tendency	to	rent	rather	than	purchase	their	housing.		
However,	Census	data	for	Birmingham,	between	1991	and	2001,	indicates	a	
gradual	increase	in	the	numbers	of	Black	Caribbeans	opting	to	purchase	their	
own	properties.		The	proportional	increase	of	African	Caribbean	homeowners	in	
the	Sutton	wards	is	on	a	par	with	their	White	British	counterparts.		Moreover,	
they	are	improving	their	homeownership	in	the	crucial	25-49	age	stage342.		This	
suggests	a	possible	correlation	between	African	Caribbean	social	mobility	–	in	
terms	of	improvements	in	occupational	status	–	and	spatial	mobility,	regarding	
changes	in	tenure	and	the	acquisition	of	housing	in	low	deprivation	
environments.		However,	the	gender	of	the	Household	Representative	Person	
(HRP)	is	unknown,	as	is	their	marital	status.		Therefore,	it	cannot	be	established	
																																								 																				
341	See	Chapter	Seven.	
342	I	reiterate	that	twenty-five	is	the	approximate	age	at	which	higher	education	often	ends	and	
labour	market	participation	commences.	
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how	many	Black	homeowners	in	the	Sutton	wards	are	the	male	heads	of	
African	Caribbean	families,	single	males	or	if	they	are	unmarried	females.					
	
	
Due	to	limitations	in	the	Census	HRP	data	it	is	also	difficult	to	establish	if	there	
is	a	correlation	between	the	improved	labour	market	positions	of	Black	females	
and	changes	in	the	contemporary	spatial	patterns	of	African	Caribbeans.		It	
could	be	the	case	that	as	Black	females	are	improving	their	occupational	status	
they	are	also	increasing	their	position	as	homeowners.		Moreover,	correlations	
between	African	Caribbean	spatial	patterns	and	changes	in	household	
structures	cannot	be	determined	from	the	data.		One	reason	is	that	someone	
identifying	as	the	Black	Caribbean	HRP	could	be	in	a	relationship,	or	living	with	
a	partner,	who	is	of	a	different	ethnic	origin.		Therefore,	it	could	indeed	be	a	
case	of	one	step	forward	and	two	steps	backward	in	regard	to	both	the	social	
and	spatial	mobility	of	African	Caribbeans.		Data	that	indicates	improvements	in	
their	spatial	situation,	as	a	consequence	of	better	labour	market	opportunities,	
might	also	be	indicative	of	their	ethnic	and	cultural	assimilation		
	
	
In	one	sense,	the	contemporary	spatial	patterns	of	African	Caribbeans	suggest	
improvements	in	their	social	status,	but	in	another	they	are	also	problematic	to	
any	meaningful	understanding	of	exactly	where	Birmingham’s	contemporary	
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Caribbean	community	is	spatially	situated.		In	the	late	1970s	and	early	1980s,	
the	Caribbean	community	was	mainly	located	in	the	low	deprivation	Bad	Lands	
–	or	cultural	Heart	Lands	–	of	Handsworth,	Lozells	and	neighbouring	wards	in	
north	Birmingham	(Rex	and	Tomlinson,	1979;	Ratcliffe,	1981).		However,	that	is	
no	longer	the	case.		African	Caribbeans	are	increasing	their	representation	in	
areas	I	define	as	ethnic	Hinter	Lands.		In	these	new	Hinter	Lands,	the	main	
housing	tenure	of	African	Caribbeans	is	that	of	homeowner.		The	African	
Caribbean	Hinter	Lands,	like	their	Heart	Lands,	are	also	located	in	the	north	of	
Birmingham.		This	suggests	that	proximity	to	their	traditional	ethnic	enclaves	
might	be	an	important	factor	of	their	cultural	habitus	and	a	significant	influence	
on	their	spatial	patterns.		In	contrast	to	the	African	Caribbean	Hinter	Lands,	
there	is	a	higher	tendency	to	rely	on	social	housing	in	their	traditional	Heart	
Lands343,	particularly	for	those	in	the	crucial	25-49	age-stage344.	
	
	
The	narratives	of	Rosemary	Campbell	and	Bishop	Webley	highlight	that	the	
outward	movement	of	African	Caribbeans	may	not	necessarily	influenced	by	
ideas	of	low	and	high	deprivation,	or	even	class	considerations.		However,	
education	and	work	are	major	factors	in	spatial	transitions.		The	majority	of	
Blacks	homeowners,	in	the	wards	identified	as	African	Caribbean	Hinter	Lands,	
are	in	the	25-49	age-stage.		This	again	suggests	that	they	are	purchasing	
properties	at	an	age	that	is	important	for	inter-generational	social	mobility	to	
																																								 																				
343	See	Table	7.16.	
344	See	Table	7.19.	
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occur,	and	when	work,	family	and	schools	are	major	considerations.		Changes	in	
the	spatial	patterns	of	African	Caribbeans	also	indicate	a	correlation	between	
improved	labour	market	positions	and	homeownership.		However,	as	
highlighted	in	the	context	of	the	Sutton	wards	above,	there	is	no	way	of	
establishing	the	gender,	or	family	structures,	of	the	homeowners.			
	
	
African	Caribbeans	are	moving	into	areas	where	they	form	a	comparatively	
small	minority	of	the	population	in	those	wards,	and	their	status	as	
homeowners	disperses	them	even	further345.		As	their	social	status	improves,	
and	they	can	afford	to	purchase	properties,	African	Caribbeans	are	being	
dispersed	by	the	individual	choices	they	are	able	to	make	in	the	housing	
market.		However,	the	spatial	mobility	of	the	majority	of	African	Caribbeans	is	
constrained	by	their	poverty	and	reliant	on	social	housing346.		Consequently,	the	
disparity	between	choice	and	constraint	–	in	terms	of	financial	independence	
and	State	dependence	–	will	be	increasingly	problematic	for	the	African	
Caribbean	community.			
	
	
																																								 																				
345	Although	the	majority	of	African	Caribbeans	tend	to	reside	in	the	north	of	the	city	(see	
Appendix	vi.),	they	still	have	a	smaller	overall	population	than	some	ethnic	groups	in	
Birmingham.		Moreover,	whilst	other	ethnic	groups	have	increased	their	populations	in	
Birmingham	only	those	of	African	Caribbeans,	and	their	majority	White	British	counterparts,	
have	actually	decreased	in	size	(see	Appendix	ii.:	Table	3.5).	
346	See	Tables	7.16	and	7.19.	
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As	home	ownership	is	beyond	the	reach	of	most	individuals	in	the	market	
society,	‘and	the	lack	of	social	housing,	combined	with	a	cap	on	housing	
benefits,	means	councils	are	beginning	to	“decant”	people	away	from	their	
communities’	(Sivanandan	2013:	4),	the	Caribbean	community	might	now	be	
viewed	as	an	imagined	community	(Anderson,	1991	[1983]).		Thus,	the	idea	of	
an	African	Caribbean	community	might	now	be	seen	in	terms	of	people	sharing	
cultural	bonds	of	attachment,	rather	than	as	a	population	located	in	a	specific	
geographical	space.		The	spatial	shift	from	Heart	Lands	to	Hinter	Lands	is	
problematic	for	Black	Caribbean	mobilisation	and	as	consequences	for	interest	
convergence.		This	is	because	it	will	be	increasingly	difficult	for	the	disparate	
Caribbean	population	to	address	the	persisting	problem	of	racism,	which	
impacts	on	them	as	a	collective.			
	
	
In	the	past,	geographical	proximity	facilitated	the	growth	of	community	
networks,	which	West	Indians	appropriated	to	overcome	racist	practices.		The	
Partner	system347	is	an	example	of	how	they	used	their	cultural	capital	
(Bourdieu,	2010	[1984]),	to	obtain	deposits	for	mortgages,	when	the	banks	
refused	them	loans.		However,	African	Caribbeans	can	no	longer	rely	on	their	
community	networks	in	the	same	way	as	their	West	Indian	predecessors,	and	
they	still	have	a	high	tendency	to	rent	social	housing	in	their	traditional	Heart	
																																								 																				
347	See	Chapter	Seven.	
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Lands348.		This	is	even	more	pronounced	for	those	between	the	ages	of	25-
49349,	which	suggests	they	are	still	generally	trapped	in	a	cycle	of	poverty.			
	
	
Despite	the	Race	Relations	Act	1976	(RRA1976)	outlawing	discrimination	in	the	
public	and	private	housing	markets,	precarious	employment	(Standing,	2011),	
bad	credit	rating	and	the	constant	risk	of	debt	construct	barriers	for	African	
Caribbeans	wishing	to	obtain	mortgages.		As	noted	by	Sivanandan	(2013)	
above,	housing	benefit	cuts	can	break	up	communities,	but	they	also	increase	
the	risk	of	poverty	for	those	at	the	higher	end	of	the	25-49	age	spectrum.		The	
Bedroom	Tax	is	detrimental	to	those	with	adult	children	who	no	longer	live	with	
them.		The	policy	disperses	African	Caribbeans,	by	forcing	them	to	find	smaller	
accommodation	that	is	often	outside	of	their	communities,	or	incur	the	risk	of	
debt	from	unaffordable	rents.		The	duality	of	the	spatial	positions	of	Black	
Caribbeans	is	another	example	of	one	step	forward	and	two	steps	backward,	
where	their	spatial	mobility	is	concerned.		Individual	gains	are	offset	by	the	
fragmentation	of	the	Black	community,	whilst	the	spatial	mobility	of	those	
residing	in	their	cultural	Heart	Lands	appear	to	be	constrained	by	increasing	
debt	and	poverty.	
	
	
																																								 																				
348	See	Table	7.16.	
349	See	Table	7.19.	
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How	have	thirty	years	of	social	change	impacted	on	the	social	mobility	of	
Birmingham’s	African	Caribbean	population?			
	
The	title	of	this	chapter	invariably	sums	up	the	situation	regarding	the	social	
mobility	of	Birmingham’s	African	Caribbean	population	in	the	past	thirty	years.		
There	has	been	progress	in	the	acquisition	of	Goods.		However,	they	have	also	
been	offset	by	major	setbacks	in	the	acquisition	of	Bads,	particularly	with	
regard	to	differences	in	social	mobility	between	genders.		The	nation	State,	in	
which	legislation,	policies	and	practices	were	supposed	to	maintain	fairness	in	
the	public	sphere,	is	no	more.		The	new	economic	arena	is	‘the	marketplace	[in	
which]	men	and	women	are	consumers	not	producers’	(ibid,	2013:	3).		Policies	
now	aim	to	give	free	reign	to	private	interests	and	activities	that	promote	
consumption,	individualism	and	competition.		The	marketplace,	and	not	the	
liberal	State,	is	now	viewed	as	the	great	leveler.		Consequently,	equality	and	
social	equity	will	not	be	delivered	by	State	intervention,	but	by	engaging	with	
the	free	market.		To	quote	Mirza	(2007:	1)	once	again,	‘the	more	things	change	
the	more	they	remain	the	same’.		Racism	continues	to	be	the	major	barrier	to	
African	Caribbean	social	mobility.		However,	it	is	no	longer	the	overt	racism,	
which	in	the	past	stipulated	‘no	Blacks,	no	dogs,	no	Irish’	(Mirza,	2006:	144)	or	
‘if	you	want	a	nigger	neighbour	vote	Labour’	(Fryer,	1984:	382).			
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Racism	is	now	much	more	insidious	and	subtle.		It	is	hidden	within	the	
vicissitudes	of	the	free	market	and	bubbles	below	the	surface	in	competitive	
market	situations	for	life-changing	Goods.		Where	the	supposed	aim	of	social	
policies	was	to	create	a	level	playing	field,	the	market	State	has	dismantled	the	
progress	made	under	several	years	of	equality	legislation	(Ratcliffe,	2015).		The	
contemporary	market	society	legitimates	the	biological	turn	(Gillborn,	2016),	
reminiscent	of	the	assimilation	and	cultural	deficiency	models	of	the	late	1960s.		
This	position	justifies	non-State	intervention	under	the	pretext	that	polices	
cannot	alter	natural	differences	in	intellect	or	ability.		Thus,	it	is	not	surprising	
that	African	Caribbean	social	mobility	is	viewed	in	terms	of	one	step	forward	
and	two	steps	backward.		Little	has	really	changed.			
	
	
The	findings	of	this	research	reinforce	the	importance	that	accumulating	and	
translating	educational	Goods	has	for	social	mobility.		However,	the	main	
difficulty	encountered	by	community	and	mainstream	educational	
organisations	in	the	past	thirty	years,	is	financial	autonomy	to	support	the	
learning	needs	of	African	Caribbeans	and	challenge	racism	in	the	labour	market.		
In	the	context	of	community	education,	the	demise	of	ACFAS	and	
Kajan350demonstrates	the	devastating	consequences	of	financial	dependency.		
State	funding	has	provided	the	KSIBS	with	security	in	the	short-term,	but	it	
remains	to	be	seen	if	it	will	flourish	in	the	long-term.		Although	mainstream	
																																								 																				
350	See	Chapters	Four	and	Five.	
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educational	institutions	are	key	sites	of	conflict	in	the	struggle	against	racism,	
the	debilitating	impact	of	racial	discrimination	is	now	overlooked	in	both	
political	and	academic	circles.			
	
	
By	David	Gillborn’s	own	admission,	university	are	finding	it	difficult	to	attract	
funding	for	“race”	research351.		H.E.	institutions	are	caught	up	in	a	competitive	
educational	process	to	develop	courses	that	attract	consumers352,	and	are	
ranked	according	to	the	position	they	attain	in	the	Research	Excellence	
Framework	(REF)353.		Moreover,	as	racial	inequality	is	no	longer	at	the	forefront	
of	the	political	agenda,	most	universities	are	not	concerned	with	“race”	
research.		Therefore,	fewer	universities	will	be	concerned	about	developing	
courses	that	focus	specifically	on	racial	inequality.		This	will	have	future	
consequences	for	African	Caribbean	social	mobility,	as	racial	discrimination	will	
be	increasingly	examined	in	isolation	from	wider	structural	processes	that	
cause	it.		Thus,	the	social	reality	of	the	impact	that	racial	discrimination	and	
discriminatory	practices	have	on	individuals	will	be	questioned	and	
consequently	overlooked.		This	position	is	reminiscent	of	the	1970s,	in	which	
the	rotten	apple	theory	(Troyna	and	Carrington,	1992)	of	racism	was	used	to	
																																								 																				
351	This	information	was	given	to	me	during	an	interview	with	David	Gillborn	(19th	June,	2013).	
352	Students	are	also	commodities	in	a	transitional	process	that	shifts	from	one	market	to	
another,	i.e.	from	the	educational	to	the	labour	market.		See	Chapter	Five.	
353	The	REF	is	the	competitive	process	by	which	universities	are	ranked	according	to	their	
research	work.	
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explain	its	persistence.		Racism	was	articulated	in	terms	of	individual	prejudice,	
rather	than	as	a	consequence	of	failings	by	the	State.		Little	has	really	changed.					
	
	
As	noted	above,	material	gains	made	by	African	Caribbeans	in	Birmingham	
have	to	some	extent	been	neutralised	by	Bads.		This	is	particularly	where	
gender	differences	in	social	mobility	are	concerned.		The	position	of	African	
Caribbean	females	has	improved	from	what	it	was	in	the	late	1970s354.		They	
are	negotiating	the	risk	of	poverty	by	accumulating	more	H.E.	and	labour	
market	capital.		However,	their	male	counterparts	have	comparatively	poorer	
educational	and	labour	market	outcomes.		Sveinsson	(2012:	4)	reveals	that	‘for	
every	one	African	Caribbean	male	undergraduate	at	a	Russell	Group	university,	
there	are	three	African	Caribbean	males	aged	18–24	in	prison’.		Moreover,	
‘African	Caribbean	men	comprise	7	per	cent	of	18–24	year-old	prisoners,	but	
0.1	per	cent	of	Russell	Group	undergraduates’	(ibid,	2012:	4).	It	is	indeed	a	case	
of	one	step	forward	and	two	steps	backward.	
	
	
Although	the	proportionate	representation	of	Birmingham’s	African	Caribbean	
females	in	the	top	tier	occupations	of	the	NS-SEC	is	on	a	par	with	their	White	
British	counterparts,	it	is	difficult	to	establish	the	exact	direction	their	careers	
																																								 																				
354	See	Ratcliffe	(1981).	
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are	taking.		In	the	late	1970s	there	was	a	tendency	for	Black	females	to	enter	
the	nursing	profession	(Ratcliffe,	1981),	which	is	still	classified	as	a	skilled	
occupation.		However,	further	research	is	needed	to	ascertain	if	Black	females	
are	progressing	into	the	financial,	commercial,	administrative	and	
technological	occupations,	which	are	generally	the	better-paid	sectors	of	the	
contemporary	labour	market.	
	
	
After	almost	seventy	years	of	a	Black	Caribbean	presence	in	Birmingham,	it	is	
difficult	to	explain	why	there	is	a	dearth	of	self-sufficient	Black	businesses	and	
community	organisations	in	the	city.		In	the	early	post-war	years,	there	was	no	
anti-discrimination	legislation,	and	the	work	most	West	Indians	could	generally	
obtain	was	menial	and	low-paid	(Fryer,	1984).		However,	during	the	late	1950s	
and	1960s,	a	number	of	self-sufficient	Black	organisations	and	businesses	
flourished	in	Birmingham’s	inner-city	areas	(Sivanandan,	1982).		This	suggests	
that	there	is	more	to	the	current	material	situation	of	Birmingham’s	Caribbean	
community	than	the	perpetuity	of	racism,	“race”	legislation	reductionism	or	
increasing	private	sector	intervention	in	the	public	sphere.		However,	the	
contemporary	factors	that	constrain	Black	entrepreneurial	agency,	and	what	
that	entails	for	the	future	social	mobility	of	African	Caribbeans,	is	an	area	that	
warrants	further	research.	
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I	reiterate	that	financial	self-sufficiency	is	crucial	to	African	Caribbean	agency	in	
their	struggle	for	social	mobility.		Although	society	has	changed,	the	same	old	
inequalities,	which	blocked	the	status	of	Black	Caribbeans	in	the	past,	persist.		
There	are	no	solutions	to	racial	discrimination,	which	might	create	a	level	
playing	field	in	market	situations,	that	will	be	provided	by	the	State.		African	
Caribbeans	have	to	develop	new	strategies	to	maintain	the	same	aims	of	social	
justice	and	equity.	Moreover,	maintaining	their	African	Caribbean	ethnic	
identity	and	community	networks,	is	fundamental	to	future	strategies	that	seek	
to	challenge	racial	inequality.		David	Gillborn	quoted	the	late	Stuart	Hall	while	
explaining	to	me	how	the	monolithic	problem	that	is	racism	can	be	overcome:	
	
‘You	struggle	where	you	are.		In	your	teaching,	you	try	and	
make	a	difference.		In	your	political	work,	you	try	and	make	a	
difference.		In	your	writing,	you	try	and	make	a	difference.		You	
do	what	you	can,	work	with	other	people,	and	sometimes	you	
can	change	the	world’	(Professor	David	Gillborn,	19th	June	
2013,	Birmingham).	
	
It	is	indeed	important	to	struggle	where	you	are.		However,	I	argue	that	for	the	
struggle	to	be	effective	it	must	be	a	joined-up	process	in	which	interests	
converge	for	the	common	cause.		What	is	needed	now	is	not	a	politics	of	
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difference,	but	a	new	politics	of	convergence	that	links	direct	action	in	the	
transitional	community	sphere	(Shukra	et	al.,	2004)	to	the	mainstream	political	
arena.		The	aim	of	interest	convergence	in	this	sense	is	not	about	influencing	
the	creation	of	new	legislation.		On	the	contrary,	it	is	about	exerting	collective	
political	pressure	to	appropriate	existing	legislation,	as	a	means	of	changing	
discriminatory	practices	and	ameliorating	racial	inequality.		Where	the	politics	
of	neo-liberalism	promotes	self-interest,	and	difference	is	used	to	fracture	
collectivity	(Sivanandan,	2013),	the	politics	of	convergence	must	promote	the	
collective	interests	of	the	Caribbean	community.	
	
	
The	struggle	against	racism,	which	is	the	major	barrier	to	social	mobility	in	
market	situations,	can	only	be	won	if	community	groups,	their	supporters	and	
political	activists	work	together	with	mainstream	institutions	and	academics	
who	are	also	trying	to	make	a	difference.		“Race”	reductionism,	in	the	politics	
of	the	market,	steers	academic	research	away	from	racial	inequality	to	less	
contentious	issues	that	attract	more	funding.		This	suggests	that	in	order	to	
have	the	academic	freedom	to	write	and	research	issues,	which	are	not	
necessarily	in	the	interests	of	financial	sponsors,	race	researchers	might	have	
to	relocate	to	the	transitional	community	sphere	(Shukra	et	al.,	2004)	in	the	
long-term.		However,	State	disengagement	also	reinforces	the	need	for	the	
Black	community	to	be	financially	autonomous.		The	Caribbean	community	
must	seek	empowerment	by	sponsoring	and	directing	the	research	of	
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academics,	who	have	the	political	platform	to	highlight	the	structural	factors	
that	perpetuates	racism	and	constrains	their	social	mobility.		Thus,	interest	
convergence	would	enable	the	struggle	against	racial	inequality	to	transcend	
the	transitional	sphere	and	embed	itself	in	the	mainstream	political	arena.		
African	Caribbeans	still	face	the	same	old	barriers	in	the	competition	to	
increase	their	life	chances	and	opportunities.		However,	the	politics	of	the	
contemporary	sites	of	struggle	are	no	longer	mediated	by	social	policies;	they	
are	instead	legitimated	by	market	forces.	
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Table	1.1:	The	Research	Participants	
	
Name/	
Pseudonym	
Ethnicity	 Gender	 Homeowner	 Details	
	
Subject	A	
	
African		
Caribbean	
	
Male	
	
Yes	
Parent	residing	in	Erdington	
with	wife;	employed	as	a	
security	guard	
	
Subject	B	
	
African		
Caribbean	
	
Female	
	
No	
Physically	incapacitated	
parent	residing	in	Aston	with	
daughter;	unemployed	
	
Subject	C	
	
African		
Caribbean	
	
Male	
	
No	
Parent	residing	alone	in	
Handsworth;	self-employed	
artist	
	
Subject	D	
	
African		
Caribbean	
	
Female	
	
Yes	
Parent	residing	with	adopted	
daughter	in	Smethwick;	
agency	worker	
	
Subject	E	
	
African		
Caribbean	
	
Male	
	
Yes	
Unemployed	former	car	
factory	worker;	living	alone	in	
Handsworth	Wood	
	
Subject	F	
	
	
African		
Caribbean	
	
Female	
	
Yes	
Unemployed	parent	residing	
in	Handsworth	with	her	son	
	
Subject	G	
	
African		
Caribbean	
	
Female	
	
No	
Unemployed	parent	residing	
in	Newtown	with	her	mother	
and	daughter	[her	daughter	
has	a	hidden	disability]	
	
ACFAS	
Project	
Manager	
	
African		
Caribbean	
	
Female	
	
- 	
	
Details	withheld	by	request	
	
Bini	Brown	
	
African		
Caribbean	
	
Male	
	
No	
Parent	residing	with	partner	
and	children;	leader	of	the	
African	Caribbean	Self-Help	
Organisation	[ACSHO]	and	
member	of	the	Pan-African	
Congress	[PAC]	
	
Bishop	
Jackson	
	
African		
Caribbean	
	
Male	
	
Yes	
Parent	residing	with	wife	and	
children	in	Halesowen,	
Administrative	Bishop	of	the	
New	Testament	Church	of	
God	[NTCG]	Brookfield	[A.K.A.	
The	Rock];	Member	of	the	
National	Executive	Council	of	
the	NTCG	
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Professor	
David	
Gillborn	
	
White		
British	
	
Male	
	
- 	
Professor	of	Critical	Race	
Studies;	Director	of	Research,	
Director	of	the	Centre	for	
Research	in	Race	&	Education	
[CRRE];	Editor-in-Chief	of	Race	
Ethnicity	and	Education	
	
Rosemary	
Campbell-
Stephens	
[OBE]	
	
African		
Caribbean	
	
Female	
	
Yes	
Former	resident	of	Ladywood;	
recently	emigrated	with	her	
husband	to	Jamaica;	former	
Head	Teacher	and	OFSTED	
Inspector;	currently	the	
Director	Principal	at	National	
College	for	Educational	
Leadership,	Ministry	of	
Education,	Jamaica	
	
The	Right	
Reverend	
Bishop	
Derek	
Webley	
	
African		
Caribbean	
	
Male	
	
Yes	
Parent	residing	with	wife	and	
children	in	Stockland	Green;	
former	Chairman	of	the	West	
Midlands	Police	Authority;	
Former	District	Bishop	for	the	
New	Testament	Church	of	
God	[NTCG];	currently	the	
National	Secretary/Treasurer	
of	the	National	Executive	
Council	of	the	NTCG	
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Table	3.1:	National	Ethnic	Populations	and	their	16-24	Cohorts	in	the	2001	Census.	
	
Ethnic	Group	 National	Ethnic	
Population	
16-24	Ethnic	
Population	
%	of	16-24	Ethnic	Population	
White	British	 44,679,361	 4,646,652	 10.39%	[10%]	
Black	Caribbean	 5,61,246	 60,614	 10.79%	[11%]	
Mixed	MWBC	 2,31,424	 36,796	 15.89%	[16%]	
Source:	2001	Census,	[Key	Census	Area	Statistics,	Commissioned	Tables];	Birmingham	City	Council	(2005).	
	
Table	3.2:	National	Ethnic	Populations	and	their	16-24	Cohorts	in	the	2011	Census.	
	
Ethnic	Group	 National	Ethnic	Population	 16-24	Ethnic	
Population	
%	of	16-24	Ethnic	
Population	
White	British	 45,134,686	 5,099,416	 11.29%	[11%]	
Black	Caribbean	 5,94,825	 71,972	 12.09%	[12%]	
Mixed	MWBC		 4,26,715	 90,297	 21.16%	[21%]	
Source:		ONS	(2011)	Census	Aggregate	Data;	InFuse	(2014).	
	
Table	3.3	Birmingham’s	Ethnic	Populations	and	their	16-24	Cohorts	in	the	2001	Census.	
	
Ethnic	Group	 B’ham	Ethnic	Population	 16-24	Ethnic	Population	 %	of	16-24	Ethnic	
Population	
White	British	 6,87,406	 81,501	 11.85%	[12%]	
Black	Caribbean	 47,831	 5,596	 11.69%	[12%]	
Mixed	MWBC		 15,644	 2,875	 18.37%	[18%]	
Source:	2001	Census,	[Standard	Tables,	Census	Area	Statistics];	Birmingham	City	Council	(2003).	
	
Table	3.4:	Birmingham’s	Ethnic	Populations	and	their	16-24	Cohorts	in	the	2011	Census.	
	
Ethnic	Group	 B’ham	Ethnic	Population	 16-24	Ethnic	Population	 %	of	16-24	Ethnic	
Population	
White	British	 5,70,217	 79,052	 13.86%	[14%]	
Black	Caribbean	 47,641	 5,580	 11.71%	[12%]	
Mixed	MWBC		 24,720	 5,528	 22.36%	[22%]	
Source:	2011	Census	Detailed	Characteristics	Tables;	Department	for	Planning	&	Growth	Strategy,	Planning	&	
Regeneration	[DPGSPR]	(2014).	
	
Table	3.5:	Ethnic	Group	Population*	Changes	in	Birmingham	Between	the	2001	and	2011	
Censuses.	
	
Census	
Year	
White	
British	
Black	
Caribbean	
White	&	
Black	
Caribbean	
African	 Indian	 Pakistani	 Bangladeshi	 Chinese	
2001	 641345	 47831	 15644	 6206	 55749	 104017	 20836	 5106	
2011	 570217	 47641	 24720	 29991	 64621	 144627	 32532	 12712	
*The	eight	ethnic	groups	in	Table	3.5	make	up	the	majority	of	Birmingham’s	total	population.	
Source:		ONS	2011	Census	Aggregate	Data.		InFuse	(2014).	
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ACSHO	
104	Heathfield	Road	
Handsworth	
Birmingham	
B19	1HJ	
	
30th	November	2011	
	
Maurice	Andrews	&	the	Harambee	Committee	
C/o	Maurice	Andrews	Solicitors	
180-182	
Soho	Hill	
Hockley	
Birmingham	
B19	1AG	
	
Reference:	200	Hamstead	Road,	Handsworth	
	
	
Dear	Maurice	Andrews	and	the	Harambee	Committee	
	
We	are	writing	this	letter	to	formally	raise	our	concerns	regarding	the	
forthcoming	sale	of	the	property	referenced	above.		We	are	of	the	opinion	that	
the	property,	which	was	formerly	used	as	a	youth	hostel,	is	currently	being	
marketed	at	a	price	that	is	well	below	its	value.		We	are	also	concerned	that	
the	sale	of	the	building	will	represent	the	loss	of	a	substantial	community	
asset.		Furthermore,	selling	the	property	will	consequently	compound	the	
social	disadvantage	faced	by	the	African	community	in	Birmingham.	
	
It	has	been	suggested	to	us	that	the	sale	of	the	Hamstead	Road	property	is	
necessary.		We	have	been	told	that	the	money	generated	from	selling	the	
hostel	will	be	used	to	develop	two	of	Harambee’s	other	properties	in	
Handsworth:	the	Linwood	Road	nursery	and	the	Grove	Lane	book	shop.		
However,	it	is	not	clear	to	us	how	selling	a	sizeable	Victorian	property	at	a	
significant	loss,	will	enable	the	proposed	development	to	take	place.	
	
The	African	community	requires	a	strong	familial	infrastructure	capable	of	
providing	our	disenfranchised	young	people	with	security	and	stability.		Over	
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the	years	the	Hamstead	Road	hostel	has	supported	the	emotional	well-being,	
and	individual	welfare,	of	a	substantial	number	of	homeless	and	vulnerable	
young	people.		If	it	were	not	for	the	Harambee	Hostel,	those	young	adults	
would	have	been	placed	in	the	care	of	Birmingham	Social	Services	and	
dispersed	throughout	the	West	Midlands.	
	
The	loss	of	a	very	important	family	support	service	will	have	a	negative	impact	
on	the	social,	intellectual,	physical	and	emotional	development	of	our	young	
people.		Those	who	have	a	difficult	relationship	with	their	families	will	no	
longer	be	able	to	access	the	support	and	shelter	provided	by	the	hostel.		As	a	
consequence,	an	increasing	number	of	young	African	men	and	women	could	
find	themselves	in	danger	of	failing	in	the	education	sector.		Without	the	
necessary	support	and	guidance,	provided	by	their	family	or	a	surrogate	
provision,	young	Africans	are	also	in	danger	of	getting	caught	up	in	the	criminal	
justice	system.	
	
We	propose	a	meeting	in	order	that	those	who	are	involved	in	the	sale	of	the	
hostel,	can	publicly	explain	their	plans	and	sooth	our	concerns	regarding	the	
loss	of	a	vital	community	asset.		We	would	like	clarification	regarding	the	
following	questions:	
	
• Has	the	Harambee	committee	exhausted	all	possible	options	regarding	how	
the	building	could	be	utilised	to	provide	a	service	to	the	community,	whilst	also	
being	self-sufficient?	
• If	the	building	has	to	be	sold	why	is	it	not	being	marketed	at	its	correct	value,	
particularly	in	these	times	of	austerity?	
• How	will	the	funds	acquired	from	the	sale	of	the	building	be	spent?	
• What	are	the	costs	and	overheads	involved	in	any	project	that	will	receive	the	
funds	from	the	sale	of	the	former	hostel?	
	
We	welcome	your	timely	and	urgent	response	regarding	all	of	the	matters	
outlined	above.	
	
Yours	sincerely	
	
	
On	behalf	of	ACSHO	
(African	Caribbean	Self-Help	Organisation)	
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Source:	Birmingham	City	Council	(2004).	
	 	
Map 1 
Areas shaded are mainly residential; information derived by Birmingham City Council 
from aerial photography. Electoral ward boundaries and road lines are derived from 
Ordnance Survey mapping and are subject to Crown Copyright. The purpose of the map 
is to provide a geographical context for thematic maps illustrating 2001 Census data. 
	 391	
References	
	
	
Acas	(2011)	The	Equality	Act	–	What’s	New	for	Employers.		Available	from:	
http://www.acas.org.uk/media/pdf/n/8/Equality_Act_2010_guide_for_employ
ers-accessible-version-Nov-2011.pdf		[Accessed	on	26/05/2014	@	19.10	p.m.].	
	
Adams,	Richard	(2016)	‘Government	drops	plans	to	make	all	schools	in	England	
academies’.		The	Guardian	Website.		Available	from:	
http://www.theguardian.com/education/2016/may/06/government-backs-
down-over-plan-to-make-all-schools-academies	[Accessed	on	06/05/2016	@	
11.55	p.m.].	
	
Alcock,	Peter	(2012)	‘The	subject	of	social	policy’.		In	Peter	Alcock,	Margaret	
May	and	Sharon	Wright	[eds.]	The	Student’s	Companion	to	Social	Policy	[4th	
ed.].		Oxford:	Wiley-Blackwell.	
	
Allen,	Sheila	(1971)	New	Minorities,	Old	Conflicts:	Asian	and	West	Indian	
migrants	in	Britain.		New	York:	Random	House	Inc.	
	
Amin,	Kaushika	et	al.,	(2011)	Black	and	Ethnic	Minority	Young	People	and	
Educational	Disadvantage.		London:	The	Runnymede	Trust.	
	
Anacker,	Katrin	B.	(2010)	‘”Still	paying	the	race	tax?”	Analysing	property	values	
in	homogenous	and	mixed-race	suburbs’.		Journal	of	Urban	Affairs.		32	(1):	55-
77.		
	
Anderson,	Benedict	(1991,	[1983])	Imagined	Communities:	Reflections	on	the	
origin	and	spread	of	nationalism	[	2nd	ed.].		London:	Verso.	
	
Anderson,	Elijah	(2004)	‘The	cosmopolitan	canopy’.		Annals	of	the	American	
Academy	of	Political	and	Social	Science.		595:	14-31.	
	
Anderson,	Elijah	(2012)	‘The	iconic	ghetto’.		Annals	of	the	American	Academy	
of	Political	and	Social	Science.		642:	8-24.	
	
Andrews,	Kehinde	(2013)	Resisting	Racism:	Race,	inequality	and	the	Black	
supplementary	school	movement.		London:	Institute	of	Education	Press.	
	
Atkinson,	Will	(2007)	‘Beck,	Individualization	and	the	death	of	class:	A	critique’.		
British	Journal	of	Sociology.	58	(3):	349-366.				
	
Back,	Les	and	Solomos,	John	(1993)	‘Doing	research,	writing	politics:	The	
dilemmas	of	political	intervention	in	research	on	racism’.		Economy	and	
Society.		22	(2):	178-199.	
	
	 392	
Ballard,	R.	(1996)	‘Negotiating	race	and	ethnicity:	Exploring	the	implications	of	
the	1991	Census’.		Patterns	of	Prejudice.		30	(3):	3-33.	
	
Banton,	Michael	(2011)	‘A	theory	of	social	categories’.		Sociology.		45	(2):	187-
201.	
	
Barry-Born,	Theo;	Bushe,	Sabrina	and	MacInnes,	Tom	(2015)	Council	Tax	Best	
Practice.		York:	Joseph	Rowntree	Foundation.	
	
BBC	(2012)	‘Academies	accused	of	pushing	difficult	students	out’.		Available	
from:		http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/9674889.stm	
[Accessed	on	13/04/2013	@	2.10	p.m.].	
	
BBC	News	(2014)	‘Birmingham	Kajan	School	to	close	after	its	first	year’.		
Available	from:	http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-birmingham-
28052817	[Accessed	on	01/07/2014	@	12.30	p.m.].	
	
BBC	News	(2015)	‘Trojan	Horse	“plot'	schools’”	timeline’.		Available	from:	
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-birmingham-28370552	[Accessed	on	
07/01/2016	@	6.54	p.m.].	
	
Beck,	Ulrich	(2000)	‘The	cosmopolitan	perspective:	Sociology	of	the	second	age	
of	modernity’.		British	Journal	of	Sociology.		51	(1):	79-105.	
	
Beck,	Ulrich	(2007)	‘Beyond	class	and	nation:	Reframing	social	inequalities	in	a	
globalizing	world’.		British	Journal	of	Sociology.		58	(4):	679-705	
	
Beck,	Ulrich	(2013)	‘Why	class	is	too	soft	a	category	to	capture	the	
explosiveness	of	social	inequality	at	the	beginning	of	the	twenty-first	century’.		
British	Journal	of	Sociology.		64	(1):	63-74.	
	
Berkeley,	Rob	(2014)	GORESummary.		Available	from:	
http://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/Summaries/GORESum
mary1.pdf	[Accessed	on	11/02/2014	@	2.14	p.m.].	
	
Berthoud,	Richard	(1999)	Young	Caribbean	Men	and	the	Labour	Market:	A	
comparison	with	other	ethnic	groups.		York:	Richard	Rowntree	Foundation.	
	
Birmingham	City	Council	(1981)	Ethnic	Minority	Populations:	Statistics	from	
1981	Census	for	areas	to	become	new	Birmingham	wards	in	1982.		
Birmingham:	Birmingham	City	Council.		
	
Birmingham	City	Council	(2009)	Housing	Allocation	Scheme:	Summary.		
Available	from:	http://www.birmingham.gov.uk/housing-application	[Accessed	
on	11/01/2015	@	18.05	p.m.].	
	
	 393	
Birmingham	City	Council	(2010)	Housing	Allocations	Policy:	Amendments	
summary.		Available	from:	http://www.birmingham.gov.uk/housing-
application	[Accessed	on	11/01/2015	@	18.10	p.m.].	
	
Birmingham	City	Council	(2013)	Index	of	Multiple	Deprivation	2010.		Available	
from:	
http://www.birmingham.gov.uk/cs/Satellite?c=Page&childpagename=Develop
ment-
Planning%2FPageLayout&cid=1223383983302&pagename=BCC%2FCommon%
2FWrapper%2FWrapper	[Accessed	on	25/05/2013	@	5.45	p.m.].	
	
Birmingham	City	Council,	Library	Services	(N.D.)	Archives	Department:	MS	
2165/1/3	&	MS	2141/A/7/12-13.	
	
Birmingham	Mail	(2016)	‘Angry	Yvonne	Mosquito	supporters	call	for	crime	
commissioner	to	resign’.		Birmingham	Mail	Website.		Available	from:	
http://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/midlands-news/angry-yvonne-
mosquito-supporters-call-11138789	[Accessed	on	10/04/2016	@	8.47	p.m.].	
	
Birmingham	Post	(2012)	‘Birmingham	politician	James	Hunte	who	lured	
Muhammad	Ali	to	the	city	dies	aged	72’.		Birmingham	Post.		Available	from:	
http://www.birminghampost.co.uk/news/local-news/birmingham-politician-
james-hunte-who-3911473	[Accessed	on	25/10/2014	@	6.56	p.m.].	
	
Black,	Clinton	V.	(1991)	History	of	Jamaica.		Kingston,	Jamaica:	Longman.	
	
Bloch,	Alice;	Neal,	Sarah	and	Solomos,	John	(2013)	Race,	Multiculture	&	Social	
Policy.		Basingstoke,	Hampshire:	Palgrave	Macmillan.	
	
Bottero,	Wendy	(2004)	‘Class	identities	and	the	identity	of	class’.		Sociology.		
38	(5):	985-1003.	
	
Bourdieu,	Pierre	(1979)	‘Symbolic	Power’.		Critique	of	Anthropology.	4	(77):	77-
85.	
	
Bourdieu,	Pierre	(1987)	‘What	makes	a	social	class?	On	the	theoretical	and	
practical	existence	of	groups’.		Berkley	Journal	of	Sociology.		(32):	1-17.	
	
Bourdieu,	Pierre	(2010,	[1984])	Distinction.		Abingdon,	Oxon:	Routledge	
Classics.	
	
Boyle,	B.	and	Charles,	M.	(2011)	‘“Tightening	the	shackles”:	The	continued	
invisibility	of	Liverpool's	British	African	Caribbean	teachers’.			Journal	of	Black	
Studies.		42	(3):	427-435.	
	
Brady,	Poppy	(2011)	‘Rival	gangs	historic	show	of	unity	for	Bishop	Derek	
Webley’.		The	Voice.		Available	from:	http://www.voice-
	 394	
online.co.uk/article/rival-gangs-historic-show-unity-bishop-derek-webley	
[Accessed	on	26/07/2014	@	9.17	p.m.].	
	
BRAP	[Birmingham	Race	Action	Partnership]	(2004)	b:rap	Briefing	No.	4,	
Community	Cohesion:	The	Emperor’s	new	clothes?		Edgbaston,	Birmingham:	
BRAP.	
	
Breen,	Richard	(2004)	Foundations	of	a	Neo-Weberian	Class	Analysis.		Available	
from	http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/Chapter%202%20--
%20Breen%20Jan%202004.pdf		[accessed	on	02/02	2010	@	4.40	p.m.].	
	
Brooks,	Miguel	(1995)	Kebra	Nagast:	The	glory	of	kings.		New	Jersey:	The	Red	
Sea	Press	Inc.		
	
Bryan,	Beverley;	Dadzie,	Stella	and	Scafe,	Suzanne	(1985)	The	Heart	of	the	
Race:	Black	women’s	lives	in	Britain.		London:	Virago	Press	Ltd.	
	
Bryman,	Alan	(2001)	Social	Research	Methods.		Oxford:	Oxford	University	
Press.			
	
Burgess,	Ernest	(2008,	[1925])	‘The	growth	of	the	city:	An	introduction	to	a	
research	project’.		In	J.	Marzluff	et	al.	[eds.]		Urban	Ecology:	An	International	
Perspective	on	the	Interaction	Between	Humans	and	Nature.		New	York:	
Springer:	71-78.	
	
Cantle,	Ted	(2002)	Community	Cohesion:	A	report	of	the	Independent	Review	
Team.		Available	from:	
http://resources.cohesioninstitute.org.uk/Publications/Documents/Document/
DownloadDocumentsFile.aspx?recordId=96&file=PDFversion	[Accessed	on	
11/01/2014	@	23.40	p.m.].	
	
Carby,	Hazel	V.	(1982)	‘Schooling	in	Babylon’.		In	the	Empire	Strikes	Back:	Race	
and	racism	in	70s	Britain.		University	of	Birmingham:	Centre	for	Contemporary	
Cultural	Studies.	
	
Clark,	Ken	and	Drinkwater,	Stephen	(2007)	Ethnic	Minorities	in	the	Labour	
Market:	Dynamics	and	diversity.		York:	Joseph	Rowntree	Foundation.	
	
Carrington,	Bruce	and	Short,	Geoffrey	(1987)	‘Breakthrough	to	political	
literacy:	Political	education,	antiracist	teaching	and	the	primary	school’.		
Journal	of	Education	Policy.		2	(1):	1-13.	
	
Carter,	Bob;	Harris,	Clive	and	Joshi,	Shirley	(1987)	The	1951-55	Conservative	
Government	and	the	Racialisation	of	Black	Immigration:	Policy	Papers	in	Ethnic	
Relations	No.	11.		England:	Centre	for	Research	in	Ethnic	Relations,	University	
of	Warwick.	
	
	 395	
Castles,	Stephen	and	Kosack,	Godula	(1973)	Immigrant	Workers	and	Class	
Structure	in	Western	Europe.		Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.	
	
Castles,	Stephen	and	Miller,	Mark	J.	(2003)	The	Age	of	Migration:	International	
population	movements	in	the	modern	world	[3rd	ed.].		Basingstoke,	Hampshire:	
Palgrave	Macmillan.			
	
Census	Area	Statistics	on	the	Web	[CASWEB]	(2014;	2015)	Available	from:	
http://casweb.mimas.ac.uk.	
	
Chamberlain,	Mary	(1999)	‘The	family	as	model	and	metaphor	in	Caribbean	
migration	to	Britain’.		Journal	of	Ethnic	and	Migration	Studies.		25	(2):	251-266.	
	
Christian,	M.	(2005)	‘The	politics	of	black	presence	in	Britain	and	black	male	
exclusion	in	the	British	education	system’.		Journal	of	Black	Studies.		35	(3):	
327-346.	
	
City	of	Birmingham	(1961)	Proceedings	of	the	Council.		Birmingham:	
Birmingham	City	Council.		
	
Coard,	Bernard	(1971)	How	the	West	Indian	Child	is	Made	Educationally	Sub-
Normal	in	the	British	School	System.		London:	New	Beacon	Books	Ltd.	
	
Cohen,	Stanley	(2002)	[1972]	Folk	Devils	and	Moral	Panics	[3rd	ed.].		London:	
Routledge	
	
Cook,	Chris	(2016)	‘Every	school	to	become	an	academy,	ministers	to	
announce’.		BBC	News.		Available	from:	
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-35814215	[Accessed	on	28/03/2016	@	
10.41	p.m.].	
	
Coughlan,	Sean	(2014)	‘White	pupils	least	likely	to	apply	to	university’.		BBC	
News.		Available	from:	http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-28462803	
[Accessed	on	26/07/2014	@	14.20	p.m.].	
	
Cracknel,	Richard	(2010)	The	Ageing	Population.		Available	from:	
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/key_issues/Key
-Issues-The-ageing-population2007.pdf	[Accessed	on	25/02/2014	@	11.12	
a.m.].	
	
CRE	(1990)	‘Sorry	It’s	Gone’!		Testing	for	racial	discrimination	in	the	private	
rented	housing	sector.		London:	Commission	for	Racial	Equality.	
	
CRE	(1997)	Exclusion	from	School	and	Racial	Equality:	A	good	practice	guide.		
London:	Commission	for	Racial	Equality.	
	
	 396	
CRE	(2007a)	Statutory	Code	of	Practice	on	Racial	Equality	in	Housing:	England.		
London:	Commission	for	Racial	Equality.	
	
CRE	(2007b)	A	Lot	Done,	A	Lot	To	Do:	Our	vision	for	an	integrated	Britain.		
London:	Commission	for	Racial	Equality.	
	
Crenshaw,	Kimberle	(1991)	‘Mapping	the	margins:	Intersectionality,	identity	
politics,	and	violence	against	women	of	colour’.		Stanford	Law	Review.		43	
(1241):	1241-1299.	
	
Crompton,	Rosemary	(2008)	Class	and	Stratification	[3rd	Ed.].		Cambridge:	
Polity	Press.	
	
Crossley,	Nick	(2001)	‘The	phenomenological	habitus	and	its	construction’.		
Theory	and	Society.		1	(30):	81-120.	
	
Crow,	Graham	and	Pope,	Catherine	(2008)	‘The	importance	of	class’.		
Sociology.		42	(6):	1045-1048.	
	
Curran,	Dean	(2013)	‘Risk	society	and	the	distribution	of	bads:	Theorizing	class	
in	the	risk	society’.		British	Journal	of	Sociology.	64	(1):	44-62.	
	
Department	for	Education	and	Skills	[DfES]	(2003)	Widening	Participation	in	
Higher	Education.		London:	DfES	Publications	Crown	Copyright.	
	
Department	for	Education	and	Skills	[DfES]	(2006)	Widening	Participation	in	
Higher	Education:	Creating	opportunity,	releasing	potential,	achieving	
excellence.		London:	DfES	Publications	Crown	Copyright.		
	
Department	for	Education	[DfE]	(2012a)	A	Profile	of	Pupil	Exclusions	in	
England.		Available	from:	
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/f
ile/183498/DFE-RR190.pdf	[Accessed	on	04/08/2014	@	13.15	p.m.].	
	
Department	for	Education	[DfE]	(2012b)	GCSE	and	Equivalent	Attainment	by	
Pupil	Characteristics	in	England,	2010/11.		Available	from:	
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/gcse-and-equivalent-
attainment-by-pupil-characteristics-in-england-2010-to-2011	[Accessed	on	
04/08/2014	@	13.20	p.m.].	
	
Department	for	Education	[DfE]	(2014)	Promoting	Fundamental	British	Values	
as	Part	of	SMSC	in	Schools:	Departmental	advice	for	maintained	schools.		
Available	from:	
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/f
ile/380595/SMSC_Guidance_Maintained_Schools.pdf	[Accessed	on	
03/02/2016	@	01.34	a.m.].		
	
	 397	
Department	for	Education	[DfE]	(2015)	Exclusion	from	Maintained	Schools,	
Academies	and	Pupil	Referral	Units	in	England:	Statutory	guidance	for	those	
with	legal	responsibilities	in	relation	to	exclusion.		Available	from:	
http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/21549/1/Exclusion_Guidance_-_January_2015.pdf	
[Accessed	on	17/03/2016	@	4.45	p.m.].			
	
Derry,	T.K.	and	Blakeway,	M.G.	(1969)	The	Making	of	Britain:		Life	and	work	
from	the	renaissance	to	the	industrial	revolution.		London:	John	Murray.	
	
Dorling,	Danny	(2009)	‘Race	and	the	repercussions	of	recession’.		Runnymede’s	
Quarterly	Bulletin.		London:	The	Runnymede	Trust.	
	
Dorling,	Danny	(2016)	‘Danny	Dorling	on	university	admissions	and	inequality’.		
Available	from:	https://www.timeshighereducation.com/comment/danny-
dorling-on-university-admissions-and-inequality	[Accessed	on	04/02/2016	@	
6.45p.m.].	
	
Douglas,	R.M.	(2002)	‘Anglo-Saxons	and	Attacotti:	The	racialization	of	Irishness	
in	Britain	between	the	World	Wars’.		Ethnic	and	Racial	Studies.		25	(1):	40-63.	
	
Dwyer,	Claire	and	Bressey,	Caroline	[eds.]	(2008)	New	Geographies	of	Race	and	
Racism.		Hampshire:	Ashgate	Publishing	Limited.	
	
Economic	and	Social	Research	Council	[ERSC]	(2014)	Insights:	2014	findings	
from	the	largest	longitudinal	study	of	UK	households.		Essex:	University	of	
Essex.	
	
Edwards,	Paul	[ed.]	(1988)	The	Life	of	Olaudah	Equiano.		Harlow,	Essex:	
Longman	Group	UK	Limited.	
	
Eltis,	David	and	Engerman,	Stanley	L.	(2000)	‘The	Importance	of	Slavery	and	the	
Slave	Trade	to	Industrialising	Britain’.		Journal	of	Economic	History.		60	(1):	
123-144.	
	
Express	and	Star	(1965)	8th	April.		“They’ll	plead	with	Minister”.		Available	from:	
Birmingham	City	Council,	Library	Services,	Archives	Department:	MS	
2141/7/12.	
	
Fawcett	Society	(2013)	The	Changing	Labour	Market:	Delivering	for	women,	
delivering	for	growth.		London:	Fawcett	Society.	
	
Fenton,	S.	(2010)	Ethnicity.	Cambridge:		Polity	Press.	
	
Ferguson,	Corinna	(2010)	‘Why	is	Birmingham's	CCTV	scheme	“unlawful”?’		The	
Guardian.		Available	from:	
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/2010/jul/06/birmi
ngham-cctv-unlawful-liberty	[Accessed	on	02/08/2014	@	1.50	p.m.].	
	 398	
	
Flett,	Hazel;	Henderson,	Jeff	and	Brown,	Bill	(1979)	‘The	practice	of	racial	
dispersal	in	Birmingham	1969-1975’.		Journal	of	Social	Policy.		8	(3):	289-309.	
	
For	[4]	Children	(2012)	Sure	Start	Children’s	Centres’	Census	2012.		Available	
from:	http://www.4children.org.uk/Files/5f1952b8-dd74-432f-a1f0-
a0920139fe09/Children_Centre_Census_FINAL.pdf	[Accessed	on	13/07/2014	
@	08.30	a.m.].	
	
Fryer,	P.	(1984)	Staying	Power:	The	history	of	black	people	in	Britain.		London:	
Pluto	Press.		
	
Garner,	Steve	(2007)	Whiteness:	An	introduction.		Abingdon,	Oxon:	Routledge.	
	
Garner,	Steve	and	Bhattacharyya,	Gargi	(2011)	Poverty,	Ethnicity	and	Place.		
York:	Joseph	Rowntree	Foundation.	
	
Geertz,	Clifford	(1994)	‘Thick	description:	Toward	an	interpretive	theory	of	
culture’.		In	Michael	Martin	and	Lee	C.	McIntyre	[eds.]	Readings	in	the	
Philosophy	of	Social	Science.		Cambridge,	Massachusetts:	The	MIT	Press.:	213-
231.	
	
Gilbert,	Francis	(2012)	‘Free	Schools	are	a	disaster’.		Guardian	Online.		
Available	from:	
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/sep/03/free-schools-are-
disaster	[Accessed	on	13/11/2013	@	4.47	p.m.].	
	
Gilchrist,	Alison	and	Kyprianou,	Paul	(2011)	Social	Networks,	Poverty	and	
Ethnicity.		York:	Joseph	Rowntree	Foundation.	
	
Gillard,	David	(2007)	‘Axes	to	grind:	The	first	five	years	of	Blair’s	Academies’.		
Education	England.		Available	from:	
www.educationengland.org.uk/articles/25academies.html	[Accessed	on	
29/09/2011	@	12.53	a.m.].	
	
Gillborn,	David	(1997)	‘Young,	black	and	failed	by	school:	The	market,	
education	reform	and	black	students’.		International	Journal	of	Inclusive	
Education.		1	(1):	65-87.			
	
Gillborn,	D	and	Youdell,	D	(2000)	Rationing	Education:	Policy,	practice,	reform	
and	equity.		Buckingham:	Open	University	Press.	
	
Gillborn,	David	(2005)	‘Education	policy	as	an	act	of	white	supremacy:	
Whiteness,	critical	race	theory	and	education	reform’.		Journal	of	Education	
Policy.		20	(4):	485-505.	
	
	 399	
Gillborn,	David	(2008a)	‘Tony	Blair	and	the	politics	of	race	in	education:	
Whiteness,	doublethink	and	New	Labour’.		Oxford	Review	of	Education.		34	(6):	
713-725.	
	
Gillborn,	David	(2008b)	Racism	and	Education:	Coincidence	or	conspiracy.		
London:	Routledge.			
	
Gillborn,	David	(2013)	‘Interest-divergence	and	the	colour	of	cutbacks:	Race,	
recession	and	the	undeclared	war	on	Black	children’.		Discourse:	Studies	in	the	
cultural	politics	of	education.		34	(4):	477-491.	
	
Gillborn,	David	(2014)	‘Racism	as	Policy:	A	Critical	Race	Analysis	of	Education	
Reforms	in	the	United	States	and	England’.		Educational	Forum.		78	(1):	26-41.	
	
Gillborn,	David	(2016)	‘Softly,	softly:	genetics,	intelligence	and	the	hidden	
racism	of	the	new	geneism’.		Journal	of	Education	Policy.:		1-24.	
	
Goffman,	Erving	(1959)	Presentation	of	Self	in	Everyday	Life.		New	York:	Double	
Day	and	Anchor	Books.	
	
Goffman,	Erving	(1963)	Stigma:	Notes	on	the	management	of	spoiled	identity.		
New	York:	Simon	and	Schuster.	
	
Goldthorpe,	John	H.	and	Marshall,	Gordon	(1992)	‘The	promising	future	of	
class	analysis:	A	response	to	recent	critiques’.		Sociology.		26	(3):	381-400.		
	
Gottfried,	Heidi	(2013)	Gender,	Work	and	Economy:	Unpacking	the	global	
economy.		Cambridge:	Polity	Press.	
	
Gov.UK	(2014)	‘Help	with	childcare	costs’.		Available	from:	
https://www.gov.uk/help-with-childcare-costs	[Accessed	on	15/09/2014	@	
11.54	p.m.].	
	
Gov.	UK	(2016)	‘PM:	Time	to	tear	down	the	barriers	at	elite	universities’.		
Available	from:	https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-time-to-tear-
down-the-barriers-at-elite-universities	[Accessed	on	02/02/2016	@	8.20	p.m.].	
	
Graeber,	David	(2006)	‘Turning	modes	of	production	inside	out:	Or	why	
capitalism	is	a	transformation	of	slavery’.		Critique	of	Anthropology.		26	(1):	61-
85.	
	
Graham,	M.	and	Robinson,	G.	(2004)	‘"The	silent	catastrophe”:	Institutional	
racism	in	the	British	education	system	and	the	underachievement	of	black	
boys’.		Journal	of	Black	Studies.		34	(5):	653-671.	
	
	
	 400	
Grove,	Jack	(2015)	‘Black	and	ethnic	minorities	still	have	mountains	to	climb	in	
higher	education’.		Times	Higher	Education	World	University	Rankings.		
Available	from:	https://www.timeshighereducation.com/features/black-and-
ethnic-minorities-still-have-mountains-to-climb-in-higher-education	[Accessed	
on	11/12/2015	@	01.36	a.m.].			
	
Guardian	(2014)	Guardian	University	League	Tables	2014.		Available	from:	
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0Aq73qj3QslDedHFNdUsxOVZ
QZ1dmbXNrYlZGUWgwdHc&usp=sharing#gid=0	[Accessed	on	16/02/2014	@	
19.20	p.m.].	
	
Guardian	(2016)	‘”Bananagate”	highlights	racism	among	Warwick	students’.	
Guardian	Online.		Available	from:	
http://www.theguardian.com/education/2016/apr/08/bananagate-highlights-
racism-among-warwick-students	[Accessed	on	20/04/2016	@	7.45	p.m.].	
	
Gunaratnam,	Yasmin	(2003)	Researching	“Race”	and	Ethnicity:	Methods,	
knowledge	and	power.		London:	SAGE	Publications.	
	
Gunter,	Henry	(1954)	A	Man’s	a	Man:	A	study	of	the	colour	bar	in	Birmingham.		
Birmingham:	The	Communist	Party.		
	
Hall,	Stuart	et	al.	(1978)	Policing	the	Crisis:	mugging,	the	State,	and	law	and	
order.		Basingstoke,	Hampshire:	Palgrave	Macmillan.	
	
Hammersley,	Martyn	and	Atkinson,	Paul	(1995)	Ethnography:	Principles	in	
practice	[2nd	ed.].		London:	Routledge.	
	
Hardy,	Jan	and	Vieler-Porter	(1992)	‘Race,	schooling	and	the	1988	Education	
Reform	Act’.		In	Dawn	Gill,	Barbara	Mayor	and	Maud	Blair	[eds.]	Racism	and	
Education:	structures	and	strategies.		London:	SAGE	Publications	Ltd:	101-114.	
	
Harris,	Clive	[ed.]	(2008)	Three	Continents,	One	History.		Birmingham:	Afro-
Caribbean	Millennium	Centre.	
	
Havergal,	Chris	(2015)	‘Russell	Group	“pulls	further	away”	in	funding	race’.		
Times	Higher	Education	World	University	Rankings.		Available	from:	
https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/russell-group-pulls-further-
away-in-funding-race	[Accessed	on	11/12/2015	@	01.14	a.m.].	
	
Hayton,	Annette	and	Paczuska,	Anna	(2002)	Access,	Participation	and	Higher	
Education.		London:	Kogan	Page	Ltd.	
	
Health	and	Safety	Executive	[HSE]	(2011)	Manual	Handling	at	Work:	A	brief	
guide.		Available	from:	http://www.hse.gov.uk/pUbns/indg143.pdf	[Accessed	
on	20/03/2015	@	3.47	p.m.].	
	
	 401	
Heath,	Anthony	and	Cheung,	Sin	Yi	(2006)	Ethnic	Penalties	in	the	Labour	
Market:	Employers	and	discrimination.		Norwich:	HMSO.	
	
Heath,	Anthony	and	Cheung,	Sin	Ye	(2007)	‘Nice	work	if	you	can	get	it:	Ethnic	
penalties	in	Great	Britain’.		In	Anthony	Heath	and	Sin	Ye	Cheung	Unequal	
Chances:	Ethnic	Minorities	in	Western	Labour	Markets.		London:	The	British	
Academy.	
	
Henderson,	Jeff	and	Karn,	Valerie	(1984)	‘Race,	class	and	the	allocation	of	
public	housing	in	Britain’.		Urban	Studies.	21	(1):	115-128.	
	
Hick,	Rod	(2015)	‘Three	perspectives	on	the	mismatch	between	measures	of	
material	poverty’.		British	Journal	of	Sociology.		66	(1):	163-172.	
	
Higher	Education	Funding	Council	for	England	[HEFCE]	(2014)	‘New	HEFCE	
analysis	shows	significant	link	between	factors	such	as	ethnicity,	gender	and	
school	type	on	achievement	in	higher	education’.		HEFCE.		27	March.		Available	
from:	http://www.hefce.ac.uk/news/newsarchive/2014/news86856.html	
[Accessed	on	16/04/2010	@	4.45	p.m.].		
	
Hill,	Amelia	and	Adams,	Richard	(2015)	‘Cost	of	childcare	so	high	that	it	does	
not	pay	UK	families	to	work’.		Guardian	Online.		Available	from:	
http://www.theguardian.com/money/2015/feb/19/cost-childcare-high-uk-
families-work-family-childcare-trust-nursery	[Accessed	on	19/02/2015	@	11.45	
a.m.].		
	
Hill,	Michael	(1996)	Social	Policy:	A	comparative	analysis.		Hertfordshire:	
Prentice	Hall/Harvester	Wheatsheaf.	
	
HM	Government	(1988)	The	Education	Reform	Act	1988.		Available	from:	
http://www.educationengland.org.uk/documents/acts/1988-education-
reform-act.pdf	[Accessed	on	17/10/2013	@	10.47	p.m.].	
		
HM	Government	(2001)	Special	Education	Needs	and	Disability	Act	2001.		
Available	from:	
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/10/pdfs/ukpga_20010010_en.pdf	
[Accessed	on	12/03/2010	@	11.40	a.m.].	
	
HM	Government	(2006)	Safeguarding	Vulnerable	Groups	Act	2006.		Available	
from:	
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/47/pdfs/ukpga_20060047_en.pdf#
page=2&zoom=auto,-65,752	[Accessed	on	27/05/2011	@	3.42	p.m.].	
	
HM	Government	(2010)	The	Equality	Act	2010.		Available	from:	
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/pdfs/ukpga_20100015_en.pdf	
[Accessed	on	16/11/2014	@	22.50	p.m.].	
	
	 402	
HM	Government	(2011)	Prevent	Strategy.		Available	from:	
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/f
ile/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf	[Accessed	on	3/09/2013	@	2.42	p.m.].	
	
Hobsbawm,	Eric	J.	(1969)	Industry	and	Empire.		London:	Penguin	Books.	
	
Hochschild,	Arlie	(2003)	The	Managed	Heart:	The	commercialization	of	human	
feeling.		California:	University	of	California	Press.	
	
Home	Office	(2013)	Anti-Social	Behaviour,	Crime	and	Policing	Bill	Fact	Sheet:	
Dispersal	powers	(Part	3).		Available	from:	
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/f
ile/202891/Fact_sheet_Police_Powers.pdf	[Accessed	on	27/07/2105	@	1.10	
p.m.].	
	
House	of	Commons	Public	Accounts	Committee	(2009)	Widening	Participation	
in	Higher	Education:	Fourth	report	of	session	2008-09.		London:	The	Stationery	
Office	Limited.	
	
I,	Too,	am	Oxford	(2014)	Available	from:	http://itooamoxford.tumblr.com/	
[Accessed	on	28/08/2014	@	111.40	p.m.].	
	
Ikuenobe,	Polycarp	(2013)	‘Conceptualizing	and	theorizing	about	the	idea	of	a	
“post-racial”	era’.		Journal	for	the	Theory	of	Social	Behaviour.		43	(4):	446-468.	
	
Independent	(2011)	‘The	2011	riots:	What	happened?		What	now’?		The	
Independent.		Available	from:	
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/the-2011-riots-what-
happened-what-now-2337267.html	[Accessed	on	11/10/2011]	at	6.45	a.m.].	
	
Independent	Safeguarding	Authority	[ISA]	(2014)	The	Safeguarding	Vulnerable	
Groups	Act	2006:	Factsheet.		Available	from	
www.coventry.gov.uk/.../safeguarding_vulnerable_groups_act_2006_fa...	
[Accessed	on	07/01/2014	@	1.15	p.m.].	
	
Isichei,	E	(1977)	The	History	of	West	Africa	since	1800.		London:	Macmillan	
Education	Limited.	
	
Islam,	Naheed	(2000)	‘Research	as	an	act	of	betrayal:	Researching	race	in	an	
Asian	community	in	Los	Angeles’.		In	Frances	Winddance	Twine	and	Jonathan	
W.	Warren	[eds.]	Racing	Research,	Researching	Race:	Methodological	
dilemmas	in	critical	race	studies.		New	York:	New	York	University	Press:	35-66.	
	
Jeffries,	Stuart	(2014)	‘Britain’s	most	racist	election:	The	story	of	Smethwick,	50	
years	on’.		Guardian	Online.		Available	from:	
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/15/britains-most-racist-
election-smethwick-50-years-on	[Accessed	on	03/10/2015	@	1.12	p.m.].	
	 403	
John,	Augustine	(1970)	Race	in	the	Inner-city:	A	study	of	young	people	in	
Handsworth,	Birmingham.		London:	Runnymede	Trust.	
	
Jones,	Philip	N.	(1976)	‘Coloured	minorities	in	Birmingham,	England’.		Annals	of	
the	Association	of	American	Geographers.		66	(1):	89-103.	
	
Karenga,	Maulana	(2008)	The	Official	Kwanzaa	Website.		Available	from:	
http://www.officialkwanzaawebsite.org/index.shtml	[Accessed	on	27/10/2014	
@	1.15	p.m.].	
	
Khan,	Shamus	and	Jerolmack,	Colin	(2013)	‘Saying	meritocracy	and	doing	
privilege’.		Sociological	Quarterly.		54	(3):	9-19.	
	
Kiely,	Aaron	(2014)	‘Why	are	Britain’s	universities	still	failing	black	and	Asian	
students’?		Guardian	Online.		Available	from:	
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/28/britains-
universities-still-failing-black-asian-students	[Accessed	on	29/03/2014	@	13.30	
p.m.].	
	
King	Solomon	International	Business	School	[KSIBS]	(2016)	KSIBS	Website.		
Available	at:	http://kingsolomonibs.com/	[Accessed	on	02/02/2016	@	09.17	
a.m.].	
	
KPMG	(2012)	Pre-Grant	Due	Diligence	Guidance.		Available	from:	
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/f
ile/214019/Pre-grant-due-diligence-guidance.pdf	[Accessed	on	24/10/2014	@	
4.40	p.m.].	
	
Lazarus,	Neil	(2011)	‘What	postcolonial	theory	doesn’t	say’.		Race	and	Class.		53	
(1):	2-26.	
	
Learning	Skills	Council	(2001)	Equality	and	Diversity	Impact	Measures:	Equality	
and	diversity	guidance	2001/02.		Available	from:	
http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/5042/1/equality-and-diversity-guidance-01-2002-
equality-and-diversity-impact-measures.pdf	[Accessed	on	28/12/2013	@	13.55	
p.m.].	
	
Learning	Skills	Council	(2002)	National	Equality	and	Diversity	Strategy:	
Widening	participation	and	promoting	inclusion,	2001-2004.		Available	from:	
http://readingroom.lsc.gov.uk/pre2005/internaladmin/equalitydiversity/natio
nal-equality-and-diversity-strategy.pdf	[Accessed	on	28/12/2013	@	13.55	
p.m.].		
	
Le	Marie,	Nicole	(2014)	‘Degrees:	Pay	more,	earn	less’.		Metro,	14	April:	1.	
	
Lentin,	Alana	(2008)	Racism.		Oxford:	Oneworld	Publications.	
	
	 404	
Levitas,	Ruth	(1998)	The	Inclusive	Society?	Social	exclusion	and	New	Labour.		
Basingstoke,	Hampshire:	Palgrave	Macmillan.	
	
Macpherson,	William	Sir	(1999)	The	Stephen	Lawrence	Inquiry:	Report	of	an	
inquiry	by	Sir	William	Macpherson	of	Cluny.		Available	from:	
http://www.archive.official-
documents.co.uk/document/cm42/4262/4262.htm	[Accessed	on	06/11/2012	
@	5.54	p.m.].	
	
Macrofox.	Com	(2015)	available	from:	
www.macrofox.com/eng/d//saving/saving.htm	[Accessed	on	15/10/2015	@	
16.05	p.m.].	
	
Mamon,	S.	(2004)	‘Mapping	the	attainment	of	black	children	in	Britain’.			Race	
and	Class.		46	(2):	78-91.	
	
Marx,	K.	(1995,	[1867])	Capital:	A	new	abridgement.		Oxford:	Oxford	University	
Press.	
	
Mason,	D.	(2000)	Race	and	Ethnicity	in	Modern	Britain.		Oxford:	Oxford	
University	Press.	
	
May,	Roy	and	Cohen,	Robin	(1974)	‘The	interaction	between	race	and	
colonialism:	A	case	study	of	the	Liverpool	race	riots	of	1919’.		Race	and	Class.		
xvi	(2):		111-126.	
	
May,	Tim	(2001)	Social	Research:	Issues,	methods	and	process	[3rd	ed].		
Buckingham:	Open	University	Press.			
	
McCarthy,	Nick	(2014)	‘Birmingham	rioters	who	fired	on	police	and	force	
helicopter	lose	appeal’.		Birmingham	Mail.		Available	from:	
http://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/birmingham-rioters-who-fired-
police-6535190		[Accessed	on	18/09/2014	@	09.30	a.m.].		
	
McKenley,	Jan	(2001)	‘The	way	we	were:	Conspiracies	of	silence	in	the	wake	of	
the	Empire	Windrush’.		Race,	Ethnicity	and	Education.		4	(4):	309-328.	
	
McLellan,	David	[ed.]	(1999)	Karl	Marx,	Capital:	A	new	abridgement.		Oxford:	
Oxford	University	Press.	
	
Metro	(2007)	‘Experts	to	meet	for	gun	crime	talks’.		Available	from:	
http://metro.co.uk/2007/02/19/experts-to-meet-for-gun-crime-talks-89565/	
[Accessed	on	26/07/2014	@	10.05	a.m.].	
	
Midland	News	(1965)	‘Smethwick	Race	Riots’?		Available	from	Birmingham	
Central	Library	Archives:		MS2141/7/12.	
	
	 405	
Miles,	R.	(1990)	‘The	racialization	of	British	politics’.		Political	Studies.		38:	277-
285.	
	
Miles,	R.	(1993)	Racism	after	“Race	Relations”.		London:	Routledge.	
	
Mirza,	Heidi	Safia	(2006)	‘Race,	gender	and	educational	desire’.		Race,	Ethnicity	
and	Education.		9	(2):	137-158.		
	
Mirza,	Heidi	Safia	(2007)	‘The	more	things	change	the	more	they	remain	the	
same’.		In	Brian	Richardson	[ed.]	Tell	it	Like	it	is:	How	our	schools	fail	black	
children.		Sterling,	Virginia:	Stylus	Publishing:	1-9.	
	
Mirza,	Heidi	Safia	(2015)	‘Harvesting	our	collective	intelligence:	Black	British	
feminism	in	post-race	times’.		Women’s	Studies	International	Forum.		51:	1-9.	
	
Modood,	T.	and	Berthoud,	R.	[eds.]	(1997)	Ethnic	Minorities	in	Britain:	Diversity	
and	disadvantage.	London:	Policy	Studies	Institute.	
	
Modood,	Tariq	(2013)	Multiculturalism:	A	civic	idea	[2nd	ed].	Cambridge:	Polity	
Press.	
	
Morrison,	Ken	(1995)	Marx,	Durkheim,	Weber:	Formations	of	modern	social	
thought.		London:	SAGE	Publications.	
	
Municipal	Dreams	(2015)	Post-war	High-Rises	in	Birmingham:	“Saucer	city”.		
Available	from:	
https://municipaldreams.wordpress.com/2015/05/19/saucer_city/	[Accessed	
on	17/04/2015	@	6.47	p.m.].	
	
NatCen	Social	Research	(2014)	30	Years	of	British	Social	Attitudes:	Self-
reported	racial	prejudice	data.		Available	from:	
http://www.natcen.ac.uk/media/338770/selfreported-racial-prejudice-
datafinal.pdf		[Accessed	on	28/05/2014	@	18.05	p.m.].	
	
Neal,	Sarah	(2002)	‘Rural	landscapes,	representations	and	racism:	examining	
multicultural	citizenship	and	policy-making	in	the	English	countryside’.		Ethnic	
and	Racial	Studies.		25	(3):	442-461.	
	
New	Testament	Church	of	God	[NTCG],	The	Rock	(2011a)	‘Why	young	people	
riot:	Part	1’.		YouTube.		Available	from:	
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LWHO6Fd1BQc	[Accessed	on	
12/03/2014@	11.42	p.m.].	
	
New	Testament	Church	of	God	[NTCG],	The	Rock	(2011b)	‘Why	young	people	
riot:	Part	2’.		YouTube.		Available	from:	
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KAeXEx4BWrc	[Accessed	on	13/03/2014	
@	12.01	a.m.].	
	 406	
New	Testament	Church	of	God	[NTCG],	The	Rock	(2011c)	‘Why	young	people	
riot:	Part	3’.		YouTube.		Available	from:	
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QCa7vqr6Ccg	[Accessed	on	13/03/2014	
@	12.20	a.m.].	
	
Noden,	Phillip;	Shiner,	Michael	and	Modood,	Tariq	(2014)	Black	Minority	and	
Ethnic	Access	to	Education:	A	reassessment.		Available	from:	
http://www.lse.ac.uk/newsAndMedia/PDF/NuffieldBriefing.pdf		[Accessed	on	
08/08/2014	@	08.56	p.m.].	
	
Nosek,	Kathleen	(1997)	Dyslexia	in	Adults:	Taking	charge	of	your	life.		Dallas,	
Texas:	Taylor	Publishing	Company.	
	
Office	for	National	Statistics	[ONS]	(2001)	2001	Census:	Aggregate	data	
(England	and	Wales)	[computer	file].		UK	Data	Service	Census	Support.		
Downloaded	from:	http://infuse.mimas.ac.uk		[Accessed	on	02/02/2014	@	
18.00].	
	
Office	for	National	Statistics	[ONS]	(2010a)	Standard	Occupational	
Classification	2010	Volume	3:	The	national	statistics	socio-economic	
classification	(rebased	on	the	SOC2010)	user	manual.		Hampshire:	Palgrave	
Macmillan.	
	
Office	for	National	Statistics	(2010b)	Standard	Occupational	Classification	
2010:	Volume	1:	Structure	and	description	of	unit	groups.		Hampshire:	Palgrave	
and	Macmillan.	
	
Office	for	National	Statistics	[ONS]	(2011)	Census:	Aggregate	data	(England	and	
Wales)	[computer	file].		UK	Data	Service	Census	Support.		Downloaded	from:	
http://infuse.mimas.ac.uk	[Accessed	on	02/02/2014	@	18.15].	
	
Office	for	National	Statistics	[ONS]	(2014)	2011	Census	Analysis:	What	does	the	
2011	Census	tell	Us	about	inter-ethnic	relationships?		Available	from:	
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandma
rriages/marriagecohabitationandcivilpartnerships/articles/whatdoesthe2011ce
nsustellusaboutinterethnicrelationships/2014-07-03	[Accessed	on	17/03/2016	
@	5.40	p.m.].	
	
Office	for	National	Statistics	[ONS]	(2015)	SOC2010	Volume	3:	The	national	
statistics	socio-economic	classification	(NS-SEC	rebased	on	the	SOC2010).		
Available	from:	http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-
method/classifications/current-standard-classifications/soc2010/soc2010-
volume-3-ns-sec--rebased-on-soc2010--user-manual/index.html#1	[Accessed	
on	20/01/2015	@	6.40	p.m.].	
	
	
	 407	
Ofsted	(2013)	Inspection	and	Health	and	Safety:	Learning	and	skills	inspections.		
Available	from:	
https://sip.derby.gov.uk/media/schoolsinformationportal/contentassets/docu
ments/educationfor14-19/ofsted%20and%20health%20and%20safety.pdf	
[Accessed	on	20/06/2014	@	6.57	p.m.].	
	
Owen,	David	(1995)	Measuring	the	Caribbean	Population	of	Great	Britain.		
University	of	Warwick:		National	Ethnic	Minority	Data	Archive,	Centre	for	
Research	in	Ethnic	Relations.		Working	Paper:	W1/95.	
	
Owen,	David	and	Johnson,	Mark	(1996)	‘Ethnic	minorities	in	the	Midlands’.		In	
Peter	Ratcliffe	[ed.]		Ethnicity	in	the	1991	Census,	Volume	Three:	Social	
geography	and	ethnicity	in	Britain:	Geographical	spread,	spatial	concentration	
and	internal	migration.		London:	HMSO:	227-270.		
	
Padley,	Matt;	Valadez,	Laura	and	Hirsch,	Donald	(2015)	Households	Below	a	
Minimum	Income	Standard.		Available	from:	
http://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/files/jrf/Households-below-MIS-Full.pdf	[Accessed	
on	02/02/2015	@	7.56	p.m.].	
	
Palmer,	Alasdair	(2009)	‘The	Michael	Powell	case	shows	how	charges	of	racism	
hobble	the	police’.		Telegraph.		Available	from:	
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/6845767/The-Michael-
Powell-case-shows-how-charges-of-racism-hobble-the-police.html	[Accessed	
on	02/08/2014	@	1.33	p.m.].		
	
Parekh,	Bhikhu	(1992)	‘The	hermeneutics	of	the	Swann	Report’.		In	Dawn	Gill,	
Barbara	Mayor	and	Maud	Blair	[eds.]	Racism	and	Education:	structures	and	
strategies.		London:	SAGE	Publications	Ltd:	92-100.			
	
Parekh	et	al.	(2002)	The	Future	of	Multi-Ethnic	Britain:	The	Parekh	report.		
London:	Profile	Books.	
	
Park,	Robert	E.	(1924)	‘The	Concept	of	Social	Distance:	As	applied	to	the	study	
of	racial	attitudes	and	racial	relations’.		Journal	of	Applied	Sociology.			8	(6):	
339-344.	
	
Peach,	Ceri	(1968)	West	Indian	Migration	to	Britain:	A	social	geography.		
London:		Oxford	University	Press.	
	
Peach,	Ceri	and	Rossiter,	David	(1996)	‘Level	and	nature	of	spatial	
concentration	and	segregation	of	minority	ethnic	populations	in	Great	Britain,	
1991’.		In	Peter	Ratcliffe	[ed.]		Ethnicity	in	the	1991	Census,	Volume	Three:	
Social	geography	and	ethnicity	in	Britain:	Geographical	spread,	spatial	
concentration	and	internal	migration.		London:	HMSO:	111-134.		
	
	 408	
Pears,	Elizabeth	(2013)	‘Is	race	equality	being	taken	off	the	political	agenda’?		
The	Voice	Online.		Available	from:	http://www.voice-online.co.uk/article/race-
equality-being-taken-political-agenda	[Accessed	on	17/05/2015].	
	
Phizacklea,	A.	and	Miles,	R.	(1980)	Labour	and	Racism.		London:	Routledge	&	
Kegan	Paul.	
	
Pilkington,	A.	(2003)	Racial	Disadvantage	and	Ethnic	Diversity	in	Britain.		
Basingstoke,	Hampshire	UK:	Palgrave	Macmillan.	
	
Platt,	Lucinda	(2011)	Inequality	Within	Ethnic	Groups.		York:	Joseph	Rowntree	
Foundation.	
	
Plowden,	Bridget	Lady	(1967)	Children	and	Their	Primary	Schools:	A	report	of	
the	Central	Advisory	Council	for	Education	in	England.		London:	HMSO.	
	
Public	Record	Office	(2008):	Catalogue	Reference:	PRO/CO1034/20.	
	
Ratcliffe,	Peter	(1981)	Racism	and	Reaction.		London:		Routledge	&	Kegan	Paul.	
	
Ratcliffe,	Peter	(1996)	‘Social	geography	and	ethnicity:	A	theoretical,	
conceptual	and	substantive	overview’.		In	Peter	Ratcliffe	[ed.]		Ethnicity	in	the	
1991	Census,	Volume	Three:	Social	geography	and	ethnicity	in	Britain:	
Geographical	spread,	spatial	concentration	and	internal	migration.		London:	
HMSO:	1-111.		
	
Ratcliffe,	Peter	(2004)	“Race”,	Ethnicity	and	Difference:	Imagining	the	inclusive	
society.		Berkshire,	England:	Open	University	Press.	
	
Ratcliffe,	P.	(2012)	‘"Community	cohesion”:	Reflections	on	a	flawed	paradigm’.		
Critical	Social	Policy.		0(0):	1-20.	
	
Ratcliffe,	Peter	(2013)	‘“Ethnic	group”,	the	State	and	the	politics	of	
representation’.		Journal	of	Intercultural	Studies.		34	(4):	303-320.	
	
Ratcliffe,	Peter	(2015)	‘Neoliberalism	and	the	demise	of	equality’.		[To	Be	
published]	
	
Restivo,	Sal	(1983)	‘The	myth	of	the	Kuhnian	revolution’.		Sociological	Theory.	
1:	293-305.	
	
Revesv,	Rachael	(2016)	‘The	sectors	with	the	largest	gender	pay	gaps	revealed’.		
Independent.		Available	from:	http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/the-
sectors-with-the-largest-gender-pay-gaps-revealed-a6821911.html	[Accessed	
on	13/02/2016	@	01.50	a.m.].	
	
	 409	
Rex,	J.	and	Moore,	R.	(1967).	Race,	Community	&	Conflict.		London:	Open	
University	Press.	
	
Rex,	J.	and	Tomlinson,	S.	(1979)	Colonial	Immigrants	in	a	British	City.		London:		
Routledge	&	Kegan	Paul.	
	
Reynolds,	Tracey	(2006)	‘Caribbean	families,	social	capital	and	young	people’s	
diasporic	identities’.		Ethnic	and	Racial	Studies.		29	(6):	1087-1103.	
	
Rhamie,	J.	and	Hallam,	S.	(2002)	‘An	investigation	into	African-Caribbean	
academic	success	in	the	UK’.		Race,	Ethnicity	and	Education.		5	(2):	151-170.	
	
Richardson,	David	(1992)	Transatlantic	Slavery:		Against	human	dignity.		
London	HMSO.	
	
Richardson,	Diane	and	Monro,	Surya	(2012)	Sexuality,	Equality	and	Diversity.		
Basingstoke,	Hampshire:	Palgrave	Macmillan.	
	
Roberts,	G.W.	and	Mills,	D.O.	(1955)	Unemployment	and	Other	Factors	
Affecting	Emigration	to	the	United	Kingdom.		Public	Records	Office,	Home	
Office.	Catalogue	Reference:	PRO/CO1034/20.		Available	from:	
www.movinghere.org.uk	[Accessed	on	17/08/2008].		
	
Robinson,	Martin	(2015)	‘Pupils	at	Trojan	Horse	school	“were	forced	to	pray	
instead	of	playing	football	and	taught	that	Christians	and	Jews	were	ignorant”’.		
Mail	Online.		Available	from:	http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
3326846/Pupils-Trojan-Horse-school-forced-pray-instead-playing-football-
taught-Christians-Jews-ignorant.html	[Accessed	on	07/01/2016	@	6.45	p.m.].		
	
Rogozinski,	Jan	(1999)	A	Brief	History	of	the	Caribbean.	New	York:	Facts	On	
File,	Inc.	
	
Rose,	David	(1995)	‘Official	social	classifications	in	the	UK’.		Social	Research	
Update:	Available	from:	http://sru.soc.surrey.ac.uk/SRU9.html	[Accessed	on	
18/04/2011	@	1.57	p.m.].	
	
Rose,	David	and	Pevalin,	David	(2001)	The	National	Statistics	Socio-economic	
Classification:	Unifying	official	and	sociological	approaches	to	the	
conceptualisation	and	measurement	of	social	class.		Institute	for	Social	and	
Economic	Research:	University	of	Essex:	ISER	Working	Papers	no.	2001-4.		
	
Rose,	David	and	Pevalin,	David	(2010)	Re-basing	the	NS-SEC	on	SOC2010:	A	
report	to	ONS.		Colchester:	University	of	Essex.	
	
Savage,	Mike	et	al.	(2013)	‘A	new	model	of	social	class?	Findings	from	the	
BBC’s	Great	British	Class	Survey	Experiment’.		Sociology.		47	(2):	219-250.	
	
	 410	
Schensul,	Jean	J.	et	al.	(1999)	Enhanced	Ethnographic	Methods.		Walnut	Creek,	
California:	AltaMira	Press.		
	
Searle,	Kevin	(2013)	‘“Mixing	of	the	unmixables”:	The	Causeway	Green	riots	in	
Birmingham’.		Race	and	Class.		54	(3):	44-64.	
	
Sellgren,	Katherine	(2014)	‘Fewer	university	offers	for	minority	groups’.		BBC	
News.		Available	from:	http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-28424556	
[Accessed	on	26/07/2014	@	14.10	p.m.].	
	
Shiner,	Michael	and	Modood,	Tariq	(2002)	‘Help	or	hindrance:	Higher	
education	and	the	route	to	ethnic	equality’.		British	Journal	of	Sociology	of	
Education.		23	(2):	209-232.	
	
Shiner,	Michael	and	Noden,	Philip	(2014)	‘”Why	are	you	applying	there?”:	
“Race,”	class	and	the	construction	of	higher	education	“choice”	in	the	United	
Kingdom’.		British	Journal	of	Sociology	of	Education.		:1-22.	
	
Shukra,	Kalbir	et	al.	(2004)	‘“Black	politics	and	the	web	of	joined-up	
governance”:	Compromise,	ethnic	minority	mobilisation	and	the	transitional	
public	sphere’.		Social	Movement	Studies.		3(1):	31-50.	
	
Sivanandan,	A.	(1981)	‘From	resistance	to	rebellion:		Asian	and	Afro-Caribbean	
struggles	in	Britain’.		Race	and	Class.		23(2-3):	111-152.	
	
Sivanandan,	A.	(1982)	A	Different	Kind	of	Hunger:	Writings	on	black	resistance.		
London:	Pluto	Press.		
	
Sivanandan,	A.	(2013)	‘The	market	State	vs.	the	good	society’.		Race	and	Class.	
54	(3):	1-9.					
	
Skellington,	Richard	(1996)	“Race”	in	Britain	Today	[2nd	ed.].		London:	SAGE	
Publications	Ltd.	
	
Smith,	Herman	W.	(1991)	Strategies	of	Social	Research	[3rd	ed.].		Fort	Worth,	
Texas:	Holt,	Rinehart	and	Winston	Inc.	
	
Smith,	Ken	(2007)	‘Operationalising	Max	Weber’s	probability	concept	of	class	
situation:	The	concept	of	social	class’.		British	Journal	of	Sociology.		58	(1):	87-
104.	
	
Social	Research	Association	(SRA)	(2003)	Social	Research	Association	Ethical	
Guidelines.		London:	Social	Research	Association.	
	
Solomos,	J.	(2003)	Race	and	Racism	in	Britain.		Basingstoke,	Hampshire	UK:		
Palgrave	Macmillan.	
	
	 411	
Spicker,	Paul	(1999)	The	International	Glossary	on	Poverty.		London:	Zed	
Books.	
	
Standing,	Guy	(2011)	The	Precariat:	The	new	dangerous	class.		London:	
Bloomsbury	Academic.	
	
Stephens,	Leslie	(1956)	Employment	of	Coloured	Workers	in	the	Birmingham	
Area:	Occasional	Papers	No.10.		London:	Institute	of	Personnel	Management.	
	
Sterling,	Louis	(1995)	‘Partners:	The	social	organisation	of	rotating	savings	and	
credit	societies	amongst	exilic	Jamaicans’.		Sociology.		29	(4):	653-666.	
	
Strand,	S.	(2008)	Minority	Ethnic	Pupils	in	the	Longitudinal	Study	of	Young	
People	in	England:	Extension	report	on	performance	in	public	examination	at	
age	16.	London:	Department	for	Children,	Schools	and	Families	(DfCSF).	
	
Street,	Joe	(2008)	‘Malcolm	X,	Smethwick,	and	the	influence	of	the	African	
American	freedom	struggle	on	British	race	relations	in	the	1960s’.		Journal	of	
Black	Studies.		38	(6):	932-950.	
	
Studio	Schools	Trust	(2011)	What	is	a	Studio	School?		Available	from:	
http://www.studioschoolstrust.org/node/3	[Accessed	on	04/11/2014	@	12.29	
a.m.].	
	
Sveinsson,	Kjartan	Pall	[ed.]	(2012)	Criminal	Justice	v.	Race	Justice:	Minority	
ethnic	overrepresentation	in	the	criminal	justice	system.		London:	Runnymede.	
	
Swann,	Michael	Lord	(1985)	The	Swann	Report:	Education	for	all.		Available	
from:	
http://www.educationengland.org.uk/documents/swann/swann1985.html	
[Accessed	on	17/08/2012	@	4.47	p.m.].		
	
Tackey,	Nii	Djan;	Barnes,	Helen	and	Khambhaita,	Priya	(2011)	Poverty,	Ethnicity	
and	Education.		York:	Joseph	Rowntree	Foundation.		
	
Taylor,	Monica	J.	(1986)	‘Education	for	all:	Some	ethical	dimensions	of	the	
Swann	Report’.		Journal	of	Moral	Education.		15	(1):	68-80.	
	
Taylor,	Simon	(1993)	A	Land	of	Dreams:	A	Study	of	Jewish	and	Caribbean	
migrant	communities	in	England.		London:	Routledge.	
	
Teaching	and	Learning	Research	Programme	[TLRP]	(2008)	Widening	
Participation	in	Higher	Education.		Available	from:	
http://www.tlrp.org/pub/documents/HEcomm.pdf		[Accessed	on	25/05/2014	
@	17.45	p.m.].	
	
	 412	
Troyna,	Barry	(1984)	‘Fact	or	artefact:	The	“educational	underachievement”	of	
black	pupils’.		British	Journal	of	Sociology	of	Education.		5	(2):	153-166.					
	
Troyna,	Barry	and	Carrington,	Bruce	(1990)	Education,	Racism	and	Reform.		
London:	Routledge.	
	
Troyna,	Barry	(1992)	‘Can	you	see	the	join?		An	historical	analysis	of	
multicultural	and	antiracist	education	policies’.		In	Dawn	Gill,	Barbara	Mayor	
and	Maud	Blair	[eds.]	Racism	and	Education:	Structures	and	strategies.		
London:	SAGE	Publications	Ltd:	63-91.	
	
UCL	(2015)	Legacies	of	British	Slave	Ownership.		Available	from:	
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/		
	
United	Kingdom	Public	General	Acts	[UKPGA]	(1992)	The	Further	and	Higher	
Education	Act.		Available	from:	
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1992/13/pdfs/ukpga_19920013_en.pdf		
[Accessed	on	03/01/2013	@	8.35	a.m.].	
	
United	Kingdom	Public	General	Acts	[UKPGA]	(2010)	Academies	Act	2010.		
Available	from:	
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/32/pdfs/ukpga_20100032_en.pdf	
[Accessed	on	31/10/2104	@	16.20	p.m.].	
	
United	Kingdom	Public	General	Acts	[UKPGA]	(2014)	The	Equality	Act	2010	
Chapter	15.		Available	from:	
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/pdfs/ukpga_20100015_en.pdf		
[Accessed	on	07/01/2014	@	10.35	a.m.].	
	
UK	Data	Services	(2015)	UK	Data	Archive	Study	Number	5850	-	Deprivation	
Scores	Based	on	1991	and	2001	Census	Area	Statistics.		Available	from:	
http://doc.ukdataservice.ac.uk/doc/5850/mrdoc/pdf/5850_1991-doe-jarman-
carstairs-townsend-wards-methodology.pdf	[Accessed	on	03/01/2015	@	8.47	
am.].	
	
Unison	(2016)	‘Opposition	to	government’s	forced	academy	policy	increases’.		
Unison:	The	Public	Service	Union.		Available	from:	
https://www.unison.org.uk/news/article/2016/03/opposition-to-forced-
academisation-increases/	[Accessed	on	17/04/2016].		
	
Universities	UK	(2013)	Where	Student	Fees	Go.		Available	from:	
http://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/highereducation/Documents/2013/WhereStu
dentFeesGo.pdf		[Accessed	on	21/05/2013	@	23.15	p.m.].	
	
US	Department	of	State,	Office	of	the	Historian	(2012)	Milestones:	1945-1952.		
Available	from:	http://history.State.gov/milestones/1945-
1952/ImmigrationAct	[Accessed	on	16/08/2012	@	09.25	a.m.].	
	 413	
	
Van	Cleve,	George	(2006)	‘Somerset’s	Case	and	its	antecedents	in	imperial	
perspective’.		Law	and	History	Review.		24	(3):	601-645.	
	
Venkatesh,	Sudhir	A.	(2013)	‘The	reflexive	turn:	The	rise	of	first-person	
ethnography’.		Sociological	Quarterly.		54	(3):	3-8.	
Vincent,	Carol	et	al.	(2012)	‘Intersectional	work	and	precarious	positionings:	
Black	middle-class	parents	and	their	encounters	with	schools	in	England’.		
International	Studies	in	the	Sociology	of	Education.		22	(3):	259-276.	
	
Wadsworth,	Marc	(2012)	‘Media	coverage	of	2011	riots	“was	disgraceful”’.		
Voice	Online.		Available	from:	http://www.voice-online.co.uk/article/media-
coverage-2011-riots-was-disgraceful		[Accessed	on	12/12	2012	@	6.57	p.m.].		
	
Walvin,	James	(2001)	Black	Ivory:	Slavery	in	the	British	empire	[2nd	ed.].		
Oxford:	Blackwell	Publishers.	
	
Waters,	Malcolm	(1994)	‘Succession	in	the	stratification	system:	A	contribution	
to	the	“death	of	class”	debate’.		International	Sociology.		9	(3):	295-312.	
	
Which?	University	(2014)	What	is	the	Russell	Group?		Available	from:	
http://university.which.co.uk/advice/what-is-the-russell-group	[Accessed	on	
16/02/2014	@	19.05	p.m.].	
	
Wilcox,	Steve	(2014)	Housing	Benefit	Size	Criteria:	Impacts	for	social	sector	
tenants	and	options	for	reform.		York:	Joseph	Rowntree	Foundation.	
	
Williams,	Eric	(2005,	[1944])	Capitalism	and	Slavery.		Kingston,	Jamaica:	Ian	
Randle	Publishers.	
	
Young,	Alfred	A.	(2013)	‘Uncovering	the	hidden	“I”	in	contemporary	urban	
ethnography’.		Sociological	Quarterly.		54	(3):	51-65.			
	
	
	
